Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on

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[a] Memorandum for the Secretary of War

Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation, 14 September 1945

[1] 14 SEPTEMBER 194:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl Harbor investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in the course of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my opinion as to whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944, requires modification either in respect of the conclusions reached or the statements of fact contained therein drawn from the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in no way affected by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen's investigation. Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my prior memorandum, which statements I made as a result of my examination of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some respects.

The "Winds" Message:

On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information the War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive, the so-called "Winds Code" message of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. Relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)"

When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.

It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department around 20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army Pearl [2] Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received and if so by whom. The testimony of Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24) that an activating "Winds"

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message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had been received was not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true of the testimony of Captain Safford, head of the Navy's Security Division, to the same effect (my Memo. P. 24).

Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any testimony that an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the United States was ever received by the War Department. Thus, Colonel Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in November and December 1941, stated:

"I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department. (Affid., Col. Harold Doud)"

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, testified no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Commander Rochefort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect. (Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)

Colonel Rox W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelligence Service at the time, stated:

"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. (Affid., Col. Rex W. Minckler)"

He said there were "one or two 'false alarms' ", which he discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in he Navy was Captain L. F. Safford.

Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time did not recall meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, at which meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral Noyes' telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 24) General Miles stated: "To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities." (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that the Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the activating "Winds" message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated there were several [3] messages intercepted which were thought at first to be the execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He thought that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2)

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 941, stated that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See Vol. D., Top Secret testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the intercept as he assumed that according to standard practice, it would be transmitted without delay to G-2 (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler). In his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel Sadtler stated that after talking to General Miles and

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Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and typed a proposed warning as follows:

"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."

However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) According to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a warning message be sent the overseas commanders as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1). Neither General Gerow nor General Smith had any recollection of any such conference with Colonel Sadtler or any such recommendation by him. General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that Colonel Sadtler was "purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination and interpretation of 'Magic' " messages (Affid., General Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise has no recollection of Colonel Sadtler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters of the "Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been impossible for Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him. (Affid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith)

[4] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message (probably a "false alarm"), he had never seen any execute message to the "Winds Code" and, so far as he knew, no such execute message was received in the War Department. He at no time urged General Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2 to send a warning message to overseas commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis. K. Sadtler, p. 3)

I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl Harbor matter, denied the receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" message.

Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in 1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Sadtler at which Colonel Sadtler presented the information he had received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was instructed to get the exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been several "false alarm" reports to the same effect. So far as he knew, Colonel Sadtler never returned to G-2 with the text or any additional information. Colonel Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of Colonel Sadtler to General Gerow or General Bedell Smith Colonel Bratton never brought Colonel Sadtler's report to the attention of the Chief of Staff. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2)

Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 did he ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code." As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy to the effect that two copies of such a message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton pointed out that not two but six copies of any such

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message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the inference being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several "false alarms" relative to the "Winds" message but no one in the Navy or in G-2 ever discussed with him the message supposed to have been sent to the Army according to Captain Safford's testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus T. Bratton)

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior to 7 December 1941, testified that on receipt of the original "Winds" message, [5] he directed the San Francisco interception station to be on the watch for an activating message and to send it to him. To the best of his knowledge, no execute message was ever picked up. (Affid., Col. Robert E. Schukraft)

General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel Sadtler's testimony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message received from Admiral Noyes has already been discussed. (See affidavits, Gen. Gerow, p. 2; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3).

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel Clausen that the source of his information on all "Ultra" (or "Magic") messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and Major Dusenbury, Colonel Bratton's assistant. He inquired of Colonel Bratton on several occasions as to whether any execute message had come in under the "Winds Code." He did not recall receiving any such information from Colonel Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would have remembered it. No other person informed him of any such execute "Winds" message prior to 7 December 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts).

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel Clausen that he had no recollection of having received any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B (see my first memorandum of 25 November 1944, pp. 19- 23). He never got the "Winds Code" or any activating or implementing message. He believed he had seen every "Ultra" message delivered to his headquarters. (Affid., Gen. Douglas MacArthur) His Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, testified to the same effect. (Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard Sutherland) Major General C. A. Willoughby, assistant Chief of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had never seen any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated fragments of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE to his knowledge were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby)

Lieutenant-Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C., at present Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, Signal Corps, War Department. In the latter capacity, he made a search for an activating "Winds" message, which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett)

[6] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the

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"Winds" message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25, November 1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that any activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received by the War Department. In this connection, General Marshall's testimony will be recalled, "I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' Code had been received by the Navy." (Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., Marshall, P. 38.)

The Rochefort Message:

In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton's testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4 December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and after discussing it, recommended a further warning or alert to our overseas commanders. General Gerow, felt that sufficient warning had already been given and General Miles stated he was in no position to overrule him. Colonel Bratton, however, still feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the Fourteenth Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for the second or implementing message, a radiogram be sent to General Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram signed "Miles," which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G- 2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather."

No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the above message. However, realizing its importance, Colonel Clausen in his subsequent investigation examined General Fielder, Short's G-2, and Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken. General Fielder testified he had no recollection of ever having seen this radiogram (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2).

As to the likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him by the Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder testified:

"[7] My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone m the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2.)"

General Fielder further said:

"No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believe the Pa

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cific Fleet Intelligence section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti- aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops, and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7 1941 the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley was in liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't now of the liaison until after the war started. (Affid. Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 8 p. 2.)"

General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included he "Winds" message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23) (Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very close [8] liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew prior to Pearl Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting Japanese messages. During the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted the Japanese message containing the "Winds Code." He took immediate action to have the local Federal Communications Commission agency monitor for the execute message, which was not received (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 1). His attention was again called to the Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 he saw on General (then Colonel) Fielder's desk the radiogram from General Miles to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was monitoring for the execute message. This information was also given to Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu.

The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the Rochefort message, contains hearsay statements to the effect that "Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had" (including the "Winds" message), the source of which as Navy personnel whose identity he could not recall. His undisclosed Navy sources were also authority for his statement that Commander Rochefort's crypto- analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for intercepts, breaking and translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would receive all this information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 December merely as a precautionary measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew)

Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does not mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently, however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this

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message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, told him he was aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in Japanese relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would inform Shivers of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this information on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

Mr. Shivers testified:

"(Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 December. ( Affid., Robert L. Shivers )"

There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell.

[9] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affidavit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically denied that he received it. General Fielder stated:

"I fell [sic] sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3)"

General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received the "Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial of the receipt of information other than that he admitted he received.

In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show conclusively that the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short personally either through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort message. Whether Short received equivalent information will now be considered.

Other Information Possessed by General Short:

I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the Navy Board, testified that had he gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram prior to the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert, he said:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me*. But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, *the destruction of the code machine could have been very significant to me*. I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. * * * I would have taken the destruction of the code machine very seriously. (Italics supplied)"

It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly others. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p 10, 19, 30), I referred to General Fielder's and Colonel Bicknell's testimony that they had information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was [10] "destroying its codes and burning its secret papers," which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell

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meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention of General Short's staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a conference presided over by General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19) Colonel Phillips stated he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo. 25 November 1944, p. 19).

The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3 December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. About two hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu, during which the cook stated that the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers' statement that on 28 November 1941 he received a radiogram from Mr. Hoover to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, who stated they had already received similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and papers" was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6 December 1941. General Fielder testified, "I gave this latter information to General Short the same day." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)

Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. This apparently was radio OpNav No. 031850, dated 3 December 1941, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval District, Commandant, 16th Naval District, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents. (Top Secret Vol. C, Safford, p. 183)"

[11] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. Shivers, and told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent formation which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of

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such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same effect. (Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 3684-3685) Colonel Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General Fielder and General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944 p. 11). Their reaction was as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell:

"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

"Following 7 December I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect "Well Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong." (Affid. Col. George w. Bicknell, p. 3)"

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to Pearl Harbor Day by General Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell, or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements made by me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based on the Army Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and Assistant G-2 had information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying its codes and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." To most people, this would mean codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes, which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it, judging from his statement that he evaluated the Dr. Mori message (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the light of the information he had received concerning the destruction by Jap Consuls of their "codes and papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testimony that Colonel Bicknell told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul was [12] burning his "codes and papers. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)

Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was destroying his codes. As distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers at that juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in considering whether General Short had adequate knowledge of the true Japanese- American situation. While it may be said that codes are technically different from secret papers, or "papers," of the Jap Consulate, and Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different as sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that to an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the destruction of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by the Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme significance.

The Manila Warning Message:

This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H. Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies

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& Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu. Colonel Wilkinson was a member by marriage of the Davies family and was secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in Manila. The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu the night of 3 December read as follows:

"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

"A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.

"2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).

"B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

"C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages [sic] early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

"You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."

[13] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of Theodore H. Davies & Company, canceled a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit)

Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941 from Colonel Wilkinson. Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G-2 of the Philippine Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities.

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Manila cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell)

In addition to the cablegram above referred to, Colonel Bicknell stated he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short in one form or another. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell) A file of this information is attached to Colonel Clausen's report. General Fielder was shown this file. Some few items struck a responsive chord in his memory, but he could not remember if they were brought to his attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to his attention, according to General Fielder. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, p. 3)

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the highly important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated:

"Japanese will attack Krakow [sic] Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore."

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A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information he gave to Short "in one form or another." (Amend affid., Col. George W. Bicknell)

[14] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:

These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers of the FBI, and Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In the aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing tension in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports found its way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese situation, which he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell)

Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN:

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and requested various items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain top secret intelligence, without, however, disclosing its origin, which included the "Winds Code" message and information tending to show a general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese Mandated islands in November, 1941, he held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about the matter. From time to time when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, he was called to present the intelligence picture to them. (Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, USS ) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts with Captain Layton were limited to about six conversations with him over the entire year 1941, the last in October, 1941. He told Captain Layton and Colonel Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment. This was in October, 1941. They apparently shared his view. He also reported this to General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley)

Comment on Information Which Reached General Short:

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional information possessed by the War Department which was not sent him, I said:

"* * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations. (P. 30)"

Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortified me in my conclusions above stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion on this subject.

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[15] Short's SOP Against Attack: In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, I stated:

"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions, Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for "*a surprise hostile attack*." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64.) (Italics supplied.)"

As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In response to so much of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to "report measures taken," he sent the short reply "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13) Short testified that his SOP of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War Department on that date or about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. S). Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently Short's present contention is that in advising the War Department by radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5 November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431)

Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C., was specially deputized to make a careful investigation to ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department of this document. He searched in the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division, and the Army Air Forces, and made specific inquires of those likely to have any knowledge of the matter. His search indicated that no such SOP was received by the War Department until March, 1942. A letter from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29 January 1942, transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen)

Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the 14th Part of the Japanese Intercept of 6-7 December 1941:

[16] Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by me to you of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation of the above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this place.

Conclusion:

My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall,

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General Gerow and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation. I find nothing in Colonel Clausen's investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions. The statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that Board's report, are clarified and modified in accordance with the present memorandum.

MYRON C. CRAMER
Major General
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Include: Copy memo from TJAG to S/W, "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board."

[admin]

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[a] Memorandum for The Secretary Of War
Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board) 14 September 1945

[1] 14 SEPTEMBER 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was classified as Top secret and consisted of one volume. I have examined the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel that as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top Secret Report require modification.

In its Top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and on page 16:

"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.

"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't" message of November 27 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii or positive directives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert No. 3.

"This was not done.

"Under the circumstances where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders and [2] this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the right alert.

"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it. (Pp. 1 & 2)

"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War, and

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Navy Departments in all of their Top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack. (P 16)"

The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this information." I have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation and find that they should be revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence. These revisions include the following:

As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth on page 2:

"Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive military operations. (R. 86) "

The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from a document as follows:

"[3] On the 24th of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds."

The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June, 1944, for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A more detailed examination of this testimony shows that it was in reality the interpretation by Captain Safford of a Japanese intercept message which was translated on 22 November 1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. This message authorized the Japanese envoys to extend the time for signing an agreement with the United States from 25 November to 29 November and it stated that the latter time was the absolute deadline and "after that, things are automatically going to happen."

