Part 2 of 2
Har Dayal’s “simplicity, sincerity and sacrifice” bore fruit and within two years he was able to organise the scattered elements of the movement into a powerful organisation. The Government of India gave credit to Har Dayal as the founder of the Ghadr Party, but Sohan Singh Bhakna asserts that “it is wrong to say that Har Dayal was the founder of the “Ghadr Party.” He admits, however, that Har Dayal was a prominent member of the party. 95 No one can deny that other leaders in Canada and the US tried to make a common front, but had failed and it was only Har Dayal who brought them together and placed before them an objective to be achieved by whatever means available.
Even before the formation of the Ghadr Party, Hopkinson had recommended to the Government of India that if it was possible to secure the deportation of Har Dayal, the seditious movement started “by him to bring in other men of his stamp” was likely to be nipped in the bud and would serve as a setback to others who intended to come out to the United States. But the Government of India were opposed to the deportation of Har Dayal, and the Viceroy even dissuaded the Secretary of State from taking such a course of action. 96 But after the formation of the Ghadr Party, and when the Indians on the Pacific Coast had started regarding Har Dayal as a Messiah and the only man who could deliver India free from the hands of the oppressor (the British Government), 97 the authorities in England and India considered it a matter of dire necessity to remove him from the scene of action. To achieve this objective they actively employed their secret agents in the United States.
Hopkinson had already introduced P.H.E. Pandian in the ranks of the Ghadr Party and it was through him that the proceedings against Har Dayal were initiated by the US Government. 98 All this was done secretly. In the account which was later submitted to the Foreign Office, Pandian mentioned that it was he who informed the US Government regarding the despatch of the revolutionary leaflets by Har Dayal to India when the bomb was thrown at the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge at Delhi. He further admitted:
I gave evidence before the Justice of Peace of the United States of America and can boldly say that I was one of the chief instruments in having Har Dayal arrested by the US Government. I gave evidence before the US Immigration Officer that he is an anarchist. 99
The Government of India were anxious that after his arrest Har Dayal should be brought to India and that a representation might be made to the US Government through diplomatic channels for deportation. But Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador, advised the Foreign Office to refrain from making any official representation since according to his information Har Dayal had made no secret in his public speeches of his political views and was already marked by the US authorities as a dangerous anarchist and they were contemplating his arrest. 100 India Office agreed to wait on receiving a secret report from Hopkinson who informed them that there was no need for representation as the case of Har Dayal was already ‘‘under consideration by Department of Labour in Washington.” 101
Har Dayal had gone to Washington in February 1914 to plead the cause of the Indians personally before the congressional Committee. Har Dayal, however, refrained from appearing before the Committee as he knew that the United States authorities regarded him as an anarchist and in that position his appearance with the other two members 102 of the delegation would “rather injure than help the representation” 103 with regard to the Asiatic Exclusion Bill. The Immigration authorities in San Francisco received the warrant of Har Dayal by the end of February 1914. Hopkinson, who was mainly instrumental in securing the arrest of Har Dayal, wired London that the Immigration authorities had received the warrant for the arrest of Har Dayal as anarchist. Since the US Immigration authorities had promised to keep him in touch with the development of the case, Hopkinson informed them about his own return to Vancouver. 104
Har Dayal was arrested by the US authorities after his return to San Francisco on 25 March 1914. After two days he was released on bail under a bond of 1,000 dollars. 105 In spite of the public assurances given by the Commissioner of Immigration Anthony Comineth that there would be a fair trial and that the arrest did not mean his deportation,
Har Dayal had decided not to wait for the proceedings and fled to Switzerland with the help of the Irish and American sympathisers. 106 The movement started by Har Dayal had won the support of many Americans who not only attended the meetings addressed by him but even gave him a helping hand by speaking along with him in which they inspired the people to rise and revolt against the British just as they had done. 107
By the time Har Dayal left the United States he and his associates had created a formidable association eager to organise a rebellion in India. Har Dayal dubbed by Crewe as the most “dangerous scoundrel of the whole party,” had lent dignity to the movement and brought about a change in the political thinking of the people.
The Government of India regarded Har Dayal as one of the most dangerous but an outstanding revolutionary which India had ever produced and a man who had by his organising activities influenced to a great extent the Indians outside the country, who were burning with a passionate desire to see their motherland free of British rule. 108 This change was the outcome of the incessant propaganda carried on through the Ghadr and by its distribution, which now extended to all parts of the world where Indians were to be found. The propaganda of the Ghadr Party had met with an immediate and warm response from the people and within a few months its followers increased both within and outside the United States.
Gradually, the party opened its branches in Canada, China, Manila and other places in the Far East. In each issue of the Ghadr the emphasis was laid on the necessity of bringing about a violent revolution in India. 109 The Ghadr enjoined upon all Indians the duty of boycotting the British Government and of refusing to enter its service.
