Inside Washington's Quest to Bring Down Edward Snowden

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PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-20

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Cyber Operations Policy (U)

This Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) supersedes National
Security Presidential Directive of July 7, 2004. This
directive complements, but does not affect, NSPD-54/Homeland
Security Presidential Directive on "Cybersecurity
Policy" of January 8, 2008; National Security Directive
on "National Policy for the Security of National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems" of July 5, 1990; and
PPD-8 on "National Preparedness" of March 30, 2011.

I. Definitions (U)

The following terms are defined for the purposes of this
directive and should be used when possible in interagency
documents and communications on this topic to ensure common
understanding. (U)

Cyberspace: The interdependent network of information
technology infrastructures that includes the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computers, information or
communications systems, networks, and embedded processors and
controllers. (U)

Network Defense: Programs, activities, and the use of tools
necessary to facilitate them (including those governed by
and conducted on a computer, network,
or information or communications system by the owner or with
the consent of the owner and, as appropriate, the users for
the primary purpose of protecting (1) that computer, network,
or system; (2) data stored on, processed on, or transiting
that computer, network, or system; or (3) physical and virtual
infrastructure controlled by that computer, network, or
system. Network defense does not involve or require accessing
or conducting activities on computers, networks, or
information or communications systems without authorization
from the owners or exceeding access authorized by the owners.
(U)

Malicious Cyber Activity: Activities, other than those
authorized by or in accordance with U.S. law, that seek to
compromise or impair the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of computers, information or communications
systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure
controlled by computers or information systems, or information
resident thereon. (U)

Cyber Effect: The manipulation, disruption, denial,
degradation, or destruction of computers, information or
communications systems, networks, physical or virtual
infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems,
or information resident thereon. (U)

Cyber Collection: Operations and related programs or
activities conducted by or on behalf of the United States
Government, in or through cyberspace, for the primary purpose
of collecting intelligence -- including information that can be
used for future operations -- from computers, information or
communications systems, or networks with the intent to remain
undetected. Cyber collection entails accessing a computer,
information system, or network without authorization from the
owner or operator of that computer, information system, or
network or from a party to a communication or by exceeding
authorized access. Cyber collection includes those activities
essential and inherent to enabling cyber collection, such as
inhibiting detection or attribution, even if they create cyber
effects.

Defensive Cyber Effects Operations (DCEO): Operations and
related programs or activities other than network defense or
cyber collection - conducted by or on behalf of the
United States Government, in or through cyberspace, that are
intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside
United States Government networks for the purpose of defending
or protecting against imminent threats or ongoing attacks or
malicious cyber activity against U.S. national interests from
inside or outside cyberspace.

Nonintrusive Defensive Countermeasures (NDCM): The subset of
DCEO that does not require accessing computers, information or
communications systems, or networks without authorization from
the owners or operators of the targeted computers, information
or communications systems, or networks or exceeding authorized
access and only creates the minimum cyber effects needed to
mitigate the threat activity.

Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (OCEO): Operations and
related programs or activities other than network defense,
cyber collection, or DCEO -- conducted by or on behalf of the
United States Government, in or through cyberspace, that are
intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside
United States Government networks.

Cyber Operations: Cyber collection, DCEO (including NDCM),
and OCEO collectively. (U)

Significant Consequences: Loss of life, significant
responsive actions against the United States, significant
damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy
consequences, or serious economic impact on the United States.
(U)

U.S. National Interests: Matters of vital interest to the
United States to include national security, public safety,
national economic security, the safe and reliable functioning
of "critical infrastructure," and the availability of "key
resources."1 (U)

Emergency Cyber Action: A cyber operation undertaken at the
direction of the head of a department or agency with
appropriate authorities who has determined that such action is
necessary, pursuant to the requirements of this directive, to
mitigate an imminent threat or ongoing attack against U.S.
national interests from inside or outside cyberspace and under
circumstances that at the time do not permit obtaining prior
Presidential approval to the extent that such approval would
otherwise be required.

II. Purpose and Scope (U)

The United States has an abiding interest in developing and
maintaining use of cyberspace as an integral part of U.S.
national capabilities to collect intelligence and to deter,
deny, or defeat any adversary that seeks to harm U.S. national
interests in peace, crisis, or war. Given the evolution in U.S.
experience, policy, capabilities, and understanding of the cyber
threat, and in information and communications technology, this
directive establishes updated principles and processes as part
of an overarching national cyber policy framework. (C/NF)

The United States Government shall conduct all cyber
operations consistent with the U.S. Constitution and other
applicable laws and policies of the United States, including
Presidential orders and directives. (C/NF)

The United States Government shall conduct DCEO and OCEO under
this directive consistent with its obligations under
international law, including with regard to matters of
sovereignty and neutrality, and, as applicable, the law of
armed conflict. (C/NF)

This directive pertains to cyber operations, including those
that support or enable kinetic, information, or other types of
operations. Most of this directive is directed exclusively to
DCEO and OCEO. (S/NF)

The United States Government has mature capabilities and
effective processes for cyber collection. (S/NF)

Therefore, this directive affirms and does not intend to alter
existing procedures, guidelines, or authorities for cyber
collection. (S/NF)

This directive provides a procedure for cyber collection
operations that are reasonably likely to result in
"significant consequences." [2] (S/NF)

The principles and requirements in this directive apply except
as otherwise lawfully directed by the President. With the
exception of the grant of authority to the Secretary of Defense
to conduct Emergency Cyber Actions as provided below, nothing in
this directive is intended to alter the existing authorities of,
or grant new authorities to, any United States Government
department or agency (including authorities to carry out
operational activities), or supersede any existing coordination
and approval processes, other than those of Nothing in
this directive is intended to limit or impair military
commanders from using DCEO or OCEO specified in a military
action approved by the President and previously coordinated and
deconflicted as required by existing processes and this
directive. (S/NF)

In addition, this directive does not pertain to or alter
existing authorities related to the following categories of
activities by or on behalf of the United States Government,
regardless of whether they produce cyber effects:

Activities conducted under section 503 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (as amended);

Activities conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, the approval authority delegated to the
Attorney General (AG) by section 2;5 of Executive Order 12333
(as amended), or law enforcement authorities; however, cyber
operations reasonably likely to result in significant
consequences still require Presidential approval, and
operations that reasonably can be expected to adversely affect
other United States Government operations still require
coordination under established processes;

Activities conducted by the United States Secret Service for
the purpose of protecting the President, the Vice President,
and others as defined in 18 U.S.C. 3056; however, cyber
operations reasonably likely to result in significant
consequences still require Presidential approval, and
operations that reasonably can be expected to adversely affect
other United States Government operations still require
coordination under established processes;

The use of online personas and other virtual operations [3] --
undertaken exclusively for counterintelligence, intelligence
collection, or law enforcement purposes that do not involve
the use of DCEO or OCEO;

Activities conducted in cyberspace pursuant to
counterintelligence authorities for the purpose of protecting
specific intelligence sources, methods, and activities;
Signals intelligence collection other than cyber collection as
defined in this directive;

Open-source intelligence collection;

Network defense;

Traditional electronic warfare [4] activities;

The development of content to support influence campaigns,
military deception, or military information support
operations; or

Simple transit of data or commands through networks that do
not create cyber effects on those networks. (S/NF)

III. Guiding Principles for DCEO and OCEO (U)

DCEO and OCEO may raise unique national security and foreign
policy concerns that require additional coordination and policy
considerations because cyberspace is globally connected. DCEO
and OCEO, even for subtle or clandestine operations, may
generate cyber effects in locations other than the intended
target, with potential unintended or collateral consequences
that may affect U.S. national interests in many locations. (S/NF)

