Anti-Anti-Nazi Barbarian Hordes are Knocking Down the Gates

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Trump LANDS in NEW SCANDAL as His WAR on LA BACKFIRES
by Brian Kabateck and Shant Karnikian
Legal AF
Jul 5, 2025

Attorney's Brian Kabateck and Shant Karnikian expose the explosive federal class action lawsuit revealing how Trump's ICE agents have turned Los Angeles into a constitutional dead zone with 3,000 daily arrest quotas. They break down the shocking allegations of os US citizens detained at gunpoint for walking through parks, workers grabbed at bus stops without warrants, and a woman literally kidnapped while being dropped off at work.



Transcript

We got some breaking news here today out
of Los Angeles where we are. A massive
federal class action has been filed
against the Trump administration.
Christy Gnome, Cash Patel, a bunch of
different heads of different branches
under the Trump administration alleging
widescale militarization of immigration
agents and sweeping ICE raids and
revealing some of the deplorable
conditions in which some of these people
are being held. It alleges that Latino
citizens, day laborers, farm workers
were targeted without any warrant, no
explanation, no questions. I mean, it's
things that we've seen, but this is a
massive lawsuit, very well written, and
this might be a very important step in
trying to seek some justice for these
people. Uh, we're not talking about
racial profiling. We're talking about
fraud, government sponsored kidnappings
and broad daylight and shredding the
Bill of Rights here in Los Angeles. I'm
Sean Carne. It's Brian Kabet. This is
Civil Action on the Legal AF Network.
Brian, tell us a little bit more about
this lawsuit. Right. So, uh, I've got
the lawsuit sitting here in front of me
and I'm going to I'm going to read from
it. I don't think you have to look any
further than paragraph 197 of the of the
lawsuit. White House official Ton
Hullman, who's in charge of ICE, right,
recently maligned Los Angeles as a
sanctuary city and vowed, quote, "We're
going to send a whole boatload of
agents. We're going to swamp the city.
this operation is not going to end.
Every day in LA, we're going to enforce
immigration law. I don't care if they
like it or not. And then Christy Gnome,
when she's not Billy busy trying to kill
her dog, said, "We're going to stay here
and build our operations until we make
sure that we liberate liberate the city
of Los Angeles." And then she told ICE
agents, "Your performance will be judged
every day by how many arrests you, your
teammates, and your office are able to
effectuate. failure is not an option. So
this lawsuit, Sean, I think we should do
this is go through some of the examples
in the lawsuit of the types of conduct
that are occurring here in Los Angeles,
even as we speak. Yeah. And I think one
thing to lay out before we get into that
is that they had an arrest quota of
3,000 arrests per day. That is just
wild. You know, judging someone's job
performance, a law enforcement officials
job performance based on how many people
they arrest. So you let's let's talk
about some of these most egregious
examples that Brian referenced a minute
ago. You had one US citizen who was
detained and cuffed while walking
through a park in Santa Ana held
afterwards. No charges, nothing. Uh
that's an American citizen. That's
someone that has a United States
passport. A citizen of this country. Who
else? Brian, just rattle them off here.
You have a number of people who were
detained while they were waiting at a
bus stop um for work and uh the agents
pointed a taser at them, said stop or
I'll use it. They were pointed guns.
They had no warrant. This is very
important. They had no warrant. They had
no probable cause. They had no
reasonable suspicion. All of those are
required. They simply found three Latino
men sitting on a park bench waiting for
work and they declare that that's
reasonable suspicion enough to stop and
ask them for their papers. There are a
number of cases of US citizens who are
simply in the wrong place at the wrong
time being forced to identify
themselves. There's an example of
someone who's a dual citizen with Mexico
in the United States who's repeatedly
asked for their identification. and they
didn't believe it and still took them
into custody simply because these
people's crime is being brown. Yeah. You
have a young lady here right here in
downtown Los Angeles who was grabbed
while her mother was dropping her off at
work. Agents never asked for ID. Her
mother described it as what looked like
a kidnapping. U no questions, no not
even asking for identification. Just
kind of really wild stuff. And this is a
big serious lawsuit. I think you have,
you know, they talk about you've got
another example here, Jason Brian
Gavida. This is these are all public
records, so I'm not disclosing anything.
Uh on June 12th, he was um he was he
heard someone say immigration agents may
be at the premises. This is a US
citizen. He saw a federal agent step out
and they were carrying handguns and some
of them had military style rifles. They
pointed at him and said, "Stop right
there." Uh they threw him up against a
fence. They asked him, quote, "What
hospital were you born in? They asked
him the same questions. They pushed him
up against a metal gated fence um and
twisted his arm. They took the phone
from him that he had been on, repeatedly
asking him again what hospital he was
born in. He showed him his real ID.
That's the ID you're required to carry
now if you can get on an airplane, but
apparently that's not good enough for
ICE." This makes me incredibly angry.
This is a a wholesale violation of the
United States Constitution, asking
somebody for their papers. Yeah. One of
the other things that it reveals is this
facility right here in downtown LA
called the B18 facility, which is a
short-term holding cell area for for
that immigration officials use. But
they've been putting detainees there for
extended periods of time. It's
underground windowless. No access.
They're not giving people access to
lawyers. They're using sleep deprivation
and other pressure mechanisms to get
people to agree to self-deport. It's it
this is just really wild stuff. This is
just destroying the Constitution. Um and
and this is something that really needs
to be pursued. Well, let's go over again
what the rules are here so that people
clearly understand them. First of all,
um nobody can stop you on the street
just cuz they have to have at a minimum
at the highest standard is a warrant. uh
certainly a warrant to enter private
places, homes, businesses that aren't
open to the public. Um they probable
cause or a at least an articulable
reasonable suspicion. Yeah. And like
we've said before in Los Angeles with
almost 50% of the population Latino, it
is not an articulable reasonable
suspicion simply because you're Latino.
In fact, that is racial profiling.
That's exactly racial profiling. But you
know, the interesting thing about this,
Sean, is that I learned from reading
this lawsuit that um ICE and immigration
here in in Southern California have not
this is not their first trip to the
courthouse, and it's not been just under
the Trump administration. They have been
brought in before. There have been
orders entered against them um for their
behavior in the past. Uh some of those
what we call consent decrees have um
have ended. They dissolved before Trump
became president, but they're back to
the same thing that they've been been at
for a considerable amount of time. Yeah.
What what this lawsuit is asking for,
the sort of relief that it's seeking is
to stop the raids, declare these
practices unconstitutional,
enforce uh federal statutes, you know,
like, you know, and the Constitution,
which require reasonable suspicion,
lawful arrests, access to counsel,
access to someone's lawyer once they're
being detained, and establish some
degree of oversight and accountability
for for the Department of Homeland
Security and ICE uh when they come in
and operate here. I mean, I think this
is an important case. It's not just
about immigration. It's about whether
the Constitution still applies to
federal agents and who whoever decided
it doesn't. I mean, this is just wild.
The these these folks that are being
detained, whether they're documented or
undocumented, have the right to due
process. Due process isn't selective.
You don't get to pick due process
because someone is or isn't in this
country legally. And they're being
deprived of their right to counsel. They
have a right to counsel. The stories in
this lawsuit are are incredible,
including lawyers being um denied access
to their clients. And as you said, this
basement detention facility, um which is
supposed to be temporary, has become
more permanent with people sleeping on
the floors, uh inadequate health care,
inadequate food, inadequate um just
warmth, just basic human needs. Um, and
this is, you know, no surprise when, as
you said, Steven Miller, um, Trump's
number one henchman when it comes to,
uh, all things immigration, has said he
wants 3,000 arrests a day nationally.
Yeah. When they've made their intent
known that they're going to do it
whether people like it or not in Los
Angeles, this is this is just exactly
what they think their their mission is.
If if this is allowed to continue, you
know, it sets a precedent that that
racial profiling, warrantless raids,
just taking people, holding them without
access to a lawyer, without basic basic
necessities is acceptable. You know,
it's just another tool of the federal
government. I mean, it is very dangerous
and this can blow up in everyone's face.
This isn't just something that affects,
you know, one party or another. It
doesn't just affect immigrants or one
group of the population. This can if
this is okay now this can be warped into
so many other things that'll be used
against at political opponents. Where do
you draw the line? This can harm
left and right. This can this can harm
all parties, all levels, all class
levels, too. You know, so it's very
dangerous and this is a big lawsuit and
they're seek seeking a lot of important
relief that I think um is necessary. you
know, this clarity and and a ruling that
this is unconstitutional, I think is
necessary here. Absolutely. And you
know, my final thought on this is we're
we're sitting here with this big
beautiful bill having passed Congress.
And in that bill, and we'll cover this
in another episode, but in that bill,
there are bonuses,
signing bonuses, overtime bonuses,
like hundreds of millions of dollars for
ICE agents. Yeah. So, this
administration is not going to stop on
its own, and it's only the courts that
have the ability and the power to
enforce the Constitution. So, as usual,
Sean, I give you the last thought. I
really want to see how this is going to
shake out. You know, when you have
federal agents that can grab you off the
street, throw you in a van, put you in
an underground cell without a lawyer,
you know, your citizenship won't even
save you. So, that's a real problem.
That's that's authoritarian regime
Gestapo type of stuff. And that's
dangerous. I think what this lawsuit is
trying to fight for is to stop that kind
of behavior. And if the courts don't do
it here, the courts don't step in to do
that. The Constitution is not going to
be able to do that in and of itself. The
courts need to step in. And I hope the
right outcome comes out of this. And
we're going to keep following this
issue. We'll see how it shakes out. I
bet you there's going to be some
important things that happen in the
coming days with this lawsuit. So stay
tuned and and subscribe so you can see
the updates on this. I'm Sean Carren.
This Brian Ketch. This is civil action
on the legal AF network. Can't get your
fill of legal AF? Me neither. That's why
we formed the Legal AF Substack. Every
time we mention something in a hottake,
whether it's a court filing or a oral
argument, come over to the Substack.
You'll find the court filing and the
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Morning AF. What else? All the other
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Part 1 of 2

