Part 1 of 2
Part 2: Authorship
Theognis the Author, Traditional Wisdom, and Some Side Effects of Authority
by Sara De MartinFrom
Defining Authorship, Debating Authenticity: Problems of Authority from Classical Antiquity to the RenaissanceEdited by Roberta Berardi, Martina Filosa, and Davide Massimo
© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
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The Theognidea are a riddle.1 They a re the only surviving collection of Archaic elegies which boasts a direct textual tradition, but it is not clear what in them is actually by an individual called Theognis, what is Archaic, and what is later. Nor is it clear when the collection was arranged as it currently is, what stages it has been through, or how it circulated in the Classical period.2 These are necessary introductory remarks if one is to speak of the poetry contained in the Sylloge Theognidea. Still, in this paper I would like to shift the attention away from these core problems of the 'Theognidean question' and put the spotlight instead on some matters of reception. The first part will be dedicated to retracing Theognis' place in the literary culture of the 4th century BC, to which date the first mentions of Theognis' name, as well as the first quotations ascribed to him.3 Secondly, I will examine the Imperial and Byzantine reception of two passages of the Sylloge (II. 425- 8 and 215- 6): this trial analysis will show how pre-existing traditional topoi were taken up in Theognis' text and consequently underwent further crystallization, with the lines eventually losing their attachment to an individual author's name. The two-fold examination will allow me to contrast the 4th-century BC notion of Theognis as a well-known author of circulating written texts and as an established ethical authority with some highly gnomical late reuses of certain Theognidean lines. On the basis of these observations, I will propose that the late anonymous circulation of some gnomai is a side effect of the renown of Theognis' name in earlier times. Overall, with this essay, my aim is to put to the test the diachronic reception-based approach to Theognis and his poetry, giving some samples of its benefits, and secondly, to contribute to the (limited to date) conversation on the Theognidean text as a repository for traditional wisdom.
1 Theognis Between 5th and 4th Century BC
1.1 Theognis and the Athenian EliteTheognidean echoes or references have been recognized already in some 5th- century BC comic passages,4 and, notoriously, in Critias' seal elegy,5 but the name of Theognis appears for the first time in extant Greek literature from the 4th century BC. There are 11 such mentions in total in Isocrates, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle.6 These authors, however, do not only mention Theognis or quote passages that they ascribe to him by name. In their works, they also cite several unattributed lines that are later found in the Mediaeval manuscripts of the Theognidean Sylloge.7 As we shall see, these instances show that Theognis was a standard poetic 'reference point' for these authors in relation to certain preferred themes, the predominant one being the teachability or transmissibility of virtue. This was a pressing philosophical topic from the time of the Sophists to the Hellenistic philosophers,8 and is often connected, in 4th-century BC discussions, to reflections on the nature of kalokagathia.9 Theognis is also mentioned twice in contexts dealing with trustworthiness, which, as a key value of the Archaic hetaireia, features prominently in the Theognidea.10
Lines 35- 36 and 434 of the Sylloge recur multiple times (sometimes attributed to Theognis, sometimes anonymously quoted) in 4th-century BC contexts focusing on the teachability of virtue and on the moral benefits of the company of noble men.11 The first occurrence calling for an analysis is in Plato's Meno. The whole dialogue, as is well known, deals with the nature and the origin of virtue.12 To ascertain whether virtue is teachable or not, Socrates leads Meno to investigate whether 'teachers' of virtue actually exist. Various figures fail the exam: elite Athenians, who are unable to teach or pass virtue on to their sons (92e-94e); Thessalian aristocrats, who are undecided about virtue being teachable (95a-b); and the Sophists, who are commonly credited with teaching virtue but, as Gorgias does (95c), deny this. Finally, Socrates mentions Theognis and quotes two passages by him:
[x] [scil. [x]) [x]; MEN. [x] (Thgn. 33-36) [x] Men. [x] (Thgn. 435) [x] (Thgn. 434) [x] (Thgn. 436-8) [x];13
Pl. Men. 95c-96a
The text presents various issues, and has been accordingly analyzed from a variety of perspectives.14 Its most evident trait is the way Plato bends the text and rhetoric of the Theognidean lines to his own purpose.15 The Socrates of the Meno openly reproaches the contradiction between the two quoted sets of Theognidean couplets. The inconsistency, though, is only apparent; the speaker's advice in II. 33- 36 is addressed to someone who 'has good sense' ([x], 36), while II. 434-8 dwell on the inefficacy of every attempt to straighten out a bad nature ([x], 438) when a man is naturally devoid of [x] (l. 435).16