The United States Government shall conduct DCEO and OCEO in a
manner consistent with applicable values, principles, and norms
for state behavior that the United States Government promotes
domestically and internationally as described in the
2011 "International Strategy for Cyberspace." (C/NF)

National-level strategic objectives and operational
necessities shall dictate what the United States Government
seeks to accomplish with DCEO and OCEO. (C/NF)

The United States Government shall integrate DCEO and OCEO, as
appropriate, with other diplomatic, informational, military,
economic, financial, intelligence, counterintelligence, and
law enforcement options, taking into account effectiveness,
costs, risks, potential consequences, foreign policy, and
other policy considerations. (C/NF)

The United States Government shall reserve the right to act in
accordance with the United States' inherent right of self
defense as recognized in international law, including through
the conduct of DCEO. (C/NF)

The United States Government shall conduct neither DCEO nor
OCEO that are intended or likely to produce cyber effects
within the United States unless approved by the President. A
department or agency, however, with appropriate authority may
conduct a particular case of DCEO that is intended or likely
to produce cyber effects within the United States if it
qualifies as an Emergency Cyber Action as set forth in this
directive and otherwise complies with applicable laws and
policies, including Presidential orders and directives. (C/NF)

The United States Government shall obtain consent from countries
in which cyber effects are expected to occur or those countries
hosting U.S. computers and systems used to conduct DCEO or OCEO
unless:

Military actions approved by the President and ordered by the
Secretary of Defense authorize nonconsensual DCEO or OCEO,
with provisions made for using existing processes to conduct
appropriate interagency coordination on targets, geographic
areas, levels of effect, and degrees of risk for the
operations;

DCEO is undertaken in accordance with the United States'
inherent right of self defense as recognized in international
law, and the United States Government provides notification
afterwards in a manner consistent with the protection of
U.S. military and intelligence capabilities and foreign policy
considerations and in accordance with applicable law; or

The President -- on the recommendation of the Deputies
Committee and, as appropriate, the Principals Committee --
determines that an exception to obtaining consent is
necessary, takes into account overall U.S. national interests
and equities, and meets a high threshold of need and effective
outcomes relative to the risks created by such an exception. (S/NF)

The information revealed to other countries in the course of
seeking consent shall be consistent with operational security
requirements and the protection of intelligence sources,
methods, and activities. (S/NF)

The United States Government, to ensure appropriate application
of these principles, shall make all reasonable efforts, under
circumstances prevailing at the time, to identify the adversary
and the ownership and geographic location of the targets and
related infrastructure where DCEO or OCEO will be conducted or
cyber effects are expected to occur, and to identify the people
and entities, including U.S. persons, that could be affected by
proposed DCEO or OCEO. (S/NF)

Additional Considerations for DCEO (U)

The Nation requires flexible and agile capabilities that
leverage the full resources of the United States Government to
conduct necessary and proportionate DCEO. These operations
shall conform to the following additional policy principles:

The United States Government shall reserve use of DCEO to
protect U.S. national interests in circumstances when network
defense or law enforcement measures are insufficient or cannot
be put in place in time to mitigate a threat, and when other
previously approved measures would not be more appropriate, or
if a Deputies or Principals Committee review determines that
proposed DCEO provides an advantageous degree of
effectiveness, timeliness, or efficiency compared to other
methods commensurate with the risks;

The United States Government shall conduct DCEO with the least
intrusive methods feasible to mitigate a threat;

The United States Government shall seek partnerships with
industry, other levels of government as appropriate, and other
nations and organizations to promote cooperative defensive
capabilities, including, as appropriate, through the use of
DCEO as governed by the provisions in this directive; and
Partnerships with industry and other levels of government for
the protection of critical infrastructure shall be coordinated
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with
relevant sector-specific agencies and, as appropriate, the
Department of Commerce (DOC). (S/NF)

The United States recognizes that network defense, design, and
management cannot mitigate all possible malicious cyber activity
and reserves the right, consistent with applicable law, to
protect itself from malicious cyber activity that threatens U.S.
national interests. (S/NF)

The United States Government shall work with private industry
-- through DHS, DOC, and relevant sector-specific agencies to
protect critical infrastructure in a manner that minimizes the
need for DCEO against malicious cyber activity; however, the
United States Government shall retain DCEO, including
anticipatory action taken against imminent threats, as
governed by the provisions in this directive, as an option to
protect such infrastructure. (S/NF)

The United States Government shall -- in coordination, as
appropriate, with DHS, law enforcement, and other relevant
departments and agencies, to include sector-specific agencies
-- obtain the consent of network or computer owners for
United States Government use of DCEO to protect against
malicious cyber activity on their behalf, unless the activity
implicates the United States' inherent right of self-defense
as recognized in international law or the policy review
processes established in this directive and appropriate legal
reviews determine that such consent is not required. (S/NF)

Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (U)

OCEO can offer unique and unconventional capabilities to advance
U.S. national objectives around the world with little or no
warning to the adversary or target and with potential effects
ranging from subtle to severely damaging. The development and
sustainment of OCEO capabilities, however, may require
considerable time and effort if access and tools for a specific
target do not already exist. (TS/NF)

The United States Government shall identify potential targets
of national importance where OCEO can offer a favorable
balance of effectiveness and risk as compared with other
instruments of national power, establish and maintain OCEO
capabilities integrated as appropriate with other U.S.
offensive capabilities, and execute those capabilities in a
manner consistent with the provisions of this directive.( TS/NF)

IV. Cyber Operations with Significant Consequences (U)

Specific Presidential approval is required for any cyber
operations including cyber collection, DCEO, and OCEO --
determined by the head of a department or agency to conduct the
operation to be reasonably likely to result in "significant
consequences" as defined in this directive. This requirement
applies to cyber operations generally, except for those already
approved by the President, even if this directive otherwise does
not pertain to such operations as provided in the "Purpose and
Scope" section of this directive. (S/NF)

V. Threat Response Operations (U)

Responses to Persistent Malicious Cyber Activity (U)

Departments and agencies with appropriate authorities
consistent with the provisions set forth in this directive and
in coordination with the Departments of State, Defense (DOD),
Justice (DOJ), and Homeland Security; the Federal Bureau of
Investigation the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence the National Security Agency the
Central Intelligence Agency the Departments of the
Treasury and Energy and other relevant members of the
Intelligence Community (IC) and sector-specific agencies -- shall
establish criteria and procedures to be approved by the
President for responding to persistent malicious cyber activity
against U.S. national interests. Such criteria and procedures
shall include the following requirements:

The United States Government shall reserve use of such
responses to circumstances when network defense or law
enforcement measures are insufficient or cannot be put in
place in time to mitigate the malicious cyber activity; and
Departments and agencies shall conduct these responses in a
manner not reasonably likely to result in significant
consequences and use the minimum action required to mitigate
the activity. (S/NF)

Emergency Cyber Actions

The Secretary of Defense is hereby authorized to conduct, or a
department or agency head with appropriate authorities may
conduct, under procedures approved by the President, Emergency
Cyber Actions necessary to mitigate an imminent threat or
ongoing attack using DCEO if circumstances at the time do not
permit obtaining prior Presidential approval (to the extent that
such approval would otherwise be required) and the department or
agency head determines that:

An emergency action is necessary in accordance with the
United States inherent right of self-defense as recognized in
international law to prevent imminent loss of life or
significant damage with enduring national impact on the
Primary Mission Essential Functions of the United States
Government,5 U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources,
or the mission of U.S. military forces;

Network defense or law enforcement would be insufficient or
unavailable in the necessary time-frame, and other previously
approved activities would not be more appropriate;