US Supreme Court drops SHOCKING ruling
by Brian Tyler Cohen
Jul 6, 2025 Brian Tyler Cohen

INTERVIEW - Brian interviews Norm Eisen about a shocking ruling from the US Supreme Court

Department of Homeland Security, et al., Applicants
v.
D.V.D., et al.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.asp ... a1153.html
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/2 ... 3_2co3.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/2 ... 3_l5gm.pdf

Transcript

I'm joined now by the founder of
Democracy Defenders Fund and Obama
ambassador and White House ethics are
Norm Eisen. Norm, thanks so much for
joining me. I want to discuss right now
uh a major situation that's unfolding in
the courts that has to do with both the
US Supreme Court and an emergency motion
that was filed. Can you explain what
just happened? Brian, uh one of the most
tragic events in certainly my 30 plus
years of following the Supreme Court. I
think one that historians will look back
on with her. The Supreme Court or
perhaps I should call them uh John
Roberts MAGA Tribunal allowed the
deportation
of migrants uh from a the United States
to a US military facility in Djibouti on
uh the Horn of Africa to South Sudan
where they face a risk of torture.
Uh nevertheless, the Supreme Court
allowed that third country deportation
there to South Sudan in my view without
proper due process. It's shocking. So in
terms of the emergency motion, can you
explain what the plaintiffs were seeking
to do? This is a case about a group of
eight migrants who um
deportation from the United States to um
our military base in Djibouti where they
were kept in a uh air
conditioned uh cargo
uh holder. I mean it's unbelievable.
This is a case where a judge, Judge
Brian Murphy in the district of
Massachusetts had said, "You can't
deport them."
Nevertheless, the United States did
deport them in defiance of his orders.
went up to the Supreme Court and uh the
Supreme Court uh held uh o over uh
dissents
uh from the uh three democraticapp
appointed minority members of the court.
The Roberts Mega Tribunal said they can
be uh deported, they can be sent abroad.
And then uh the they went back to court
and said, "Wait a minute, the government
is going to send us to South Sudan where
we have uh danger of being tortured."
Uh first they went to a court, a
District of Columbia federal court on an
emergency basis. That judge, Judge Moss,
transferred the case back to Judge Brian
Murphy. And Judge Murphy said, "It's
wrong. I disagree with it, but I have to
follow the Supreme Court." He refused to
stop the deportation. And as a result,
these migrants were sent from Djibouti
where they were on the US military base
to South Sudan, a country violent uh on
the brink of civil war where there's a
risk of torture. experts say there's a
US statute that says you can't send uh
individuals to a country where they're
going to be tortured. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, the MAGA tribunal,
refused to stop it. This is the last
straw for this unjust Supreme Court that's acting as
Trump's enablers in this case. Brian,
I'm having a little bit of trouble
understanding how it's
acceptable, or certainly legal, that you
can send somebody to a country that they
didn't come from. I mean, is the
purpose of of deportation to get them
back to where they came, or is it just to
to purge them from the country, and
wherever they land on the map is
acceptable as far as the US government
is concerned? It's sick. It's a
disgrace.

And what the lawyers for these
individuals were arguing was that
it's not enough that there have been
findings that they're subject to
deportation. We now need to have
additional process
for the issue you identify. But
apparently the court is not explaining
the basis why they have
stayed the district court's order.