The Ghadr was specially intended to appeal to the martial races of India and was posted to the Punjab in large numbers from different places in the United States and the Far East. Along with the anti-British propaganda aimed at instigating Indians to revolt, the Ghadr party took extra care to inform public opinion in America about the situation in India and to neutralize British propaganda in the United States and elsewhere. 110 After the departure of Har Dayal the events moved rapidly. The anti-British movement got a fillip from the voyage of the Komagata Marti, while the outbreak of the world war in August 1914 gave an opportunity to the Ghadr Party to make a practical demonstration of the Ghadr doctrine which it had been preaching to the Indians all over the world. 111
The Voyage of Komagata Maru After having come under the spell of Har Dayal’s propaganda, the Indians in Canada started thinking in terms of challenging the immigration laws of that country which were creating an unfair distinction between the European and the Indian subjects of the British Government. This realisation became more intense with the arrival of the three delegates, viz., Nand Singh Sehri, Balwant Singh and Narain Singh, who had gone to represent their grievances to the authorities in England and India. 112 The failure of the mission prompted the Indian emigrants to make arrangements for a direct passage service between Calcutta and Vancouver 113 in order to fulfil the conditions laid down by the immigration laws of Canada. The Canadian Government after having come to know about the above scheme of the Indians immediately informed the Secretary of State for Colonies in London that serious consequences were likely to follow if the Indians succeeded in their plan and in that case it would probably become necessary to make drastic amendments of immigration regulations. They further referred to the necessity of preventing an influx into Canada of a race unfitted by their constitutional temperament and habits for permanent residence in that country. 114 The India Office denied having had any information as to the establishment of such communication between India and Canada. 115 After receiving this unsatisfactory reply, the Canadian Government amended their immigration laws and the intimation was conveyed to the Government of India that since the Dominion Parliament anticipated a very congested labour market in British Columbia, it was proposed to prohibit after 31 March 1914 the landing of any immigrants pertaining to artisan, general, or unskilled labour class, subject to a proviso that immigration authorities might admit any immigrant if satisfied. 116
Unaware of these diplomatic communications the Indian emigrants proceeded calmly with their programme of introducing the shipping service before 31 March 1914, as it was rumoured that the law on the subject of Immigration was likely to be made more stringent after that date. In the beginning of 1914, Bihari Lai Varma went to Hong Kong from Canada to charter a steamer. But he failed in his attempt. Behari Lai, however, inspired no confidence amongst the people both on account of his youth and lack of money to finance any such scheme. 117 In the meantime G.D. Kumar had been sent by the Ghadr Party to Manila to open a branch there and to carry on the propaganda of the party. It appears that he interested Baba Gurdit Singh (1860-1954), a rich contractor of Singapore, with the idea of chartering a steamer to convey Indian passengers to Canada and America. 118 Gurdit Singh knew about the failure of the scheme of Behari Lai and agreed to undertake the project. Like a true businessman he gave a good deal of publicity to the programme of starting a direct steamer service between Calcutta and Vancouver by Sri Guru Nanak Steamer Company. On 13 February 1914, he published an advertisement for intending emigrants explaining in some detail what his proposals were. In the beginning there was some difficulty in finding a ship, but in March 1914 Komagata Marti was chartered from a Japanese firm through Mr A. Bune, a German shipping agent in Hong Kong. To start with, the Hong Kong authorities deliberately delayed the departure of the ship. The reason was that they wanted to prevent the vessel from proceeding since it was anticipated by them that the passengers would not be admitted into Canada. 119 Legally the authorities were powerless to stop the ship from sailing and after negotiations, Gurdit Singh got the permission to sail on 4 April with 165 passengers. On the way 111 passengers were taken at Shanghai, 86 at Meji and 14 at Yokohama and the Komagata Maru sailed for Vancouver with 376 passengers. 120 The Government of India viewed the departure of the ship as a deliberate attempt by the Indians to challenge directly the legality of the Canadian immigration laws and in their opinion they should not have left in a body at a time when the Canadian Government had declared that it did not want any more labourers or artisans. 121 As compared with the official attitude, the public was asking: “But what about the right of Indians as British subjects?” and newspapers like the Tribune hoped that they would not be summarily turned back. Such an exclusion in the opinion of the paper was likely to create trouble for the Government. The time had come, the paper continued, for the Government of India to intervene on behalf of the people and secure not only their landing, but also the removal of an indefensible prohibition. 122 The Government of India preferred “to have the immigrants rejected by Canada than to exercise any control,” 123 as they were powerless to do so under the existing rules. While on the way, Gurdit Singh cheered the passengers by saying that “we are going to have a test case. The Canadian Government can never send us back because we are English subjects, and if it does send us back that will have a very bad effect upon India.” 124
On its way to Canada the emissaries of the Ghadr Party encouraged the passengers and distributed copies of the Ghadr at Shanghai, Shimonosaki (Meji) and Yokohama and at the last named port the ship was visited by Bhagwan Singh and Barkatullah and the former delivered a spirited address to the passengers advising them to rise against the British Government. 125
As expected, when the ship reached Vancouver on 21 May 1914, the Canadian Government refused to allow the immigrants to land. The main question before the Indians now at stake was not that Canada had a legal right to exclude anybody, but whether British citizenship carried with it the right of free entrance to any part of the Empire. 126
The unjust refusal of the Canadian Government to permit the Indian immigrants to land was keenly resented both by the passengers and their countrymen in India and abroad. Public meetings were held not only on the ship and in Canada, but also in India to condemn the highhanded policy of the Canadian Government. The Indians at Vancouver also formed a committee with a view to helping the passengers and for creating facilities for their landing but with little success. Desh of Lahore reminded the Indians that it was their duty to “protest against such injustice and oppression,” and appealed that “every town and village in India should hold meetings to call the attention of the Government to the affair.” 127