The Emergency Cyber Actions are reasonably likely not to
result in significant consequences;

The Emergency Cyber Actions will be conducted in a manner
intended to be nonlethal in purpose, action, and consequence;

The Emergency Cyber Actions will be limited in magnitude,
scope, and duration to that level of activity necessary to
mitigate the threat or attack;

The Emergency Cyber Actions, when practicable, have been
coordinated with appropriate departments and agencies,
including State, DOD, DES, DOJ, the Office of the DNI, FBI,
CIA, NSA, the Treasury, DOE, and other relevant members of the
IC and sector-specific agencies; and

The Emergency Cyber Actions are consistent with the
U.S. Constitution and other applicable laws and policies of
the United States, including Presidential orders and
directives. (S/NF)

In addition, Emergency Cyber Actions that are intended or likely
to produce cyber effects within the United States (or otherwise
likely to adversely affect U.S. network defense activities or
U.S. networks) must be conducted:

Under the procedures and, as appropriate, criteria for
domestic operations previously approved by the President; and
Under circumstances that at the time of the Emergency Cyber
Action preclude the use of network defense, law enforcement,
or some form of DOD support to civil authorities that would
prevent the threatened imminent loss of life or significant
damage. (S/NF)

Department and agency heads shall report Emergency Cyber Actions
to the President through the National Security Advisor as soon
as feasible. If the coordination specified above is not
practicable in the available time, then notification shall occur
after the fact as soon as possible to inform subsequent whole-
of-government response and recovery activities. (S/NF)

Until such time as any additional criteria for domestic
operations are approved by the President, authorization by
department and agency heads for Emergency Cyber Actions that are
intended or likely to produce cyber effects within the United
States (or otherwise likely to adversely affect U.S. network
defense activities or U.S. networks) shall be granted only if
the President has provided prior approval for such activity, or
circumstances at the time do not permit obtaining prior approval
from the President and such actions are conducted within the
other constraints defined above. (S/NF)

VI. Process (U)

The National Security Staff (NSS) shall formalize the functions
of the Cyber Operations Policy Working Group (COP-WG) as the
primary United States Government forum below the level of an
Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) for integrating DCEO or OCEO
policy, including consideration of exceptions or refinements to
the principles of this directive. The COP-WG shall work with
other elements of the policy community as appropriate to the
geographic or functional context of the DCEO- or OCEO~related
policy discussion at the earliest opportunity. The COP-WG is
not an operational group, but will address policy issues related
to the conduct of operations raised by departments and agencies
or the NSS. (S/NF)

Departments and agencies shall work through the to raise
unresolved or ambiguous policy questions in an integrated IPC
meeting of all appropriate national and economic security
stakeholders. The NSS shall use existing channels to elevate
any unresolved policy conflicts to the Deputies and Principals
Committees, as appropriate. (C/NF)

Departments and agencies shall continue to use existing
operational processes for cyber operations, except as those
processes are modified by or under this directive. Other types
of operations that are supported or enabled by cyber operations
shall use their existing operational processes. This continued
use of existing operational processes applies, for example, to
operations conducted under military orders that authorize DCEO
or OCEO, including clandestine preparatory activities. (C/NF)

Departments and agencies, during planning for proposed cyber
operations, shall use established processes [6] to coordinate and
deconflict with other organizations -- including, as appropriate,
State, DOD, DOJ, DES, members of the IC, and relevant sector-
specific agencies -- and obtain any other approvals required
under applicable policies, except as those processes are
modified by or under this directive. Departments and agencies
shall modify or enhance these processes as future circumstances
dictate. (S/NF)

Departments and agencies shall coordinate DCEO and OCEO with
State and Chiefs of Station or their designees in countries
where DCEO or OCEO are conducted or cyber effects are expected
to occur. (S/NF)

Coordination of DCEO and OCEO with network defense efforts shall
be sufficient to enable a whole-of-government approach to the
protection of U.S. national interests and shall identify
potential implications of proposed DCEO and OCEO for U.S.
networks, including potential adversary responses or unintended
consequences of U.S. operations for which the United States
Government or the private sector would need to prepare. This
coordination shall occur in a manner consistent with operational
security requirements and the protection of intelligence
sources, methods, and activities.

Toward this end of ensuring a unified whole-of-government
approach, departments and agencies shall coordinate and
deconflict DCEO and OCEO with network defense efforts of other
departments and agencies as appropriate. (S/NF)

In addition, DCEO and OCEO with potential implications for
U.S. networks shall be deconflicted as appropriate and
coordinated with DHS, appropriate law enforcement agencies,
and relevant sector-specific agencies. (S/NF)

The United States Government shall make all reasonable efforts
to identify and notify, as appropriate, private sector
entities that could be affected by DCEO and OCEO. (S/NF)

Policy Criteria (U)

Policy deliberations for DCEO and OCEO shall consider, but not
be limited to, the following criteria:

Impact: The potential threat from adversary actions or the
potential benefits, scope, and recommended prioritization of
proposed U.S. operations as compared with other approaches --
including, as appropriate, network defense by the
United States Government or private sector network operators;

Risks: Assessments of intelligence gain or loss, the risk of
retaliation or other impacts on U.S. networks or interests
(including economic), impact on the security and stability of
the Internet, and political gain or loss to include impact on
foreign policies, bilateral and multilateral relationships
(including Internet governance), and the establishment of
unwelcome norms of international behavior;

Methods: The intrusiveness, timeliness, efficiency, capacity,
and effectiveness of operational methods to be employed;

Geography and Identity: Geographic and identity aspects of
the proposed activity, including the location of operations
and the resulting effects, the identity of network owners and
users that will be affected, and the identity or type -- when
known -- of adversaries to be countered or affected by U.S.
operations;

Transparency: The need for consent or notification of network
or computer owners or host countries, the potential for impact
on U.S. persons and U.S. private sector networks, and the need
for any public or private communications strategies before or
after an operation; and

Authorities and Civil Liberties: The available authorities
and procedures and the potential for cyber effects inside the
United States or against U.S. persons. (S/NF)

Policy decisions shall be broad enough and include rationales in
order to provide guidelines and direction for future proposals
with the same operational and risk parameters.

Annex: Implementation (U)

Departments and agencies shall establish necessary Capabilities
and procedures for appropriate and timely implementation of DCEO
and OCEO policies in the national interest.

Policy Process (U)

Departments and agencies shall, as appropriate, conduct DCEO
and OCEO in accordance with the principles set forth in this
directive and shall bring forward to the COP-WG situations
that require policy discussion, including considerations of
exceptions to those principles, using the policy criteria
described in this directive. [Action: All; ongoing] (C/NF)

The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, shall
establish and operate the COP-WG to serve as the entry point
for interagency deliberations of policy matters related to
DCEO and OCEO. [Action: ongoing] (C/NF)

The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, as needed,
shall use the existing policy escalation process through an
appropriate joint IPC-level group involving all stakeholders
for a given situation, the Deputies Committee, and the
Principals Committee. This process shall clarify the
application of the principles set forth in this directive to
specific operations, including consideration of exceptions or
refinements to those principles. [Action: NSS; ongoing] (C/NF)

The NSS, as needed, shall lead reviews by appropriate
departments and agencies of legal issues associated with DCEO
and OCEO. The NSS shall refer legal questions to the chief
legal officers of the appropriate departments or agencies or
to DOJ for resolution of interagency disagreements or as
otherwise appropriate. [Action: ongoing] (C/NF)

The DNI shall continue to ensure, through appropriate policies
and procedures, the deconfliction, coordination, and
integration of all IC cyber operations and serve as the EC
focal point for strategic planning and policy coordination
related to cyber operations, both within the EC and with other
departments and agencies in interagency coordination
processes. [Actionz ongoing]