It has been argued that Plato's out-of-context reuse of these Theognidean words is deliberate, that his misinterpretation is consciously forced, and that his reproach of Theognis is fallacious. To convince Meno, a pupil of Gorgias, that the matter cannot be resolved through an appeal to authorities, Plato's Socrates may be using the weapons the youth is most sensitive to, and imitating the Sophists' abuse of poetic texts.17 What can be said with confidence is that Plato is clearly using Theognis to stress the inevitable confusion that exists about the nature of virtue.18 The quotations are a means to extend and deepen Socrates' exposition of this ambiguity, and to take it to its conclusion (possibly also while making fun of contemporary intellectual manners). Theognis, the noble Thessalians, and Meno himself are all undecided about the teachability of virtue, meaning that they do not know exactly what virtue is, and therefore cannot teach it. Not even those who are themselves kaloi kai agathoi (e.g. the well-known Athenian political figures), insists Plato, are teachers ([x]) of virtue (96b). Theognis is thus lumped together, criticized, and dismissed with other figures commonly regarded as conventional sources of wisdom in the matter of virtue: nobles, socially and politically prominent figures, and sophists.19
Lines 35-36 [20] are quoted also by Xenophon's Socrates in the Symposium:
[x] (Thgn. 35-36) [x].21
Xen. Symp. 2.4
The 'bodily odours which come from the efforts and undertakings of free men' ([x]), Socrates argues, presuppose noble aspirations and take time to be achieved. The metaphor is soon clarified; Socrates is referring to kalokagathia, a status which can be established only associating oneself with 'good men' ([x]). After the quotation of Theognis, the exchange goes on briefly on the topic of keeping company with skilled men and their teachings (2.5), and then the teachability of kalokagathia is questioned by the guests (2.6). By stating that the question is controversial, Socrates then dismisses the debate (2.7).
Xenophon quotes the same lines again in the Memorabilia, but this time without naming Theognis:
[x].23
Xen. Mem. 1.2.20
Xenophon (from 1.2.12 onwards) is considering the moral corruption of Alcibiades and Critias. Once they left Socrates, these two men started leading a debased life, but not, argues Xenophon, because they had been corrupted by Socrates (who showed himself to be an exemplary kalos kai agathos to those who associated with him, 1.1.18).24 Their debasement was rather a consequence of the fact that, by leaving his company, Alcibiades and Critias interrupted their training in virtue.25 Xenophon is therefore relieving Socrates of responsibility (cf. 1.2.28), but he is also making his own point about the achievement of virtue; association with good people is askesis (practice) of arete, and arete, like any discipline which needs training, can be forgotten if not practiced enough, or can deteriorate through association with the bad. The two elegiac quotations aim at iterating and vindicating Xenophon's stance -- and Xenophon is using the poetic lines in exactly the sort of 'appeal to authority' that Plato critiques: a confirmation that Theognis was, indeed, a common authority on virtue.
Theognis is mentioned also by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, again in a context that focuses on the role of practice in establishing and maintaining virtue: [x], 1170a11-13. [26] This is the first of three such Theognidean appearances in the Nicomachean Ethics in contexts that touch on moral excellence. We find 1. 35 of the Sylloge again partially quoted and unattributed at the end of book 9, where Aristotle deals with friendship and associations. Once again, we find the usual pronouncements; social relations impact on a person's mental formation, with bad people corrupting one another, and good people making each other better.
[x]. 27
Arist. Eth. Nic. 1172a3-5, 10-15
Finally, another Theognidean line, quoted already in the Meno, appears further on in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argues that theoretical discourse is ineffective in transmitting virtue, as it cannot lead the many to kalokagathia. 'Theoretical ethics' can guide to arete only those young people who are naturally prone to love what is 'noble' (those who have an [x]):
[x].28
Arist. Eth. Nic. 1179b2-10
To validate this pronouncement, Aristotle resorts to Theognis' l. 434, adjusting it to his own rhetorical need, and making almost 'proverbialized' use of it. Yet, despite the adjustment, there is an evident thematic consistency between the original Theognidean context and the Aristotelian one. Aristotle is maintaining exactly that 'you will never make the bad man noble through teaching', as is staled in ll. 437-8 of the Sylloge, in the near context of 434.
