MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: THE TILLMAN AND

Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.

Re: MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: THE TILLMAN

Postby admin » Sat Nov 21, 2015 12:53 am

IX. OTHER CASES BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE’S ATTENTION

The Committee’s investigation has focused on the information the Defense Department provided about the two most famous U.S. soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars: Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch. During the course of the investigation, however, families and friends of soldiers killed or injured in the wars contacted the Committee’s majority staff to recount similar experiences in which the Pentagon provided misleading information about a battlefield casualty.

For example, the family of Specialist Jesse Buryj of Canton, Ohio, who died in Iraq on May 5, 2004, experienced many of the same frustrations as the Tillman family. The Army initially claimed that Specialist Buryj had been killed by the enemy and posthumously awarded him a Bronze Star for his valor while guarding a highway checkpoint.260 Nine months later, after several investigations, the family learned his death was actually a fratricide.261 In July 2004, Specialist Buryj’s parents accepted an invitation to meet President Bush at a campaign rally. They asked him to help them learn the truth about how their son died. According to the family, the President agreed to assist.262 Specialist Buryj’s mother recalled that after the meeting, her case received more attention, but the military still did not provide a satisfactory account of what happened to her son.263 A few months later, a Bush-Cheney campaign official contacted the family. Rather than offer assistance, the official asked Specialist Buryj’s mother to appear in a campaign commercial for the President. Mrs. Buryj refused.264

The Committee’s majority staff was also contacted by the family and friends of Private First Class LaVena Johnson, a weapons supply manager from Florissant, Missouri, who died, family members say, in a suspicious non-combat incident near Balad, Iraq, on July 19, 2005. According to news reports, the Army ruled the death a suicide, and a medical examiner concurred with this finding.265 But Private Johnson’s family believes Army investigators ignored physical evidence inconsistent with a finding of suicide. They also believe that the Army has additional information about the circumstances of Private Johnson’s death that it has not shared with the family.

While the names of these soldiers are not as well-known as Pat Tillman and Jessica Lynch, their sacrifices were just as great and their families are just as deserving of the truth.
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Re: MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: THE TILLMAN

Postby admin » Sat Nov 21, 2015 12:53 am

X. CONCLUSION

The men and women who serve in the military act selflessly and courageously in defending our country and fighting for freedom. They are willing to risk serious injury and even death in fulfilling their responsibilities. And too often their willingness to sacrifice becomes an actual and irreplaceable loss for their families and for our country.

Our nation cannot adequately recognize that service, but we can honor their sacrifice by keeping faith with their trust and dedication.

That starts by making sure our troops never go to battle unless it is absolutely necessary. It also means making sure they have the benefit of the best equipment and intelligence and the best medical care if they are injured.

Our nation also has an inviolate obligation to share truthful information with a soldier’s family and the American people should injury or death occur. As Corporal Tillman’s brother, Kevin, told the Committee:

Pat and these other soldiers volunteered to put their lives on the line for this country. Anything less than the truth is a betrayal of those values that all soldiers who have fought for this nation have sought to uphold.266


That standard was not met in either Corporal Tillman’s or Private Lynch’s cases.

Neither case involved an act of omission. The misinformation was not caused by overlooking or misunderstanding relevant facts. Instead, in both cases affirmative acts created new facts that were significantly different than what the soldiers in the field knew to be true. And in both cases the fictional accounts proved to be compelling public narratives at difficult times in the war.

The fictional version of Private Lynch’s circumstances came when many Americans were first beginning to worry about the direction of the Iraq war. The heroic efforts of Private Lynch became, in the words of one CENTCOM officer, "an awesome story."

Specialist Kevin Tillman told the Committee that he believed the combination of a difficult battle in Fallujah, bad news about the state of the war, and emerging reports about Abu Ghraib prison created a motive to fictionalize the details about his brother’s death. Whether he is correct or not, the public affairs staff of the Army recounted that the death of Corporal Tillman generated the most media coverage of the Army "since the end of active combat" and was "extremely positive in all media."