That said, we do need to have process.
They're at risk of being tortured. The
court blocked that order. Apparently,
they're thinking -- we're guessing here --
apparently they're thinking as well
they've had some process already to
leave the United States, and it's up
to the executive where they go. But my
god, Brian, this is the United States of
America. We're sending these individuals
to a country, South Sudan, violent,
dangerous. They are at risk of torture
there. And it's heinous. It
ranks with the very worst decisions when
you look back at the history of
this Supreme Court. Inhumane, cruel,
unconstitutional,
against the statute. But it must
have some reasoning like that they've
received the minimum amount of process.
It's sick.

And so what do you presume
the Trump administration's goal is by
virtue of doing this? Because clearly
the countries that they're looking for,
these third countries that
they're looking to deport, to
exile, to disappear immigrants who
are in the United States, are
not vacation destinations. I
mean, the places that they're sending
them are not places that I think any of
these immigrants would want to go.
And so, what is the goal for the Trump
administration as far as you know?

They're embarked upon a reign of terror,
and they want to frighten migrants
who are here. They want to broadcast
around the world that the United States
is a dangerous and unjust place. But why
would we want our allies to
see that it's not targeted?
This is a reign of terror that is
offending all decent human beings around
the world. It's not just discouraging
migrants from coming here, it's
frightening away tourism, one of the
major bases for our economy. Look at
the boom in IT, the internet, AI.
It's fueled by innovators and engineers
who come to this country from all over
the world. They're intimidating and
frightening those people. They're
talking about going after migrants
who are lawfully here. They're sweeping
some of them up in this drag net. So,
it's a draconian overreach. It's
grotesque. It's wrong.

Donald Trump is
underwater with the American public on
the immigration issue, which used to be
one of his strongest issues because of
this kind of cruel overreach. And
when he faces voters, I think in
Virginia, where it's been one of the
highest per capita places of these
reckless, and dangerous, and
intentionally wrong policies, in the
2025 elections in New Jersey, and then in
2026, it's going to be a referendum. I
predict it's going to be a thumping loss
at the ballot box for Donald Trump, who's
also so struggling in polls. This is not
what the American people want.

And shame
on the Roberts court. I've written about
the need to reform the court. There are a
number of the justices who are
there illegitimately because of
manipulations in the United States
Senate. And we're going to have to
have wholesale reform because the
MAGA majority on the Robert's court
are enabling Donald Trump's
unconstitutional,
illegal, cruel, and inhumane behavior.

But do you have any concern that in
kind of some backwards way, because this
new one big beautiful bill passed, it
gives a massive amount of money to
ISIS's budget. And so even though
they're kind of carrying out
these draconian plans, even though their
legality is questionable at best,
even though they have a Supreme Court
in their pockets to allow them to
perpetuate this stuff, that we're
actually going to see more and more and
more by virtue of the sheer deluge of
funds that they're going to be getting
as the result of this bill.

I've
spoken about this before, but ICE's
budget, if it was a military, it would
be the 16th biggest military in the
entire world. ICE will have more
funding than Brazil and Israel's
military in total.

Well, the line that
the Supreme Court has drawn is that
before individuals are deported, they're
entitled to due process, notice, and an
opportunity to be heard. Now, once
that minimum has been achieved, Trump
is running amuck sending people to
third countries.

Brian, we need to
surge. Nobody would have thought that
we'd get almost 200 orders stopping
different parts of the Trump's agenda.
200 times. Even this corrupt MAGA
majority on the court has not been able
to intervene in that sheer volume. And
when you called me and asked me if
I'd come on, you said, "Are you
working?" I said, "Yes, I am. I'm
preparing the lawsuits for next week."
So, myself, democracy defenders fund,
the wonderful democracy litigating
organizations that we work with other actors
defending the constitution like the
labor movement.
That's what's made possible.

We have to
double down. And we intend to do it.
We're going to work twice as hard.
Unfortunately,
the collaborators
in the United States Congress, and in the
Supreme Court, Article One and Article 3
MAGA majorities, collaborating with
Article 2, Trump and his cronies in
the executive branch, are going to make a
lot of work for the courts. But we're
just going to keep on going.

And I will
say, I got to be honest about the
threat. I have to be honest about how
corrupt I think this decision is. Don't
take my word for it. Read the minorities
dissents, excoriating
what happened. Really, it's the
first case. Today was a follow on.
It's the first case that's so terribly
broken. Unanimous minority opposition in
in part one.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/2 ... 3_l5gm.pdf

Today was just part
two of enforcing that.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/2 ... 3_2co3.pdf

Even against
all that, we've been able to push the
ball forward. Politico has a story this
weekend that, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's terrible decision in the Cassa
case on nationwide injunctions. We've
just seen a flurry of class actions
and other positive rulings this week in
which the courts and the litigants are
keeping on going.

As you know, we
were on file with a class action about
birthright citizenship within two hours.
I came on your show to announce it that
day that terrible Supreme Court
decision was announced.

The Hill has
gotten steeper. We're just going to run
twice as hard.

Well, of course, for
everybody watching who's looking to help
the efforts of those people like Norm,
like the folks at State Democracy
Defenders who are actually fighting this
stuff on the front lines in the courts
where it matters, I'm going to put the
link to Democracy Defenders Fund right
here on this screen, and also in the post
description of this video. Norm, as
always, thank you for the work you're
doing, and for coming on with me
today.

Back to drafting my next
complaint, Bryan.
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**************************

Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 1
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1153
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. D.V.D., ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 23, 2025]
The application for stay presented to JUSTICE JACKSON and by her referred to the Court is granted. The April 18,2025, preliminary injunction of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, case No. 25–cv– 10676, is stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of the Court.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
In matters of life and death, it is best to proceed with caution. In this case, the Government took the opposite approach. It wrongfully deported one plaintiff to Guatemala, even though an Immigration Judge found he was likely to face torture there. Then, in clear violation of a court order, it deported six more to South Sudan, a nation the State Department considers too unsafe for all but its most critical personnel. An attentive District Court’s timely intervention only narrowly prevented a third set of unlawful removals to Libya.
Rather than allowing our lower court colleagues to manage this high-stakes litigation with the care and attention
2 DHS v. D.V.D.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
it plainly requires, this Court now intervenes to grant the Government emergency relief from an order it has repeatedly defied. I cannot join so gross an abuse of the Court’s equitable discretion.
I A
Federal law generally permits the Government to deport noncitizens found to be unlawfully in the United States only to countries with which they have a meaningful connection.8 U. S. C. §1231(b). To that end, Congress specified two default options: noncitizens arrested while entering the country must be returned to the country from which they arrived, and nearly everyone else may designate a country of choice. §§1231(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A). If these options prove infeasible, Congress specified which possibilities the Executive should attempt next. These alternatives include the noncitizen’s country of citizenship or her former country of residence. §§1231(b)(1)(C), (2)(E).
This case concerns the Government’s ability to conduct what is known as a “third country removal,” meaning a removal to any “country with a government that will accept the alien.” §1231(b)(1)(C)(iv); see §1231(b)(2)(E)(vii). Third-country removals are burdensome for the affected noncitizen, so Congress has sharply limited their use. They are permissible only after the Government tries each and every alternative noted in the statute, and determines they are all “impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible.”§§1231(b)(1)(C)(iv), (2)(E)(vii).
Noncitizens facing removal of any sort are entitled under international and domestic law to raise a claim under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113. Article 3 of the Convention prohibits returning any person “to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 3
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The United States is a party to the Convention, and in 1998 Congress passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act to implement its commands. The Act provides that “[i]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.” §2242(a), 112Stat. 2681–822, codified as note to 8 U. S. C. §1231. It also directs the Executive to “prescribe regulations to implement” the Convention. §2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681–822. Those regulations provide, among other things, that “[a] removal order . . . shall not be executed in circumstances that would violate Article 3.” 28 CFR §200.1 (2024).
B On February 18, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an internal guidance document directing immigration officers to “review for removal all cases . . . on the non-detained docket” and “determine the viability of removal to a third country.” No. 1:25–cv–10676 (D Mass.), ECF Doc. No. 1–4, p. 2.Just as DHS circulated this new policy, a Guatemalan man known in this litigation as O. C. G. appeared before an Immigration Judge to seek relief from his impending removal to Guatemala. O. C. G. explained that he had previously been forced to flee Guatemala after facing torture and persecution there for his identity as a gay man. See Dkt. 8–4, p. 1; ECF Doc. 1, p. 24. He fled initially to Mexico, he said, but had not found safety there, either: A group of men raped him and locked him in a room until his sister paid them a ransom. ECF Doc. 8–4, at 1. O. C. G. accordingly asked the judge whether he “could be deported to a country other than Mexico or Guatemala.” Ibid. The Immigration
4 DHS v. D.V.D.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Judge granted withholding of removal to Guatemala, the only country designated in the order of removal. Id., at 1– 2; see also ECF Doc. 1, p. 25. Because the government had not sought to remove O. C. G. to Mexico, the Immigration Judge did not address his request for protection against removal there. ECF Doc. 8–4, at 1–2; ECF Doc., at 25.
Two days later, Immigration and Customs Enforcement escorted O. C. G. out of his cell and put him on a bus to Mexico. ECF Doc No. 8–4, at 2. On the way, they provided him with “oral notice that he would be removed to Mexico.” See ECF Doc. 106–1, p. 3 (Defendants’ Response to Requests for Admission). DHS did not issue a new order of removal designating Mexico, did not reopen the prior proceedings, and did not provide either O. C. G. or his lawyer with advance notice. Id., at 3–4. Mexican authorities promptly deported O. C. G. back to Guatemala, where hewent into hiding. ECF Doc. 1, at 5.
Along with three noncitizens who feared that they, too, would imminently be whisked off to a “third country” without notice, O. C. G. filed this putative class action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against DHS, Secretary Noem, and Attorney General Bondi. Plaintiffs alleged that the Government’s apparent policy of removing noncitizens to a third country without notice or the opportunity to file a claim under the Convention violated the immigration laws, the regulations implementing the Convention, and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Among other things, plaintiffs sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief preventing their own removal and the removal of putative class members without adequate notice and a “meaningful opportunity” to present a claim under the Convention. Id., at 37. Plaintiffs also requested that the Government return O. C. G. to the United States.
On March 28, 2025, the District Court entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) as to both the three individual plaintiffs who remained in the United States and a putative
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 5
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class of all individuals “subject to a final order of removal from the United States to a third country.” ECF Doc. 34,
p. 2. The order prohibited the defendants from removing the plaintiffs and putative class members to a third country without “written notice of the third country” and “a meaningful opportunity . . . to submit an application” for relief under the Convention. Ibid.
C On March 30, DHS issued a second guidance document, which contained a two-step process for executing third-country removals. If a country provides the United States with what DHS believes to be “credible” “assurances that aliens removed from the United States will not be persecuted or tortured,” then (the policy says) DHS may remove the noncitizen to that country without any process. See App. to Application for Stay of Injunction 54a–55a (App.) The Government says this policy permits DHS to change someone’s “deportation country to Honduras . . . at 6:00
a. m., put [them] on a plane, and fl[y them] to Honduras” 15minutes later. ECF Doc. No. 74, p. 12 (Tr. Apr. 10, 2025).
In the absence of credible “assurances” from a foreign country, the policy provides, “DHS will first inform the alien of ” her impending removal. App. 55a. Even so, the policy prohibits officers from providing the noncitizen with an affirmative opportunity to raise her fear of torture. Only one who “states a fear of removal” unprompted will be given a screening interview, which will take place “within 24 hours of referral.” Ibid. Those who cannot establish their eligibility for relief at the screening interview can apparently be deported immediately, without a chance to provide evidence or seek judicial review. See ECF Doc. 74, at 52– 53.
Around the time it adopted this new policy, DHS arrested four putative class members covered by the TRO. As the Government admits, “DHS . . . typically arrests people to