The persistent presence of Theognis' name and verses in 4th-century BC discourses on virtue should be evident by now. Excerpts from his elegies are quoted in contexts which explicitly refer to the ideal of kalokagathia, and which are concerned with the way kalokagathia and arete are transmitted, acquired and developed. In the case of Plato, Theognis is presented as a commonly-acknowledged authoritative source, which provides -- according to Plato's Socrates -- a skewed and contradictory (though widely accepted) perspective on virtue, in Xenophon and Aristotle, ll. 35-36 and 434 are used as a rhetorical tool to establish these authors' views on the matter of kalokagathia. These lines seem to be a favourite commonplace to which 4th-century writers resort in these contexts filled with the entangled ideas of virtue, moral excellence and nobility.29
The involvement of the Socratics with Theognis requires us to interrogate the ideological connotations of their reuse of Theognis' verses. canfora (1995) 122-3 argues that the ideal of 'aristocratic prevalence', pervasive in the Theognidea, must have struck a chord in the Socratic milieu of traditional Athenian aristocracy.30 The association of Theognis with the theme of 'good birth' is indeed frequent, and not confined to the passages analysed above. We know of a treatise On Theognis ([x]) said to be by Xenophon (Stob. 4.29c.53), and the Theognidean collection ([x]) known to the writer of this treatise 'began with the theme of good birth' ([x]). Another On Theognis is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (Diog. Laert. 6.16 = Antisth. V A 41.15 Giannantoni) as the work of Antisthenes, a Socratic who equated virtuous men with the well-born ([x], Antisth. V A 134.2-3 Giannantoni).31 Theognis was mentioned also in an Aristotelian fragment (fr. 69 Gigon = 92 Rose, in Stob. 4.29a.25) from the treatise On good birth ([x]). Was Theognis in this period held up as an advocate for selective 'aristocratic breeding', and for the need to close access to the 'best' social circles in the city?
We ought to bring out in evidence an important common theme in all the passages examined above. Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle discuss arete and kalokagathia only in reference to social elites, and some of the passages analyzed also show terms typical of the rhetoric of the 'elite-masses' opposition.32 The kaloi kai agathoi of whom Plato's Socrates talks are the Athenian and Thessalian ruling classes ([x], 95c), whose socio-political prominence thus seems to serve as one mark of 'virtue', at least as conventionally intended.33 Xenophon, too (Symp. 2.4), dwells on a concept of kalokagathia which is clearly not devoid of socio-political connotations. A contrast between 'the public' or 'the masses', on the one hand, and 'the private' or the 'few' on the other, thus takes shape in the passage, While perfumes fudge the distinction between free and slave, kalokagathia pertains only to nobles. Kalokagathia cannot be acquired or exercised in places of popular sociability, like the 'perfume market', but only in elite contexts, familiar from the poetry of the Archaic aristocratic tradition. The symposium is likely to be one of these contexts, given the fictional setting of Xenophon's work itself.34 Finally, Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1179b) mentions the few (those 'naturally prone to virtue') as opposed to 'the many' ([x],1179b10) who have no hope of attaining kalokagathia, and lingers on the 'noble' character [x], 1179b8) of those who can more easily reach it.35
All things considered, Theognis' lines were particularly renowned in the political groups Socrates moved in, as the critique has already established.36 But the examined reuses allow us to clarify the political reasons of such an interest, and the tenrms of these literary appropriations.
Firstly, we need to stress that, in 4th-century BC Athens, Theognis was reused by elitist authors: members of a political and intellectual elite that defined itself in opposition to the 'masses', these authors addressed not the wider public, but an elite of 'like-minded aristocrats'.37 Among these, Xenophon and Aristotle make Theognis speak for them as 4th-century BC Athenians. while Plato dismisses him as a spokesperson for (at that time) widespread misconceptions about the teachability of virtue. Therefore, in all cases, this repurposing of Theognis' lines set the Archaic ideology originally expressed in them against the contemporary political context -- that of 4th-century BC democratic Athens -- and show how Theognis' was a poetical voice to whom well-born Athenians could relate. These reuses, indeed, demonstrate how the Theognidean, Archaic political terminology of 'good' and 'bad', 'noble' and 'base' was transferred into the contemporary socio-political clash: that of the traditional Athenian elite striving for a recognition of its own superior political status within the horizons of the democratic polis, where the only legal distinction was that of citizens and non-citizens.38 All in all, Theognis was (already) an authoritative voice through which Athenians could establish their elitist ideals and validate them rhetorically. To complete this picture of Theognis in the 4th century BC, I will focus on Aristotle again. The analysis will bring us to consider Aristotle's engagement with a circulating written text of Theognis.