As the Committee investigated the Tillman and Lynch cases, it encountered a striking lack of recollection. In Private Lynch’s case, Jim Wilkinson, who was the Director for Strategic Communications for the CENTCOM Commander and attended CENTCOM operational briefings, told the Committee he did not know where the false information originated or who disseminated it.

In Corporal Tillman’s case, even after seven Defense Department investigations, no one has been able to identify the person who created the false information about enemy fire. At the top of the chain of command, where the Committee focused its attention, pertinent questions also remain unanswered. The White House was intensely interested in the first reports of Corporal Tillman’s death. On April 23, White House officials sent or received nearly 200 e-mails concerning Corporal Tillman. In contrast, the White House could not produce a single e-mail or document relating to any discussion about Corporal Tillman’s death by friendly fire. Not a single written communication about the personal reactions or the substantive, political, and public relations implications of the new information was provided to the Committee.

Despite receiving information from all the top military leaders in Corporal Tillman chain of command — including Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, and General Abizaid — the Committee could not determine if any of the officials had communicated with President Bush or White House officials about fratricide in Corporal Tillman’s case. The lack of recollection also prevented the Committee from understanding how information about Corporal Tillman was handled within the Defense Department and how the Defense Department and the White House shared information on this matter.

If the testimony the Committee received is accurate and if the documents submitted are complete, then the intense interest that initially characterized the White House’s and Defense Department’s reaction to Corporal Tillman’s death was followed by a stunning lack of curiosity about emerging reports of fratricide and an incomprehensible carelessness and incompetence in handling this sensitive information.

The pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific information makes it impossible for the Committee to assign responsibility for the misinformation in Corporal Tillman’s and Private Lynch’s cases. It is clear, however, that the Defense Department did not meet its most basic obligations in sharing accurate information with the families and with the American public.
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Re: MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: THE TILLMAN

Postby admin » Sat Nov 21, 2015 12:54 am

Notes:

1 Captain Richard M. Scott, Commander, Headquarters & Headquarter Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, AR 15-6 Final Report [Incomplete Draft] (Apr. 29, 2004).

2 Id. Although a complete draft of Captain Scott’s report has not been located, the Department of Defense Inspector General collected available drafts and exhibits and identified Captain Scott’s major findings. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 7 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

3 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

4 Id. at 20.

5 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May 28, 2004) (containing May 8, 2004, AR 15-6 report by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph L. Kauzlarich, Executive Officer, 75th Ranger Regiment).

6 Id. at 1.

7 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 2, 31-32 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

8 Id. Army rules require both a 15-6 "legal" investigation and a prompt safety investigation in cases of fratricide. Army Regulation 385-40 (1994); DOD Instruction 6055.7 (2000).

9 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

10 U.S. Army Safety Center, U.S. Army Accident Report, Date of Accident 040422 (undated).

11 Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation — CPL Patrick Tillman (Jan. 7, 2005).

12 Id.

13 Id. at 10.

14 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 3 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

15 Id.

16 Id. at 2.

17 Id. at 54.

18 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 99 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

19 Id.

20 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 54 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

21 U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Report of Investigation into Death of Corporal Tillman and AMF Soldier Thani, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2007).

22 Executive Summary, Army Action — Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Report Related to the Death of Corporal (CPL) Patrick D. Tillman (undated).

23 Letter from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S. Army, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July 31, 2007); Letter from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S. Army, to Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July 31, 2007).

24 Id.; see also Executive Summary, Army Action — Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Report Related to the Death of Corporal (CPL) Patrick D. Tillman (undated).

25 Id.

26 Defense Department Briefing with Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Richard Cody (July 31, 2007).

27 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 217 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

28 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

29 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 17 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

30 Id.

31 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong. (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49) (Serial No. 110-49).

32 Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President (April 27, 2007).

33 Letter from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, and Tom Davis, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Aug. 10, 2007).

34 No contemporaneous transcript was produced from the interview with Mr. McCormack, but an unofficial transcript was created from an audio recording of the interview.