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remove them.” ECF Doc. 101, p. 39 (Tr. Apr. 28, 2025). Indeed, DHS promptly transferred the four arrested class members to Guantanamo Bay. Id., at 29.
Notwithstanding the TRO’s express prohibition on third-country removals without notice or process, on March 31, the Government placed all four class members held in Guantanamo Bay on a Department of Defense flight to El Salvador.1
At a subsequent hearing, an attorney for the Government claimed DHS had not violated the TRO because the Department of Defense had conducted the removals. According to the agreement that governs the relationship between DHS and the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, however, DHS “has legal custody” of noncitizens detained at Guantanamo Bay “and is responsible for the custody of detained aliens for administrative purposes related to immigration law violations.” ECF Doc. 99–1, p. 2. DHS also remains “responsible for the [noncitizens’] physical custody” at Guantanamo Bay, and for any immigration-related“ transfers, releases, and removals.” Id., at 3. By contrast, the Department of Defense merely provides security and logistical support consistent with DHS’s “guidance.” Id., at 4.
The Government was unable to reconcile its representations to this evidence. Nor could it explain “[w]hat authority” the Department had “to effectuate a deportation.” ECF Doc. 101, at 37.
D On April 18, the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and for a preliminary injunction,
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1Other class members may have been removed to El Salvador as well, but the Government declined to respond to four consecutive requests for information from class counsel seeking clarification. See ECF Doc. 101, at 27. This is presently the subject of discovery in the District Court. See ECF Doc. 88.
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holding that the plaintiffs had shown the Government’s process for conducting third-party removals likely violated the Due Process Clause. The injunction requires the Government to provide noncitizens with written notice in advance of a third-country removal (as is statutorily required, see infra, at 15), along with a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim under the Convention. ECF Doc. 64, pp. 46–47.
On May 7, plaintiffs’ counsel received news reports “announcing the imminent removal of . . . Laotian, Vietnamese, and Philippine class members . . . to Libya,” again without notice or an opportunity to object. ECF Doc. 89, p. 2. Plaintiffs thus sought emergency relief from the district court. That same day, the court issued an order “clarif[ying]” its preliminary injunction so as to leave no doubt that “the allegedly imminent removals . . . would clearly violate” the preliminary injunction. ECF Doc. 91, pp. 1–2. That order narrowly averted the deportations.
Had the court not acted, 13 class members would have landed in Tripoli in the midst of violence caused by opposition to their arrival. Secretary of State Marco Rubio later averred in a sworn affidavit that “Libya’s Government of National Unity (GNU) publicly rejected the use of Libyan territory for accepting deportees,” as did “rival authorities based in Benghazi.” App. 71a. Indeed (he explained) the “public reports of potential migration removals to Libya” had caused such unrest that “GNU-aligned forces took action against the two largest armed groups in the Libyan capital on May 12–13, sparking the most serious street fighting in Tripoli since 2022.” Ibid. Contemporary news reports confirm these armed clashes. See, e.g., Armed Clashes Erupt in Libya’s Tripoli After Reported Killing of Armed Group Leader, Reuters, May 12, 2025.
Less than two weeks later, plaintiffs’ counsel received reports of plans for yet more unannounced third-country removals, this time to South Sudan. ECF Doc. 111. At an
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emergency hearing, Government lawyers confirmed that several class members were indeed en route to South Sudan after having received less than 24 hours’ notice of their impending deportations. By the time of the hearing, “DHS be-lieve[d] that the plane [could not] be turned around,” but was unwilling to share its location. ECF Doc. 126, pp. 10, 17 (Tr. May 20, 2025). Attorneys for the government also could not confirm whether “the pilot of the plane and the staff onboard” were aware of the District Court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting the removals. Id., at 16–17.
More details emerged the next day. At approximately
5:45 on the evening of May 19, DHS provided six inmates of an immigration detention facility with a document indicating that they would be removed to South Sudan. See ECF Doc. 145, p. 11 (Tr. May 21, 2025). At 9:35 a.m. the next morning, DHS removed them from their cells and put them on a flight. Id., at 16. Short of the noncitizens “yelling at any of the jailers that they were afraid to go to South Sudan” (as the District Court put it), id., at 13, DHS did not offer the noncitizens an opportunity to assert a claim under the Convention.2
The District Court found that DHS had “unquestionably” violated its order. Id., at 12. Nonetheless, at the Government’s request, the court permitted the Government to provide the requisite process in South Sudan, and it did not order the class members’ return to the United States. See id., at 21, 86, 96.
Meanwhile, discovery proceeded on the status of O. C. G., the Guatemalan man with whom this case began. The Government had previously attested that, before O. C. G.’s removal, an officer had asked him whether he was afraid of
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2Notably, days before the plaintiffs filed this suit, the administration “ordered the departure of non-emergency U. S. Government employees from South Sudan,” due to risks posed by “armed conflict” and “fighting between various political and ethnic groups.” Dept. of State, South Sudan Travel Advisory (Mar. 8, 2025).
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returning to Mexico, and O. C. G. had responded that he was not. On the eve of that officer’s deposition, however, the Government submitted an “errata sheet” admitting the information had been false. See ECF Doc. 103–1, p. 2; ECF Doc. 105, pp. 2–3. Because O. C. G. had been removed to Mexico without notice or an opportunity to file a claim under the Convention, the District Court ordered the Government to facilitate his return. The Government eventually agreed to comply with that order. See ECF Doc. 143.
The Government has appealed the merits of the preliminary injunction to the First Circuit, where briefing is ongoing. Pending that appeal, it seeks permission to continue its practice of conducting third-country removals without notice. Both the District Court and the First Circuit denied that request. The Government now asks this Court for an emergency stay of the preliminary injunction.
II This Court “will grant a stay pending appeal only under extraordinary circumstances,” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co., 463 U. S. 1315, 1316 (1983) (Blackmun, J., in chambers), especially where two lower courts have already denied such relief, Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U. S. 1319, 1320 (1994) (Rehnquist, C. J., inchambers). Ordinarily, the Court considers the likelihood of irreparable harm to the applicant absent emergency intervention, the applicant’s likelihood of success on the merits of an appeal to this Court, and the equities. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam);see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009).
A
“[B]egin with the basic proposition that all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly.” Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 458 (1975). This Court often reiterates that “‘[a] stay is not a matter of right,’” but “an exercise of judicial discretion.” Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.
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v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 10 (1942); see also Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 24 (2008). That is so because stays are equitable remedies, which courts may (but need not) grant in order to resolve ongoing emergencies and “‘clear away all intermediate obstructions against complete justice.’” Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271, 274 (1857).