The War Department did not send this specific information to the Hawaiian Department.

It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of our minds."

The Board further found:

"On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese' intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States. (R. 87) (P2)

"* * * On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. (R. 123-124) * * * (P 5)"

This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference "(R. 123- 124)" is to the testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board as to the source of the information which he mentioned in his testi-

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mony to Admiral Hart. He stated that he could not then recollect the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had information that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the United States and probably against Russia. He gave as a basis for this information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 25392, which was a circular message from Tokyo on 19 November 1941. Reference to additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth on page 125 shows that what he had in mind was the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" message.

[4] Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that this information reached Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of November 1941.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese "Winds Code." He took immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the execute message. He further testified that his attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when he saw on the desk of General Fielder a warning message from G-2, War Department, dated 5 December 1941, asking that the G-2, Hawaiian Department, communicate with Commander Rochefort immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously refers to the "Winds code." Colonel Bicknell further testified that he also received information of the "Winds Code" broadcasts from Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message.

Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had established and maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he gave General Fielder such information as he had received concerning intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and concerning other information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested, and which came to his knowledge in the course of his duties. The information thus given to General Fielder during the latter part of November, 1941, included the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept.

The Board found:

"* * * War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff On November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action. (Pp. 2 & 3)"

The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton as he read from a summary called "A Summary of Far Eastern Documents" which he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as follows:

"G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands. (P 87)"

This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December 1941.

[5] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Layton, Captain Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Com-

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mander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indicates the probability that General Short was advised of the presence of Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing radio traffic of the Japanese navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat Intelligence Officer, during November and continuing down to 7 December, indicated considerable Japanese military activity in the Mandates and concentrations of Japanese naval forces in the Marshalls. (See documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's Report.)

The Board found:

"On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87.) (P. 3.)"

This again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the Admiral Hart examination. General Russell read from this while questioning Colonel Bratton, as follows:

"General RUSSELL. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December 1st message, Colonel.

"Colonel BRATTON. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General * * * (P. 88.)"

Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the Navy received, i. e., the Navy Department intercept of the "Winds Code" message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept and stating that by this means Japan would notify her consuls of war decision, and another message to the same general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at Batavia, to the State Department. Mr. Foote also stated: "I attached little or no importance to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming since 1936."

As shown above, the "Winds Code" information was available in the Hawaiian Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States.

[6] The Board stated:

"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280.) * * * (P. 3.)"

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department dated 3 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy

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most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time Colonel Bicknell received this information it was discussed with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence Unit in Honolulu; and that Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in Honolulu had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General there was burning his papers. The additional evidence also shows that on the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference conducted by General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave to General Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, also gave this information to Short.) General Fielder further testified that he gave General Short any pertinent information that came to his attention.

The Board further stated:

"As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chef of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not months." (R. 243-244.) (P. 3.)

"[7] * * * All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297) (P 3)"

The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by Colonel Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen. However, Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that his prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to Colonel Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen represented a better recollection than when he previously testified. He had previously testified that the intercepts, of the character mentioned and which were contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff. G-2. But in testifying before Colonel Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy what material was delivered to whom during the period in question, and that there were no records to show who delivered or who received the material. He had also previously testified that he personally delivered these intercepts to the officials mentioned. But in his testimony to Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries as were made, the deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then Lieutenant Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, must be revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4:

"All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go out to

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the field with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)"

The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to General Short and available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December.

The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese were under instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he asked [8] General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders and that General Gerow replied, "Sufficient had been sent." Following this, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to his superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief of Staff, in a matter of such importance.

The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of information which, according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington during November and December 1941. This included the information already mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese Embassy that the deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25 November, was extended to 29 November; and also information available at Washington on 28 November in the form of an intercept of a message by Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, advising that there was hardly any possibility of the United States considering the "proposal" in toto, and that if the situation remained as tense as it then was, negotiations would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be called so, and that "our failure and humiliation are complete" and suggesting that the rupture of the present negotiations did not necessarily mean war between the Japanese and the United States but would be followed by military occupation of the Netherlands's Indies by the United States and the English which would make war inevitable. The proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese envoys on 26 November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further referred to information available to the War Department on 5 December, as related by Colonel Sadtler, relative to the "false alarm" execute message to the "Winds Code."

None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of 29 August 1945, and analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the information which the War Department sent to General Short. [sic]

Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of additional information was available initially to General Short in the Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department, on the general subject of the tense and strained relations between Japan and the United States and warnings of war.

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The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield, and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence [9] which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary of War. One such dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4 December 1941, set forth prophetically:

"Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South."

The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese execute message to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message.

In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's report.

Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio traffic out of the Japanese Consulate.

Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian Department G-2 contained much material gathered from observers, travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other intelligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by Colonel Clausen in his report to the Secretary of War. Some are initialed by General Short.

Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17 and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the probable moves of Japan.

General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that they were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and that his cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI was most complete. (See Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6.)

General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional investigation, "it was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent."

Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War Department did not send the actual intercepts were, according to witnesses before Colonel [10] Clausen that this type of information and its source, of necessity, had to be guarded most carefully, and that its dissemination to the overseas commanders would have included not only General Short but also all the overseas commanders and that this, in itself, would be dangerous from a security standpoint since it would spread the information into too many hands. There as been considerable evidence given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified before Colonel Clausen,

"* * * Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been so compromised."

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The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department information as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen,

"Dispatches from the war Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis which was done prior to 7 December 1941."

The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the War Department which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor. These intercepts were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements in Pearl Harbor according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The requests of Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. Two intercepts, which were not decrypted and translated until 8 December, were part of the series mentioned. These were not included in the Top Secret Exhibit given the Board. They were sent 6 December by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo Japanese Numbers 253 and 254. The two in question, Nos. 253 and 254, are attached to Colonel Clausen's report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel Clausen's investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and transmitted to Washington by teletype on 6 or 7 December. They were not in the code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and the teletype between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation until the night of 6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so, time elapsing between receipt at Washington and dissemination in readable English form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of 3.5 days.

There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which he could have inferred that Pearl Harbor would be the attacktarget in the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows [11] that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial traffic sources shortly before 7 December. These arrangements included an opportunity to the Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traffic of the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu. Some of this traffic included the same types of reports as were intercepted and forwarded to Washington concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just what commercial traffic was decrypted and transmitted by the Navy at Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being made to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner, attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports from Honolulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo and made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency as 7 December approached, and were made according to the pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor.

The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds Code" at pages 6 and 17. On page 6 the Board referred to testimony of Colonel Sadtler that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of

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Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message had been intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investigation it appears that Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, who conducted for the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Colonel Clausen conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall having so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Sadtler testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes on 5 December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else at the time. He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual intercept which was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned.

Captain Safford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese "Winds Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel Clausen's investigation discloses no evidence that the Army ever received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Captain Safford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself and other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.

Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds Code" or some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the British Intelligence Service and formed the basis for the dispatch from London to Manila, and, in turn from Manila to Honolulu mentioned above. This dispatch was disseminated to the British Intelligence Service sub- agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete file of the dispatches from the British Intelligence Service, and available to the Hawaiian Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen's query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in the documentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to his report.

[12] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and General Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked General Gerow and General Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel Sadtler also testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows:

"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith contained in the affidavit mentioned are correct statements of fact wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

"General GEROW: "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of Magic. I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps Officer. To the best of my recollection I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of implementing message to the Japanese Winds Code.' If I had received such a message or notice thereof I believe I would now recall the fact in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation, In any event, there should be written

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evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened."

"General SMITH: "I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an 'Ultra' officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province." P 2— ffidavit of Colonel O. K. Sadtler.)"

From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department Rochefort message of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because [13] of receipt of an execute message to the "Winds Code." But Colonel Bratton has testified that the reason which prompted him to recommend this warning was information derived from other intercepts to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes and important papers. The Board, also on page 7, referring to the G-2 warning message of 5 December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony before Colonel Clausen, however, General Fielder stated:

"* * * I have no recollections of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer: particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. * * *"

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on about 5 December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Commander Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of the "Winds Code."

It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the "Winds Code" was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct the Japanese representatives to burn their codes and secret papers. The Japanese later sent the same information to their diplomatic and consular representatives by other and more direct means. This latter information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investigation, was available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941.

On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese message from Tokyo to the envoys in Washington. The Board concludes:

"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and 10:30 p m., December 6, as follows:

"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238.) He told Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and see the contents. (R. 307)

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"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence. (R 239-241.) He stated that [14] General Miles did nothing about it as far as he knows. (R. 241.) This record shows no action by General Miles.

"Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238.)

"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m.

"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning." (Pp. 11, 12.)

"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately ____ Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty officer.

"General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows. (P. 16.)

"These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel Bratton. In testifying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave the Board incorrect testimony; that the only set of the 13 parts he delivered on the night of 6 December was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith on [15] General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December; and that he did not know how the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7 December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that he received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any until after 9:00 a. m., on the morning of 7 December. Colonel Dusenbury stated Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely received.

"On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General Smith and General Miles From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears that General Gerow and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts before the morning of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became aware accidentally of the general contents of the 13 parts the evening of 6 December. He was dining at the home of his opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall, the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to General Miles.

"The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton telephoned General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. the morning of 7 December to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the Japanese messages directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part message at 1:00 p. M., 7 December, and to destroy their code machines. The Board further finds that General Marshall did not come into his office until 11:25 a. m.

"These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before

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Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which [sic] would be in the office of the chief of Staff "between 10:30 and 11:30 that morning." Major General John R. Deane testified before Colonel Clausen that on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Building until between 9:00 and 9:30 a. m. General Miles testified before Colonel Clausen that he conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December in his office at about 11:00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December, was not received by Colonel Bratton until "after he arrived that morning, between 9:00 and 10:00 a. m."

The Board further found:

"There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6 the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7 was [16] clear-cut and definite. (P. 15)"

The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There was not received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7 December. It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part reply of the Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States, but this at most suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at some time in the near future, which may or may not have been followed by war. The only other information that was received between 4 and 6 December of significance, in addition to what had already been transmitted to General Short, was information received on 4 December that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular posts had been instructed to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed out, this information was fully available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be delivered at 1:00 p. m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as heretofore pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and it itself was not a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would occur at that time. The Board further found:

"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor. (P. 18)"

This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is not the fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a statement.

This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the Top Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General Short has since testified was information he should have received. General Short testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the message which General Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7 December, referred to by the Board on page 17. He testified that he would have gone into a different alert if General Marshall had given him this message by telephone. General Short testified in response to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert:

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"[17] I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there about the destruction of the code machines. _The _other _matter _wouldn't _have _made _much _of _an _impression _on _me. (Underscoring supplied.)"

As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 information that the Japanese Government had sent orders to various diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain of its codes and important papers.

The "other matter" referred to was the information which General Marshall included in his message which read as follows:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

My Conclusion:

The views expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views expressed herein.

MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

[admin]

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REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

[1156] Under date of 13 July, 1944. this Court of Inquiry was ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to inquire into all circumstances connected with the attack made by the Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December, 1941, to include in its findings a full statement of facts deemed to be established, to give its opinion as to whether any offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service and, in case its opinion be that offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred, to specifically recommend what further proceedings should be had.

The Court convened on 24 July, 1944, and since then has held daily sessions almost continuously in Washington, San Francisco, and Pearl Harbor, having called and examined numerous witnesses from the State, War, and Navy Departments.

The Court, having thoroughly inquired into all facts and circumstances in connection with the attack by the Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, and having considered all evidence adduced, finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACTS

Pearl Harbor is situated on the Island of Oahu, near the city of Honolulu, the capital of the Territory of Hawaii, distant 2100 miles from San Francisco. It is the only permanent outlying United States Naval Base in the Eastern Pacific. It possesses great strategic importance as a point from which naval operations in defense of the Western United States can be conducted, and offensive operations against an enemy to the Westward launched and supported. The United States possesses no base on the West Coast of the United States that meets these requirements to an equivalent extent.

II

Prior to 1940 certain subdivisions of the Pacific Fleet and, beginning in May, 1940, the entire Fleet operated in the [1157] Hawaiian area with Pearl Harbor as a base. In May, 1941, three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic.