Along with the protest meetings the passengers on the Komagata Maru also considered it preferable to fight legally. They approached the Canadian Court of Law and lodged an appeal in the name of Mansa Singh. The judicial authorities at Victoria tried it as a test case on which to decide the fate of all. 128 It was apparent that neither the Canadian Government nor the people were willing to allow any more Indians into their country and even before the Indians took their case to the Court, there was a strong movement in Vancouver amongst the local people to send by force the Komagato Maru with its passengers back to India, as it was feared that the Court’s verdict might go in their favour. 129 Perhaps sensing the temperament of the people the case of Mansa (Munshi) Singh was rejected by the Court. In addition, the Canadian authorities raised another objection about the payment of the charter money. 130 The necessary amount was immediately collected by the Indians in Canada and the Charter was transferred to the names of Bhag Singh and Husain Rahim. The orders of deportation passed by the Canadian Court on all the passengers further gave a mortal blow to the rights of Indians, and in the protest meetings the Indians made it clear to the authorities that by ill-treating them they were rendering a great disservice to the British Empire. 131 Lajpat Rai also hinted in a letter dated 30 June 1914 that on account of these orders passed on the Komagata Marti passengers “we are on the threshold of a great agitation amongst the Indians.” 132 The Tribune of Lahore warned that if a whole body of nearly 400 passengers were turned back, “the position of the Indians would be known definitely and it was after all proper to know one’s status.” The paper anticipated that probably after the return of the Indians, they would “consider whether they were satisfied with their lot and if not what they would do to deserve better.” 133
The Government of India did not attach any significance to these warnings. The India Office cared less and dismissed the issue by saying that the Enterprise had been “financed by the Indian agitators for political purposes in India.” 134
After prolonged but fruitless negotiations between the passengers and the Canadian authorities, the Komagata Maru left Vancouver on 23 July for Hong Kong. The affair cost the passengers enormously and the sufferings of those on board, who were refused even provisions and water, were immense. For about two months, the passengers underwent all sorts of miseries at the hands of the Canadian authorities and at the time of leaving Gurdit Singh sent a telegram which was published in the Japan Times warning the British Government that they would make it impossible for them to maintain their rule in India 135 after such treatment of the Indians. But at Yokohama, Gurdit Singh was informed by the Hong Kong authorities that they would not allow the landing of the passengers and mentioned their decision to enforce the local vagrancy ordinance against any “who might attempt to land at that port.” 136 This order further inflamed the anti-British feelings of the passengers and when they diverted the ship towards Calcutta they were inspired with the single determination to end British Imperialism and work for their country’s honour and freedom. In their view a Government which made the Komagata Maru incident possible had no moral right to exist. 137
The Ghadr Party supplied the passengers with money and arms. The beginning of the programme for bringing about a revolt in India had been made. 138 The Government of India was aware of the turbulent feelings of the returning passengers and in the beginning of August 1914 had fully armed themselves with special legislation and powers to keep the situation under control. The Ingress into India Ordinance of 1914 which was passed immediately empowered them to restrict the liberty of any person entering India after 5 September, if such action was considered necessary for protecting the state.
The Komagata Maru arrived at the mouth of Hooghly at the end of September. Under the above ordinance, the luggage of each passenger was examined and they were directed to disembark and proceed to a special train which was in readiness to convey them to their respective places in the Punjab. Instead of obeying these orders, the passengers started marching towards Calcutta with the intention of depositing a copy of the Granth Sahib at the Sikh Gurdwara and to make a representation to Government. But they were stopped by the British police near Budge Budge. Resenting this there ensued a fight between the two parties which resulted in the killing of nearly twenty Indians while the loss of life on the Government side was only two British and two Indian policemen. During the night following the riot many Indians escaped to the neighbouring villages while others were arrested and Gurdit Singh himself disappeared and came to the notice of the authorities only at the end of the war.
This incident aroused the public feelings especially in the Punjab against the highhanded policy of the Government. In order to appease the public but in reality to whitewash the doings of the Canadian authorities and the officials at Budge Budge, the Government of India appointed, in October, a Committee of Enquiry to look into the circumstances of the voyage and the landing at Budge Budge of the Komagata Maru passengers. But privately Hardinge informed Crewe that the main advantage of the enquiry would be that it would elucidate the fact that the Sikhs behaved very badly. 139 Despite the enquiry, the series of calamities which fell to the lot of the Indians on the Komagata Maru had a tremendous impact on the revolutionary movement in India and abroad. The Ghadr Party had already been urging their countrymen to return to India and overthrow the oppressive Government; now this incident served as a powerful stimulus to the propaganda already at work among them. 140 The Director of Criminal Intelligence also noted in May 1914 that the rapid discontent among the Sikhs and other Punjabis on the Pacific Coast was one of the worst features in the present political situation. The leaders, he commented had thrown the entire blame for the failure of the venture upon the one-sided policy of the British Government in India who had shown no interest in the welfare of the Indians in the British colonies. 141 Shiploads of Indians started towards India in the trail of the Komagata Maru with the single object of overthrowing the British Government. In fact the repeated indignities which had been heaped upon the Indians in Canada as well as the humiliation which they received on their arrival in India contributed towards the sapping of the loyalty of the Sikhs in the Punjab. 142 The Sikhs who for years past had regarded themselves as specially favoured community indispensable to the “British Raj” had begun to have some doubts. When the Budge Budge riot occurred and a number of Komagata Maru passengers were shot and others arrested and put in jail under the Ingress into India Ordinance, the idea was for a time prevalent that the Government was actually biased against the Sikhs. This state of feelings amongst the Sikhs was viewed by the Punjab Government as “particularly unfortunate in view of the number of’’ 143 Indians who were then on their way back to India. The declaration of war in August 1914 and this incident helped the Indian revolutionaries to make preparations for a revolution in India for the overthrow of the British Government.