For centuries, courts have “close[d] the doors” of equity to those “tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative tothe matter in which [they] see[k] relief.” Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U. S. 806, 814 (1945); see generally T. Anenson, Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, 51 U. C. D. L. Rev,1827 (2018) (reviewing this doctrine’s long history). That principle, “rooted in the historical concept of [the] court o fequity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith,” ensures that courts do not become “‘abettor[s] of inequity.’” Precision Instrument, 324 U. S., at 814.
Here, in violation of an unambiguous TRO, the Government flew four noncitizens to Guantanamo Bay, and from there deported them to El Salvador. Then, in violation of the very preliminary injunction from which it now seeks relief, the Government removed six class members to South Sudan with less than 16 hours’ notice and no opportunity to be heard. The Government’s assertion that these deportations could be reconciled with the injunction is wholly without merit. Notice at 5:45 p.m. for a 9:35 a.m. deportation, provided to a detainee without access to an attorney, plainly does not “‘affor[d]’” that noncitizen with “‘a reasonable time’” to seek relief. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 4).
Even if the Government’s overnight notice had been adequate, moreover, DHS also did not provide the required “meaningful opportunity . . . to raise a fear of return” under the Convention. ECF Doc. 64, at 46. The affected class
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members lacked any opportunity to research South Sudan, to determine whether they would face risks of torture or death there, or to speak to anyone about their concerns. Instead, they were left in their cells overnight with no chance to raise a claim and deported the next morning.
The Government thus openly flouted two court orders, including the one from which it now seeks relief. Even if the orders in question had been mistaken, the Government had a duty to obey them until they were “‘reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.’” Maness, 419 U. S., at 459 (quoting United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 293 (1947)). That principle is a bedrock of the rule of law. The Government’s misconduct threatens it to its core.
So too does this Court’s decision to grant the Government equitable relief. This is not the first time the Court closes its eyes to noncompliance, nor, I fear, will it be the last. See Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. ___ (2025) (per curiam). Yet each time this Court rewards noncompliance with discretionary relief, it further erodes respect for courts and for the rule of law.
B In light of the Government’s flagrantly unlawful conduct, today’s decision might suggest the Government faces extraordinary harms. Yet even that is not the case. Rather, following a recent trend, the Court appears to give no serious consideration to the irreparable harm factor. See, e.g., id., at ___ (slip op., at ___); SSA v. AFSCME, 605 U. S. ___ (2025). Without a showing that a stay is necessary to avoid irreparable harm, however, this Court’s midstream intervention is inexcusable. See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 558 U. S., at 190. Besides the facially absurd contention that the Executive is “irreparabl[y]” harmed any time a court orders it temporarily to refrain from doing something it would like to do, see Application for Stay of Injunction 37, the Government
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has identified no irreparable harm from the challenged preliminary injunction. Instead, the Government locates the source of its injury in the District Court’s efforts to provide relief to the class members in South Sudan. Id., at 37–39. That argument is misguided. First, the District Court’s remedial orders are not properly before this Court because the Government has not appealed them, nor sought a stay pending a forthcoming appeal. Second, the court adopted the narrowest possible remedy, allowing the Government itself to choose whether it would return the class members to the United States or provide them with process where they are held. Finally, the Government is in every respect responsible for any resulting harms. Had it complied with the preliminary injunction, no followup orders would have been necessary, nor would the Government have faced a “sudden need . . . to detain criminal aliens” abroad. Id., at
39. It does not face such “need” today, as it can return the noncitizens it wrongfully removed at any time. No litigant, not even the Government, may “satisfy the irreparable harm requirement if the harm complained of is self-inflicted.” 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948.1 (3d ed. 2013); Bennett v. Isagenix Int’l, LLC, 118 F. 4th 1120, 1129–1130 (CA9 2024).
For their part, the plaintiffs in this case face extraordinary harms from even a temporary grant of relief to the Government. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (recognizing detainees’ interests against removal are “particularly weighty”). The Government has made clear in word and deed that it feels itself unconstrained by law, free to deport anyone anywhere without notice or an opportunity to be heard. The episodes of noncompliance in this very case illustrate the risks. Thirteen noncitizens narrowly escaped being the target of extraordinary violence in Libya; O. C. G. spent months in hiding in Guatemala; others face release in South Sudan, which the State Department says is in the midst of “‘armed conflict’” between
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“‘ethnic groups.’” N. 2, supra. Only the District Court’s careful attention to this case prevented worse outcomes. Yet today the Court obstructs those proceedings, exposing thousands to the risk of torture or death.
III On the merits of its appeal, the Government principally raises a bevy of jurisdictional objections. Given its conduct in these proceedings, the Government’s posture resembles that of the arsonist who calls 911 to report firefighters for violating a local noise ordinance. In any event, the Government has not established a likelihood of success on any of its arguments.
A The Government points to six separate provisions that, it says, deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to hear this dispute. See Application for Stay of Injunction 4–6, 19–28.The Government’s core objection is this: By way of a series of complicated immigration-law provisions, Congress sought to consolidate all of an individual’s objections to an order of removal into a single petition for review. See 8
U. S. C. §§1252(a)(4), (5), (b)(9), §1231 note. Ultimately, the Government says, the plaintiffs in this case object to their removal. So, they should bring their challenges in a petition for review of an order of removal. Yet the Government also claims that it need not issue or reopen any orders of removal before deporting someone to a third country. That is part of the problem plaintiffs seek to remedy: Without an applicable order of removal, they have no way to raise their claims under the Convention. In the end, then, the Government’s view is that the only way to challenge its refusal to provide orders of removal is to appeal those (nonexistent) orders. That is absurd. Nothing in the Government’s cited provisions bars the plaintiffs from bringing a challenge to
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the Government’s no-notice removals directly in federal district court.
Only one jurisdictional objection remains with any force. Under §1252(f )(1), “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation” of certain provisions in the immigration laws, except on an individual basis. Section 1231(b),the provision governing third-country removals, is one of those provisions. As a consequence, courts may not grant “classwide injunctive relief ” to enjoin the “operation” of §1231(b). Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 481 (1999).
As an initial matter, §1252(f )(1) undisputedly does not affect the District Court’s authority to grant relief to the individual plaintiffs here; it affects only the classwide injunction. Thus, even if the Government is correct that classwide relief was impermissible here, it plainly remains obligated to comply with orders enjoining its conduct with respect to individual plaintiffs.
As for the propriety of classwide relief, it is difficult to say whether the District Court’s injunction enjoined the “operation” of §1231(b). Certainly, the Government is not enjoined from executing third-country removals. The court has only barred the Government from executing such removals without notice, pursuant to the DHS policy, which(the court found) deprives noncitizens of their statutory and due process rights. This Court has indicated that courts “may enjoin the unlawful operation” of laws “not specified in §1252(f )(1) even if that injunction has some collateral effect on the operation of a covered provision.” Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U. S. 543, 553, n. 4 (2022) (emphasis deleted). So §1252(f )(1) would bar classwide relief here only if the Government’s no-process policy were central to the “operation” of §1231(b) and not merely “collateral” to it. Ibid., n. 4. At a minimum, that presents a difficult question this Court should not decide without briefing, argument, or