35 Ex-Player Tillman Likely in Danger Zone as an Army Ranger, Washington Times (Mar. 21, 2003).

36 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

37 Id.

38 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 18 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

39 Id. at 30.

40 Former NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan, Associated Press (Apr. 23, 2004); U.S. Military Says NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan Exemplified All Soldiers’ Patriotism, Associated Press (Apr. 24, 2004).

41 E-mail from David Compton, Office of the Army Chief Public Affairs, to numerous addressees (Apr. 25, 2004).

42 Id.

43 E-mail from Lieutenant Commander Jane Campbell, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Major Kristen Carle, Office of the Army Chief for Public Affairs (Apr. 23, 2004). (Reporting that Corporal Tillman’s death "was a topic of the discussion at the front office this morning and CJCS PA [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs] is also involved.").

44 E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Jeanie Mamo, Director of White House Media Affairs (Apr. 23, 2004).

45 Id.

46 E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Apr. 23, 2004).

47 Id.

48 Shari Lawrence, Army Human Resources Command, "EXSUM" Document (Apr. 23, 2004).

49 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of U.S. Army Specialist Bryan O’Neal, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 94 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54); Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 13 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

50 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

51 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, at 3 (Nov. 26, 2006).

52 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General Bryan Brown, at 5 (Nov. 17, 2006).

53 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General Howard Yellen (Retired), at 39 (July 25, 2007).

54 "Personal For" message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).

55 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal (Nov. 26, 2006).

56 "Personal For" message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).

57 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

58 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

59 "Personal For" message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).

60 E-mail from Carol Darby, Media and Community Relations Division Chief, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, to Lieutenant Colonel Hans Bush, Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Apr. 28, 2004).

61 Id.

62 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T. Olson, at 60 (July 27, 2007).

63 Id. at 61.

64 Army Regulation 600-8-22 § 3-10(b) (2006).

65 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 53 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).

66 Silver Star Award Citation for Corporal Patrick D. Tillman, United States Army (undated).

67 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 55 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).

68 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Awards Silver Star to Fallen Ranger (Apr. 30, 2004).

69 Id.

70 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, at 69 (July 25, 2007).

71 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 54 (Feb. 29, 2008).

72 Id.

73 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 110 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

74 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Senior Chief Petty Officer Stephen White, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 111 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

75 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC Announces Tillman Investigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/2004/040529-01.htm).

76 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan (Sept. 10, 2007).

77 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

78 Id.

79 See, e.g., E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (May 29, 2004) ("No one will ever tell you, but nice job on this one. May have minimized … damage by pushing the panic button early.").

80 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 29 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).

81 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation, at 11 (May 28, 2004).

82 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F. Sattler, at 50 (July 24, 2007).

83 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F. Sattler, at 46 (July 24, 2007).

84 Id.

85 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Colonel James Craig Nixon, at 121 (Oct. 28, 2006).

86 Id.

87 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 44 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).

88 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush (Sept. 19, 2007).

89 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T. Olson (July 27, 2007).

90 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita, at 69 (Sept. 24, 2007).

91 Id. at 63.

92 Id.

93 General Bryan Brown, Response to Questions from BG Jones (Dec. 9, 2004) ("[W]e initially told Mr. DiRita that OSD PA should make the announcement. They determined it should be a uniformed member of the chain of command. The logical choice was LTG Kensinger. I agreed.").

94 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita, at 67 (Sept. 24, 2007).

95 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T. Olson, at 40 (July 27, 2007).

96 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush, at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).

97 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 63 (Feb. 29, 2008).

98 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush, at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).

99 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 64 (Feb. 29, 2008).

100 E-mail from Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the Chief Public Affairs (May 28, 2004).

101 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC Announces Tillman Investigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/2004/040529-01.htm).

102 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush, at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).

103 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May 28, 2004).

104 E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (May 29, 2004).

105 E-mail from Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the Chief Public Affairs to multiple recipients (May 29, 2004).