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References 1. Note by Director of Criminal Intelligence “on Indian Revolutionary Activities in America,” H.P.D., June 1909, No. 30. N.A.I.
2. V. Chirol, ( ndian UnrestX (London, 1910), p. 28.
3. Haridas T. Mazumdar, America's Contribution to India's Freedom Allahabad, 1962, p. 5.
4. Note on Serious 'Disturbances and Political Trouble in India 1907- 1917. Home Political Deposit, February 1918, No. 31. N.A.I.
5. Commerce & Industry Deptt., Emig. B, March 1913, Nos. 31 34. N.A.I.
6. Note C.J. Stevenson-Moore, D.C.I., 30 September 1907. H.P.D., June 1909, No. 30 N.A.I.
7. British Consul Laidlaw to Foreign Office, 26 June 1907. F.D. S.E., March 1908, Nos. 595 600. N.A.I.
8. Quoted in F.D., S. I, July 1906, Nos. 55-56. N.A.I.
9. Ibid. The Irish nationalists who were championing the cause of Indians in the USA were George Freeman, the editor of the Gaelic American and John Davey of the
Clan na Gael.
10. ibid
10a. The Gaelic American , 9 December 1905, Home Public Deposit, Dec. 1906, No. 129. N.A.I.
11. Enclo : British Consul Laidlaw to Foreign Office, 26 June 1908, Foreign Deptt.. Secret External, March 1908, Nos. 595 600. N.A.I.
12. Note on the Pan-Aryan Association, Foreign Department, Secret Internal, February 1910, Nos. 56 59. Both Joshi and Barkatullah were known to Shyamaji. The name pan Aryan was selected with a view to include some Persian students who were then studying in New York. ibid. Another association which existed at that time was the Indo-American Association formed by G.N. Mukerjee, M.C. Sinha and other students at Oregon, but not much is known about its activities. Home Public Deposit, Dec. 1906, No. 129. N.A.I.
13. Home Political B, August 1907, Nos. 138-148. N.A.I.
14. The Ghadr Directory (New Delhi, 1934), p. 16.
15. Indian Agitators Abroad (Simla, 1911), p. 137.
16. “History-Sheet of Myron H. Phelps.” Home Political Deposit, October 1909, No. 17. N.A.I.
17. Native Newspaper Reports, Bombay, 1907.
18. Indian Sociologist, September 1906.
19. “History-Sheet of Myron H. Phelps,” Home Political Deposit, October 1909, No. 17 N.A.I.
20. “History Sheet of Madame Cama.” Home Political B, Aug. 1913, No. 61. The Sun (New York) dated 20 October 1907, while commenting on her visit wrote : “Madame Cama, the East Indian reformer and lecturer arrived here on Saturday. He and her husband are high class persons and are among the recognised leaders of the movement in India to throw off the British yoke. Madame Cama being especially radical.” Foreign Department, Secret Internal, February 1910, Nos. 56-59. N.A.I.
21. “History-sheet of Madame Cama,” Home Political B, Aug. 1913, No. 61. N.A.I.
22. “Memorandum on Anti British agitation in England, Part IV,” Foreign Department, Confidential B, General, 1911, No 62. N.A.I.
23. Report of the C I.D. on Indian Unrest , p. 149, IOL.
24. Percy Sanderson, British Consul-General, New York, to H.M. Durand, British Ambassador, Washington, 25 Oct. 1906, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, May 1907, Nos. 25-27. N.A.I.
25. History- Sheet of Myron Phelps. Home Political Deposit, October 1910, No. 17. N.A.I.
26. Morley to Minto, 23 April 1908, Morley Papers. Bryce also informed the Foreign Office that there were “Hindus in American cities hatching treasonable and dangerous plots.” Bryce to Foreign Office, 21 July 1909, Foreign Department, Confidential B, General, 1910, No. 13. N.A.I.
27. J.C. Ker, Political Trouble in India 1907-1917 (Calcutta, 1917), p. 219.
28. Guy Hope, America and Swaraj: The US Role in Indian Independence (Washington, 1968), p. 11.
29. Minto to Morley, 12 August 1908, Morley Papers. I.O.L.
30. Speech by President Roosevelt delivered at the Metropolitan Methodist Episcopal Church on 18 January 1909. Home Political Deposit, October 1910, No 17.
Other Americans, especially Sherwood Eddy said “what would happen if Great Britain left India today? India would welter in blood, with hopeless internal wars”; yet others sympathised with the Indian national movement. For details about the different shades of opinion about India see Some American Opinions on the Indian Empire (London, 1915) and Some American Opinions on British Rule in India , published by the Indian Nationalist Committee (Stockholm, 1919).
31. Guy Hope, op. cit., p. 6.
32. Morley to Minto, 4 February 1910, Morley papers, I.O.L.
33. Diwakar Prasad Singh, “American Official Attitude Towards the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-1929” Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1964, Microfilm). This is confirmed by the correspondence which passed between Roosevelt and other British officials and especially Morley- Morley talked to Whitclaw Reid, the American Ambassador in London, about pro Indian developments in America and got it conveyed to President Roosevelt through Sydney Brooks that he (Roosevelt) should say something in public so that the British policy in India might be put before the Americans in proper light. Roosevelt to Sydney Brooks, 28 December 1908, quoted in Manoranjan Jha Civil Disobedience and After— The American Reaction to Political Developments in India during 1930-1935 (Delhi, 19731, pp. 9-10. For further details about this aspect see Biting E. Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1952 ;, Vol. 6.