Policy Reviews and Preparation (U)

The Office of the DNI, in coordination with appropriate
departments and agencies, shall prepare a classification guide
for departments and agencies to use in the implementation of
the policies in this directive. [Action: Office of the
2 months after directive approval] (U) (C/NF)

The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, shall lead an
interagency review of the United States Government's
communications strategy: including public affairs guidance,
regarding DCEO and OCEO. Pending approval of this strategy by
the Deputies Committee, the United States Government's public
posture on related matters shall be: "All United States
Government activities in cyberspace are consistent with the
principles stated in the May 2011 International Strategy for
Cyberspace." [Action: NSS report to Deputies; 1 month after
directive approval] (C/NF)

The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, shall work
with the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security,
the AG, the DNI, relevant IC and sector-specific agencies, and
other heads of departments and agencies as appropriate to
develop for the conduct of Emergency Cyber Actions, as set
forth in this directive -- in addition to the previously cited
procedures and, as appropriate, domestic criteria to be
approved by the President -- detailed concepts of operation,
supporting processes, communications capabilities, exercises,
and training. In addition, the NSS -- working with these same
departments and agencies shall, as necessary, develop for
Presidential approval procedures and criteria for DCEO to be
conducted in response to malicious cyber activity. [Action:
NSS update on implementation to Deputies; 3 months after
directive approval] (TS/NF)

The Secretary of Defense, the DNI, and the Director of the CIA
in coordination with the AG, the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security, and relevant IC and sector-specific
agencies shall prepare for approval by the President through
the National Security Advisor a plan that identifies potential
systems, processes, and infrastructure against which the
United States should establish and maintain OCEO capabilities;
proposes circumstances under which OCEO might be used; and
proposes necessary resources and steps that would be needed
for implementation, review, and updates as U.S. national
security needs change. [Action: DOD, Office of the DNI, and
CIA update to Deputies on scope of plans; 6 months after
directive approval] (TS/NF)

The Secretary of Defense and other department and agency heads
as appropriate -- in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall develop and
maintain a flexible, agile capability for the purpose of using
DCEO to defend U.S. networks consistent with the provisions
set forth in this directive. [Action: DOD and others;
ongoing] (C/NF)

The Secretary of Defense -- in coordination with the
Secretaries of Homeland Security, Commerce, and State, the AG,
the DNI, and relevant IC and sectorwspecific agencies shall
develop a multi-phase plan to be approved by the Deputies
Committee for testing, reviewing, and implementing NDCM. The
plan shall be subjected to legal review and address
authorities, technical feasibility, operational risks, and
coordination procedures. [Action: DOD present first phase of
plans to Deputies; 2 months after directive approval] (S/NF)

The AG and the DNI -- in
collaboration with the Secretaries of
Defense, State, Commerce, and Homeland Security, and relevant
IC and sector-specific agencies shall develop a multi-phase
plan to be approved by the Deputies Committee for a test of
the applicability and efficacy of counterintelligence
authorities in the conduct of DCEO. The plan shall be
subjected to legal review and address technical feasibility,
operational risks, and coordination procedures. [Action: D0J
and Office of the DNI present first phase of plans to
Deputies; 2 months after directive approval] (S/NF)

The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the DNI, the
AG, and the Director of the CIA in collaboration as
appropriate with the Secretaries of State and Commerce and the
heads of relevant IC and sector-specific agencies shall
develop proposals to be approved by the President through the
National Security Advisor to ensure that a necessary framework
of proposed options, roles, and levels of delegation is in
place for the use of all appropriate United States Government
DCEO and OCEO capabilities to advance and defend U.S. national
interests, including actions taken in response to indications
of imminent threat or when the United States or the Internet
is subjected to a debilitating attack. This framework shall
consider how cyber operations capabilities will complement
other United States Government cyber capabilities, including
network defense and law enforcement. [Action: DOD, DHS, DOJ,
Office of the DNI, and CIA update to Deputies; 6 months after
directive approval] (S/NF)

Department and agency heads conducting DCEO or OCEO covered
under this directive shall report annually on the use and
effectiveness of operations of the previous year to the
President through the National Security Advisor. [Action:
relevant departments and agencies; ongoing until otherwise
directed] (S/NF)

Foundation Building (U)

The DNI, working with appropriate departments and agencies,
shall continue to lead interagency efforts to improve
intelligence collection in support of DCEO and OCEO, including
under conditions when Internet infrastructure is significantly
degraded. These efforts shall include an enhanced process for
sharing intelligence-based cyber threat information with the
private sector and international partners in the interest of
minimizing the need for DCEO. The DNI shall identify needed
investments -- including in research and development, testing,
and evaluation -- to help develop intelligence capabilities in
support of DCEO and OCEO. [Action: Office of the
ongoing] (S/NF)

The Secretary of State -- in coordination with the Secretaries
of Defense and Homeland Security, the AG, the DNI, and others
as appropriate shall continue to lead efforts to establish
an international consensus around norms of behavior in
cyberspace to reduce the likelihood of and deter actions by
other nations that would require the United States Government
to resort to DCEO. [Action: State; ongoing] (C/NF)

The AG -- through the FBI and in coordination as appropriate
with DHS, appropriate elements of the EC, and other
departments and agencies - shall continue to identify,
investigate, mitigate, and disrupt malicious cyber activity in
the interest of minimizing the need for DCEO. The AG, through
the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, shall lead
related interagency efforts by integrating, sharing,
coordinating, and collaborating on counterintelligence,
counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement
information from member organizations concerning
investigations of malicious cyber activity in order to
facilitate the use of all available authorities to address
such threats. These activities shall be coordinated with
other entities and the private sector as appropriate.
[Action: ongoing] (C/NF)

The Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and
Commerce -- along with the AG, the DNI, and others as
appropriate shall continue to advance interagency efforts
with international partners to increase their cyber capacities
for self protection and, where appropriate, to facilitate
cooperative defense of cyberspace in the interest of
minimizing the need for DCEO. The partnerships shall include
application of not only improvements to network defenses, but
also sharing -- as appropriate and consistent with operational
security requirements and the protection of intelligence
sources, methods, and activities -- of DCEO-related
information, tools, and methods consistent with the provisions
set forth in this directive, the National Disclosure Policy,
and with U.S. national interests. [Action: State, DOD, DHS,
DOC, and Office of the ongoing] (C/NF)

The Secretary of Homeland Security in coordination with the
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, the AG, the DNI, and the
heads of relevant sector-specific agencies -- shall continue to
lead interagency efforts to develop partnerships with other
levels of government and the private sector to increase the
nation's cyber capacities for self protection and, where
appropriate, to facilitate cooperative efforts to secure
cyberspace in the interest of minimizing the need for DCEO.
[Action: ongoing] (C/NF)

_______________

Notes:

1. As these terms are used in on "Critical Infrastructure,
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection" from December 17, 2003. (U)

2 referred to operations with significant consequences as "sensitive
offensive cyber operations."

3 Human intelligence operations undertaken via the Internet.

4 As defined by the Joint Dictionary 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms" (as amended through February 15, 2012):
military action involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to
control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic
warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic
protection, and electronic warfare support. (U)

5 As defined in on "National Continuity Policy" of May 9,
2007. (U)

6 Including the May 9, 2007, "Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) among
the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice and the Intelligence
Community Regarding Computer Network Attack and Computer Network Exploitation
Activities," and other operational Coordination processes that exist between
departments and agencies. (S/NF)

[admin]

Senate Approves Major Changes to Surveillance Laws in Passing USA Freedom Act
By VICE News
June 2, 2015

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The US Senate voted Tuesday in favor of passing the USA Freedom Act, which will replace key parts of controversial legislation that had allowed the government to conduct a mass surveillance program — largely unchecked — since the 9/11 attacks.