For the purpose of conducting exercises and maneuvers at sea designed to increase efficiency and readiness for war, the remaining major vessels of the Pacific Fleet were organized in three main Task Forces. The operating schedule was so arranged that there was always at least one of these Task Forces, and usually two, at sea. Frequently, during Fleet maneuvers, the entire available Fleet was at sea.

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The vessels and the Fleet planes thus rotated their scheduled periods in port, periods essential to the mobility of the Fleet for purposes impossible of achievement at sea. At no time during 1941 were all the vessels of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

The operating schedule in effect on 7 December, 1941, was issued in September, 1941. In accordance with its provisions Task Force One, under the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. N., and part of Task Force Two were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. Task Force Three, under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. N., was at sea, engaged chiefly in escorting the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON to Midway to which point planes were being ferried.

Part of Task Force Two, under the command of Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr., U. S. N., and including the aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE, was returning from ferrying planes to Wake.

[1158] Task Force One included the preponderance of the battleship strength of the Fleet. The three battleships of Task Force Two had been left behind in Pearl Harbor because their slow speed did not permit them to accompany the ENTERPRISE to Wake. It was purely a coincidence that all battleships of the Pacific Fleet, except one undergoing overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December.

III

Beginning at 0755, Honolulu time, on 7 December, 1941, an attack was delivered from the northward of Oahu by Japanese carrier aircraft against units of the United States Pacific Fleet then moored and anchored inside the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, against Army and Navy aircraft, and against shore installations on the Island of Oahu. An attack delivered simultaneously by Japanese midget submarines was without effect. The details of these attacks and the extent of the loss of life and of the damage inflicted by Japanese aircraft have since been made matters of public record.

Within the same 24 hours the Japanese also delivered attacks on the Philippines, Wake and Guam, as well as on Hong Kong and Malaya. The attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be disassociated from these. All were the reprehensible acts of a warrior nation, war- minded and geared to war through having been engaged in hostilities for the past four years, and long known to have aggressive designs for the dominance of the Far East. The United States was then at peace with all nations and for more than 20 years had not engaged in [1159] hostilities.

In time of peace it is a difficult and complicated matter for the United States to prevent an attack by another nation because of the constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered. This is a military consideration which gives to a dishonorable potential enemy the advantage of the initiative, deprive the United States of an opportunity to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and places great additional responsibility on the shoulders of commanders afloat in situations where instant action, or its absence, may entail momentous consequences.

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IV

From 1 August, 1939, to 25 March, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations, charged by law under the Secretary of the Navy with the operations of the Fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, was Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N. The Commander-in-Chief of th Pacific Fleet from 1 February to 17 December, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department from 7 February to 17 December, 1941, was Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S. A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District from 11 April, 1940, until 1 April, 1942, was Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N. He was an immediate subordinate of Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in [1160] protecting Pearl Harbor. With respect to those duties connected with the defense of Pearl Harbor, Rear Admiral Bloch's responsibility was solely to Admiral Kimmel. It is an established fact that this responsibility was discharged to the complete satisfaction of the latter.

V

Admiral Kimmel and Lieut. General Short were personal friends. They met frequently, both socially and officially. Their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect and, in general, this was true as regards their subordinates. They frequently conferred with each other on official matters of common interest, and invariably did so when messages were received by either which had any bearing, on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was mindful of his own responsibility and of the responsibilities vested in the other. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the Base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes.

VI

For some time preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States, engaged in the protection of shipping and the patrolling of sea lanes in the Atlantic, was passing through the preliminary stage of a transition from a state of national military unpreparedness to an ability to cope successfully with two resourceful and fully prepared enemies. The vigorous and convincing representations made by Admiral [1161] Stark before Congressional committees, beginning in January, 1940, showed clearly that the Navy was unprepared for war and greatly needed ships, planes, and men. These representation, linked with the fall of France, resulted in an Act of Congress in June, 1940, whereby appropriations were voted for practically doubling the size of our Navy.

During all of 1941 and for some time thereafter the problem confronting both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff. U. S. Army, was one of expansion and of distributing, to the best advantage, the limited supply of ships, planes, guns, and men and intensifying the training of personnel while production was being stepped up.

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Under date of 30 December, 1940, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commanding the 14th Naval District and the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, after conference with Admiral Richardson, the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Lieut. General Herron, the then Commanding General Hawaiian Department, initiated correspondence addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations in which he set forth the inability of the 14th Naval District to meet a hostile attack with the equipment and forces at hand. He pointed out that, as Naval Base Defense Officer, he had no planes for distant reconnaissance. He gave as his opinion that neither in numbers nor types were the Army bombers satisfactory for the purpose intended. He invited attention to the serious deficiency on the part of the Army with regard to both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. He noted also that an anti-aircraft warning system planned [1162] by the Army was scheduled for completion at an indefinite time in the future.

This letter was forwarded to the Navy Department by Admiral Richardson, by endorsement. He concurred in the opinion that the Army aircraft and anti-aircraft batteries were inadequate to protect the Fleet in Pearl Harbor against air attack, and urged that adequate local defense forces be provided. He further expressed the opinion that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection, and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the Fleet.

Under date of 24 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, based upon the representations made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and in general concurrence herewith. In this letter the belief was expressed that, in case of war with Japan hostilities might be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or on the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The dangers envisaged in the order of their importance and probability were considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack. (2) Air torpedo plane attack. (3) Sabotage. (4) Submarine attack (5) Mining (6) bombardment by gunfire.

Defense against all but (1) and (2) being considered satisfactory, it was proposed that the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii; also that the Army give consideration [1163] to the questions of balloon barrages. The employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses at Pearl Harbor; that local joint plans be drawn for defense against surprise aircraft raids; that there be agreement on appropriate defences of joint readiness for immediate action against a surprise aircraft raid; and that joint exercises for defense against surprise aircraft raids be held.

The Secretary of War, under date of 7 February, 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. He pointed out that the Hawaiian Department was the best equipped of all overseas Army departments and held a high priority for completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. He outlined the details of the Hawaiian project and stated the number of pursuit planes and antiaircraft guns eventually to be supplied. He stated that the equipment for the aircraft warning system was expected to be delivered in

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Hawaii in June, 1941, and that all arrangements for installation would have been made by the time the equipment was delivered.

Copies of these letters were furnished Admiral Kimmel, Lieut. General Short, and Rear Admiral Bloch.

In a letter dated 17 October, 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch reported to the Chief of Naval Operations that the only increment that had been made to the local defense forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, was the U.S.S. SACRAMENTO, an old gunboat of negligible gun power [1164] and low speed. He urged that the Department send a number of small fast craft equipped with listening gear and depth charges for anti-submarine purposes and further urged that he be sent two squadrons of VSO planes to be used for patrol against enemy submarines.

Admiral Kimmel forwarded this letter with the following endorsement:

"There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the U.S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet tied to its base by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its security at sea is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can possibly be made available. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs."

The Chief of Naval Operations replied, under date of 25 November, 1941, that no additional vessels could be supplied for the present but that certain sub chasers, due for completion in May, 1942, had been tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval District, certain privately owned vessels might be expected at a future time and that there were no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval District.

It is a fact that, through 1941, the demand for munitions and war supplies exceeded the capacity of the nation and in all important commands there existed marged [sic] [1165] deficiencies in trained personnel and in material equipment and instruments of war. Although shortages were inevitable, it is a further fact that they had direct bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor.

VII

On 5 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, submitted a joint memorandum to the President, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time and giving, as one of the basic reasons the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

On 7 December, 1941, the U. S. Pacific Fleet was numerically inferior to the Japanese naval forces in both combatant and auxiliary vessels.

Aware of this existing weakness in relative fighting strength, and of the vigorous steps being taken by the United States to overcome deficiencies, Japan clearly sensed the advantage of striking before these steps could become effective. Her advantageous position was strength-

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ened by her extensive espionage system which utilized her civilian, consular and diplomatic nationals throughout the world, and enabled her constantly to keep accurately informed of the U. S. Naval building program and of the location and movements of U.S. Naval vessels.

The topography of Oahu is peculiarly suited to the observation of Pearl Harbor and its activities. The local officials of the United States were unable to overcome Japan's advantage in this respect. It was impossible for [1166] them to prevent anyone from obtaining military information and, because of legal restrictions imposed by the Federal statutes, they could not interfere with the mails and the transmission of messages by radio, telegram, and cable.

In addition, having in mind Japan's traditional tendency to distort legitimate actions of a peaceful nation into deliberate threats to her own security and prestige, the War and Navy Departments were compelled to take every precaution to avoid offending her super- sensitive sensibilities. For example, as of 16 October, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to "take such preparatory deployments as will not constitute provocative action against Japan" and, on 28 November, 1941, the War Department directed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to "undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act".

In contrast to the ease with which Japanese in United States territory, particularly in Hawaii, were able to obtain and to transmit to Japan military information of value, every obstacle was placed in the way of such information being collected in Japan by foreign nationals.

As an instance of Japanese secretiveness and surveillance of foreigners, including those of the U. S. Diplomatic services, the U. S. Naval attache in Tokyo was compelled to report to the Japanese Navy Department whenever he contemplated an excursion beyond the limits of the city, and he was closely watched at all times. He was effectively prevented from obtaining any information as to the type and [1167] number of Japanese ships under construction and the capacity of their naval shore establishments, as well as of the location and movements of Japanese ships.

It is a fact that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December, 1941.

VIII

A naval base exists solely for the support of the Fleet. The fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits. Periodical visits to a base are necessarily made by mobile seagoing forces in order that logistics support may be provided and opportunity given for repair and replenishment, for rest and recreation, and for release of the personnel from a state of tension.

To superimpose upon these essentials the further requirements that the seagoing personnel shall have the additional responsibility for se-

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curity from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base, is to challenge a fundamental concept of naval warfare. There is not, and there has not been, any lack of understanding on the part of the Army and Navy on this point. The defense of a permanent naval base is the direct responsi- [1168] bility of the Army. The Navy is expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the base is a joint operation only to that extent. To be adequate, the defense must function effectively during the periods when the Commander- in-Chief and all the units of the Fleet are absent.

In the case of naval districts lying beyond the continental limits of the United States, the commandant of the district occupies a dual status. As commandant of the district, he is governed by all existing instructions relating to the duties of commandants of naval districts and is answerable direct to the Navy Department. He is also an officer of the Fleet and as such is under the Commander-in- Chief of the Fleet for such duties as the latter may designate.

The fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was thus designated as an officer of the Pacific Fleet is the circumstance that links the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with the duty of assisting the Army in defending the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor. Except for this, the chief responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was for the readiness, the efficiency, and the security of the vessels of the Fleet while at sea. It is through gaining and maintaining control of vital sea areas that a Fleet contributes to the defense of the shore and its activities.

The defense of the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor was the direct responsibility of the Army.

[1169] IX

Under date of 27 February, 1941, the Commandant, 14th Naval District, Rear Admiral Bloch, in his capacity as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued an operations plan establishing security measures, including air defense and surface ship patrol, in order to cooperate with and assist the Army in protecting Pearl Harbor and safeguarding the Fleet.

Under date of 28 March, 1941, joint agreements were reached between Lieut. General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, as to joint security measures for the protection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor Base. It was agreed that when the threat of a hostile raid or attack was considered sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander was to take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such portion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warranted.

Joint air attacks upon hostile *surface* vessels were to be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Army bombardment strength to participate in each such mission was to be determined by the commander, Hawaiian Department, the number of bombardment planes released to Navy control to be the maximum practicable.

Defensive *air operations* over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu were to be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The

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Commandant, 14th Naval District, was to determine the Navy fighter strength to participate [1170] in these missions, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control to be the maximum practicable.

When naval aircraft under the command of the Naval Base Defense Officer were insufficient for long-distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, the Army aircraft so made available were to be under the tactical control of the Naval commander directing the search operations.

The Naval Base Defense Officer was entirely without aircraft, either fighters or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled to rely upon Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units. The Commander Patrol Wing Two, Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N., was by Admiral Kimmel placed under Rear Admiral Bloch's orders, and was by the latter directed to consult with the Army and to prepare a detailed naval participation air defense plan. Rear Admiral Bellinger thus was given the additional status of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, while retaining his status as an air officer of the Fleet.