34. “History sheet of Myron H. Phelps” see also the “Open Letter to Theodore Roosevelt.” Home Political Deposit, October 1910, No. 17. N.A.I.
35. Gujarati, 24 January 1910. Native Newspaper Reports, Bombay, 1910.
36. Shakti, 23 January 1910. ibid.
37. Indian Agitators Abroad, p. 139. Joshi belonged to an Indian state and on the representation made by the British Government, he decided to leave the United States and came back to India where he tendered an apology for having associated with the Indian revolutionaries there. Foreign Department, Secret International, February 1910, Nos. 56-59. N.A.I.
38. R.H. Bruce-Dickson to Secretary of State, for Foreign Affairs, 8 March 1910. Foreign Department, General B, June 1910, Nos. 9-12 N.A.I.
39. Gary R. Hess, “The Hindu in America : Immigration and Naturalization Policies in India 1917-1946,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XXXVIII, 1969, p. 60.
40. Bryce to Edward Grey, 14 October 1907. Judicial and Public Department, F No. 821/1907, IOL.
41. ibid.
42. Note by C E. Low, 14 July 1916. Commerce and Industry, Emigration A, November 1916, Nos. 1-16. The total exclusion of the Indians was accomplished by the Immigration Law passed in February 1917.
43. The returns of the Immigration Department show that the flow of Indians from India to Canada was as follows:
June 1904 to June 1905 / 45
June 1905 to June 1906 / 387
June 1906 to March 1907 / 2,124
March 1907 to March 1908 / 2,623 Vide W-L. Mackenzie King, “Oriental Immigration to Canada.” US Department of Justice Records, Roll No. 1 . See also Commerce and Industry Deptt. Immigration A, October 1913, Nos. 31-33. N.A.I.
44. W. Hopkinson’s “Report on Hindu Affairs in Canada.” US Department of Justice Records, Roll. No. 1. N.A.I.
45. Mackenzie King, op. cit
46. Dady Burjar to W C. McPherson, 30 January 1914, Commerce & Industry Department, Immigration A, December 1914, No. 4, N.A.I.
47. India Office Memorandum on Indian Immigration into Canada, 26 Aug. 1916. Commerce & Industry Department, Emigration Filed and Indexed, October 1915, No. 68. N.A.I.
48. Colonel F. A. Warren to Govt, of India, 22 November 1906. Commerce & Industry Department, Emigration A, May 1907, Nos. 7-29. N.A.I.
49. Notes. Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration A, February 1908, Nos. 18-33. N.A.I.
50. Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22 Jan. 1908. ibid.
51. Report of Mackenzie King on “Oriental Immigration to Canada,” 2 May 1908. Commerce & Industry Department, Emigration A, July 1908, Nos. 15-19. Morley while discussing the Indian immigration controversy considered it as the most hopeless in the world and “no wonder that the Indian who is a sensitive animal, hates the action of the colonies, but it is no wonder that the colonies insist on remaining white.” Morley to Minto, 12 November 1908, Minto Papers. National Library Edinburgh.
52. Report of Mackenzie King, op. cit.
53. Secretary of State to Viceroy, 25 March 1908. Judicial & Public Department, F-No. 1235/1913. I O.L.
54 India Office Memorandum on Indian Immigration into Canada,'* 26 Aug. 1915. Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration Filed and Indexed, October 1915, No. 68. N.A I.
55. Secretary of State for India to Government of India, 19 June 1908, Commerce & Industry Department, Emigration A, July 1908, Nos. 15-19. N.A.I.
56. “India Office Memorandum on Indian Immigration into Canada", 26 Aug. 1915, Commerce & Industry Department, Emigration Filed and Indexed, October 1908, No. 68. Baba Gurdit Singh holds that this innocent provision was cleverly explained to be merely in the interest of the immigrant adventurer who, for the sake of prudence, should have something to fall back upon so as not to be left stranded on a foreign shore. Baba Gurdit Singh, Voyage of Komagata Maru (Calcutta, n.d.), p. 10.
57. K.K. Banerjee, Indian Freedom Movement , Revolutionaries in America (Calcutta, 1969), p. 3.
58. Notes. Commerce & Industry Department, Emigration B, June 1910, Nos. 14 15. N.A.I.
59. Viceroy to Secretary of State, January 1908, Judicial & Public Department, F.No. 1235/1913. l.O.L.
60. Bombay Samachar, 6 June 1909. Native Newspaper Reports, Bombay, 1910.
61. “Memorandum on matters affecting East Indian Community in British Columbia” by Colonel E.J E. Swayne. C & I. Department, Emigration A, May 1909, No. 13. N.A.I.
62. ibid.
63. Walter R. Hearn (British Consul-General, San Francisco) to Grey, 20 April 1908. Commerce & Industry Department, Emigration B, July 1908, Nos. 5-6. N.A.I.
64. Indian Agitators Abroad (Simla, 1911), p. 47.
65. “Memorandum on Matters Affecting the East Indian Community in Canada." C. & I. Department, Emigration A, May 1909, No. 13.
66. “History-sheet of Tarak Nath Das”, C. & I. Department, Emigration B, March 1912, Nos. 31-44. N.A.I.