The 67-32 Senate vote came two days after key controversial pieces of the USA PATRIOT ACT expired, temporarily halting the government's contested anti-terror surveillance measures.

The House already voted on the Freedom Act, and it is now before President Barack Obama, who is expected to speedily give his seal of approval. Certain provisions in the Act mandate the phasing out of the National Security Agency's (NSA) bulk phone records collection program over the next six months.

The new, more restrictive legislation instead will allow officials to access phone records, which will remain with phone companies, as long as the agency has a search warrant.

The American Civil Liberties Union Tuesday praised the Senate vote on the Freedom Act, calling its passage a "milestone."

"This is the most important surveillance reform bill since 1978, and its passage is an indication that Americans are no longer willing to give the intelligence agencies a blank check," the ACLU's Legal Director Jameel Jaffer said in a statement. "It's a testament to the significance of the Snowden disclosures and also to the hard work of many principled legislators on both sides of the aisle. Still, no one should mistake this bill for comprehensive reform."

"The bill leaves many of the government's most intrusive and overbroad surveillance powers untouched, and it makes only very modest adjustments to disclosure and transparency requirements," he added.

Senate Republican leaders had initially attempted to block the Act's passage, but relented after proposed amendments to the House's bill failed.

Related: With a Deadline Looming, the Fate of the PATRIOT Act Is in Limbo

The Associated Press contributed to this report

[admin]

Keith Alexander Unplugged: on Bush/Obama, 1.7 million stolen documents and other matters
by Glenn Greenwald
May 8, 2014

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The just-retired long-time NSA chief, Gen. Keith Alexander, recently traveled to Australia to give a remarkably long and wide-ranging interview with an extremely sycophantic “interviewer” with The Australian Financial Review. The resulting 17,000-word transcript and accompanying article form a model of uncritical stenography journalism, but Alexander clearly chose to do this because he is angry, resentful, and feeling unfairly treated, and the result is a pile of quotes that are worth examining, only a few of which are noted below:

AFR: What were the key differences for you as director of NSA serving under presidents Bush and Obama? Did you have a preferred commander in chief?

Gen. Alexander: Obviously they come from different parties, they view things differently, but when it comes to the security of the nation and making those decisions about how to protect our nation, what we need to do to defend it, they are, ironically, very close to the same point. You would get almost the same decision from both of them on key questions about how to defend our nation from terrorists and other threats.

The almost-complete continuity between George W. Bush and Barack Obama on such matters has been explained by far too many senior officials in both parties, and has been amply documented in far too many venues, to make it newsworthy when it happens again. Still, the fact that one of the nation’s most powerful generals in history, who has no incentive to say it unless it were true, just comes right out and states that Bush and The Candidate of Change are “very close to the same point” and “you would get almost the same decision from both of them on key questions” is a fine commentary on a number of things, including how adept the 2008 Obama team was at the art of branding.

The fact that Obama, in 2008, specifically vowed to his followers angered over his campaign-season NSA reversal that he possessed “the firm intention — once I’m sworn in as president — to have my Attorney General conduct a comprehensive review of all our surveillance programs, and to make further recommendations on any steps needed to preserve civil liberties and to prevent executive branch abuse in the future” only makes that point a bit more vivid.

AFR: Can you now quantify the number of documents [Snowden] stole?

Gen. Alexander: Well, I don’t think anybody really knows what he actually took with him, because the way he did it, we don’t have an accurate way of counting. What we do have an accurate way of counting is what he touched, what he may have downloaded, and that was more than a million documents.

It’s hard to recall a better and clearer example of how mindless and uncritical the American media is when it comes to the unproven pronouncements of the U.S. Government. Back in December, 60 Minutes broadcast a now-notorious segment of pure access journalism in which they gullibly disseminated one false NSA claim after the next in exchange for being given exclusive(!) access to a few Secret and Exciting Rooms inside the agency’s headquarters. The program claimed that Snowden “is believed to still have access to 1.5 million classified documents he has not leaked”. On its Twitter account, 60 Minutes made this claim to promote its show:

How Edward Snowden managed to steal an alleged 1.7 million documents from the NSA. Sunday: http://t.co/gbrIu5yMcc

— 60 Minutes (@60Minutes) December 13, 2013

Mike McConnell, the vice chairman of Booz Allen and former Director of National Intelligence in the Bush administration, then claimed that “Snowden absconded with 1.7 million to 1.8 million documents.”

Ever since then, that Snowden “stole” 1.7 or 1.8 million documents from the NSA has been repeated over and over again by US media outlets as verified fact. The Washington Post‘s Walter Pincus, citing an anonymous official source, purported to tell readers that “among the roughly 1.7 million documents he walked away with — the vast majority of which have not been made public — are highly sensitive, specific intelligence reports”. Reuters frequently includes in its reports the unchallenged assertion that “Snowden was believed to have taken 1.7 million computerized documents.” Just this week, the global news agency told its readers that “Snowden was believed to have taken 1.7 million computerized documents.”

In fact, that number is and always has been a pure fabrication, as even Keith Alexander admits. The claimed number has changed more times than one can count: always magically morphing into randomly chosen higher and scarier numbers. The reality, in the words of the General, is that the US Government “really [doesn’t] know[] what he actually took with him” and they “don’t have an accurate way of counting”. All they know is how many documents he accessed in his entire career at NSA, which is a radically different question from how many documents he took. But that hasn’t stopped American media outlets from repeatedly affirming the inflammatory evidence-free claim that Snowden took 1.7 million documents. As usual, even the most blatantly unreliable claims from National Security State officials are treated as infallible papal pronouncements by our Adversarial Watchdog Press.

There’s an equally vital point made by Alexander’s admission. The primary defense of the NSA and its defenders is that one need not worry about the staggering sums of data they collect because they have implemented very rigorous oversight mechanisms and controls that prevent abuse. Yet Edward Snowden spent months downloading a large amount of highly sensitive documents right under their noses. And not only did they have no idea that he was doing it, but now – even after spending large sums of money to find out – they are still completely incapable of learning which documents he took or even how many he took. Does that at all sound like a well-managed, tightly controlled system that you can trust to safeguard your most personal data and to detect and prevent abuse of this system by the tens of thousands of people who have access to it?

AFR: What is your personal opinion on the decision to award a Pulitzer Prize to the Guardian and Washington Post newspapers for their “revelation of widespread secret surveillance by the National Security Agency, helping through aggressive reporting to spark a debate about the relationship between the government and the public over issues of security and privacy”?

Gen. Alexander: I’m greatly disappointed that we have rewarded those who have put so many lives at risk. I think that’s the best way to say that. . . . At the end of the day, I believe peoples’ lives will be lost because of the Snowden leaks because we will not be able to protect them with capabilities that were once effective but are now being rendered ineffective because of these revelations.

There are few things in life more ironic than being accused by U.S. Generals, including those who participated in the war in Iraq, of being responsible for the loss of lives. For that sort of irony, nothing will beat that episode where the US Pentagon chief and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that WikiLeaks – not themselves, but WikiLeaks – has “blood on its hands” by virtue of publishing documents about the U.S. war in Afghanistan. In the world of the U.S. National Security State and its loyal media, those who go around the world killing innocent people over and over are noble and heroic, while those who report on what they do are the ones with “blood on their hands”.