Under date of 31 March, 1941, plans were drawn up and jointly agreed upon by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force. These plans were complete, and their concept was sound. Their basic defect lay in the fact that the naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet. This circumstance was forced by necessity, but was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that to be adequate, the defense of [1171] a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance from the Fleet.

The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with this as a premise. It was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer, because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at sea.

X

Shortly after assuming command of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel issued specific comprehensive instructions as to the steps to be taken for the security of the Fleet in the operating sea areas. Aware of the inadequacy of the shore defenses of Pearl Harbor, he also required the vessels, while at the base, to assist to the limit of their resources. These instructions were revised and brought to date on 14 October, 1941 were given wide circulation within the Pacific Fleet, and were sent for information to other commands and to the Navy Department.

The security of the Pacific Fleet, operating in the Hawaiian Area and based on Pearl Harbor, was predicted on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

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[1172] (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.

(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two.

The measures prescribed to provide against these possibilities included continuous inshore, boom, and harbor patrols, intermittent patrol of the inner and offshore areas by destroyers, daily search of operating areas by air, the covering of sortie and entry, and daily sweeps for magnetic and anchored mines. The only entrance to Pearl Harbor was guarded by an anti-torpedo net.

The Task Forces operating at sea were screened protectively by aircraft and destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night, ammunition was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Water-tight integrity was maintained, horizon and surface battle lookouts were kept posted, the ships steamed darkened at night, and the use of the radio was restricted to a minimum.

Admiral Kimmel, recognizing the potentialities of the submarine as an instrument of stealthy attack, and believing that Japanese submarines were operating in Hawaiian waters, was of the opinion that this form of surprise attack against his Fleet was the one most likely to be employed by Japan. Therefore, he had issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters [1173] were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and ran the risk of committing an overt act against Japan, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule "shoot first and explain afterwards".

Actually, in execution of these orders, a midget submarine was discovered in an operating area, attacked and destroyed by the combined efforts of a naval patrol plane and a destroyer of the inshore patrol, about 20 minutes prior to the air attack on the morning of 7 December. There was nothing, however, in the presence of a single submarine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent.

It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security of his Fleet while at sea were adequate and effective. No naval units were either surprised or damaged while operating at sea in the Pacific prior to or on 7 December, 1941.

XI

While vessels of the United States Navy are lying in port, it is the invariable custom to keep on board a number of officers and men sufficient to provide for internal security, and to protect against fire and the entrance of water. The force so remaining on board is always balanced as to ranks and ratings so that all requirements can be met in case of emergency. A watch is maintained day and night.

In other than normal situations a "condition of readiness" is placed in effect. On the morning of 7 December considerably [1174] more than half of the Naval personnel were on board their ships in Pearl Harbor, more than ample to meet an emergency in port. Their

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efficiency and their heroic behavior on that day are proof of their fitness for duty.

The Navy's practice in numbering its three prescribed "conditions of readiness" is opposite to the method adopted by the Hawaiian Department of the Army in numbering its "alerts". With the Army, the No. 3 alert represents the maximum state of readiness, while the Navy refers to that state as No. 1. In the interest of clarification, definition of the respective states of readiness is here set forth:

Army Alerts / Navy Conditions of Readiness

No. 1. Defense against sabotage and uprisings. No threat from without. / No. 1. Entire crew, officers and men at battle stations. Action imminent.

No. 2. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, and aircraft, in addition to No. 1. / No. 2. Provides the means of opening fire immediately with one-half the armament. Enemy believed to be in vicinity.

No. 3. Requires occupation of all field positions./ No. 3. Provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and antiaircraft batteries in case of surprise encounter.

The alert in effect in the Hawaiian Department of the Army at the time of the attack was their No. 1. The condition of readiness of the vessels in Pearl Harbor at that time was an augmented Navy No. 3. This condition had been in effect for many months preceding that date. To assume [1175] a high condition of readiness in port and to man guns and stations which cannot be utilized in any circumstance, is to impose on the entire personnel an unjustified state of tension and to defeat the purpose for which the vessels have entered the base; i. e., to make repairs, to replenish supplies, to give the personnel rest and relaxation, and thus to prepare for operations at sea.

The same holds true with regard to the patrol planes of the Fleet. And to a small number of fighters that had been left behind by the absent carriers. They were part of the Fleet, engaged in daily operations and, when not operating, were undergoing overhaul or the crews were being rested in anticipation of further operations. At the time of and immediately prior to the attack on the morning of 7 December 1941, some were in the air covering the movement of a task force, others were on 30 minutes notice, some others were on 4 hours notice, and the remainder were under overhaul.

These planes were not part of the permanent defense of Pearl Harbor. To have kept the crews awake and ready with engines warmed up, in the absence of any indication of an impending attack, would have been to undermine their further usefulness.

The Navy controlled none of the guns mounted on shore. The only means available to the vessels of the Fleet for contributing to their own defense against aircraft while in Pearl Harbor was their anti-aircraft batteries. The anti-aircraft batteries installed on the ships in Pearl Harbor were incapable of a volume of fire at all comparable to that of the batteries of the same ships today.

[1176] On all ships inside Pearl Harbor a considerable proportion of the anti-aircraft guns was kept manned day and night and with ammunition immediately at hand. Also, by prearrangement with the Army, there was in effect a system, correct as to its details, for the coordinating of the anti-aircraft fire of vessels of the Fleet in part with that of the Army on shore.

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Existing Fleet orders provided for the establishment of air defense sectors within the Pearl Harbor area, and for the berthing of ships within the Harbor in such positions as to develop the maximum anti- aircraft gun fire in each sector, commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port.

These orders were carried out to the letter. On the morning of the attack the vessels of the Fleet brought hostile planes, as they came within one or more of these air defense sectors, under heavy fire intensified within a very few moments by the full fire of the entire anti-aircraft batteries of all ships.

It is a fact that the Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December, 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to their defense.

XII

An attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launch- [1177] ing of planes. Once launched, the attacking planes can be prevented from inflicting damage only by other planes or anti-aircraft gunfire or both. Even when a determined air attack is intercepted, engaged by aircraft, and opposed by gunfire, some of the attacking planes rarely fail to get through and inflict damage.

To destroy an aircraft carrier before she can launch her planes requires that her location be known and that sufficient force, in the form of surface or underwater craft, or aircraft, or all three, be at hand. To have the necessary force at or near the point of intended launching in time to insure the destruction of the carrier, it is necessary that the carrier's presence in a general area, and within narrow limits of time, be known or predicted with reasonable accuracy. Even in time of war the fulfillment of this condition is difficult where vast sea areas are involved, and where both the point from which the carrier departs, as well as the fact of her departure, are unknown.

This was the case during the days immediately prior to 7 December 1941. Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port. Their departure and whereabouts were a closely guarded Japanese secret and were likewise unknown, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding.

Although the U.S. Ambassador to Japan reported, as of 27 January, 1941, that there was a rumor to the effect that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was planned, its authenticity was discounted in the Embassy for the reason that such an attack, if actually contemplated, would scarcely be likely to be a topic of conversation in Japan.

[1178] The Navy Department informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of this rumor and stated that the Navy Department "places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future".

In time of war, an outlying naval base may be expected to become an enemy objective, sooner or later. It is an established fact, however, that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded

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or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941.

The attack of 7 December, 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place was unpredictable.

XIII

Where a carrier's presence in a general area is not known in advance and is not predictable within narrow limits of time, there must be resort to procedure which will give warning of a hostile approach. The usual procedure employed by carriers bent on delivering a surprise attack, although by no means the only procedure possible, is to arrive about 700 miles from the objective at dark the night preceding the attack, steam at high speed during the night, and launch the planes at dawn, about 400 miles from the objective. It [1179] is this general procedure which establishes early morning as the time when an air attack is most likely to be delivered. The events of 7 December, 1941, point to the likelihood of this procedure having been followed by the Japanese.

The greatest degree of warning of an impending early morning air attack is obtained if the hostile carrier be sighted prior to dark the night before. In such event, a maximum warning of about twelve hours may be obtained. In the case of an island base, such as Pearl Harbor, it is necessary to cover the circumference of a circle of 700 miles radius each day (the direction from which the attack is expected being unknown) in order to obtain either positive or negative information.

Assuming 25 miles visability (which in the Hawaiian area is not found everywhere nor always assured), an effective daily search requires the daily employment of patrol planes which, in turn, requires that double or triple that number (180-270) be available, it being impossible to employ the same planes and crews every day, or even every other day.

If only the dawn circle of 400 mile radius is to be searched daily, the total number of planes required to be available is 100-150. The maximum warning; is then reduced to about two hours.

Where planes are not available to cover all sectors, the selection of sectors to be omitted is left purely to chance and under such circumstances the advisability of the diversion of all planes from other duties is questionable unless there be information as to the fact of a hostile [1180] approach and of the direction, within reasonable limits, from which the approach is expected.

Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to perform this duty, even if the necessary number is available. The resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the Fleet incapable of performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarine over an extensive sea area as a means of continuously guarding against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not sound military procedure either in peace or in war.

It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in case of

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emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers, and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved.

In brief, the deciding factors were:

(a) The Naval Base Defense Officer, Rear Admiral Bloch, although charged with the conduct of the reconnaissance, had no patrol planes permanently assigned to his command.

[1181] (b) The only Naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian area were the 69 planes of Patrol Wing Two and these were handicapped by shortages of relief pilots and crews. They were a part of the Fleet, and not a part of the permanent defense of Pearl Harbor. The only other planes suitable and available for daily long range reconnaissance were six Army bombers.

(c) The task assigned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent (how imminent he did not know). The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information.

(d) If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet for war would be reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet operations.

(e) The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced seriously after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews to stand up under the demands of long-range reconnaissance.

It is a fact that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not justified [1182] in the absence of information indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time. It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available.

XIV

At the time of the attack, only a few vessels of the Pacific Fleet were fitted with radar. The radar of vessels berthed in a harbor such as Pearl Harbor, partially surrounded by high land, is of limited usefulness at best and does not provide the necessary warning of a hostile approach.

The shore-based radar on the Island of Oahu was an Army service and entirely under Army control. The original project called for 6 permanent (fixed) and 6 mobile installations. The fixed installations had not been completed by 7 December, 1941, and only 3 sets had been shipped to Oahu up to that time. On that day there were in operation 6 mobile sets located in selected positions, with equipment in efficient condition, but inadequately manned.

Training of personnel had started on 1 November, 1941. Lieut. General Short earlier had requested that the Navy assist in this training,

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and 15 of his men had been sent to sea on vessels of the Fleet for that purpose. Admiral Kimmel also had detailed the Pacific Fleet Communication Officer as liaison officer with the Army. He could not supply six other naval officers requested for permanent duty in the Information Center of the air warning system because no officers were available for such detail.

During the second week of November, 1941, Commander [1183] W. G. Taylor USNR, was, by Admiral Kimmel, detailed to the Army Interceptor Command for duty in an advisory capacity, in connection with the setting up of the Army air warning system. Commander Taylor had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar with radar in the stage of its development that existed at that time.

On 24 November, 1941, he called a conference for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a war-time basis, and to decide what additional personnel and equipment would be needed. Two naval officers and 6 Army officers were present at this conference.

The minutes of the conference, concurred in by all present, included an exhaustive statement of deficiencies and the steps to be taken for their remedy. Copies of the minutes were furnished the conferees and copies were forwarded to the Acting Commanding Officer of then Interceptor Command, and to the Acting Signal Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. Steps agreed upon as necessary for the improvement of the system had not become effective by 7 December, 1941.

The Army Interceptor Command was barely in the first stages of organization by 7 December. Four of its officers had been sent to school on the mainland in order to fit them for their new duties. Until 17 December, 1941, the organization was on a tentative basis only and the actual order setting up the Command was not issued until that date. One of the [1184] principal weaknesses of the Interceptor Command on 7 December, 1941, was that the Information Center had no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile.

