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151. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:32:10; ibid., 9:33:58.
152. For first quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:35:50. For second quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position,channel 7, 9:36:34; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004). For the third quote, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:39; 9:39:37; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004).
153. Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003); FAA memo,"Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft; QUIT25; September 11, 2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2-4 (Peninsular Radar position); FAA memo,"Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft; QUIT25; September 11, 2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2-5 (East Feeder Radar position).
154. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:38:02; Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003).The estimated time of impact of Flight 77 into the Pentagon is based on Commission analysis of FDR, air traffic control, radar, and Pentagon elevation and impact site data.
155. Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003); NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, recorder 1, channel 7, 9:41.
156. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:42:08.
157. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 10.
158.The United 93 timeline in FAA report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:17 "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." See FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 11.
159.The United 93 timeline in FAA report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:54 a "second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible screaming or a struggle and a statement,'get out of here, get out of here' from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 11. At 9:31:48, ExecJet 56 also called in, reporting that "we're just answering your call.We did hear that, uh, yelling too." The FAA responded at 9:31:51,"Okay, thanks.We're just trying to figure out what's going on." FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 15.
160. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 15.
161. FAA memo,"Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 10, 13; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center position, line 5154.
162. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 19.
163. Ibid., p. 23.
164. FAA memo,"Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 16-17; FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, pp. 26-32.
165. FAA memo,"Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 17-19.
166. For 9:46 quotation, see ibid., pp. 19-20. For 9:49 discussion about military assistance, see ibid., p. 21.
167. For 9:53 discussion about scrambling aircraft, see ibid., p. 23. Neither Monte Belger nor the deputy director for air traffic services could recall this discussion in their interviews with us. Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Peter Challan interview (Mar. 26, 2004). Subsequently Belger told us he does not believe the conversation occurred. Monte Belger, email to the Commission, July 12, 2004. However, tapes from the morning reveal that at
9:53 a staff person from headquarters told the Command Center "Peter's talking to Monte now about scrambling." FAA memo,"Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 23. For discussions about the status of United 93, see ibid., pp. 24-27.
168. Ibid., pp. 23-27.We also reviewed a report regarding seismic observations on September 11, 2001, whose authors conclude that the impact time of United 93 was "10:06:05±5 (EDT)."Won-Young Kim and G. R. Baum, "Seismic Observations during September 11, 2001,Terrorist Attack," spring 2002 (report to the Maryland Department of Natural Resources). But the seismic data on which they based this estimate are far too weak in signal-to-noise ratio and far too speculative in terms of signal source to be used as a means of contradicting the impact time established by the very accurate combination of FDR, CVR, ATC, radar, and impact site data sets.These data sets constrain United 93's impact time to within 1 second, are airplane- and crash-site specific, and are based on time codes automatically recorded in the ATC audiotapes for the FAA centers and correlated with each data set in a process internationally accepted within the aviation accident investigation community. Furthermore, one of the study's principal authors now concedes that "seismic data is not definitive for the impact of UA 93." Email from Won-Young Kim to the Commission,"Re: UA Flight 93,"July 7, 2004; see also Won-Young Kim,"Seismic Observations for UA Flight 93 Crash near Shanksville, Pennsylvania during September 11, 2001," July 5, 2004.
169. FAA memo,"Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 31.
170. For 10:17 discussion, see ibid., p. 34. For communication regarding "black smoke," see FAA memo,"Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93) Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, pp. 16-18 (Cleveland Center, Imperial Radar position).This report from the C-130H was recorded on ATC audio about 1 minute and 37 seconds after the impact time of United 93 as established by NTSB and Commission analysis of FDR, CVR, radar, and impact data sets-more than a minute before the earliest impact time originally posited by the authors of the seismic data report.
171. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician, channel 5, 10:07.
172. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 10:10.
173. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician, channel 4, 10:14.
174. DOD record, NEADS MCC/T Log Book, Sept. 11, 2001.
175.William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003.
176. Larry Arnold testimony, May 23, 2003.
177. See DOD record, NEADS MCC/T Log Book, Sept. 11, 2001.The entry in this NEADS log records the tail number not of American 77 but of American 11:"American Airlines #N334AA hijacked." See also DOD record, Surveillance Log Book, Sept. 11, 2001.
178.William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003; DOD briefing materials,"Noble Eagle; 9-11 Timeline," undated.