1.2 AristotleThe scope of mentions and quotations of Theognis is broader in Aristotle than in other 4th-century BC authors. We count eight quotations (both ascribed and anonymous) in the Aristotelian Ethics, as well as two more mentions (with no text quoted), one in the Nichomachean Ethics and one in a fragment. With no exception, the references to Theognis are meant as gnomic validations of Aristotle's statements on ethics. Still, to him Theognis is not simply a source of gnomai. Two examples will illustrate this.
Passage 1179b2-10 of the Nicomachean Ethics is an example of how a line from the Theognidea can be 'conventionalized' in the process of citation. The quoted phrase (Thgn. 434) is wedged into Aristotle's prose and the original subject of the main verb is altered. These are signs that the sentence had probably become a commonplace with which to express incisively a specific concept -- the unfeasibility of some action. The flow of thought is seamless: no interruption precedes the quotation and the period goes on after it. What is more, the pentameter is broken into two segments by the insertion of the adverb [x]. Aristotle is here expressing his own point with Theognis' words. and thus is at the same time validating his own stance, which of course coincides with the utterance of an acknowledged poetical authority. Aristotle, like Plato, neglects to mention the Asclepiads who are cited in l. 432 of the Sylloge and are the 'original' subject of [x]. In Theognis, the sense is: 'if the Asclepiads could heal human wretchedness, they would obtain many high rewards'. Aristotle chooses the term [x] as subject of the verb [x]: the line thus undergoes a metaphorical shift. The word [x] ('reward') refers to the (imaginary) achievements that discourse would accomplish if it could 'convert' people to virtue. Independently from the source from which Aristotle draws the line, we see that he is using it as a commonplace: 'if they could do x, they would do a roaring trade' is a way to express the unfeasibility of x. Aristotle's casual use of it shows the conventionality of this expression. He utilizes the line as he sees fit; nevertheless, the context remains strictly related to that of the Theognidean elegy this line belongs to, as already noticed above. Though Aristotle appropriates the expression nonchalantly by changing the referent, he is still well aware of its original context. The broader Theognidean frame of the elegy 429-38, especially its second section, is verbally echoed (and thus presupposed) in the Aristotelian context. Beside the general claim that without a good natural disposition virtue cannot be put into practice, the reference is made to the inefficacy of discourse (cf. Thgn. 436-7 [x]) and teaching (cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1179b21 and 23 [x], Thgn. 437-8 [x]). This is crucial evidence for the fact that l. 434 was circulating together with the following lines, and that therefore 429-38 likely existed as an elegy in Aristotle's time.39
Another case of Theognidean echoes punctuating Aristotle's prose text is to be found in the Eudemian Ethics:
[x] (Thgn. 125-126) [x]. 40
Arist Eth. Eud, 1237b8-16
In West's edition of the Sylloge, the lines Aristotle quotes here (12 -6) belong to the elegy 119-28, where the necessity of testing friends' good intentions is the central theme. In the Aristotelian passage, we can identify some Theognidean traces from outside the verbatim quotation. Aristotle says that, in matter of friendship, judging correctly is 'not easy' ([x], 1237b11), and understanding if a friend is reliable takes time. These ideas are present in II. 119-24 of the Sylloge: [x].41 The difficulty of uncovering a friend's insincerity is stated also in the couplet which precedes this elegy in the Sylloge: [x], Thgn. 117-8.42 In this case as well, the echoes in Aristotle's text suggests that Thgn. 117-28 (in the current editions identified as two poems, 117-8 and 119-28) might have been circulating together during his time, in a not much different sequence than the one transmitted in the Mediaeval manuscripts.