106 E-mail from Lieutenant Colonel John Robinson to multiple recipients (May 29, 2004).

107 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

108 Id.

109 E-mail from Barry Jackson, Deputy to the President’s Senior Advisor, to Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the President (Apr. 23, 2004).

110 E-mail from Matthew Scully, Deputy Director of Presidential Speechwriting, to Michael Gerson, Assistant to the President for Speechwriting (Apr. 23, 2004).

111 E-mail from Jennie M. Koch, Executive Assistant to the National Security Advisor, to Gregory Schulte, Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004).

112 E-mail from Matthew Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign, to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

113 E-mail from Mark McKinnon, Chief Media Advisor, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

114 E-mail from Peggy Noonan to Peter Wehner, White House Director of Strategic Initiatives (Apr. 23, 2004).

115 E-mail from Ron Fournier to Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the President (Apr. 23, 2004).

116 Although various e-mails reviewed by the Committee referred to this as a "statement" or a "comment," Mr. Gross explained that he had technically written a "response to an inquiry," rather than a "presidential statement" because it was released only in reply to particular queries. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 61 (Sept. 5, 2007). Other White House officials also told the Committee that they saw a distinction between Mr. Gross’s "response to questions" and a more formal, proactive "presidential statement." White House officials were unhappy with news coverage of Mr. Gross’s April 23 comment, possibly because the press referred to it is as a "statement" from the White House. See E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

117 E-mail from Taylor Gross, White House spokesman, to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

118 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).

119 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Taylor Gross, White House spokesman (Apr. 23, 2004).

120 Id.

121 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Matthew Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign (Apr. 23, 2004).

122 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

123 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 67 (Sept. 5, 2007).

124 Id. at 42.

125 Id. at 52.

126 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan (Sept. 10, 2007).

127 Id.

128 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

129 Id.

130 Id.

131 Department of Defense, Instruction Number 1300.18 (2008).

132 Pub. L. 108-136.

133 U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1588 (Report 108-354), at 695 (Nov. 7, 2003). Representative Walter B. Jones, the original sponsor of act, explained that some military families "had little time to grieve" because they were forced to "fend off aggressive press inquiries" in the hours after a loved one’s death. A 24-hour delay on publicity, he said, "would not unreasonably impair the public’s access to information about military activities, but could provide an immeasurable amount of relief to those who have endured the loss." Statement of Representative Walter B. Jones, Congressional Record, E889 (May 7, 2003).

134 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).

135 Id.

136 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack, NSC Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004). Mr. McCormack told the Committee he had no recollection of the events described in this e-mail.

137 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

138 E-mail from Noam Neusner, Special Assistant to the President for Economic Speech Writing, to Erin Healy, Assistant White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).

139 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett by Staff (Sept. 12, 2007).

140 E-mail from Lee Bockhorn, White House Research Assistant, to Michael Gerson, Assistant to the President for Speechwriting (Apr. 27, 2004).

141 President George W. Bush, Remarks at White House Correspondents’ Dinner (May 1, 2004).

142 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004).

143 E-mail from Matthew Scully, deputy director of Presidential Speechwriting, to John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking (Apr. 28, 2004).

144 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Carol Darby, at 39 (Sept. 18, 2007).

145 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Matthew Scully, deputy director of Presidential Speechwriting (Apr. 28, 2004).

146 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004).

147 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 29, 2004).

148 "Personal For" message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).

149 Although the acting Defense Department Inspector General, Thomas Gimble, testified that his office "think[s] the P4 memo stopped with the three generals that were on it," the IG did not interview Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, or any White House officials during its investigation. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

150 10 U.S.C. 151(b).

151 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 34 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

152 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

153 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan (Sept. 10, 2007).

154 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Michael Gerson (Sept. 11, 2007).

155 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 102 (Sept. 5, 2007).

156 White House, President Bush Discusses American Competitiveness Initiative During Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2007).

157 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Tom White, Secretary of the Army (June 25, 2002).