67. See Rules and Regulations of the Hindustan Association. C&l Department, Emigration B, May 1911, Nos. 4-5. N.A.I.
68. Free Hindustan, March-April 1910,.
69. Rajni Kanta Das, Hindustani Workers on the Pacific Coast (Berlin, 1923), p. 89.
70. Indian Agitators Abroad (1911 Simla,) pp. 169, 179.
71. Notes Home Political A, April 19, No. 18. The first issue of the paper was brought out on 1 February 1910. N.A.I.
72. Copy of the Petition sent to Earl of Crewe, 25 April 1911. C. &. I. Department, Emigration B, September 1911, Nos 4-7. See also F. No. 279, Gokhalc Papers - A copy of the petition was sent to Gokhale also.
73. F.C. Ismonger and J. Slattery, An Account of the Ghadr Conspiracy (Lahore, 1919), pp. 4-5, IOL.
74. “The Span of Life,” March 1912, Foreign Office 275/1912, PRO.
75. Besides the societies already mentioned earlier there were Association for the Promotion of Education of the People of India and Hindustan Club at Seattle composed of students. At Portland there were Bharat ScwakSabha and United India League, with the main purpose of bringing about the social and political regeneration of Indians by constitutional means. Ibid.
76. The need for a capable leader had been communicated by Das to his friends in Paris. Das had suggested Ajit Singh, while the Indian nationalists sent Har Dayal. Ker, op cit., p. 234. Har Dayal had also made up his mind while in Algiers to go to America as he could not carry on cordially with others in Paris. Har Dayal to Madame Cama, 21 May 1910, Har Dayal Papers. NMML.
77. Indian Agitators Abroad (Simla, 1911), p. 171, IOL.
78. The Span of India, March 1912; No. F O 275/1912 P.R.O.
In the opinion of Director of Criminal Intelligence, before the coming of Har Dayal, there was^o dangerous organisation of Indian revolutionaries on the Pacific Coast, but he anticipated that the great many of the Indians who were dotted about in various places there entertained extremely revolutionary ideas which might at any time culminate in desparate enterprises in India on the part of the individuals, if they were organised by a capable leader. D.C.I. to India Office, 9 Aug. 1911, Home Political Deposit, August 1911, No. 17. N.A.I.
79. Indian Agitators Abroad (Simla, 191 1). p. 70.
80. Lajpat Rai, Young India (New Delhi, 1965), p. 167.
81. See Har Dayal’s correspondence with Rana 1909-10, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
82. A. Carnegie Ross, British Consul-General San Francisco to Mitchell Innes, Charge d' Affaires, The British Embassy Maine, 21 Sept. 1912- Commerce & Industry Department, Emigration B, February 1913, Nos. 28-32. N.A.I.
83. Extract from the letter of Har Dayal quoted in Ismonger and Slattery, op. cit., p. 1 See also Har Dayal, A Sketch of Complete Political Movement for the Emancipation of India, Har Dayal Papers. N-M M.L.
84. W.C. Hopkinson to W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, Ottawa, 5 Nov, 1912, C. and I. Department, Emigration B, February 1913, Nos-28-32. Funds for the scholarship were provided by Bhai Jawala Singh, a wealthy farmer and six Guru Gobind Singh scholarships were announced in Indian newspapers.
85. Hopkinson to Foreign Office, 21 January 1913. Home Political B, June 1913, Nos 5-17. N.A.I.
86. Home Political Deposit, March 1921, No. 69. N.A.I. At that time Khankhoje was vice-president of the Hindustan Association of United States of America, which mainly looked after the interests of the Indian students and was later obscured by the activities of the Ghadr party. Ibid.
87. Ismonger and Slattery, op. cit., p. 8.
88. Hopkinson to Foreign Office, 17 February, 1913, Home Political B, June 1913, Nos- 5 17. N.A.I.
89. Ismonger and Slattery, op. cit., p. 13 Other prominent workers who attended this meeting were Thakur Das, Ram Chandra Peshwari, Pandit Kanshi Ram, Sohan Singh Bhakna, and Nawab Khan. Sohan Singh Bhakna gives the date of the meeting as 13 March 1913. See the “Statement of Sohan Singh Bhakna” History of Freedom Movement, File No. 21/2, N A. I.
90. Statement of Sohan Singh Bhakna , op. cit.
91. Randhir Singh, Ghadr Heroes (Bombay, 1945), p. 9.
After the passing of the resolutions, the* election for the main workers of the Association was held and the following were elected :
President: Sohan Singh Bhakna
Vice-President: Kesar Singh Didha
General Secretary: Har Dayal
Treasurer: Pandit Kanshi Ram
Vice-Treasurer: Hamam Singh
Organising Secretaries: Karim Bakhsh and Munshi Lai
Joint Secretary: Thakur Das.
Statement of Sohan Singh Bhakna, op. cit.
92. Randhir Singh, op. cit., p. 9.
93. The very first issue of this paper reflected the ideas of Har Dayal. In an article ‘ our name and work,” it explained “What is our name? Mutiny (Ghadr). Where will the mutiny break out? In India. When ? In a few years. Why ? Because people can and are ready to fight and die for freedom.” There was no secret about the aims and objects of the Ghadr, the sub title of which declared it to be the “enemy of the British Government.” Home Political Deposit, Oct. 1915, No. 43. N.A.I.