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time for reflection.
Even if the Government could establish that its enjoined actions (of providing no notice or process) are integral to the “operation” of §1231(b), that in turn would raise a “‘seriousconstitutional question.’” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603 (1988). That is because, as the Government reads it, §1252(f )(1) threatens to nullify plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights entirely. Recall that the Government claims it may remove noncitizens in the space of 15 minutes. See supra, at 4. Such noncitizens cannot practicably file individual lawsuits to vindicate their due process rights. After all, they will not know of the need to file a claim until they are on a bus or plane out of the country. Nor will their counsel, whom the Government refuses to notify. The Government can hardly expect every deportable noncitizen to file a pre-emptive lawsuit. Thus, if §1252(f )(1) precludes class-wide vindication of the right to notice and due process under these circumstances, then it effectively nullifies those rights.
Whether Congress can nullify a due process right by way of a jurisdiction-stripping provision is a difficult question. See Webster, 486 U. S., at 603 (citing Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 681, n. 12 (1986)). The Government has not attempted to show that it is likely to succeed on that issue.
B That leaves, finally, the merits of plaintiffs’ underlying APA and due process claims. Begin with the statutory and regulatory scheme governing removal. In the Government’s view, once a noncitizen has been found removable, she can effectively be removed anywhere at any time. That view would render meaningless the countless statutory and regulatory provisions providing for notice and a hearing. See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. §1229(a)(1) (“In removal proceedings under section 1229a . . . written notice . . . shall be given . . .
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to the alien or to the alien’s counsel of record”); 8 CFR§1240.10(f ) (2024) (in removal hearing, the Immigration Judge “shall . . . identify for the record a country, or countries in the alternative, to which the alien’s removal may be made”); §241.8(e) (when a removal order is reinstated after a noncitizen illegally reenters the country, noncitizen who “expresses a fear of returning to the country designated in that order” must be given an interview (emphasis added));8 U. S. C. §§1228(b)(1)–(3) (noncitizens determined removable due to felony conviction must be given notice under §1229(a) and 14 days “to apply for judicial review”); 8 CFR§238.1(b)(2) (requiring notice to noncitizens removable due to felony convictions).
The Government asserts that it need only comply with these provisions once, for the first removal proceeding, and can disregard them afterwards. The consequence of that view is that what happens in removal proceedings simply does not matter. The Government could designate any location in its initial order, lose before the immigration judge, decline to appeal, and promptly thereafter deport the noncitizen to a country of the Government’s choosing. Indeed, that is precisely what happened in O. C. G.’s case.
Where did the Government find the authority to disregard Congress’s carefully calibrated scheme of immigration laws? It does not argue the third-country removal statute provides it. See Application for Stay of Injunction 13. Instead, the Government simply falls back on the Executive’s implied authority in this field. Yet “the President must comply with legislation regulating or restricting the transfer of detainees” even in “wartime.” Kiyemba v. Obama, 561
F. 3d 509, 517 (CADC 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). It is a “‘cardinal principle of statutory construction,’” moreover, that statutes should be construed so that “‘no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001). Here the Government construes the statute’s lack of “a particular
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process for carrying out” third-country removals, Application for Stay of Injunction 13, as conveying near-unlimited power to the Executive, rendering the remaining statutory scheme “‘void . . . or insignificant.’” TRW, 534 U. S., at 31. To make this claim is to ignore the clear statutory command that notice and a hearing must be provided. See supra, at
15. The Government cannot show a likelihood of success on plaintiffs’ statutory and regulatory claims, nor can it defend the lawfulness of its no-notice removals.
Turning to the constitutional claim, this Court has repeatedly affirmed that “ ‘the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal proceedings.” J. G. G., 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3); A. A. R. P., 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). Due process includes reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950). Of course the Government cannot avoid its obligation to provide due process “in the context of removal proceedings,” J. G. G., 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3), by skipping such proceedings entirely and simply whisking noncitizens off the street and onto busses or planes out of the country.
It is axiomatic, moreover, that when Congress enacts a statutory entitlement, basic procedural due process protections attach. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332 (1976). Congress expressly provided noncitizens with the right not to be removed to a country where they are likely to be tortured or killed. See 8 U. S. C. §1231 note. As this Court has explained, the “‘right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind . . . is a principle basic to our society.’” Mathews, 424 U. S., at 333 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Being deprived of the right not to be deported to a country likely to torture or kill you plainly counts. Thus, plaintiffs have aright to be heard.
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The Government barely disputes these basic principles. Instead, it obfuscates the issue by asserting that some (perhaps “many”) members of the class should be treated as if they never entered the United States. Application for Stay of Injunction 33–34. Yet even if that were true as to some class members, it could show at most that the class might be too broadly defined, not that the Government is likely to succeed on the constitutional merits.
Similarly, the Government relies on precedent about the wartime transfer of detainees to assert that the Executive’s determination that “a country will not torture a person on his removal” is “conclusive.” Id., at 29 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. 674 (2008) and Kiyemba, 561 F. 3d 509).Yet the immigration laws provide for judicial review of “factual challenges to” orders denying relief under the Convention, Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 581 (2020), so plainly the Executive’s determinations are not “conclusive” here. In any event, the plaintiffs in this case do not challenge any executive determination. There is no evidence in this case that the Government ever did determine that the countries it designated (Libya, El Salvador, and South Sudan) “w[ould] not torture” the plaintiffs. Application for Stay of Injunction 29. Plaintiffs merely seek access to notice and process, so that, in the event the Executive makes a determination in their case, they learn about it in time to seek an immigration judge’s review. The Fifth Amendment unambiguously guarantees that right.
* * * The Due Process Clause represents “the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). By rewarding lawlessness, the Court once again undermines that foundational principle. Apparently, the Court finds the idea that thousands will suffer
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violence in far flung locales more palatable than the remote possibility that a District Court exceeded its remedial powers when it ordered the Government to provide notice and process to which the plaintiffs are constitutionally and statutorily entitled. That use of discretion is as incomprehensible as it is inexcusable. Respectfully, but regretfully, I dissent.