But what makes this claim so remarkable is how often it is made and how false it always turns out to be. The accusation about WikiLeaks was ultimately demonstrated to be false. The same was true of the identical claim made about NSA whistleblower Thomas Drake, and the leaker who exposed the Bush-era warrantless eavesdropping program, and Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg, and virtually every other person who has brought unwanted transparency to what the U.S. Government is doing in the dark. But accusing whistleblowers and journalists of causing the deaths of innocent people is a tactic people like Gen. Alexander continue to embrace because it’s virtually never pointed out by our stalwart media how many times that claim has been proven to be an utter fabrication.

* * * * *

The release date for my book on the NSA, privacy, and our reporting of the surveillance story, No Place to Hide, is next Tuesday, May 13, at which time all of the previously unpublished NSA documents that are reported on in the book will be placed online, with free access, at the book’s website.

[admin]

WikiLeaks 'has blood on its hands' over Afghan war logs, claim US officials
by David Leigh
July 30. 2010

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• Defence secretary describes leak as 'potentially dangerous'
• 'Loose' intelligence policy in US army to be reviewed


Julian Assange said WikiLeaks tried to follow a request to redact some names but the US refused to help. Photograph: Linda Nylind for the Guardian Linda Nylind/Guardian

WikiLeaks and its editor-in-chief, Julian Assange, have come under attack from US officials and their allies for potentially endangering informants and troops in Afghanistan by posting the texts of thousands of leaked war logs.

The US defence secretary, Robert Gates, claimed in Washington: "The battlefield consequences are potentially severe and dangerous for our troops, our allies and Afghan partners, and may well damage our relationships and reputation in that key part of the world."

Gates said sensitive intelligence which could endanger informants had been widely distributed down to junior level in the US army, in a loose policy which might now have to be reconsidered.

"We endeavour to push access to sensitive battlefield information down to where it is most useful – on the front lines – where as a practical matter there are fewer restrictions and controls than at rear headquarters," he said. "In the wake of this incident, it will be a real challenge to strike the right balance between security and providing our frontline troops the information they need."

Admiral Mike Mullen, who chairs the joint chiefs of staff, said: "Mr Assange can say whatever he likes about the greater good he thinks he and his source are doing, but the truth is they might already have on their hands the blood of some young soldier or that of an Afghan family."

The Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, called the disclosure of the names of Afghans who had co-operated with Nato and US forces "irresponsible and shocking". He said in Kabul: "Whether those individuals acted legitimately or illegitimately in providing information to the Nato forces, their lives will be in danger."

WikiLeaks withheld some 15, 000 intelligence reports to protect informants. But some of the posted texts contain details of Afghans who have dealt with the coalition.

Assange said today that they had tried to comply with a private White House request to redact the names of informants before publication. But the US authorities had refused to assist them.

He said in a statement: "Secretary Gates speaks about hypothetical blood, but the grounds of Iraq and Afghanistan are covered with real blood."

Thousands of children and adults had been killed and the US could have announced a broad inquiry into these killings, "but he decided to treat these issues with contempt''.

He said: "This behaviour is unacceptable. We will continue to expose abuses by this administration and others."

Meanwhile, both US and UK authorities remained silent about the disclosures in the 92,000 war log files that hundreds of civilians have been killed or wounded by coalition forces in unreported or previously under-reported incidents. The Ministry of Defence withdrew promises to make an official statement about US allegations that two units of British troops had caused exceptional loss of civilian life.

MoD sources said that at least 15 of the 21 alleged cases had now been confirmed, but they were unable to say what investigations had subsequently taken place, or when they would now make a statement.

A detachment of the Coldstream Guards was newly arrived in Kabul when innocent civilians were shot on four separate occasions in October-November 2007.

Several different companies of Royal Marine commands are alleged to have shot civilians who came "too close" to convoys or patrols on eight occasions in Helmand province during the six-month period ending in March 2008.

Sources said that the then Labour foreign secretary, David Miliband, was so concerned about civilian deaths that he helped push forward a UN resolution in 2008, setting up an UN system to monitor such casualties.

But it does not function effectively, according to the independent Human Rights Watch. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported 828 civilian deaths in 2008, thanks to "pro-government forces", saying force protection incidents, "are of continuing concern", where innocent drivers, car passengers or motorcyclists, are shot by passing troops.

The US authorities are concentrating their firepower on leakers and their friends. Gates said the FBI had been called in to widen the criminal investigation into Private Bradley Manning, who is in military custody charged with leaking a classified video showing Apache pilots gunning down two Reuters cameramen in Baghdad who they believed might be insurgents.

Manning is being moved from a military jail in Kuwait to Quantico, Virginia, and the FBI will now be able to investigate civilians such as Assange, for possible conspiracy offences. Assange's whereabouts were unknown today.

• This article was amended on 2 August 2010. The original referred to Qauntico, Maryland. This has been corrected.

[admin]

Obama officials caught deceiving about WikiLeaks
The private statements and reports continue to come out that contradict the administration's public claims
by Glenn Greenwald
January 19, 2011

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President Bush and President-elect Obama walk along the West Wing Colonnade of the White House in Washington, Monday, Nov. 10,2008, prior to their meeting. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)(Credit: Associated Press)

(updated below)

Whenever the U.S. Government wants to demonize a person or group in order to justify attacks on them, it follows the same playbook: it manufactures falsehoods about them, baselessly warns that they pose Grave Dangers and are severely harming our National Security, peppers all that with personality smears to render the targeted individuals repellent on a personal level, and feeds it all to the establishment American media, which then dutifully amplifies and mindlessly disseminates it all. That, of course, was the precise scheme that so easily led the U.S. into attacking Iraq; it’s what continues to ensure support for the whole litany of War on Terror abuses and the bonanza of power and profit which accompanies them; and it’s long been obvious that this is the primary means for generating contempt for WikiLeaks to enable its prosecution and ultimate destruction (an outcome the Pentagon has been plotting since at least 2008).

When WikiLeaks in mid-2010 published documents detailing the brutality and corruption at the heart of the war in Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, held a Press Conference and said of WikiLeaks (and then re-affirmed it on his Twitter account) that they “might already have on their hands the blood of some young soldier or that of an Afghan family.” This denunciation predictably caused the phrase “blood on their hands” to be attached to WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange, in thousands of media accounts around the world. But two weeks later, the Pentagon’s spokesman, when pressed, was forced to admit that there was no evidence whatsoever for that accusation: ”we have yet to see any harm come to anyone in Afghanistan that we can directly tie to exposure in the WikiLeaks documents,” he admitted. Several months later, after more flamboyant government condemnations of WikiLeaks’ release of thousands of Iraq War documents, McClatchy‘s Nancy Youssef — in an article headlined: ”Officials may be overstating the danger from WikiLeaks” — reported that “U.S. officials concede that they have no evidence to date“ that the disclosures resulted in the deaths of anyone, and she detailed the great care WikiLeaks took in that Iraq War release to protect innocent people.

The disclosure of American diplomatic cables triggered still more melodramatic claims from government officials (ones faithfully recited by its servants and followers across the spectrum in Washington), accusing WikiLeaks of everything from ”attacking” the U.S. (Hillary Clinton) and “plac[ing] at risk the lives of countless innocent individuals” and “ongoing military operations” (Harold Koh) to being comparable to Terrorists (Joe Biden). But even Robert Gates was unwilling to lend his name to such absurdities, and when asked, mocked these accusations as “significantly overwrought” and said the WikiLeaks disclosures would be “embarrassing” and “awkward” but would have only “modest consequences.”

Since then, it has become clear how scrupulously careful WikiLeaks has been in releasing these cables in order to avoid unnecessary harm to innocent people, as the Associated Press reported how closely WikiLeaks was collaborating with its newspaper partners in deciding which cables to release and what redactions were necessary. Indeed, one of the very few documents which anyone has been able to claim has produced any harm — one revealing that the leader of Zimbabwe’s opposition privately urged U.S. officials to continue imposing sanctions on his country — was actually released by The Guardian, not by WikiLeaks.