94. Mark Naidis, “Propaganda of the Ghadr Party,” Pacific Historical Review , Vol. XX (1951), p. 261.
95. Statement of Sohan Singh Bhakna , op. cit.
96. Home Political B, June 1913, Nos. 5-17. The Government of India was against this move because under the Immigration laws Har Dayal would be deported to the last place of residence (Martinique) and not to India, ibid .
97. Hopkinson to Foreign Office, 13 February 1914. Foreign Office, No. 371/2152/1914 P.R.O. Hopkinson was a Police Inspector at Calcutta, before he came to Canada in 1907. Later on he was employed by the Department of the Interior in Canada and was also an agent of the British Government and used to send reports about the activities of the Indian revolutionaries. He was killed by Mewa Singh. See Home Political A, January 1915, Nos. 3 6. N.A.I.
98. The proceedings against Har Dayal were initiated after Hopkinson received assurance from the Assistant Commissioner of Immigration that if the former was able to prove that “any of the Hindu students in the US” was an anarchist then the Immigration authorities would take action. See Hopkinson’s report, Home Political B, June 1913, Nos. 5 17. N.A.I.
99. Pandian to the British Ambassador, 5 November 1915. Foreign Office, 371/2784/1916- The other British Agent A. Tilton Steele also informed Spring-Rice that we succeeded in moving the Immigration authorities in San Francisco to deport one of the chief leaders, Har Dayal of Stanford University See Foreign Office, 115/2068/1916. PRO Even Har Dayal attributed his arrest to British influence. See Ker, op. cit., p. 238.
100 Spring-Rice to Grey, 9 February 1914. Foreign Office; 371/2152/1914. The American authorities regarded Har Dayal as out and out anarchist, “who believed not only in revolution in India, but revolution everywhere, he believed in a combination and consolidation of all the anarchist forces in the entire world for the purpose of social industrial and all kinds of revolutions of the rankest character.” Trial records, p. 12. By his revolutionary speeches, Har Dayal came within the purview of the expulsion provisions of the Immigration laws of the United States. “Memorandum on Indians in America," US Department of Justice Records Roll No. 1. The evidence needed by the US authorities was given by both Pandian and Steele as mentioned earlier.
101. Hopkinson to Foreign Office, 13 February 1914. Foreign Office, 371/ 2152/1914. P.R.O.
Don Dighan, however concludes on the basis of British Foreign Office papers that action against Har Dayal was taken by the American officials independently. Don K. Dighan, “The Hindu conspiracy in Anglo-American Relations during World War I.” Pacific Historical Review Vol. XL 1971. p. 61.
102. The other two members were Dr Sudindra Bose and Dr Bishan Singh.
103. Hopkinson to Foreign Office, 19 February 1914. F.O. 371/2152/1914. PRO.
104. ibid.
105 The bond was furnished through the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company of Baltimore, Maryland. Spring-Rice to Grey, 7 May 1914. ibid.
106. Har Dayal had an inkling that he would not be allowed to carry on his anti-British activities in America for long and in a meeting on 31 December 1913 had informed his countrymen that “if I am turned out of this country, I can make preparations for the mutiny in any other country. Our Ashram and our arrangements are so complete that the Ghadr work will not be stopped by my leaving the country. I shall have to go to Germany to make arrangements for the approaching Ghadr.” The Ghadr, 7 April 1914. Samras believes that it was through the influence of William Jennings Bryan that Indian revolutionaries whisked away Har Dayal to Europe. The Maharatta 16 September 1938.
107. In one of the meetings an American asked Har Dayal about the population of India which the latter replied was about 30 crores. “How many Englishmen are there,” asked the American. “About l£ lakhs,” replied Har Dayal The American then remarked that this small number of Englishmen could be driven out of the country with stones without difficulty. Har Dayal admitted this fact and added that Indians were gradually becoming conscious of their power. Ismonger and Slattery, op. cit., p. 25.
108. “History Sheet of Har Dayal.” Home Political F.No. 28/7/1938. N.A.I.
109. See “Memorandum on the Indian Revolutionary Activities in the United States.” US Department of Justice Records, Roll No. 2. N.A.I.
110. See pamphlets by R. Chandra, i.e , “Exclusion of Hindus From America and, “India Against Britain” (November 1916 U.S.A.).
111. In the beginning, the Ghadr was issued weekly in Urdu and Gurmukhi. In May 1914, a third edition of this paper started in Gujarati. In 1915, a Hindi edition of the paper was also brought out. After Har Dayal, Ram Chandra became its editor. Besides the Ghadr, the other publications of the party were Ghadr di Gun, Hand-Jung, Bilan, “A Little Wisdom is a Dangerous Thing,” “Evidence of Figures.” These were composed for the Indians and were distributed all over the world. “War Office Memorandum on German Literary Propaganda as Regards India and the Orient.” Home Political Deposit, Dec 1916, No. 30. N.A.l.
112. But before leaving England, the delegation, however, made it clear to reporter of a London paper that Canada’s “treatment of the Sikhs will do more to injure the British Empire than the gift of six dreadnaughts would have helped.” Emigration A Section, 1913, Nos. 31-33. N.A.L.
113. Attempts had been made previously in 1910 and 1912 to charter a ship to run between Calcutta and Vancouver, but without success. Hopkinson, the British Agent had reported in November 1910 that the Hindus in Canada had worked up a plan to bring over Hindus from India. Hopkinson’s Report, 17 November 1910. Hopkinson to F.O. 17 November 1910, Judicial and Public, Department F. No. 568/1911. l.O.L.