Between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, the Air Warning System operated from 0400 to 0700, the basis for these hours being that the critical time of possible attack was considered to be from one hour before sunrise until two hours after sunrise. On week days training in the operation of the system also took place during working hours.

On the morning of 7 December the only officer in the Army Information Center was 1st Lieutenant (now Lt. Colonel) K. A. Tyler, Army Air Corps. He had received no previous instruction as to his duties, had been on duty there only once before, and on the morning in question was present only in the capacity of an observer for training. At 0715 that morning he received a call from the radar station at Opana, located in the northern part of the Island of Oahu, to the effect that a large number of planes, bearing approximately north, had been picked up on the screen. Assuming that these were friendly planes because he had heard indirectly that a flight of B-17s was en route from Hamilton Field, California, to Oahu, he did nothing about this report. These B-17s actually arrived over Oahu during the attack, and many of them were destroyed.

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At the Opana station, where this report originated, Private Locard [sic] (now 1st Lieutenant) and Private Elliott [1185] (now sergeant) were on duty with instructions to observe and track flights and report them to the Information Center. Private Locard had had some previous training but Elliott none. The station was scheduled to shut down at 0700, but as the truck had not come to take these men to their camp for breakfast, Private Locard continued to operate the radar set in order to assist in the training of Elliott.

Shortly after 0700 there was picked up on the screen an unusually large flight of planes, coming in from a northerly direction at a distance of about 136 miles. Checking the equipment to make sure, Locard decided to call the Information Center and did so when the planes had come in to 132 miles. Having reported the fact to the Army officer on duty (1st Lt. Tyler), Locard and Elliott continued to track the planes in to twenty miles from Oahu, when they lost them due to distortion.

For information of this flight to have been of value as a warning, it would have been necessary for the planes first to have been promptly identified as hostile, and then their presence and their bearing and distance immediately reported to and received by higher authority, and disseminated throughout the Command. The organization and training, of the Information Center and Communication System at this time was not such as to permit these important requirements to be fulfilled. Actually, the oncoming planes were not identified as hostile until the Japanese marking on their wings came into view.

[1186] XV

The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7 December was that inflicted by torpedoes launched from Japanese torpedo planes. These torpedoes were designed specially for the form of attack in which they were used. Up to the time that the Japanese demonstrated the feasibility of delivering an attack from torpedo planes in relatively shallow water and under conditions of restricted length of approach, the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain was to the effect that such an attack was not practicable.

After a study had been made of the problem of protecting vessels in port against torpedo attack, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 15 February, 1941, stated that it was considered that the relatively shallow depth of water (about 45 feet) limited the need of anti-torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor, and, in addition, that the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles.

The letter further stated that certain limitations and considerations must be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which were the following:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height [1187] for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

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(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

On 13 June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the Commandants of the various naval districts, modified limitation (a) by stating that recent developments had shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights as much as 300 feet and, in [1188] some cases, make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet with excellent runs. This letter, however, did not modify the view expressed in the letter of 15 February as to the need for anti- torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor.

Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of defense but were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would interfere with the activity of U. S. Aircraft, and the smoke because the strength of the prevailing winds would render it ineffective.

The specially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use fell in the category of the so-called secret weapon, of which the robot bomb and the magnetic mine are examples. Such weapons always give to the originator an initial advantage which continues until the defense against them has been perfected.

It is a fact that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to the secret development and employment of a specially designed torpedo.

XVI

Strained relations between the United States and Japan had existed and been a source of concern to this country for many months prior to 7 December, 1941. That the Japanese policy in the Far East was one of aggression had been well known for many years. Their program of expansion, which envisaged Japan as *the* dominating power in the Western Pacific, was in direct conflict with the policies of the United States [1189] and Great Britain, and opposed to agreements established by treaty.

At the instigation of the Japanese, negotiations were begun by the State Department on 12 May, 1941, looking to the peaceful settlement

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of existing problems. On 17 November, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was joined by Mr. Kurusu in the capacity of special envoy.

On 26 July, 1941, Japanese assets in the United States were frozen. The order freezing these assets required a system of licensing shipments to Japan, and no licenses were issued for oil or petroleum products.

There was a feeling on the part of U. S. officials that hostilities, unless prevented by some means, would become an actuality in the not distant future. They were familiar with the Japanese trait of attacking without declaration of war, as had been done against China in 1894, and against Russia in 1904.

The Secretary of State held numerous conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, at which the negotiations with Japan were discussed. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations attended many of these conferences and were kept informed of the progress of these negotiations. At the same time efforts to improve the military position of the United States were being vigorously prosecuted.

On 16 October, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Admiral Kimmel by dispatch that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, [1190] that the new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were a possibility, and that the Japanese might also attack the United States and Great Britain. In the same dispatch Admiral Kimmel was directed to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions, nor constitute provocative action against Japan.

On the following day, 17 October, 1941, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated "Personally I do not believe that the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you (that of 16 October) merely stated the 'possibility'".

For the purpose of viewing the events of the succeeding months in their true relation to the events of 7 December, this date of 16 October, 1941, may well be taken as the beginning of a critical period which terminated in the attack of 7 December, 1941.

In accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October, Admiral Kimmel made certain preparatory deployments, including the stationing of submarines off both Wake and Midway, the reinforcement of Johnston and Wake with additional Marines, ammunition, and stores, and the dispatch of additional Marines to Palmyra. He also placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the Fleet which were in West Coast ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a West Coast Navy Yard and placed in [1191] effect additional security measures in the Fleet operating areas.

He reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the steps taken and received written approval of his action. He continued the measures which he had already placed in effect looking to readiness for war, preparation of the Pacific Fleet for war being his assigned task.

He did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his staff, all experienced officers of long service, and sought by every

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means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the information at hand.

On 24 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed also to the Commander- in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to Commandants of Naval districts with headquarters at San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Panama, which stated:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiation with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addresses to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately."

The contents of this dispatch were made known to Lieut. General Short and discussed with him.

[1192] The reaction on Admiral Kimmel and his advisers was to direct their attention to the Far East. They did not consider that the expression "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction" included the probability or imminence of attack in the Hawaiian area, specific mention having been made of the Philippines and Guam with no mention of Hawaii.

They recognized the capability of Japan to deliver a long-range surprise bombing attack and that she might attack without a declaration of war. They reasoned that she would not commit the strategic blunder of delivering a surprise attack on United States territory, the one course that irrevocably would unite the American people in war against Japan. Public opinion in the United States was far from being crystallized on the question of taking steps to curb her expansion in the Western Pacific.

Conceivably, Japan might well have taken aggressive action against British and Dutch possessions in the Far East, gaining the oil and other raw materials that she was seeking, without military interference from the United States. An attack elsewhere than in the Far East seemed, therefore, to be only a remote possibility and not enough of a probability to warrant abandonment of the preparation of the Fleet for war.

To continue these preparations was, therefore, Admiral Kimmel's decision, made on his own responsibility in the light of the information then available to him and in the knowledge that every precaution within his power, compatible [1193] with maintaining the Fleet in a state of readiness for war, had already been taken.

XVII

On 27 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, reading as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and a aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces

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indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Continental districts, Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

This dispatch was sent also to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and has since become known as the "war warning message".

On the morning following the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral Kimmel discussed its contents with Lieut. General Short, Rear Admiral Bloch, the Flag officers of the Fleet present, and the members of his staff.

After much further study, Admiral Kimmel and his advisers interpreted the warning to mean that war was imminent, and that readiness to undertake active operations was expected. They were unable to read into it any indication that an attack against the Hawaiian area was to be expected, particular attention having been directed to the Japanese activities in the Far East, with objectives in that area [1194] specifically mentioned. No reference was made to the possibility of a surprise aggressive move "in any direction", as had been done in the dispatch of 24 November.

There was nothing to indicate that defensive measures should take precedence over all others. The "appropriate defensive deployment" that was directed was not interpreted as referring specifically to the Pacific Fleet, in view of the deployments of the Pacific Fleet already made in compliance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October. In addition, since that date, a squadron of submarines had been sent to the Philippines, leaving only 5 in Pearl Harbor.

There were other considerations which no doubt influenced Admiral Kimmel. The Navy Department's dispatch of 30 November, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and sent to Admiral Kimmel for his information, ordered the Commander-in- hief, Asiatic Fleet, to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea. This appeared to indicate that the authorities in Washington expected hostilities to occur in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.

On 28 November the Chief of Naval Operations advised Admiral Kimmel that the Department had requested, and the Army had agreed to, the relief of Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops, and the replacement of Marine planes with Army pursuit planes. This action, involving as it did a complicated problem and the movements of sizeable U. S. Naval forces westward to effect their transfer, was an indication of the fact that the authorities [1195] in the War and Navy Departments did not then expect a hostile movement toward the Hawaiian Islands.

On 28 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations repeated to Admiral Kimmel the information contained in a dispatch which the War Department, on 27 November, had transmitted to Lieut. General Short, and other Army addressees, to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated, that Japanese future action was unpredictable, that hostile action was possible at any moment, and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act in case hostilities could not be avoided. Such measures as were undertaken were to be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

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To this dispatch Lieut. General Short had replied on 27 November:

"Report Department alerted against sabotage. Liaison with Navy."

The steps taken caused the Army planes to be grouped in such manner as to afford better protection against sabotage, although militating against their taking the air promptly. In the absence of a reply from the War Department, Lieut. General Short considered that the alert he had placed in effect was approved.

Lieut. General Short having, on 28 November, 1941, received instructions from the Adjutant General of the Army to take measures to protect military establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, reported in detail the measures that he had taken and repeated the fact that he had placed in effect Alert (No. 1) against sabotage. He interpreted the dispatch from the Adjutant General as further [1196] indicating that his alert against sabotage constituted complete compliance with the War Department's wishes.

There was no mention in any of the dispatches received by Lieut. General Short, between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, of the possibility or probability of an attack against Oahu.

As further evidence of the prevailing sentiment against the likelihood of an immediate move toward Hawaii, it is a fact that a flight of B- 7s from the Mainland arrived over Oahu during the attack of 7 December, without ammunition and with guns not ready for firing.

These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. There were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.

XVIII

From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, conversations between our government and Japan did continue, notwithstanding the statement contained in the war warning message under date of 27 November, 1941, that "negotiations with Japan, looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased."

This statement was based upon the note delivered by the State Department to the Japanese representatives on 26 November, a copy of which was furnished the Navy [1197] Department. It did not in itself discontinue negotiations and conversations, but, on the contrary, gave an "outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan." The stipulations contained therein were drastic and were likely to be unacceptable to Japan.

The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of the War and Navy Department because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be severed or that war would declared. The sending of the note therefore began the final phase of the critical period which culminated on 7 December.

Although it was stated in the press that a note had been delivered none of its contents was given out to the public until after the attack. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note nor of its contents until many months after the attack.

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In a personal letter to Admiral Stark, dated 26 May, 1941, he had invited attention to the importance of keeping commanders, well removed from Washington, informed of developments and eventualities, stating:

"The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a [1198] condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

"It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

"It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available."

From time to time during this critical period there was received in the War and Navy Departments certain other important information bearing on the current situation. The testimony as to this information forms a part of the record of this Court. The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in these findings, the Court having been informed that their disclosure would militate against the successful prosecution of the war.

[1199] This information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. No facilities were available to them, either in the Fleet or in the Hawaiian area, which would enable them to obtain the information direct. They were dependent solely upon Washington for such information.

With regard to not transmitting this information, the stand taken by the Chief of Naval Operations was that the "war warning message" of 27 November completely covered the situation. The fact remains however, that this message, standing alone, could not covey to the commanders in the field the picture as it was seen in Washington.

Only three other messages were received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Chief of Naval Operations between 26 November and 7 December, one informing him that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London to destroy certain codes, and the other two relative to the destruction of United States codes at Guam and outlying islands.

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In the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time, the War and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent and, by inference and deduction that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. This information was embodied in a dispatch by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, who, after consulting with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, had it encoded and sent to the Commanding Generals in Panama, Manila, and Hawaii, with instructions that the naval authorities in those areas be informed of its contents.