Overall, we must also notice that Theognis' name is referred to by Aristotle as that of a renowned authority, with no further detail. It is a name Aristotle can cite to validate his statements. He quotes Theognis, as he does other authors, for a rhetorical purpose. Theognis appears as bearer of well- cknowledged ethics on which Aristotle can base himself, or with which he can back up his own arguments. Yet Theognis was more than a source of validating maxims for Aristotie. He does not know only the lines he quotes but shows awareness also of the context they come from. The quoted lines might have been circulating orally as sayings; but Aristotle also knew that they came from a broader context, from longer elegies -- which suggests that he might have accessed them as such in an entextualized version.43
We have thus explored the presence of Theognis in the texts of Plato and Xenophon, products of the 5th century BC and its tensions, and in Aristotle. We have recognized the role of Theognis as an 'authoritative voice' in the 4th-century BC cultural landscape, and also ascertained the ideological load of several reuses of his poems. There is a sense, in the period, that Theognis is the poet to resort to for quotable lines on friendship and virtue, a sort of 'teacher of wisdom'44 in these matters. The sample examination of some Aristotelian reuses of Theognis' poetry allows us to add further elements to the picture. The 'undeclared' Theognidean presence, these scattered echoes traceable in the prose nearby the quotations, disclose a deep familiarity on the part of Aristotle with Theognis' text, This familiarity goes beyond the verbatim quotations of isolated gnomai: Aristotle knew the elegiac frame he was drawing the lines from. The examined Aristotelian cases are not dissimilar to that of Xen. Symp. 2.4, where, in the reuse of Thgn. 35-36, we might sense awareness of the broader sympotic context the distich comes from. Even though we cannot exclude that the authors knew the broader elegiac contexts mnemonically, I think that these cases likely imply engagement with the Theognidean text in written form. Both passages confirm a further detail of these authors' notion of Theognis in the 4th century BC: teacher of wisdom and authority in matter of some ethical themes, whose texts are ideologically loaded; but also recognized author of some circulating written texts.
With this picture in mind, we shall now turn to the later afterlife of Theognis. Examining the fortunes of two other passages will allow us some glimpses of the destiny of Theognidean poetry in Imperial and Byzantine times. This will, eventually, lead us to elaborate some core ideas about the trajectory of the history of Theognis' text from the 5th century BC onwards.
2 Two Cases of Later Reception[x].45
Thgn. 425-8
The hexameters are almost identical to two lines of a 3rd-century BC papyrus which preserves some remains of what has been recognized as the Mouseion of the 4th-century BC sophist Alcidamas:46
[x].47
P. Petr. 1.25.10-15 (TM 59083 = MP3 77, 3rd BC) (ed. Bassino)48
Alcidamas' Mouseion was probably the main source of the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, handed down to us in a 2nd-century BC version in a manuscript (Laur. Plut. 56.01). 49 The lines found in the papyrus are also in the version of the Certamen preserved in the manuscript: [x] (Cert. Hom. et Hes. 77-79, ed. Bassino).
The motif of [x] ('best not to be born') is only one instance of the wider Greek pessimistic conception of human life, which is detectable, in different forms, from Homer onwards.30 This particular topos is found widely in literary texts from the 5th and 4th century BC.51 Passages from Bacchylides and Sophocles, as well as one Euripidean and one Aristotelian fragment, exemplify its pervasiveness and standardized form: 52
[x].53
Bacchyl. 5.160-2
[x].54
Soph. OC 1224- 7
[x].55
Eur. Beller. fr. 285.1-2 K.
[x].56
Alexis fr. 145.14-16 K.-A.
p. 294.43-5.3 Gigon (= p. 48.18-23 Rose) [x]. p. 295.15-20 Gigon (= p. 49.5-9 Rose) [x].57
Arist. fr. 65 Gigon (= fr. 44 Rose)
Lines 425- 8 of the Sylloge thus elaborate on a pessimistic notion deeply rooted in the Greek mindset, and more specifically on an apparently widely circulating saying, as it is explicitly said in Euripides', Aristotle's, and Alexis' fragments. As LeVen (2013) 32 warns. 'studying the relationship between texts relying on the same gnome [ ... ] would not tell us much about the mutual relationship of the two "texts" but does help us map individual passages' connections to a textual collective', which is the 'endless, and endlessly fluid, repertoire of intertextual connections with oral narratives'.58 Indeed, we do not know if the motif of [x] was already established as a saying in hexameters when Alcidamas utilized it, if he borrowed it from some previous tradition of the Certamen, or if the two lines were the sophist's creation.59 In any case, we must consider the possibility that the Sylloge's lines might not only be taking up a wide-spread motif, but also a pre-existing hexameter form in which the topos had already crystallized. Scholars have even spoken of the hexameters as a proverb;60 they maintained that the composer of Il. 425-8 fitted such proverb into an elegiac version, and that the pentameters are redundant, adding nothing to the concepts in the hexameters. Nonetheless, I believe that something can be said in defense of their poetic quality. The pentameters do indeed draw from very common motifs, As for 426, both the metaphor of life as the faculty of 'seeing the sunlight' and the attribute [x] used for the sun and sunlight, are found already in epic.61 In 428, we find another well-established image, that of 'lying under a tall heap of earth'.62 So, the hexameters take over a pre-existing saying and the pentameters comment on it. Still, they do this by elaborating on mixed literary motifs: the result is a poignant chain of shared images linked to the broader sphere of life and death -- a sequence which results in sounding proverbial on its own. Its later fortune confirms that it was perceived as such.