114. Government of Canada to Secretary of State for Colonies, 16 August 1913. Judicial and Public, Department, No. 1235/1913. I.O.L.
115. Judicial and Public Department, E. No. 1235/1913. I.O.L.
116. Secretary of State to Viceroy, 25 October 1913. Ibid.
117. Report of Dr Raghunath Singh on the voyage of Komag at a Mam Home Political A, Sept. 1914,08. 211-224 KW. N.A.I.
118. Chief Secretary, Govt, of Bengal to Secretary, Govt, of India, 29 June 1914, Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration A, September 1914, Nos. 40-47. Even as early as 1910 G.D. Kumar along with other leaders in Canada formulated a plan to bring out Hindus from India. However, the scheme did not materialise. Judicial and Public Department No. 568/1911. Amongst the correspondence of Harnam Singh Sehri, who was hanged in the Burma conspiracy case, which the British captured, there were large number of letters from Kumar which showed that he was connected with the organisation of the Komagata Mam expedition. The Ghadr Directory, op. cit., p. 193. Baba Gurdit Singh had taken active part in the agitation at Singapore for the removal of restrictions on the emigration of Asiatics in Canada. He was reported to be a leader among his compatriots and was popularly known as Bengal Ka Kaptan. Ghadr Directory (Delhi, 1934), p. 91.
Even the Director of Criminal Intelligence reported that there was no doubt about the connection of Gurdit Singh with the revolutionary Indians in Canada and America. Gurdit Singh had sent to India the prospectus of his steamer company which he named Siri Guru Nanak Steamer Company along with the copy of the Ghadr. See C R. Cleveland note dated 8.5.1914, Commerce and Industry Emig A, Sept. 1914, Nos. 40-47. N.A.I.
119. William Vincent to Secretary Home Department, 3 December 1914, Home Political A, March 1915, Nos. 1-13. N.A.I.
120. Ker, op. cit., p, 240.
121. Native Newspapers Report , Punjab, 1914.
122 ibid.
123. R L. Borden to G H. Parley 17 July 1914, Emigration A, Oct. 1914, Nos. 3-6. N.A.I.
124- Report of Dr Raghunath Singh on the voyage of the Komagata Maru. Home Political A, Sept. 1914, Nos. 21 1-224 KW. N.A.I.
125 Ker, op. cit., p. 240. “Even Gurdit Singh during both the onward and on its return voyages posed as a revolutionary leader.” Ghadr Directory, p. 92.
126. S.A. Waiz, Indians Abroad (Bombay, 1927), pp. 670-71.
127. Native Newspapers Reports, Punjab, 1914.
128. Tsmonger and Slattery, op cit., pp. 37-38.
129. US Department of Justice Records, Roll No. N.A.I. A firm of solicitors in Canada refused to take up the case of the Indians since in their opinion the matter was now “beyond the realm of legal proceedings” and had become a question of national policy and diplomacy rather than law. See Baba Gurdit Singh, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
130. Ismonger and Slattery, op cit , p. 38.
131. The Tribune, 11 June 1914; Native Newspapers Reports , Punjab, 1914.
132. The Punjabee (Lahore), 30 June 1914. Native Newspapers Reports, Punjab, 1914.
133. The Tribune, 11 July 1914. Native Newspaper Reports, Punjab, 1914-
134. Secretary of State for India to Viceroy 6 August 1914. Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration B, August 1914, Nos. 10-14. Even a Canadian writer Mackey was of the same view. He blamed the Indian revolutionaries in India and Canada for the Komagata Maru enterprise and why had deliberately advised their fellow countrymen to make this spectacular attempt to breakdown our regulations.” Mackey, “Problems of Immigration VII. Komagata Maru,” West- minster Hall Magazine and Farthest West Review , Vol. V, No. 6, July 1914.
135. The Tribune , 23 July 1914. Native Newspapers Reports , Punjab, 1914.
136. William Vincent to Secretary Home Department, 3 Dec. 1914. Home Political A, March 1915, Nos. 1-13 N.A.I.
137. Randhir Singh, op. cit., p. 12. When Komagata Maru left Kobe, the British Ambassador warned the Government of India that these Indians intended to make trouble on arrival in India. British Ambassador in Japan to Government of India, 3 September 1914. F.O. 371/2158/ 1914. PRO.
138. Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna before he left America was entrusted by the Ghadr Party with 100 pistols which he was to make over to Gurdit Singh for use of Komagata Maru passengers. Ghadr Directory , p. 272. It appears that the Ghadr Party had a scheme of sending a consignment of arms and ammunition through the passengers of Komagata Maru. However, Tarak Nath Das who was entrusted with the task was arrested by the Canadian authorities while trying to smuggle arms and ammunition into Canada for conveyance to India by the passengers of Komagata Maru. D. Petrie, Communism in India, 1924-27 (Calcutta, 1927), p. 337.
139. Hardinge to Crewe, 15 October 1914. Hardinge Papers.
140. Michael O’ Dwyer, India As I Knew It / 88 5 1925 (London, 1925), p. 194
141. “Memorandum on German Connection with Indian Sedition.” Home Political Deposit, October 1915, No. 43. N.A.I.
142. The Khalsa Advocate, 31 January 1914. Native Newspaper Reports, Punjab, 1914.
143. “A review of seditious and revolutionary activity in the Panjab showing the measures adopted to combat them (hereafter referred to as a review of revolutionary activity in the Punjab). Home Political B, July 1918, Nos. 292-316. N A-I.