[1200] The dispatch to Hawaii left Washington at 12:17 p. m. Washington time (6:47 a. m., Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's RCA office at 7:33 a. m. (Honolulu time) . Thus there remained but 22 minutes before the attack began for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hour after the attacking force had departed.

Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. Even in this event, however, there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu.

XIX

It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate commanders, particularly those in distant areas constantly supplied with information. To fail to meet this obligation is to commit a military error

It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operation of the Fleet, and having important information in his possession during this critical period, especially on the morning of 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral [1201] Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.

OPINION

Based on Finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules.

Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the Constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered. Prevented the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in the event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing [in] the Hawaiian area, and that it imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might be construed as an overt act.

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Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between Admiral Husband E Kimmel, USN, and Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of interest, [1202] no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either. And that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by the common interest.

Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in personnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.

Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U.S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December, 1941.

Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The Court is further of the opinion that the defense should have been such as to function effectively independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet [1203] must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits. Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX, the Court is of the opinion that the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U.S.N., in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily.

Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were complete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning.

The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for their employment with the Fleet.

Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet, and that the steps taken were adequate and effective.

Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated

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neither the probability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and bearing in mind that he had not knowledge of the State Department's note of 26 November, the Navy's condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships' antiaircraft batteries as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances, although had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total damage inflicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a degree which is problematical; and, that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the number of these planes lost might thus have been reduced.

The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known in advance that the attack would take place on [1204] 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects, and that, beyond the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore, anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another in so far as expectation of attack is concerned.

It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it could not be known when an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December.

Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would take place was unpredictable.

Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time.

[1206] Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-based air warning system, an Army service under the direct control of the Army, was ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused with a flight of Army B-17s en route from California, and that the information obtained by Army radar was valueless as a warning, because the planes could not be identified as hostile until the Japanese markings on their wings came into view.

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Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of which was unknown to the United States.

Based on Finding XVI. And particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Operations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October, 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision, made after receiving the dispatch of [1207] 24 November, to continue preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available to him.

Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which influenced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support the interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the "war warning message" of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.

Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately [1208] the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.

The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken.

Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service.

RECOMMENDATION

The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

ORIN G. MURFIN,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
President.

EDWARD C. KALBFUS,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
Member.

ADOLPHUS ANDREWS,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
Member

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The Court having finished the inquiry, then at 4 p. m., [1209] Thursday, October 19, 1944, adjourned to await the action of the convening Authority.

ORIN G. MURFIN,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.),
President.

HAROLD BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

[admin]

Page 323

[1] ADDENDUM TO COURT'S FINDING OF FACTS

In the Finding of Facts, No. XVIII, the Court had referred to "certain other important information" as being available to the War and Navy Departments. This information was obtained by intercepting Japanese messages and breaking their diplomatic codes. The Court has been informed that these codes are still in use and, if it became known to the Japanese Government that they had been broken by the United States, the codes would be changed and, as a consequence, the war effort would be adversely affected.

For this reason, the Court has refrained from analyzing or discussing the details of the information in its Finding of Facts but feels that its report would not be complete without a record of such details. The Court, therefore, submits the following record in this addendum and transmits it to the Secretary of the Navy for filing with other highly secret matter referred to as such in the record of the Court's proceedings.

Highly secret messages, hereinafter mentioned, were intercepted by the War and Navy Departments during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, 1941, and prior thereto. The method of handling these messages in the Navy Department was as follows:

The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Communications operated directly under the Chief of [2] Naval Operations. They were responsible to see that all messages were transmitted to him in order that he might be kept conversant at all times with existing conditions.

Officers in Intelligence and Communications, Divisions of Naval Operations, remained on duty night and day. They made every effort to obtain all possible diplomatic and military information, in order that high officials of our government might be kept fully informed.

Messages were translated and placed in a folder immediately upon receipt or intercept. The important messages were marked with a clip and taken by a designated officer to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Directors of War Plans, Naval Intelligence, and Naval Communications, and to the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Wilkinson, kept himself constantly informed regarding all messages. He checked as to whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations had seen the important ones and in many cases took them personally to the Chief of Naval Operations and discussed them with him.

Immediately after the receipt of the note of 26 November, 1941, from the Secretary of State, the Japanese representatives in Washington sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted by the Navy Department. This is Document 17, Exhibit 63, which gave Tokyo the following stipulations contained in the note:

(a) The recognition of Hull's "four principles".

(b) (1) Conclusion of mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Moscow, Washington, The Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

[3] (2) Agreement between Japan, United States, England, The Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) Complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely to promise to support no regime but that of Chiang Kai-shek.

(5) The abolition of extraterritoriality, the concessions in China, and other requirements bearing on reciprocal trade treaty, rescinding freezing orders, stabilization of yen, etc., and for Japan to amend her tripartite pact with Germany and Italy.

The Japanese representatives added in their report to Tokyo, the following:

"Both dumbfounded and stated to Hull we could not even cooperate to the extent of even reporting this to Tokyo."

No information regarding the delivery of this note or of its contents was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other commanders afloat.

From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not transmitted to the Commander-in- Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November, 1941, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November, 1941, and referred to as "The Winds Code" was as follows:

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

[4] "(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

"(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**

"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***

"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

"Forward as urgent intelligence."

The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in- Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval District, substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941, the United States Naval Attach‚, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some future late information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated.

All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy Department, considering the expected information most important, were on the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of

* East wind rain.
** North wind cloudy.
*** West wind clear.

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diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or [5] war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department.

It is a matter of general knowledge that Japan has had for many years a thorough system of espionage throughout the world and continuously sought and received information regarding the location and movements of United States naval vessels. There were certain messages received in the Navy Department which showed very clearly that Japan, at this critical period, was particularly desirous of obtaining exact information from two sources, namely, Manila and Honolulu. Messages between Tokyo, Manila, and Honolulu inquiring especially about planes, ships, their places of anchorage, etc., in the latter ports, were intercepted. Similar messages were sent to Japanese officials in Honolulu clearly indicating that Japan was most [6] desirous of obtaining exact information as to ships in Pearl Harbor.

The important messages having special reference to Pearl Harbor were as follows:

(a) On 15 November, 1941, Document 24, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department, 3 December, 1941, states:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make your "ships in harbor report" irregular but at rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

(b) On 18 November, 1941, Document 37, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department on 5 December, 1941, states:

"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N" Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy."

Note by Navy Department on this message:

"Manila Bay" probably means "Mamala Bay."

(c) On 18 November, 1941, Document 40, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Honolulu to Tokyo and translated in Navy Department 6 December, 1941, gives information as to ships moored in certain areas in Pearl Harbor and movements of ships in and out.

[7] (d) On 29 November, 1941, Document 36, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Washington 5 December, 1941, states:

"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future will you also report even where there are no movements."

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Admiral Kimmel was not aware of and had no information regarding these messages.

On 5 November, 1941, Document 7, Exhibit 63, Tokyo to Washington, was intercepted. This message stresses the necessity of signing an agreement between the United States and Japan by 25 November, 1941.

On 22 November, 1941, Document 11, Exhibit 63, intercept from Tokyo to Washington, stated that the signing of agreement set for 25 November, 1941, could be postponed until 29 November, and in explanation this message stated:

"* * * There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, * * * if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. * * *"

No intimation of the receipt of this message was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat, nor was any information transmitted to them regarding contents of the messages mentioned in the following paragraphs.

[8] On 28 November, 1941, a dispatch, Document 18, Exhibit 63, was intercepted between Tokyo and Washington which in part reads as follows:

"* * * The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal—"

referring to note of 26 November—

"* * * the Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions * * *"

etc.

The message indicates the position of Japan regarding the note of 26 November, and further indicates that within two or three days negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Further, it emphasizes the importance of delay. Neither the message nor any of its contents were transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat.

On 29 November, 1941, Document 19, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Washington and translated by the Navy Department 30 November, 1941, directs that Japanese representatives make one more attempt to have United States reconsider and states:

"* * * please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations."

Again, on 30 November, 1941, Document 20, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Washington to Tokyo indicated that negotiations were to be stretched out.

These two messages indicate that the Japanese were sparring for time.

[9] On 30 November, 1941, Document 22, Exhibit 63, translated by the Navy Department on 1 December, 1941, was intercepted, being

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a message from Tokyo to Japanese representatives in Berlin, reading as follows:

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has [10] become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England Australia, The Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

On 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows:

"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan and this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is."

On 1 December, 1941, Document 21, Exhibit 63, was intercepted, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which reads as follows:

"1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the [11] United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and

** JD-1: 6710

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others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter."

On 2 December, 1941, Document 25, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo, translated by the Navy Department 3 December, 1941, reports that conversations with the State Department continue; that the Japanese representatives stated to Welles, the Under Secretary of State, that it is virtually impossible for Japan to accept new American proposals as they now stand, and that the Japanese representatives feel that the United States is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation.

On 3 December, 1941, Document 29, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Washington, translated by the Navy Department 4 December, 1941, requests their representatives to explain Japan's increased forces in Indo-China.

On 3 December, 1941, Document 33, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo, translated by Navy Department 5 December, 1941, states: [12]

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

On 6 December, 1941, Document 38, Exhibit 63, from Tokyo to Washington, was intercepted, giving notice to the Japanese representatives that a reply consisting of 14 parts to American proposal of 26 November is being sent to them, directing that secrecy should be maintained and stating that the time of presenting this reply would be sent in a separate message.

The first 13 parts of this reply were intercepted and received by the Navy Department at about 3:00 p.m., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made ready for distribution by 9:00 p.m., Washington time, of that date. These 13 parts contain a very strong and conclusive answer to the note of November 26 and state in part,

"Japan cannot accept proposal as a basis of negotiations."

Commander Kramer, the officer whose duty it was to distribute this class of information, prior to 9:00 p.m., 6 December, 1941, 'phoned Captain Wilkinson that an important message had been received and was being translated. He also tried to communicate with Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Turner at their homes but found them out.

At about 9:00 p.m.,Washington time, Commander Kramer proceeded to the White House with the 13 parts of reply and delivered a copy to a White House aide, with the request that [13] it be delivered immediately to the President. Kramer then proceeded to the home of Secretary Knox where he personally delivered to the Secretary a copy of the Japanese reply. Secretary Knox read the reply, did not discuss it in detail with Kramer, but 'phoned the Secretary of War and Secretary of State.

*JD-1: 6921.
*** Not Available.

Page 329

Kramer then proceeded to the home of Captain Wilkinson and gave a copy to him. Kramer told Wilkinson that he had tried to get Stark and Turner. Wilkinson made several 'phone calls, presumably to Admiral Stark and others. This information regarding receipt of these 13 parts or their contents was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet or other Commanders Afloat.

Kramer then returned to his office in the Navy Department, arriving about 12:30 a.m., 7 December, and as no other important messages were at hand, went home and returned to the Navy Department about 7:00 a.m. Upon his arrival he found the 14th part of the Japanese reply had been received and decoded. He then delivered a copy of all 14 parts to the Flag Secretary in his office of the Chief of Naval Operations at about 9 a.m., where he found several officers gathering for a conference with Admiral Stark. Kramer then proceeded, about 9:30 a.m., to the White House and made delivery of the 14 parts of the message. He proceeded then, at about 9:50 a.m., to the State Department and delivered same to the Secretary of the Navy, who was there in conference with the Secretary of State.

At about 10:30 a.m., Kramer returned to the Navy Depart- [14] ment where he found another message had been translated. This message, an intercept from Tokyo to Washington, was marked "Urgent, very important" and read as follows:

"Will the ambassador please submit to the U.S. Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the U.S. at 1:00 p.m., on the 7th, your time."

Kramer delivered a copy of this message (hereinafter referred to as the "one p.m. message") to the Flag Secretary of Admiral Stark, the latter at the time being in conference with several officers.

Kramer then returned to the White House and delivered the "1:00 p.m. message." From there he went to the State Department where the Secretary of the Navy was still in conference with the Secretary of State. On arrival he requested one of the State Department assistants to present the message to the Secretary of the Navy and to invite his attention to the fact that 1:00 p.m., Washington time, meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia.