The many indirect attestations show that both the hexameters and the elegiac version had a successful afterlife.63 As for the elegiacs, II. 425-7 are quoted and ascribed to Theognis by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 3.3.15.1), while the entire elegy is quoted anonymously in Sextus Empiricus (Pyr. 3.231). It is then found in Stobaeus (4.52b.30), who separately reports Alcidamas' hexameter version as well (4.52b.22), confirming that the two were still circulating in parallel.64 Finally, 425-7 are transmitted unattributed in Sudu [x] 4099 and, with ascription to Theognis, by the paroemiographer Macarius (2.45), Out of five such occurrences in later ancient authors, three cases report the elegiac lines in a lemma without any contextualization: Stobaeus, the Suda, and Macarius. Such treatment is intrinsic to the nature of these works, which are arranged as series of entries: they are, respectively, an anthology of extracts from Greek writers, an encyclopaedia and a paroemiographical collection.65 By contrast, in the works of Clement and Sextus, the quotations are inserted in a broader argumentative context and help to build the author's case. Neither author, however, engages with the lines, and instead both quote them without introduction or further comment, simply as an authoritative rhetorical aid to their arguments:
[x] (Thgn. 425-7) [x] (Eur. fr. 449.3- 6 K.) [x].66
Clem. Strom. 3.3.15.1-2 (II 202.8-16 Stahlin)
[x] (Eur. fr. 449.3-6K.) [x] (Thgn. 425-8) [x].67
Sext. Emp. Pyr. 3.230-1
Thus, the elegiac, Theognidean version, despite appropriating an established motif, had its own success, and contributed to the further canonization of this pessimistic imagery in later ancient sources. To deepen our understanding of this process of transmission and reception, let us consider the similar fate of another passage in the Theognidea.
Lines 213- 8 of the Sylloge include the famous exhortation to be 'socially flexible', by imitating the octopus:68
[x].69
Thgn. 213-8 (213-4 + 215-8 W.[2])70
The Theognidean variant of this motif may be the most popular one, but this same topos can be found in other Archaic and Classical passages, often in similarly hortatory contexts. There are striking commonalities between these lines of the Sylloge, an epic fragment, and a Pindaric fragment:71
[x].72
Thebais fr. *8 W. (= Thebais fr. 4 Bernabe = Nosti fr. 14 Allen = 'Hom.' fr. 3 Davies)73
[x].74
Pind. fr. 43 S.-M.
The motif returns also in a Sophoclean fragment (Soph. fr. 307 R.2) and in two fragments of Old Comedy (Eup. fr. 117 and Alc. com. fr. 1 K.-A.). 75 As with the topos 'better not to be born', the imagery of the octopus' colour-changing skin as a metaphor for the human mind was well-established at the latest by the early Classical period. To the question of the relations between these passages (complicated by the doublets at Thgn. 1071-4) there is, again, no straightforward answer. One may wish to recognize conscious textual allusions, but what the texts share is primarily what I would call a 'common imagery'; the articulation of a topos in its details, rather than the actual wording.76
Theognis' ll. 215-6 and these five other passages are all quoted by Athenaeus. The two comic fragments, the fragment from the Thebaid, and Theognis' II. 215- 6 are to be found in book 7 of the Deipnosophists (7.316b-c, 317a-b), in a section focused on descriptions of the octopus. In book 12, instead, Athenaeus quotes in a row Pindar, Sophocles, and part of Theognis' l. 215 (12.51)c- d). lines 215- 6 are also quoted earlier, in Plutarch, on a number of occasions. In one case (De amie. mulrif. 960 they are presented as laughable because, says Plutarch, nobody can follow Theognis' advice and tirelessly adjust to many people, thus acquiring many friends. Plutarch quotes the lines twice more, in discussions of natural philosophy, in both cases together with Pindar's fragment 43 (Aet. phys. 916c. De soll. an. 978e). Part of l. 215 ends up, although rearranged and unattributed, in an entry of Diogenianus' collection of proverbs (1.23 cod. Mazarinco - Apostol. 2.39), where it is to be found together with l. 3 of Thebais fr. *8.77 A parody of ll. 215-6 is also to be found in Philostratus. He does not mention Theognis but these elegiacs (which mock his namesake, the sophist Philostratus of Egypt) follow exactly the syntax of ll. 215-6:
[x].78
Philostr. V.S. 486 (II.6.23-26 Kayser)