To say that the Obama administration’s campaign against WikiLeaks has been based on wildly exaggerated and even false claims is to understate the case. But now, there is evidence that Obama officials have been knowingly lying in public about these matters. The long-time Newsweek reporter Mark Hosenball — now at Reuters — reports that what Obama officials are saying in private about WikiLeaks directly contradicts their public claims:

Internal U.S. government reviews have determined that a mass leak of diplomatic cables caused only limited damage to U.S. interests abroad, despite the Obama administration’s public statements to the contrary.

A congressional official briefed on the reviews said the administration felt compelled to say publicly that the revelations had seriously damaged American interests in order to bolster legal efforts to shut down the WikiLeaks website and bring charges against the leakers. . . .

“We were told (the impact of WikiLeaks revelations) was embarrassing but not damaging,” said the official, who attended a briefing given in late 2010 by State Department officials. . .

But current and former intelligence officials note that while WikiLeaks has released a handful of inconsequential CIA analytical reports, the website has made public few if any real intelligence secrets, including reports from undercover agents or ultra-sensitive technical intelligence reports, such as spy satellite pictures or communications intercepts. . . .

National security officials familiar with the damage assessments being conducted by defense and intelligence agencies told Reuters the reviews so far have shown “pockets” of short-term damage, some of it potentially harmful. Long-term damage to U.S. intelligence and defense operations, however, is unlikely to be serious, they said. . . .

Shortly before WikiLeaks began its gradual release of State Department cables last year, department officials sent emails to contacts on Capitol Hill predicting dire consequences, said one of the two congressional aides briefed on the internal government reviews.

However, shortly after stories about the cables first began to appear in the media, State Department officials were already privately playing down the damage, the two congressional officials said.

[admin]

Pentagon Sees a Threat From Online Muckrakers
By STEPHANIE STROM
MARCH 17, 2010

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To the list of the enemies threatening the security of the United States, the Pentagon has added WikiLeaks.org, a tiny online source of information and documents that governments and corporations around the world would prefer to keep secret.

The Pentagon assessed the danger WikiLeaks.org posed to the Army in a report marked “unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal sanctions.” It concluded that “WikiLeaks.org represents a potential force protection, counterintelligence, OPSEC and INFOSEC threat to the U.S. Army” — or, in plain English, a threat to Army operations and information.

WikiLeaks, true to its mission to publish materials that expose secrets of all kinds, published the 2008 Pentagon report about itself on Monday.

Lt. Col. Lee Packnett, an Army spokesman, confirmed that the report was real. Julian Assange, the editor of WikiLeaks, said the concerns the report raised were hypothetical.

“It did not point to anything that has actually happened as a result of the release,” Mr. Assange said. “It contains the analyst’s best guesses as to how the information could be used to harm the Army but no concrete examples of any real harm being done.”

WikiLeaks, a nonprofit organization, has rankled governments and companies around the world with its publication of materials intended to be kept secret. For instance, the Army’s report says that in 2008, access to the Web site in the United States was cut off by court order after Bank Julius Baer, a Swiss financial institution, sued it for publishing documents implicating Baer in money laundering, grand larceny and tax evasion. Access was restored after two weeks, when the bank dropped its case.

Governments, including those of North Korea and Thailand, also have tried to prevent access to the site and complained about its release of materials critical of their governments and policies.

The Army’s interest in WikiLeaks appears to have been spurred by, among other things, its publication and analysis of classified and unclassified Army documents containing information about military equipment, units, operations and “nearly the entire order of battle” for American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in April 2007.

WikiLeaks also published an outdated, unclassified copy of the “standard operating procedures” at the military prison in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. WikiLeaks said the document revealed methods by which the military prevented prisoners from meeting with the International Red Cross and the use of “extreme psychological stress” as a means of torture.

The Army’s report on WikiLeaks does not say whether WikiLeaks’ analysis of that document was accurate. It does charge that some of WikiLeaks’s other interpretation of information is flawed but does not say specifically in what way.

The report also airs the Pentagon’s concern over some 2,000 pages of documents WikiLeaks released on equipment used by coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Pentagon concluded that such information could be used by foreign intelligence services, terrorist groups and others to identify vulnerabilities, plan attacks and build new devices.

WikiLeaks, which won Amnesty International’s new media award in 2009, almost closed this year because it was broke and still operates at less than its full capacity. It relies on donations from humans rights groups, journalists, technology buffs and individuals, and Mr. Assange said it had raised just two-thirds of the $600,000 needed for its budget this year and thus was not publishing everything it had.

Perhaps the most amusing aspect of the Army’s report, to Mr. Assange, was its speculation that WikiLeaks is supported by the Central Intelligence Agency. “I only wish they would step forward with a check if that’s the case,” he said.

[admin]

Clapper Reads From the Bush/Cheney/Nixon Playbook to Fear-Monger Over Transparency
by Glenn Greenwald
February 12, 2014

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James Clapper, President Obama’s top national security official, is probably best known for having been caught lying outright to Congress about NSA activities, behavior which (as some baseball players found out) happens to be a felony under federal law. But -– like torturers and Wall Street tycoons before him -– Clapper has been not only shielded from prosecution, and not only allowed to keep his job; he has has now been anointed the arbiter of others’ criminality, as he parades around the country calling American journalists “accomplices”. Yesterday, as Wired’s Dave Kravets reports, the “clearly frustrated” Clapper went before a Senate committee (different than the one he got caught lying to) to announce that the Snowden disclosures are helping the terrorists:

We’re beginning to see changes in the communications behavior of adversaries: particularly terrorists. A disturbing trend, which I anticipate will continue . . . Terrorists and other adversaries of this country are going to school on U.S. intelligence sources, methods, and tradecraft. And the insights they’re gaining are making our job in the intelligence community much, much harder. And this includes putting the lives of members or assets of the intelligence community at risk, as well as those of our armed forces, diplomats, and our citizens.

As Kravets notes, “Clapper is not the most credible source on Snowden and the NSA leaks.” Moreover, it’s hardly surprising that Clapper is furious at these disclosures given that “Snowden’s very first leak last June” – revelation of the domestic surveillance program – “had the side-effect of revealing that Clapper had misled the public and Congress about NSA spying.” And, needless to say, Clapper offered no evidence at all to support his assertions yesterday; he knows that, unlike Kravets, most establishment media outlets will uncritically trumpet his claims without demanding evidence or even noting that he has none.

But in general, it’s hardly surprising that national security officials claim that unwanted disclosures help terrorists. Fear-mongering comes naturally to those who wield political power. Particularly in post-9/11 America, shouting “terrorists!” has been the favorite tactic of the leadership of both parties to spread fear and thus induce submission.

In a recent New York Times op-ed detailing how exploitation of terrorism fears is the key to sustaining the modern surveillance state, Northwestern University Philosophy Professor Peter Ludlow wrote that “since 9/11 leaders of both political parties in the United States have sought to consolidate power by leaning … on the danger of a terrorist attack”. He recounted that ”Machiavelli notoriously argued that a good leader should induce fear in the populace in order to control the rabble” and that “Hobbes in ‘The Leviathan’argued that fear effectively motivates the creation of a social contract in which citizens cede their freedoms to the sovereign.” It would be surprising if people like Clapper didn’t do this.

But what has struck me is how seriously many media figures take this claim. In the vast majority of interviews I’ve done about NSA reporting, interviewers adopt a grave tone in their voice and trumpet the claims from U.S. officials that our reporting is helping the terrorists. They treat these claims as though they’re the by-product of some sort of careful, deliberative, unique assessment rather than what it is: the evidence-free tactics national security state officials reflexively invoke to discredit all national security journalism they dislike. Let’s review a bit of history to see how true that is.