Admiral Stark had arrived in his office at the Navy Department at some time between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m., on the morning of 7 December. Although he testified that he had no information prior to this time relative to the Japanese reply to the note of November 26th he was informed of the 14 parts and "the 1:00 p.m. message" not later than 10:30 a.m., of that date. He testified that General Marshall 'phoned him and suggested that the information regarding the delivery of the 14 parts at 1:00 p.m. was most important and significant and, in his opinion, should be transmitted to Commanders in the [15] Pacific. Admiral Stark at first demurred and hung up the receiver. Shortly thereafter he 'phoned General Marshall requesting that, in the event he sent the message to the Commanding Generals in the Pacific area, he instruct them to relay this message to naval opposites.

The message which General Marshall sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Exhibit 48) reads as follows:

"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we

Page 330

do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

This message left the War Department at 11:52 a.m., Washington time, was sent out over R.C.A. at 12:17 p.m. (6:47 a.m. Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's R.C.A. office at 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. There remained but 22 minutes before the attack for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hours after the attacking force had departed.

Had the telephone and plain language been used, this message could have been received in Hawaii before the attack began. Even in this event, however, there was no action open to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet planes in their air bases in Oahu.

Orin G. Murfin,
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
President.

Edward C. Kalbfus,
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Member.

Adolphus Andrews,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Member.

[admin]

[1] FIRST ENDORSEMENT [Stamped:] Nov. 2, 1944.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July, 1944.

1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.

2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing authorities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge Advocate General to attempt to substitute his evaluation of the evidence for that of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to support a finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderantly on one side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion, the Judge Advocate General must hold, as a matter of law, that such a finding or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8; CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936;, P. 11.

3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII:

"In the early forenoon of 7 December, 1941, Washington time, the Army and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, *by inference and deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon*."

4. This Finding, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible officials of the War and Navy Departments did in fact make the inference and deduction underscored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the past tense of the verb "appear", and used the expression "appeared to indicate rather than "should have indicated" lends support to this construction. Such

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an [12] impression would not be supported by the record, as the great preponderance of the evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion. It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Philippines, and British and Dutch possessions in the Far East.

5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December, 1941 held positions in the Navy Department which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the consensus in the Navy Department was that any attack would probably come in the Far East, and the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate positions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously colored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of selecting, from the great mass of intelligence reports available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those which in the light of subsequent events proved to be hints or indications of Japanese intentions.

Therefore, any finding, opinion or inference that the responsible officials the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack, that an attack on Hawaii was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes this fact, as shown by its finding last paragraph of Finding XVII) that);

"These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere."

[3] 7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion of Opinion expressed by the Court (P. 1207) that:

"Admiral Harold R Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and especially in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon."

As been previously pointed out, the message herein referred to was not construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area.

8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the time at which the War and Navy Departments had information indicating a break in diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile action by the Japanese on that date, was in the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time. It is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on this finding, in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this information was known in Washington on 7 December, 1941. The evidence before this Court establishes, beyond any doubt, that the information referred to was not available to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10 a. m., the morning of 7 December 1941.

9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the apparent contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Naval Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in failing to transmit certain information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the final Opinion that "no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred in the part of any person in the naval service". That this is only an apparent, and not a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. This statement, as well as the Finding of

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Facts and Opinions taken as a whole indicate [4] that it was the conclusion of the Court, although not clearly expressed that the evidence adduced did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit the information in question to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Fleet on 7 December 1941 and that any causal connection between this failure on Admiral Stark's part and the disaster would be entirely speculative. Such a conclusion is fully supported by the testimony in this record.

10. Subject to the foregoing remarks the proceedings findings opinions and recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, legal.

T. L. Gatch
T. L. GATCH
The Judge Advocate General.

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TOP SECRET

[1] UNITED STATE FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

3 Nov. 1944.
FF/A17-25.
Serial: 003191.
TOP SECRET.

From: The Commander In Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry—Review of.
Reference: (a) SecNav ltr of 21 October 1944.
Annex: (A) List of Parts of Record that Contain Information of super-secret nature.

1. In compliance with Reference (a) the following comment is submitted as to how much of the record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears such relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.

2. There are only two general classifications of information which, if made public, would be detrimental to the conduct of current and future operations. These are:

(a) Information which directly or by inference would lead the Japanese to suspect that we have been able to break their codes.

(b) Verbatim plain language reproductions of messages sent in United States Codes. The Japanese presumably have the enciphered versions of these messages and if they are given the word for word plain language version it would help them to work on our codes. This is a matter of less importance than the possible compromise of what we know about Japanese encryption but it should be guarded against.

[2] 3. The really vital point is to preserve absolute secrecy as to our success in breaking Japanese codes. It is essential to keep this information to ourselves. I say this for the following reasons:

(a) All Japanese intercepts considered by the Court were in diplomatic codes. Most of these are still in effect with only minor changes. They are still the sources of information of incalculable value. Furthermore, all Japanese codes, Army and Navy, as well as diplomatic, are of the same general structure. The Japanese codes of today are not basically different from those they used in 1941. Breaking one code makes it easy to break the others. The Japanese presumably are well aware of this. If they were told that we broke their diplomatic codes in 1941 there is a reasonable assumption that they will change the whole basic code structure. If they were to do this the damage would be irreparable. The information we get relates not only to the current and prospective movements of Japanese naval vessels upon which we base our operating plans but also include data as to troop strength and prospective troop movements which are vital to the Army. It also relates to the disposition of Japanese Army and Navy air forces. It is impossible to overstate the disadvantages we would suffer if there were to be a leakage direct or indirect that an alert enemy might interpret as indicating that we can and do break his codes. It is no exaggeration to state that Midway might have been a Japanese victory had it not been for the information which we obtained by intercepting his coded despatches. The risks we have

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taken in advancing into the Marshall Islands and the Philippines would have been far greater than they actually were had we not been able to obtain information of Japanese dispositions and movements from Japanese sources.

(b) In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that there be no public release of any information which would alert the Japanese as to the possibility that we were breaking their codes.

[3] (c) It is a pertinent question as to just what part, if any, of the record of proceedings can be made public, without resulting in a leak of vital information.

(c) I can say unequivocally that Volume 5 (the Top Secret volume of proceedings) must not be made public. With regard to the other volumes of the record I find there are certain paragraphs which do point quite clearly to the fact that we have information which could only be obtained by reading Japanese coded messages. I have listed these in Annex (A) of the report, which also includes certain references which might be damaging to the security of our own codes.

(e) I am not any too certain of the effectiveness of the deletions recommended in Annex (A). There are statements of a border-line nature concerning which it is difficult to tell whether or not an alert enemy might find a clue as to what our knowledge of his codes really is. However, if the record is also abridged by deletion of the matter enumerated in Annex (A), it would be devoid of any direct reference to information which we must keep from becoming public.

(f) The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that I am in favor of making public the parts of the record not referred to in the Annex. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that publication of a weeded record or of abridged Findings would have the following undesirable results:

(1) The picture presented would be disjointed and full of unexplained gaps. I think this would lead to a demand of Congress and by the Press for more information, on the ground that the part made public was incomplete, and that withholding of any information is indicative of a desire on the part of the Navy to whitewash high naval officers. A situation such as this might well lead to discussions that would inadvertently disclose just the information that we feel is vital to keep secret.

[4] (2) Admiral Kimmel's principal contention is that he was kept in the dark as to certain information which the Navy Department had obtained from various sources, including the breaking of Japanese codes. This is a matter which cannot be made public without irreparable damage to the conduct of the war. It is not unlikely that if there is a public release of some of the Facts and Opinions, but no release concerning matters in which Admiral Kimmel is particularly concerned, he may take further action to protect his own reputation. The potentialities are particularly dangerous, because Admiral Kimmel's civilian lawyers have now been informed, so I understand, of the existence and content of the many Japanese messages in question. I know of no means of keeping these lawyers from talking in public, except such ethical views as they may have concerning their responsibility for not doing anything that would jeopardize war operations. It is a question just how far they could be restrained by ethical considerations, if the Navy Department were to make public the part of the record which is unfavorable to Admiral Kimmel, while suppressing that part which he regards as a main element of his defense.

(3) I also invite attention to the fact that the Findings include certain Facts and Opinions critical of Army efficiency, ascertained by proceedings to which the Army was not a party. The publication of this part of the record might well result in an inter-service dispute, which would tend to bring out the very information which it is essential to conceal.

4. In regard to the requirements of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, I note that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify. This law does [15] not obligate the Secretary of the Navy to make any public statement of what the Court of Inquiry has ascertained. Furthermore, as I understand it, the President has definitely expressed himself as opposed to any act which might interfere with the war effort. I, therefore, conclude that there is no necessity for making anything public, except on the ground that something should be done to suppress the rumors and irresponsible accusations that are now current. I do not believe that such considerations in any way warrant jeopardizing the war effort by publicising all or any part of the record.

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5. With regard as to whether or not there should be any public statement, I offer the opinion that no steps should be taken without consulting the Secretary of War, and arranging for parallel action. The two Departments should not issue conflicting statements, nor should one keep silent while the other one makes a statement. Assuming that the War Department would take parallel action I recommend that there be no public release whatsoever. However, if the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War decide that there must be some report to the public, I recommend a statement to the Press in substance as follows:

"The Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed which warrant court martial proceedings against any person or persons in the naval service. The Secretary of the Navy approves the Findings. The record of the Court will not be made public while the war is in progress."

6. If you should find it advisable, at a later time, to issue a further statement it seems to me that it would also be desirable to make public in some manner the fact (see page 1160 of the record) that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends, that they met frequently, that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect, and that they [6] invariably conferred on matters bearing on the development of the Japanese situation and their several plans in preparing for war. This would refute the statements and rumors that have been prevalent to the effect that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were at odds with one another. Of course, no such statement could be made unless the Secretary of War concurs. If the Secretary of War does concur you might find occasion to make informal comment on the matter at a press conference.

/S/ E. J. King,
E. J. King.

TOP SECRET

ANNEX "A" To COMINCH SERIAL 003191

1. The following portions of the Record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry should not be made public, because they convey information which the enemy could use to the detriment of United States war operations.

(a) Volume 5 (the "Top Secret" volume).

(b) The following paragraphs of Volumes 1, 2,3, and 4:

(1) Volume 1

Page Paragraph Page Paragraph

166 683 255 174
172 739 256 179
213 Entire Page 266 180
214 116 266 260
214 117 266 261
214 127 297 81

(2) Volume 2

Page Paragraph Page Paragraph

315 25 470 3
315 26 470 4
326 145 471 5
328 153 471 6
344 226 471 7
396 54 471 8
427 43 471 9
430 54 472 15
432 63 473 18
432 64 473 19
463 18 473 20
463 19 473 21
463 20 473 22
465 24 483 51
466 25 534 40
466 26 563 168
466 27 567 187
468 38

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(3) Volume 3

Page Paragraph Page Paragraph

805 176 889 16
817 7 889 17
818 8 911 38
850 149

(4) Volume 4

Page Paragraph

938 34
939 35

(c) Also the following parts of the "Findings" in Volume 4: Page 1191. Third paragraph (beginning with words "on 24 November") and the despatch quoted therein.

Page 1192. Entire page.
Page 1193. Entire page.
Page 1194. First 3 lines
Page 1198. Last paragraph.
Page 1199. Entire page.
Page 1200. Entire page.
Page 1201. First 2 lines
Page 1206. Last paragraph.
Page 1207. Entire page.
Page 1208. First 7 lines.

Statement of Admiral Stark:

Paragraph 7.
Paragraph 8.

Statement of Admiral Kimmel:

Page 21. Last paragraph.
Page 22. First paragraph.

(d) All "Top Secret" exhibits, and the following exhibits listed in the index to Volume 1: 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 40, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 76, 76, 77.

NOTE

The Top Secret Second Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 6 Nov. 1944 by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, was not published, however a paraphrased copy of this endorsement was published.

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[1] TOP SECRET
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

FF1/A17-25.
Serial: 003224
TOP SECRET.

6 Nov 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor. Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.

Page 336

1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the first endorsement and to the following remarks.

2. (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two- thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on.

(b) In Fact III (page 1158) the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.

[2] (c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Kimmel) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.