76 Adrados (1958) 4-5 proposed that Pind. fr. 43 S.-M. was the model for the elegiac lines, and that Pindar's antecedent was the Thebaid -- which the scholar does not exclude may have been known also to Theognis. 77 Diogenianus probably drew it from Plutarch: his reading[x] is in Plut. De amic. multit. 96f(cod. D), Aet. phys. 916c, De soll. an. 978e. 78 '1 am aware that Philostralus the Egyptian also, though he studied philosophy with Queen Cleopatra, was called a sophist. This was because he adopted the panegyrical and highly-coloured type of eloquence; which came of associating with a woman who regarded even the love of letters as a sensuous pleasure. Hence the following elegiac couplet was composed as a parody aimed at him: acquire the temperament of that very wise man, Philostratus, who, fresh from his intimacy with Cleopatra, has taken on colours like hers' (transl. Wright [1921] 17.
Finally, a non- literal reference to l. 215 with a mention of Theognis is to be found in Julian's Misopogon, where the emperor mockingly reports the accusations of the Antiochenes against him. He is described as in flexible (thus contravening the teaching of Theognis) and unable to adapt to the Antiochenes' mindset (a defect described by means of another topos: the proverbial 'roughness of Mykonos'):
[x].79
Jul. Mis. 349d (pp. 189.20-90.2 Nesselrath)
Philostratus' parody and Julian's hint at Theognis' line, although they contrast sharply in their treatment of the text (Philostratus does not mention Theognis, Julian does), are both witnesses to the renown of these lines. Philostratus' parody, to be effective, needs to be based on a well-known passage (see the indefinite [x]). Julian instead only mentions Theognis and subsumes the core idea of l. 215 in his own prose: there is no need to quote the actual line fully. Just below, he uses another proverbial image with the same illustrative purpose for which he resorts to Theognis. Line 215 and the saying on the roughness of Mykonos are both well known and analogously rhetorically functional. So, all in all, in some cases ll. 215-6 are quoted without ascription, and even end up in a repertory of proverbs; in other cases, the ascription is maintained and stands as a testament to the enduring popularity of those lines as authored by Theognis.
In sum, both the examined sets of lines develop well-established imageries, and their postclassical fortune is livelier than that of the other poetical instances of the same motifs. Having thus gained perspective on the fortunes of their ancient reception, we can now move to some conclusions.
3 ConclusionsThis essay has started with an investigation of the Theognidean presence in 4th-century BC prose writings, where we can trace a well-defined author named Theognis. Not only is he unanimously recognized as the composer of specific lines (35-36 and 434), but an 'authority status' on specific themes also seems unanimously accorded to him, even though different authors referred to him with different aims.80 Besides, we have seen that the Archaic ideals expressed in the Theognidea and their characteristic terminology were transferred from the Archaic civic confrontation to the mass-elite opposition in democratic Athens. Plato's critique further suggests that Theognis was a canonical authority in matter of virtue, co-opted as spokesperson for the conventional notion of kalokagathia popular among the Athenian elite.
We then considered the later reception of ll. 425-8 and 215-6. In the light of this examination, we can make two sets of observations. Firstly, in both cases, stereotypical imageries occur, which have several famous 5th-century BC parallels. In these two examined cases, the Theognidean lines are either the first or one of the first extant attestations of images and motifs which will go on to be successful in other Classical literary texts. We lack evidence to clear up the relations among the ancient passages, given the pervasiveness of both imageries. However, it is likely that the two Theognidean loci drew on already established topoi and contributed to popularizing them in their own elegiac version. Theognis' variations on such topoi (consider the case of the octopus trope) had a longer afterlife than others, for their gnomicity and intrinsic 'quotability', namely, the self-standing nature of many of the Theognidean couplets,81 which makes them 'reusable' in any context. The study of other elaborations of the same topoi and that of the transmission of Theognis' versions allow us to recognize Theognis' poetry as both a recipient of 'traditional wisdom' (if we agree to apply this label to the complexes of imagery examined), and a means of perpetuating it.