179. For lack of knowledge about the hijacking, see, e.g.,White House transcript, Card interview with Ron Fournier of the Associated Press, Aug. 7, 2002. For information on the hijacking within the FAA, see the discussion of American 11 in section 1.2.
180. See White House record, Situation Room Log, Sept. 11, 2001;White House record, Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) Watch Log, Sept. 11, 2001; DOD record, Senior Operations Officer log, Sept. 11, 2001.
181. Jane Garvey interview (Jun. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004).
182. For notifications, see DOD record, Assistant Deputy Director Operations Passdown Log, Sept. 11, 2001. For the call to the FAA, see DOD record, Senior Operations Officer log, Sept. 11, 2001 ("9:00 NMCC called FAA, briefed of explosion at WTC possibly from aircraft crash.Also, hijacking of American Flight 11 from Boston to LA, now enroute to Kennedy"). For the scrambling of jets not being discussed, see Ryan Gonsalves interview (May 14, 2004).
183. Secret Service records show the motorcade arriving between 8:50 and 8:55. USSS record, shift log, Sept. 11, 2001 (8:55); USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (8:50). For Andrew Card's recollection, see Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). For the President's reaction, see Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004);White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Schieffer of CBS News, Apr. 17, 2002.
184.White House transcript, Rice interview with Evan Thomas of Newsweek, Nov. 1, 2001, p. 2; see also White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001.
185.White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 1.
186. For Rice's meeting, see White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward of the Washington Post, Oct. 24, 2001, pp. 360-361. For White House staff monitoring the news, see, e.g., White House transcript, Rice interview with Evan Thomas, Nov. 11, 2001, p. 388.
187. On White House staff reaction, see White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 361; Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On security enhancements, see USSS memo, interview with Carl Truscott, Oct. 1, 2001, p. 1. On security measures being precautionary, see Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004).
188. For the time of the teleconference, see FAA record, Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001. For recollections of the NMCC officer, see Charles Chambers interview (Apr. 23, 2004). For recollections of the FAA manager, see Michael Weikert interview (May 7, 2004). For Belger's reaction, see Monte Belger testimony, June 17, 2004.
189. For the times of the video teleconference, see White House record, Situation Room Communications Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (9:25 start); CIA notes, Cofer Black timeline, Sept. 11, 2001 (CIA representatives joining at 9:40); FAA record, Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001 (FAA representatives joining at 9:40).
190. Patrick Gardner interview (May 12, 2004). For participants, see Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Jeff Griffith interview (Mar. 31, 2004). On the absence of Defense officials, see John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004).The White House video teleconference was not connected into the area of the NMCC where the crisis was being managed.Thus the director of the operations team-who was on the phone with NORAD-did not have the benefit of information being shared on the video teleconference. See, e.g., Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004); Montague Winfield interview (Apr. 26, 2004); Patrick Gardner interview (May 12, 2004). Moreover, when the Secretary and Vice Chairman later participated in the White House video teleconference, they were necessarily absent from the NMCC and unable to provide guidance to the operations team. See DOD report, OT-2 Analysis of NMCC Response to Terrorist Attack on 11 SEP 01, Oct. 4, 2001; John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004).
191. NSC notes, Paul Kurtz notes, Sept. 11, 2001; Paul Kurtz meeting (Dec. 22, 2003). For shootdown authority having already been conveyed, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
192. Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004). For the job of the NMCC in an emergency, see NMCC briefing (July 21, 2003).
193. For the Secretary's activities, see DOD memo, interview of Donald Rumsfeld, Dec. 23, 2002; Stephen Cambone interview (July 8, 2004).
194. Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004). Secure teleconferences are the NMCC's primary means of coordinating emergencies, and they fall into two categories:"event" and "threat." Event conferences seek to gather information. If the situation escalates, a threat conference may be convened. On 9/11, there was no preset teleconference for a domestic terrorist attack. NMCC and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) briefing (July 21, 2003). For the content of the conferences on 9/11, see DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
195. See DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; see also White House notes, Thomas Gould notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
196. On difficulties in including the FAA, see NMCC and NMJIC briefing (July 21, 2003); John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004). On NORAD and the time of the FAA's joining, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For the FAA representative, see Rayford Brooks interview (Apr. 15, 2004).
197. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004); Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004).
198. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
199. On the briefing, see ibid.The Vice Chairman was on Capitol Hill when the Pentagon was struck, and he saw smoke as his car made its way back to the building. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004). For the Chairman being out of the country, see DOD record, Deputy Director for Operations Passdown Log, Sept. 11, 2001.
200. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
201. Ibid.
202. Ibid.
203. For the President being informed at 9:05, see White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001. For Card's statement, see White House transcript, Card interview with Ron Fournier, Aug. 7, 2002. For the Pres-ident's reaction, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
204. For the President's activities, see Education Channel videotape,"Raw Footage of President Bush at Emma E. Booker Elementary School," Sept. 11, 2001 (remaining in classroom); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004) (in the holding room). For his calls, see White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001 (9:15 call to Vice President); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004) (call to Rice); President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004) (call to Pataki); White House record, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (call to Mueller). For the decision to make a statement, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the Secret Service's perspective, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).
205. On the return to Washington, see Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004); Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On consulting with senior advisers, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). On information about additional aircraft, see, e.g., Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On decisions and the focus on the President's speech, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004).
206. On the motorcade, see USSS record, shift log, Sept. 11, 2001 (departing 9:35, arriving 9:45); USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (departing 9:36, arriving 9:42). Fleischer deduced from his notes that the President learned about the Pentagon while in the motorcade.Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the President's actions and statements to the Vice President, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004);White House notes, Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
207. On not returning to Washington, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); USSS memo, interview of Edward Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001;Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). For additional sources on the President's desire to return, see White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5. For the Vice President's recollection, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For time of departure, see USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001. On Air Force One's objectives on takeoff, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).
208. USSS memo, interview of Gregory LaDow, Oct. 1, 2001, p. 1. Shortly after the second attack in New York, a senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President's movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for-possibly hijacked- in addition to the two that had already crashed.Though the senior agent told someone to convey this information to the Secret Service's operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated; it failed to reach agents assigned to the Vice President, and the Vice President was not evacuated at that time. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); USSS memo, interview of Nelson Garabito, Oct. 1, 2001; see also Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004).
209. American 77's route has been determined through Commission analysis of FAA and military radar data. For the evacuation of the Vice President, see White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 2; USSS memo, interview of Rocco Delmonico, Oct. 1, 2001 (evacuation of the White House); see also White House notes, Mary Matalin notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the time of entering the tunnel, see USSS report,"Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 11-October 3, 2001," Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2. Secret Service personnel told us that the 9:37 entry time in their timeline was based on alarm data, which is no longer retrievable. USSS briefing (Jan. 29, 2004).
210.White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4; President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
211. On Mrs. Cheney, see USSS report, "Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 11-October 3, 2001," Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2 (time of arrival);White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 (joining the Vice President). For the contemporaneous notes, see White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the content of the Vice President's call, see White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5.According to the Vice President, there was "one phone call from the tunnel. And basically I called to let him know that we were a target and I strongly urged him not to return to Washington right away, that he delay his return until we could find out what the hell was going on." For their subsequent movements, see White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5;White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek,Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2.
212. On communications problems, see, e.g., President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). On lack of an open line, see, e.g., Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004).
213. On the Vice President's call, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For the Vice President's time of arrival in the shelter conference room, see White House record, PEOC Shelter Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (9:58); USSS memo, OVP 9/11 Timeline, Nov. 17, 2001 (9:52; Mrs. Cheney arrived White House and joined him in tunnel);White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes (9:55; he is on phone with President);White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 ("And when I got there, he was on the phone with the President . . . But from that first place where I ran into him, I moved with him into what they call the PEOC"); White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4
(9:35 or 9:36 arrival; he estimated a 15-minute stay); Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004) (arrived with Rice and the Vice President in conference room; called headquarters immediately; call logged at 10:00); President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting,Apr. 29, 2004 (Vice President viewed television footage of Pentagon ablaze in tunnel);White House transcript, Rice interview with Evan Thomas, Nov. 1, 2001, p. 388 (Rice viewed television footage of Pentagon ablaze in Situation Room). For the Vice President's recollection about the combat air patrol, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 17, 2001, p. 16.
214. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); see also White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, pp. 7-8.
215. Douglas Cochrane meeting (Apr. 16, 2004); Condeleeza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For Rice entering after the Vice President, see USSS report,"Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 11-October 3, 2001," Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2; Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004).
216. In reconstructing events that occurred in the PEOC on the morning of 9/11, we relied on (1) phone logs of the White House switchboard; (2) notes of Lewis Libby, Mrs. Cheney, and Ari Fleischer; (3) the tape (and then transcript) of the air threat conference call; and (4) Secret Service and White House Situation Room logs, as well as four separate White House Military Office logs (the PEOC Watch Log, the PEOC Shelter Log, the Communications Log, and the 9/11 Log).
217. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For one open line between the Secret Service and the FAA, see note 208. At Secret Service headquarters, personnel from the intelligence division were also on a phone conference with FAA headquarters. Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004). For notification of an inbound aircraft at 10:02, see USSS record, Intelligence Division timeline, Sept. 11, 2001; USSS record, Crisis Center Incident Monitor, Sept. 11, 2001. For the FAA's projection, see Tim Grovack interview (Apr. 8, 2004). For Secret Service updates, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
218.White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001;White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
219. For Libby's characterization, see White House transcript, Scooter Libby interview with Newsweek, Nov. 2001. For the Vice President's statement, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For the second authorization, see White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001; White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
220. Joshua Bolten meeting (Mar. 18, 2004); see also White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001 ("10:15-18:Aircraft 60 miles out, confirmed as hijack-engage? VP:Yes. JB [Joshua Bolten]: Get President and confirm engage order").
221. For the Vice President's call, see White House record, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 11, 2001;White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001; White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001. Fleischer's
10:20 note is the first mention of shootdown authority. See White House notes,Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 11, 2001;
see also Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
222. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
223. On reports of another plane, see White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001;White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the Vice President's authorization, see ibid.; DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For Hadley's statement, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
224. For the quotation, see White House transcript, Libby interview with Newsweek, Nov. 2001. On the air-craft's identity, see White House record,White House Military Office Log, Sept. 11, 2001.
225. On the NMCC, see DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. On the Secret Service's contacts with the FAA, see notes 208, 217. On the Secret Service conveying information to the White House, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004).
226. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
227. Ibid.
228. Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004). On the morning of 9/11, General Eberhart was in his office at headquarters-roughly 30 minutes away from Cheyenne Mountain, where the operations center is located.
229. DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 11, 2001.
230. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 10:32:12. For the text of the chat log message, see DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 11, 2001.
231. For the statements of NEADS personnel, see Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004) (NEADS commander); Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22, 2004) (mission commander); James Fox interview (Oct. 29, 2004) (senior weapons director). On the understanding of leaders in Washington, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For the orders to Langley pilots, see NEADS audio file,Weapons Director position, recorder 1, channel 2, 10:10-11.
232. For evidence of the President speaking to Rumsfeld, see White House notes,Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On inability to recall this conversation, see Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004).
233. DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
234. Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004).At 11:15, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to the President and told him DOD was working on refining the rules of engagement so pilots would have a better understanding of the circumstances under which an aircraft could be shot down. See, e.g., DOD notes, Stephen Cambone notes, Sept. 11, 2001. DOD did not circulate written rules of engagement until sometime after 1:00 P.M. See DOD memo, rules of engagement, Sept. 11, 2001 (faxed to Andrews Air Force Base at 1:45 P.M.).
235. David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004).
236.The 113th Wing first learned from the FAA tower at Andrews that the Secret Service wanted fighters air-borne.The FAA tower had been contacted by personnel at FAA headquarters, who were on an open line with senior agents from the President's detail. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004). On the Secret Service agent relaying instructions, see USSS memo, Beauchamp to AD-Inspection, September 11 experience, Feb. 23, 2004. On the order to fly weapons free, see David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004); DOD memo, interview of David Wherley, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 12.
237. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
238. These estimates are based on analysis of Boeing 757 maximum operating speed data, FAA and military radar data, and assumptions regarding how the airplane would be operated en route to the Washington, D.C., area. The shortest time frame assumes maximum speed without regard to overspeed warnings, a straight-line path, and no time allowed for maneuvering or slowing to aim and crash the airplane into its target.The probable time frame allows for speeds consistent with the observed operation of the airplane prior to its final maneuvers and crash, as well as for maneuvers and slowing in the D.C. area to take aim.According to radar data, the fighters from Langley Air Force Base arrived over Washington at about 10:00 A.M. Two of the three Langley fighters were fully armed (i.e., with missiles and guns); the third fighter carried only guns. Craig Borgstrom interview (Dec. 1, 2003).
239. For the pilots' awareness, see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003); Bradley Derrig interview (Dec. 1, 2003); Craig Borgstrom interview (Dec. 1, 2003). For the quotation, see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003). 240. For no authority at 10:10, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2. For shootdown
authority at 10:31, see DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 11, 2001. For possibility of ordering a shoot-down, see Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 2, 2004).
241. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, recorder 1, channel 4, 10:02:22.