158 Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to William H. Layer (June 26, 2002).

159 Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Mr. Pat Tillman (June 28, 2002).

160 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 203 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

161 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Dr. Steven Bucci, at 26 (Sept. 20, 2007).

162 Id; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J. Craddock, at18 (July 27, 2007).

163 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita, at 41 (Sept. 24, 2007).

164 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 35 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

165 Id. at 177.

166 Id. at 178.

167 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

168 Letter from Donald Rumsfeld to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, and Tom Davis, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July 26, 2007).

169 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Dr. Steven Bucci, at 26 (Sept. 20, 2007).

170 Id. at 32.

171 Id.

172 Id. at 34.

173 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J. Craddock, at 19 (July 27, 2007).

174 Id. at 27.

175 Id. at 17.

176 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J. Craddock, at 28 (July 27, 2007).

177 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General James Lovelace, at 20 (July 31, 2007).

178 10 U.S.C. 151(b); although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not in the chain of command between combatant commanders and the Secretary of Defense, the Goldwater-Nickles Act allows the Chairman to act as a conduit for communications between the combatant commanders and the Secretary, 10 U.S.C. 163(a).

179 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J. Craddock, at 34 (July 27, 2007).

180 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 34 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

181 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

182 Id.

183 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

184 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F. Sattler, at 41 (July 24, 2007).

185 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 223 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

186 Id.

187 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 33 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

188 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, IV, at 26 (Sept. 19, 2007).

189 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 197 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

190 Id. at 219.

191 Id.

192 Shari Lawrence, Army Human Resources Command, "EXSUM" Document (Apr. 23, 2004).

193 Id.

194 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Paul Tagliabue (May 27, 2008).

195 General Abizaid blamed the delay in his receipt of the P4 on "a problem within my own headquarters." According to CENTCOM’s Director of Operations at the time, Lieutenant General John Sattler, "we had problems with our P4 system" while deployed outside of the continental United States that might have caused such a delay. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F. Sattler, at 33 (July 24, 2007).

196 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

197 Id.

198 Id. at 233.

199 Department of Defense, Gen. Abizaid Central Command Operations Update Briefing (Apr. 30, 2004) (online at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcr ... iptid=2557).

200 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49). Then-Captain Uthlaut told the DOD IG that he was unaware of the friendly fire for approximately 10 days while recuperating after the firefight. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Captain David Uthlaut, at 5 (July 29, 2006).

201 Letter from General John Abizaid (Retired) to Chairman Henry Waxman and Ranking Member Tom Davis, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Jan. 15, 2008).

202 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

203 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General John Abizaid, at 9 (Dec. 13, 2006).

204 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Bryan Brown, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 218 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

205 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General Bryan Brown, at 16 (Nov. 17, 2006).

206 Id.

207 Id. at 39.

208 General Kensinger had been invited to attend the August 1, 2007, Committee hearing, but refused, citing a "previously scheduled business matter." E-mail from Charles Gittins, Attorney for General Kensinger, to Majority Staff, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (July 22, 2007). A subpoena was issued to compel his appearance, but U.S. Marshals could not locate General Kensinger prior to the hearing. Subpoena from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, to Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (July 31, 2007).

209 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 24 (Feb. 29, 2008).

210 Id. at 30.

211 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, at 8 (Dec. 1, 2006).

212 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General Howard Yellen (Retired), at 40 (July 25, 2007).

213 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 25 (Feb. 29, 2008).

214 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General Howard Yellen (Retired), at 39 (July 25, 2007).

215 Id. at 62.

216 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, at 74 (Dec. 1, 2006).

217 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Retired), at 59 (Feb. 29, 2008).

218 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant Colonel David Duffy, at 7 (Nov. 30, 2006).

219 Id. at 8.

220 Id. at 16.

221 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Retired), at 28 (Feb. 29, 2008).

222 Id.

223 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, at 47 (July 25, 2007).

224 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Colonel Clarence Chinn, at 26 (Nov. 7, 2006).