Secondly, in these later uses, we observed a progressive anonymization of Theognis' lines. In Clement and Sextus, ll. 425-7 (or 425-8) are a given, a quote to be used with an argumentative purpose, alongside similar quotations, and they need not to be commented on. For the purposes of these texts, the authorship of the lines is unimportant: their validating strength is what counts. The case of the octopus lines also exemplifies a second, parallel aspect of the late destiny of the Theognidean text, i.e. its popularity. Julian's allusion to Theognis' lines and Philostratus' parody reveal the renown of that text: it could be referred to both as Theognis' and without ascription, being in either case rhetorically effective. This, to use an imagery which is familiar to us by now, reflects Theognis' own octopus-like flexibility, the flexibility of his ever-applicable, universal, timeless lines, which are authoritative when mentioned, but still rhetorically effective when left anonymous. This is also due to intrinsic features: the seriality and 'fragmentability', the gnomic, universal character of many of the Theognidean statements, their availability 'to the later crystallisation in proverbial saying', and thus ever 'reenactable', in any context, as Condello wrote.82
It could be pointed out that, as ll. 425-8 and 215-6 are not ascribed to Theognis any earlier than the 1st or 2nd century AD, they might have been included among the Theognidea quite late. This does not invalidate the 'parabola of authority' of Theognis' name I have just considered. On the contrary, ll. 425-8 and 215-6 might have been included in the Theognidea precisely because they were as gnomic and proverbial sounding as those known as Theognis', who was by now an established wisdom authority.
To make some comprehensive considerations: Theognis achieved renown in the 4th century BC; at that time, he was already a 'validating' authority and his lines were already used gnomically. Nonetheless, such a status was one aspect of a much more rounded notion of Theognis, which entailed authorship, authority status, as well as an ideological position. This early establishment as an authority influenced the way his poetry was later used. With time, some Theognidean lines (such as the two case studies here examined), being gnomic and reenactable, became commonplaces, acquiring what we could call a proverbial veneer. They circulated autonomously, and were probably being taken up in anthologies;83 finally, in some cases they ended up losing the ascription to Theognis.84 But the necessary condition for their anonymization was their wide circulation -- and other sources attest that they were, at least partly, or up to a certain time, circulating as Theognis'. In other words, their anonymization is a side effect, or better still the end result, of the authority once accorded to Theognis, of his profile of teacher of ethical wisdom which underlies his 4th-century BC reuses. This leads us to the core argument of this paper. We saw that the motifs of 'better not to be born' and the 'adaptability of the octopus' are well attested in Greek literary texts, and it is therefore safe to assume that they were rooted in the Greek imaginary prior to Theognis' own elaboration on them. Hence, already circulating topoi were taken up in Theognis' lines and fitted to the elegiac meter. The metrical arrangement, the renowned authority and gnomic versatility of Theognis' lines had these motifs further established in 'Theognidean versions'. Over the centuries, authors resorted to them more often than to other literary instances of the same imageries, and the lines eventually ended up, with no ascription, in Imperial and Byzantine compilations (425-7 in Suda a 4099; 215-6 in Diogenian. 1.23 cod. Mazarinco = Apostol. 2.39). Seen from this perspective, Theognis' fame and recognized auctoritas, therefore, develop almost as a middle episode in a longer story, which begins with the anonymous wisdom repertory these lines drew from and ends with the anonymous wisdom repertory they eventually became part of.
One last question concerns the significance of acknowledging the arc of the Theognidean reception through time. This essay has offered a sample analysis of some chosen Theognidea and of the ways they are quoted in different times, proposing a shift in our perspective on and our approach to the corpus. The survey aimed to show, through selected examples, how much can be discovered by studying how Theognis' lines were appropriated and adjusted over time, by considering what happened, in the reuses, to the ideology the Theognidea first voiced, what later authors thought of the poet, and how Theognis became the 'grumpy aristocrat' of our collective imagination -- or if perhaps this notion developed earlier and actually played a role in the arrangement of the Sylloge itself. Although there might be much we do not know about the Theognidean corpus, there is also a lot that we can say about the journey in time of Theognis' poetry: it is embedded in later authors' texts, and we should keep an eye out for this, shifting the focus onto the indirect tradition and onto the dynamics of reception and quotation.
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