by admin » Sat Nov 21, 2015 12:36 am
Mr. Hodes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, as I understand it, there have been at least six different investigations into this matter. It appears that each of those investigations had serious flaws. First there was Captain Scott's investigation, completed within 2 weeks of the incident. Second, Colonel Kauzlarich's investigation -- I don't know whether I have butchered his name -- which was finished on May 16, 2004.
The DOD IG concluded that these two investigations were, "tainted by the failure to preserve evidence, a lack of thoroughness, and the failure to pursue investigative leads.''
Third was an investigation by General Jones completed 6 months later. The IG had similar criticisms of that report.
Fourth, the IG report itself, issued in March of this year. But the IG was unable to determine who doctored key witness statements supporting the Silver Star award.
And fifth, was an Army Criminal Investigation Division investigation finished at the same time as the IG investigation. This report inexplicably concluded there were no rules of engagement violations, even though there was a friendly fire fatality and multiple injuries.
And finally, as of yesterday, General Wallace has completed his investigation. General Wallace's investigation apparently suffered from an overly narrow scope, failing to examine the actions of key military leaders. And we have before us the top military brass involved in these questions at the time: General Brown, General Abizaid, General Myers, and Secretary Rumsfeld.
Now, let's put aside for a moment the merits of each of the individual investigations. Do you all, gentlemen, agree that it should not take six different investigations, 3 years, congressional investigations, and millions of taxpayer dollars to address the significant failures that have occurred in this case?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
General Myers. Agree.
General Brown. Yes, sir.
General Abizaid. Agree.
Mr. Hodes. Secretary Rumsfeld, the approach of ordering a series of military investigations that are limited in scope and that do not address the question of what top officials knew appears to be the Department of Defense's MO when it really doesn't want accountability.
When the allegations of abuse at Abu Ghraib arose in 2004, the Pentagon took the same approach. First, there was the Taguba investigation, limited to the conduct of the military police at Abu Ghraib. Second was the Fay investigation that examined the conduct of the military intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib, but there was no inquiry into the involvement of the civilian leadership. Third was the Army Inspector General's investigation, which focused on interrogation practices in general in Iraq and Afghanistan, without examining the role of top Pentagon leadership. In all there were over a dozen investigations by the Pentagon into detainee abuse issues, but none has resulted in a full understanding of the civilian leadership's involvement in the abuses. None has resulted in a full understanding of your involvement or the involvement of the White House.
Mr. Secretary, do you see the parallels here? Do you see why some would think that in the case of both Abu Ghraib and in the Tillman investigation there were deliberate efforts to avoid accountability? And if you see that, the manner in which this serial kind of narrow investigating, never answering the questions about who at the top knew what is a problem, what do you think ought to be done so that the American people can be assured that the top leadership in this country is accountable, is willing to come forward and tell the truth, and is going to take the actions to reassure the American public that abuses won't happen again?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Congressman, I don't obviously agree with your characterization of the history of this. There was an independent panel that looked at Abu Ghraib at the senior level and issued a report. There is a problem, I don't disagree at all, with the perception that you end up in a situation like the Tillman case, where you have five, six or seven separate investigations. And there are a variety of reasons as to how they got from where they were to where they are today with the most recent Army investigation and announcement.
None of the answers are satisfactory. It is unfortunate. It is harmful. It causes exactly the perception that you are promoting. And it is regrettable.
Mr. Hodes. What should be done about it?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't know. I wish I had some brilliant answers. One of the things I might just mention is that under Goldwater-Nichols, the command responsibility is separated from the organized train-and-equip responsibility. And as a result, you end up with people who are down one of those chains of accountability and responsibility, and some people who are down the opposite chain, the administrative as opposed to the command. However, in the middle at various places, there are individuals who have a hat, if you will, in both of those. And you end up frequently with a long pause as to who should do what, who has the responsibility. Should it go up? Should the court martial or the investigation be done at this level or that level? Should it be done in the administrative chain or the command chain? Obviously, the problems usually happen in the command chain, so there is a tendency to be biased toward that.
On the other hand, you take a man like John Abizaid, who was the combatant commander in that case, he was fighting a war. He was busy. He was traveling all over the world. And there is an attraction to moving the responsibility for such an investigation over to the administrative chain, because those individuals are not engaged in the actual chain of command and wrestling with those problems.
I don't know what the answer is. But I know that there is a tension there that I find confusing as to who is going to take responsibility for it from the bottom up. And you end up -- possibly one of these gentlemen who have lived it can make a better analysis than I have, but I have been concerned about it, and expressed concern about it within the Department, and I think it in some way contributes to the problem that you are talking about.
Mr. Hodes. Thank you. I see my time is up.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time is up, but General Abizaid, did you want to comment on that point?
General Abizaid. Sir, I think it is very important to understand that the way the warfighting system is designed is to keep the operational commanders' hands free with forward- looking battlefield activities and operational decisions. The administrative chain of command in this case, going through the Department of the Army, handles things like notification of families, awards, logistics, etc. And I think it would not be beneficial to try to saddle the combatant commander with all the administrative functions, because it would cause his staff to become too big, too unwieldy, and would frequently cause that person to take their eye off of the immediate actions going on in the battlefield.
And I would like to point out that during this time period, if it had been the only event that was occurring in the theater, it could hardly be understood that the information didn't flow freely. But the battle of Fallujah was taking place around this time, all sorts of various military activities, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, 27 different countries in the region responding to various political-military activities, etc.
It is absolutely essential that we keep track of what is happening in order to make sure that the right resources are applied at the right place and that lives are preserved in the way that we conduct our military operations.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, General. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. I have had my time.
Chairman Waxman. Oh, you have had your time. So the next would be Mr. Davis.