225 Brigadier General Mike Jones, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Nov. 29, 2004); Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr., at 6 (Dec. 8, 2006).

226 Brigadier General Mike Jones, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr., at 3 (Nov. 29, 2004).

227 Army Regulation 600-34 § 3-7 (2003) ("[W]ithin a reasonable period of time after family members are notified of the death of a soldier, but not more than 30 days after the date of notification, the CAO [casualty assistance officer] … will ensure that the PNOK [primary next of kin] and other family members … [a]re informed of the investigations, the names of the agencies conducting the investigations, and the existence of any reports by such agencies that have or will be issued as a result of the investigations"); Army Regulation 600-8-1 § 4-13(b) (1994) (providing a script for notifying family members in cases of friendly fire, including, "His/her death is the result of suspected friendly fire. An investigation is being conducted.").

228 U.S. Army, Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq (undated) (online at www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/At ... ntCmpy.pdf).

229 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Jessica Lynch, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 22 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

230 U.S. Central Command Operational Update Briefing with Major General Victor Renuart, CENTCOM Director of Operations (Apr. 5, 2003).

231 Id.

232 American Troops Rescue Iraq POW Lynch, Associated Press (Apr. 1, 2003).

233 Id.

234 U.S. Central Command Operational Update Briefing with Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, CENTCOM Deputy Director of Operations (Apr. 2, 2003).

235 Missing Soldier Rescued; U.S. Forces Remove POW From Hospital, Washington Post (Apr. 2, 2003).

236 Id.

237 ‘She Was Fighting to the Death’; Details Emerging of W. Va. Soldier’s Capture and Rescue, Washington Post (Apr. 3, 2003).

238 Id.

239 Id.

240 Id.

241 Remains Found at Iraqi Hospital to be Flown to U.S., Military Times (Apr. 3, 2003).

242 Id.

243 A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch — Still in Hospital After 67 Days — Suffered Bone-crushing Injuries in Crash During Ambush, Washington Post (June 17, 2003).

244 White House is Revising its War Message; Setbacks Providing Lessons, Washington Post (Apr. 3, 2003).

245 Id.

246 Pfc. Jessica Lynch Isn’t Rambo Anymore, New York Times (Nov. 9, 2003).

247 A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch — Still in Hospital After 67 Days — Suffered Bone-crushing Injuries in Crash During Ambush, Washington Post (June 17, 2003). The military conducted at least two investigations into Private Lynch’s capture and rescue, one by the Army and one by the Defense Department Inspector General, but neither specifically addressed the dissemination of false information. Defense Department Office of Inspector General, Executive Summary: Alleged Premeditated Fabrication and Inappropriate Conduct of U.S. Military Personnel Involved in the Rescue of Private First Class Jessica Lynch, U.S. Army (undated); U.S. Army, Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq (undated) (online at www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/At ... ntCmpy.pdf).

248 Steve Ritea, Jessica Lynch’s Story: A Little Too Perfect? American Journalism Review (Aug./Sept. 2003).

249 Id.

250 Family Learns Iraqis Executed Soldier Captured at Same Time as Lynch, Washington Post (May 29, 2004).

251 E-mail from Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication, to Majority Staff, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (Apr. 19, 2007) (ellipses in original).

252 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, IV, at 69 (Sept. 19, 2007).

253 Id. at 73.

254 Id.

255 Id. at 71.

256 Id. at 75.

257 Id. at 76.

258 Id. at 73.

259 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of James R. Wilkinson, at 58 (Mar. 14, 2008).

260 An Army Death, and a Family Left in the Dark, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2006).

261 Id.

262 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Majority Staff, Telephone Interview of Peggy Buryj (June 2, 2008).

263 NOW, PBS (Nov. 17, 2006) (online at www.pbs.org/now/transcript/246.html).

264 An Army Death, and a Family Left in the Dark, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2006).

265 Father Wants Soldier’s Death Reinvestigated, Associated Press (June 4, 2008).

266 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 21 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
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