(d) Fact V (page 1160) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently, that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which bad any bearing on the development of the United States- Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another.

(e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.

[3] (f) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions.

My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.

(g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base were necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment

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is that this principle is sound enough but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor *should* have been strong enough for self defense. The [4] fact that it *was not* strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for, employing the Fleet in defensive measures.

(h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.

[5] (i) Facts X and XI (page 1171) set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti-submarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance and the maintenance of augmented Condition 3 on board vessels in port. Condition of readiness No. 3 provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in Alert No. 1 which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that condition of readiness No. 3 is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises: 50% were on 4 hours notice (page 669). This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also points out that there were no longer range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads:

"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defence."

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This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on.

(j) Fact XII (page 1176). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

[7] Fact XIII (page 1178) discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170 and 350 to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson (pages 683, 1053, 1055).

(l) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor-both Army and Navy. It there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.

(m) Fact XV (1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install baffles appears to

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have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.

(n) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows:

[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.

(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.

(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a *surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

(o) Fact XVII (page 1193). In this section the Court sets forth certain in, formation, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:

(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days: [101] [sic] that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any time and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.

(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.

(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.

(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.

(p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming to all end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows:

[11] (1) A number of messages were received from informers during and prior to this period in the Navy Department but were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. These messages are summarized in the Addendum to the Court's Finding of Facts at the back of Volume 5 of the record. The test of the messages is set forth at length in Volume 5, beginning at page 692. These messages indicate definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor, and mention, in some cases, a desire to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel these despatehes, because to do so might jeopardize the secrecy which it was necessary to main as to the ability of the Navy Department to obtain them. This contention as some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the sources of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give

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Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information contained in these messages. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the despatehes he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at his disposal. I have to concur in this view.

(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at length into the handling of the "14 part message", originated in Tokyo and addressed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The first 13 parts were received in the Navy Department on 6 December at 2100, on that date. They set forth the Japanese views as to certain United States proposals for resolving matters under dispute between the [12] countries, and leave no doubt that the United States proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At or about 0700, 7 December, the 14th part of the message was received. This part of the message said that the Japanese Government had finally lost hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiation. This part of the message was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Mr. Hull at the State Department.

(3) At about 1030 on 7 December, the so-called "1:00 p. m. message" was received in the Navy Department. It directed the Japanese Ambassador deliver the 14 part message to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. on that day. This message was of significance because 1:00 p. m. in Washington was dawn at Honolulu. This message was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. 13 the significance of the "1:00 p. m. time of delivery". In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) Navy Department, or at least, some officers therein, appreciated that the formation just received pointed to the possibility—even to the probability-of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this mess came to his attention about 11:00 a.m., and that he immediately telephoned to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with Japan was imminent, and that an attack against Hawaii would be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the [13] need for sending this message, but after brief consideration asked General Marshall to include in his proposed despatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General Marshall sent a despatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting "what amounts to an ultimatum at 1:00 p.m., Washington time, on 7 December; that Japanese are under orders to destroy their codes immediately and that while the War Department does not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, you are to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of this communication." He sent this via commercial radio, which was then the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The despatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would have been of great value in a planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.

(4) On 3 December (the date is not specified in the Findings: it is stated Exhibit 20) Admiral Kimmel was [14] informed that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his statement, page 28) that "the significance of this despatch was diluted substantially by publication

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of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.

(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch directing the destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency". (Exhibit 22.)

(q) Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this section the Court sets forth matters which have already been discussed in the three preceding sub-paragraphs; and, in addition, touches on the matter of the so-called "Winds message". This Japanese message, originating in Tokyo on 19 November, was received in the Navy Department on 28 November. It set forth that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short wave news broadcast, and directed that when these words were heard codes were to be destroyed. This message was received in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected "weather forecast". On 4 and 5 December the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected "weather forecast" which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. The code words appearing in this implementing message meant that Japanese relations with Russia were [15] in danger. These two messages have been preserved in the files of the Federal Communications Commission. In addition to this indication that the Japanese were about to break relations with Russia, there is evidence (Volume 5, page 746) that Captain Safford, on duty in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications saw on 4 December, a "yellow slip" on which was written a different version of the implementing code, which meant that relations with the United States and Great Britain were in danger. Captain Safford thinks that this message was intercepted by an East Coast station, but he was not sure. No written trace of the message referred to by Captain Safford could be found in the files of the War Department or the Navy Department There is considerable testimony in the record as to what was done with the "Winds message." Various officers testified that the implementing despatches were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. *It is an established fact that none of the implementing messages were ever sent to Admiral Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.

(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII on page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."

[16] (s) Fact XIX (page 1200). The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.

(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy.

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It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained, despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; however, it appears to me that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.

3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion:

(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II (page 1201), the Court expresses the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's dispositions on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.

[17] (b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI (page 1202) the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and materiel which existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pear I Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and materiel at the time and that available means were spread thin throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications of that information which was given to him.

(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII (page 1202), the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.

(d) The Court holds (page 1203) that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.

(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX (page 1203), the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in [18] concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.

(f) The Opinion, based on Fact X (page 1204), expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.

(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI (page 1204), as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that

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no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening up of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.

[19] (h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII (page 1207), the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had been placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.

(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII (1207), the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.

(j) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX (page 1207), the Court expresses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had received regarding the Japanese situation, and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that information had been [20] received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisers did not construe this message as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the view of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the message in question nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu, and midnight in East Asia (page 14 of Top Secret Addendum to the Findings). It, therefore, seems evident, though Admiral Stark did not have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this message, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.

4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation (page 120S) the Court finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.

5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor [21] incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in at the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.

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(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.

[22] (2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds Message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the "1:00 p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.

(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the senseof intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.

(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December [23] concerning destruction of United States Secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:

(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.

(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessel in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.

(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.

6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in questions they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.

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[24] 7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.

8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the record bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.

E. J. King.
E. J. KING.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Memo for File: This is Admiral King's Second Endorsement, as paraphrased, by the deletion of the magic. This is the paraphrase that was made public because the public interest required that the magic not be made public.

JOHN FORD BAECHER, USNR,
Special Assistant to the Secretary.

COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

[Copy]

FF1/A17-25.
Serial:
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Correspondence re Court of Inquiry Investigating Pearl Harbor.
Enclosure: (A) Subject correspondence.

1. The attached file copy and rough draft (which was published) is the paraphrased version of my second endorsement to the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry investigating Pearl Harbor.

/S/ E. J. KING,
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy.

[1] COMINCH FILE

[admin]

UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SECOND ENDORSEMENT

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.

1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks.

2. (A) As to Facts I and II, the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from

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going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on.

(b) In Fact III the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.

[2] (c) Fact IV sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.

(d) Fact VI sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect, that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another.

(e) Part VI sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.

[3] (f) Fact VII sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.

(g) Fact VIII stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principles this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should have been strong enough for self-defense. The [4] fact that it was not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless,

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he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for employing the Fleet in defensive measures.

(h) Fact IX. This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that th basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.

[5] (i) Facts X and XI set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti- ubmarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "augmented Condition 3" on board vessels in port. "Condition of readiness No. 3" provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in "Alert No. 1" which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that "condition of readiness No 3" is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises; 50% were on 4 hours notice. This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also, points out that there were no long range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI reads:

"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defense."

This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on.

(J) Fact XII. The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that

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no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941 The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

[7] (k) Fact XIII discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore, unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes, using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the are between 170 and 350 to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.

(1) Fact XIV. This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor—both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.

(m) Fact XV states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department. Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.

(n) Fact XVI. In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject The more important items are as follows:

[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet,

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that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.

(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.

(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

(o) Fact XVII. In this section the Court sets forth certain information, which as known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather an elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:

(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days; [10] that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.

(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.

(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.

(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.

(p) Fact XVIII. This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows:

[11] (1) Information was received from trusted sources during and prior this period which was made available in the Navy Department but which was to sent to Admiral Kimmel. This information indicates definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor and indicates a desire in some cases to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel this information, because to do so might compromise the sources from which it was obtained. This intention has some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the source of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information which he was receiving. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the dispatches he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at Admiral Stark's disposal. I have to concur in this view.

(2) In addition to the foregoing, the Court goes at length into the handling certain information which was received in the Navy Department on the 6th of December, at 2100 on that date. The greater part of this information indicated the Japanese views concerning certain United States proposals for solving matters under dispute between the countries, and leaves no doubt that the United States' proposals were [12] unacceptable to Japan, but do

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not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At, or about, 0700, 7 December, further trustworthy information was received which indicated that the Japanese Government had finally given up hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. This information was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 the White House, and at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Secretary Hull at State Department.

(3) At about 10:30 A. M. on 7 December, further reliable information was received in the Navy Department. The substance was that the Japanese Ambassador was to deliver a note containing the information referred to in the preceding paragraph to the Secretary of State at 1:00 P.M. on that day. Information was of significance because 1:00 P. M. in Washington was dawn in Honolulu. It was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and immediately thereafter, to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull its significance. In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (Honolulu time) the Navy Department, or at least some officers therein, appreciated that the information just received pointed to the possibility—even probability—of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states this information came to his attention about 11:00 A. M. and that he immediately telephone [sic] to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General [13] Short that a break with Japan was imminent and that an attack against Hawaii could be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the need for sending this message, but after brief consideration, asked General Marshall to include in his proposed dispatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General Marshall sent a dispatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting what amounted to an ultimatum at 1:00 P. M. Washington time on 7 December; and that while the War Department did not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, he, General Short, was to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of this communication. He sent this via commercial radio, which was the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The dispatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 A. M. Honolulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would been of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.

[14] (4) On 3 December Admiral Kimmel was told that there was every reason to believe that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says that "the significance of this dispatch was diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.

(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch directing the destruction of Secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency. This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy Secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency."

(q) There was also available to the Navy Department on 25 November reliable information, received from a trusted source, to the effect that certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short-wave news broadcast. When these words were heard, codes were to be destroyed. This inform was available in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had

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it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected broadcast. On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected broadcast which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. Various officers testified that the implementing broadcasts were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but [15] Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. *It is an established fact that these implementing broadcasts [1] were never sent to Admiral Kimmel*. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.

(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII) that 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."

(s) Fact XIX. The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.

(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would [16] seem essential thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy. It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; [2] however, it appears to that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.

[17] 3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.

(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II, the Court expresses the view that presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary. And that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's disposition on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.

(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI, the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and material which existed in 1941 had an adverse bear upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of and material at the time and that available means were spread thin through the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the indications of that information which was given to him.

[1] Later investigations indicate that the vital implementing broadcasts were not, in fact, received by the Navy Department.

[2] Admiral Wilkinson's testimony was later received but did not change any of the opinions or facts established.

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[18] (c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII, the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this a narrow view of the question, and that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.

(d) The court holds that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.

(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, the plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.

[19] (f) The Opinion, based on Fact X, expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.

(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI, as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.

(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII, the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly he would have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.

[20] (i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XV II, the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.

[21] (j) In the opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX, the court presses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he received regarding the Japanese situation, and especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that information had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this

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Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisers did not construe this information as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the views of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the information, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1:00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia. It, therefore, seems evident, that though Admiral Stark did have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this information, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of information available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.

[22] 4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation the Court finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.

5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God," beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people are unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine possible courses of action they might have taken.

(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. Attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early accurate information [23] as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the best and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information able in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.

(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain information available to the Navy Department concerning the disposition of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the broadcast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

(3) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the information which he received indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m., which information Admiral Stark received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. [24] It appears that had this information been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it *might* have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last

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minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese attack.

(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.

(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" of 27 November; the 3 December information that the Japanese were destroying their codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter in outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facts of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be must given consideration. After weighing those considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:

(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.

[25] (2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.

(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been full [sic] operational.

6. The derelictions of the part of Admiral stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.

7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to position in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.

8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the records bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.

E. J. King
E. J. KING

[admin]

THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

[Stamped:] 1 Dec. 1944

Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.

1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, a Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find the evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.

2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet in the Second Endorsement, will include the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain the relevant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.