Here, for instance, is Dick Cheney, in a June, 2006 speech, condemning The New York Times for its reporting on the NSA warrantless eavesdropping and SWIFT banking programs, sounding exactly like James Clapper yesterday, along with countless Democratic commentators and blogs over the last year:

Some in the press, in particular The New York Times, have made it harder to defend America against attack by insisting on publishing detailed information about vital national security programs.

First they reported the terrorist surveillance program, which monitors international communications when one end is outside the United States and one end is connected with or associated with al Qaeda. Now the Times has disclosed the terrorist financial tracking program.

On both occasions, the Times had been asked not to publish those stories by senior administration officials. They went ahead anyway. The leaks to The New York Times and the publishing of those leaks is very damaging to our national security.

The ability to intercept al Qaeda communications and to track their sources of financing are essential if we’re going to successfully prosecute the global war on terror. Our capabilities in these areas help explain why we have been so successful in preventing further attacks like 9/11. And putting this information on the front page makes it more difficult for us to prevent future attacks. Publishing this highly classified information about our sources and methods for collecting intelligence will enable the terrorists to look for ways to defeat our efforts. These kinds of stories also adversely affect our relationships with people who work with us against the terrorists. In the future, they will be less likely to cooperate if they think the United States is incapable of keeping secrets.

Cheney was joined by George Bush, who called the NYT’s reporting “disgraceful” and said: “The fact that a newspaper disclosed it makes it harder to win this war on terror.” Bush White House spokesman Tony Snow added: “In choosing to expose this program, despite repeated pleas from high-level officials on both sides of the aisle, including myself, the Times undermined a highly successful counterterrorism program and alerted terrorists to the methods and sources used to track their money trail.”

Bush made exactly the same accusations in 2005 as Clapper did yesterday after the NYT back then (finally) revealed the NSA’s warrantless eavesdropping program. “My personal opinion is it was a shameful act for someone to disclose this very important program in a time of war. The fact that we’re discussing this program is helping the enemy….It is a shameful act by somebody who has got secrets of the United States government and feels like they need to disclose them publicly.” A week later, Bush officials announced a criminal investigation of the leaks and said: “Our enemies have learned information they should not have, and the unauthorized disclosure of this effort damages our national security and puts our citizens at risk. Revealing classified information is illegal, alerts our enemies, [and] endangers our country.”

Meanwhile, the GOP-led House actually passed a formal resolution condemning the NYT and “call[ing] on news organizations to avoid exposing Americans ‘to the threat of further terror attacks” by revealing U.S. government methods of tracking terrorists.” Then House Majority Leader John Boehner said: “We’ve just tipped off all of the terrorists around the world that here is another way that we could have caught you, but now you know about it.” Rep. Mike Oxley, the GOP Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, called the paper’s reporting “treasonous”, saying: “We are at war, ladies and gentlemen. Now some of you folks find that an inconvenient fact.” GOP Congressman Peter King called for the prosecution of the Times journalists and editors responsible for the stories – “We’re at war, and for the Times to release information about secret operations and methods is treasonous,” he said – just as he’s done for journalists involved in the current NSA reporting.

These same platitudes have been hauled out by U.S. officials for decades. When Daniel Ellsberg disclosed the Pentagon Papers, Nixon officials repeatedly smeared him – with no evidence – as likely working in conjunction with Russia (sound familiar?), while he and the NYT were repeatedly accused of damaging national security, putting our men and women in uniform in harm’s way, and helping America’s enemies.

Political officials hate transparency.They would rather be able to hide what they’re doing. They therefore try to demonize those who impose transparency with the most extreme and discrediting accusations they can concoct (you’re helping terrorists kill Americans!). The more transparency one imposes on them, the more extreme and desperate this accusatory rhetoric becomes. This is not complicated. It’s all very basic.

James Clapper is saying exactly what Dick Cheney and George Bush before him said, and those three said what John Ehrlichman and Henry Kissinger said before them about Ellsberg. It’s all spouted with no evidence. It’s rote and reflexive. It’s designed to smear and fear-monger. As Professor Ludlow notes, “Fear is even used to prevent us from questioning the decisions supposedly being made for our safety.”

Maybe it’s time for journalists to cease being the leading advocates for state secrecy and instead take seriously their claimed role as watchdogs. At the very least, demand evidence before these sorts of highly predictable, cliched attacks are heralded as something to be taken seriously. As it is, they’re just cartoons: ones that are played over and over and over.

Murtaza Hussain contributed research and reporting.

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Is This a Video of the Director of National Intelligence Lying to Congress? [Updated]
By Dan Amira
June 6, 2013

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As we now know, the NSA has been collecting data on millions of domestic and international phone calls for some time now — since 2006, according to Dianne Feinstein. Maybe this bothers you; maybe it doesn't. Feinstein insists the program is an essential part of "protecting America"; Congressman Mike Rogers says it has already been "used to stop a terrorist attack in the United States."

But one person who doesn't like the idea of the NSA spying on Americans is Oregon senator Ron Wyden. And at a hearing in March, he asked James Clapper, the director of National Intelligence, a straightforward question: "Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?"

Clapper's answer? "No, sir ... not wittingly."

Update, 5:13 p.m.: Clapper tells the National Journal, "What I said was, the NSA does not voyeuristically pore through U.S. citizens' e-mails. I stand by that." Except ... that's not what he said.

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18 U.S. Code § 1001 - Statements or entries generally

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(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or

(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years.

(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.

(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to—

(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or

(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 749; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(L), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147; Pub. L. 104–292, § 2, Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3459; Pub. L. 108–458, title VI, § 6703(a), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3766; Pub. L. 109–248, title I, § 141(c), July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 603.)

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House Intelligence chairman hints at Russian help in Snowden leaks
BY TOM CURRY
NBC NEWS NATIONAL AFFAIRS WRITER
Jan 18, 2014

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A leading House Republican is raising questions about Russia's involvement in the largest security leak in recent U.S. history.

House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers said that former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, who has leaked details of the NSA’s surveillance operations, “was a thief who we believe had some help.”

In an interview to be aired Sunday on NBC’s Meet the Press, Rogers said that rather Snowden being a crusader for Americans’ privacy, “the vast majority” of what Snowden stole “had nothing to do with privacy. Our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines have been incredibly harmed by the data that he has taken with him and we believe now is in the hands of nation states.”

The Michigan Republican added that there are still “certain questions that we have to get answered” about who helped Snowden remove data from the NSA and later make it public in newspapers in the United States and Britain.

“He was stealing information that had to do with how we operate overseas to collect information to keep Americans safe…. And some of the things he did were beyond his technical capabilities” -- a fact which Rogers said “raises more questions. How he arranged travel before he left. How he was ready to go, he had a go bag, if you will.”

Rogers added that he believes “there's a reason he ended up in the hands, the loving arms, of an FSB (Russian security service) agent in Moscow. I don't think that's a coincidence….I don't think it was a gee-whiz luck event that he ended up in Moscow under the handling of the FSB.”

It was mostly in response to Snowden’s disclosures that President Barack Obama announced Friday some restrictions on how the NSA will collect data and conduct surveillance.

Separately, Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution in Washington and a former CIA official, said Friday that one key question now in the Snowden affair is “Is it really Edward Snowden who is doing this, or is there a larger apparatus? I know that many people in the intelligence community… now no longer regard Edward Snowden as a thief or a traitor…. They regard him as a defector” who has gone over to a foreign intelligence agency.