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Part 2 of 2

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1153
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v.
D. V. D., ET AL.
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
[July 3, 2025]
On April 18, 2025, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts preliminarily enjoined the Government from removing “any alien” to a “country not explicitly provided for on the alien’s order of removal” without following certain procedures designed to enable the alien to seek relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100−20, 1465 U. N. T. S.
113. No. 25−cv−10676, ECF Doc. 64, pp. 46−47. The District Court later found that the Government had violated that injunction by failing to provide six class members a “meaningful opportunity” to assert CAT claims before such removal. ECF Doc. 118, p. 1. On May 21, the District Court issued an “order on remedy,” directing the Government to follow specified procedures with respect to those individuals, tailored to the circumstances. ECF Doc. 119. The Government sought a stay of the April 18 injunction before our Court.
On June 23, we stayed the April 18 preliminary injunction pending disposition of any appeal and petition for writ of certiorari. Later that day, however, the District Court issued a minute order stating that the May 21 remedial order “remain[ed] in full force and effect,” “notwithstanding” our stay of the preliminary injunction. ECF Doc. 176. The only authority it cited was the dissent from the stay order.
The Government has moved for “an order clarifying” our
2 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.
stay. Motion for Clarification. It argues that the stay of the April 18 preliminary injunction divests the May 21 remedial order of enforceability. Respondents argue that the District Court correctly understood the May 21 order to remain in effect—despite our stay of the preliminary injunction it purported to enforce—because the May 21 order effectively operates as a remedy for civil contempt.
The motion for clarification is granted. Our June 23 order stayed the April 18 preliminary injunction in full. The May 21 remedial order cannot now be used to enforce an injunction that our stay rendered unenforceable. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 428 (2009) (explaining that a reviewing court’s stay order “divest[s]” the district court “order of enforceability”). Even if we accepted respondents’ characterization of the May 21 order, such a remedy would serve to “coerce” the Government into “compliance” and would be unenforceable given our stay of the underlying injunction. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 303 (1947); see id., at 295 (“The right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued and a fortiori when the injunction or restraining order was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” (citations and footnote omitted)).
Despite the dissent’s provocative language, see post, at 6 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.), a claim that a lower court has failed to give effect to an order of this Court is properly addressed here. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U. S. 493, 497 (1978) (per curiam) (“A litigant who . . . has obtained judgment in this Court after a lengthy process of litigation, involving several layers of courts, should not be required to go through that entire process again to obtain execution of the judgment of this Court.”); see United States v. Fossatt, 21 How. 445, 446 (1859). “Assuming as we do” that the District Court will now conform its order to our previous stay and cease enforcing the April 18 injunction through the May 21 remedial order, we have no occasion to reach the
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Government’s other requests for relief. Cf. Deen v. Hickman, 358 U. S. 57, 58 (1958) (per curiam). If the Government wishes to seek additional relief in aid of the execution of our mandate, it may do so through mandamus. See In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 255 (1895) (explaining that any matter “disposed of by” decree of this Court must be carried “into execution, according to the mandate,” by the courts below).
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KAGAN, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1153
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v.
D. V. D., ET AL.
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
[July 3, 2025]
JUSTICE KAGAN, concurring.
I voted to deny the Government’s previous stay application in this case, and I continue to believe that this Court should not have stayed the District Court’s April 18 order enjoining the Government from deporting non-citizens to third countries without notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See DHS v. D. V. D., 606 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2025) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 9–18). But a majority of this Court saw things differently, and I do not see how a district court can compel compliance with an order that this Court has stayed. See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 294–295 (1947); Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14, 24–26 (1887). Because continued enforcement of the District Court’s May 21, 2025 order would do just that, I vote to grant the Government’s motion for clarification.
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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1153
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v.
D. V. D., ET AL.
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
[July 3, 2025]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins, dissenting.
The United States may not deport noncitizens to a country where they are likely to be tortured or killed. International and domestic law guarantee that basic human right. In this case, the Government seeks to nullify it by deporting noncitizens to potentially dangerous countries without notice or the opportunity to assert a fear of torture. Because the Fifth Amendment, immigration law, federal regulations, and this Court’s precedent unambiguously prohibit such no-notice deportations, see DHS v. D. V. D., 606 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2025) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 15–18), a Federal District Court issued a classwide preliminary injunction barring the Government from removing noncitizens without notice and adequate process.
The Government appealed, and pending its appeal repeatedly violated the District Court’s order. See id., at ___– ___ (slip op., at 2–9). Meanwhile, the Government sought an emergency stay of the injunction from this Court. In its briefing, the Government took a kitchen-sink approach, arguing that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant classwide injunctive relief, that it also lacked jurisdiction over individual plaintiffs’ claims under the Due Process Clause, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to notice ora hearing before their removal. Without citing any of these arguments, or indeed providing any legal justification, this
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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Court granted the Government its requested stay.
Now, the Government returns for more. At issue in its latest filing is a month-old remedial order, which the District Court issued after the Government attempted illegally to deport eight class members to South Sudan. The remedial order required the Government to provide those noncitizens, whom it is currently holding in Djibouti, with the process to which the Constitution and federal law entitled them: adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. No. 25–cv–10676 (D Mass., May 21, 2025) ECF Doc. 119. Following this Court’s unreasoned stay of the original preliminary injunction, the District Court issued a minute order explaining that its remedial order (which the Government did not appeal, and whose validity this Court therefore did not consider) remained in effect. ECF Doc. 176. Rather than complying with the remedial order, the Government immediately returned to this Court, purporting to seek “clarification” of the stay.
What the Government wants to do, concretely, is send the eight noncitizens it illegally removed from the United States from Djibouti to South Sudan, where they will be turned over to the local authorities without regard for the likelihood that they will face torture or death. Because “‘the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal proceedings,” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3), the Government’s no-notice removals are undoubtedly illegal, see D. V. D., 606 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 15–18)(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). In simple terms, the Government requests that the Court remove an obstacle to its achieving those unlawful ends. That obstacle, again, is the District Court’s remedial order, which it issued to resolve the Government’s violations of the preliminary injunction this Court later stayed. The Government now asks this Court to hold that the stay invalidated the remedial order.
In substance, of course, the Government’s new request for
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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
relief has nothing to do with clarification, so this Court has no business considering its merits now. The Court’s Rules make plain where the Government should have pressed its argument about the nature and validity of the remedial order: before the lower courts. See this Court’s Rule 23(3) (“Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, an application for a stay will not be entertained unless the relief requested was first sought in the appropriate court or courts below”); cf. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3) (emphasizing need to comply with Rule 23, and criticizing this Court for granting relief when it was “doubtful” that the applicants’ request to the lower courts had been adequate). The Government undisputedly did not comply with that Rule.
Litigants may alternatively seek an “extraordinary writ,” such as an injunction, even without complying with Rule
23. See this Court’s Rule 20(1). Yet that relief is available only if it would “aid . . . the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.” Ibid. Far from maintaining our jurisdiction, vacating the District Court’s remedial order risks doing the opposite: destroying jurisdiction over the noncitizens the Government intends to deport without notice or process. The Government thus plainly cannot satisfy Rule 20’s requirements, either. Finally, even the majority does not believe that the Government is entitled to mandamus relief.
Although Members of today’s majority have previously insisted that “this Court should follow established procedures” when granting emergency relief, A. A. R. P., 604
U. S., at ____ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5), the Court now ignores its Rules to grant the Government its desired “clarification” immediately. The majority suggests(relying on an argument the Government did not make) that a remedy for civil contempt is not enforceable when the
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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
underlying injunction has been stayed.1 Ante, at 2. Perhaps that should be the rule, but the question appears to be a matter of first impression in this Court. In support of its view, the majority cites a single line of dictum in United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 (1947), which says that the right to remedial relief for civil contempt “falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued.” Id., at 295. “Preliminary injunctions, however, do not conclusively resolve legal disputes,” and neither do temporary stay orders. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 6). Accordingly, this Court’s stay certainly did not “prove” that the District Court’s injunction was “erroneously issued.” Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 295.2
Given that the majority can muster no more than a sentence of 80-year-old dictum in support of today’s holding, the District Court can hardly be faulted for reaching a contrary conclusion. The District Court, moreover, had only moments to decide the question, for (unlike this Court) it
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1To be clear, even the majority today does not dispute that “[v]iolations of an order are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal, . . . or though the basic action has become moot.” United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 294 (1947) (citing Worden
v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14 (1887), and Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911)). Civil contempt orders in turn “may . . . be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court’s order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.” 330 U. S., at 303–304. The majority appears to construe the District Court’s order as serving the former purpose. See ante, at 2.
2 After first adopting the Government’s characterization of its request as one for “clarification,” see ante, at 1–2, the majority later appears to justify its premature intervention by treating it as a request for mandamus relief, see ante, at 2 (“[A] claim that a lower court has failed to give effect to an order of this Court is properly addressed here”). Even the majority, however, does not believe that mandamus relief is warranted. Its reliance on General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U. S. 493 (1978) explains why. There, a District Court disobeyed a clear instruction “specifically addressed” in this Court’s opinion. Id., at 496. Here, this Court did not see fit to provide the District Court with any instructions.
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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
realized that the lives and safety of eight noncitizens were at stake. Any suggestion that the District Court failed to carry “‘into execution’” this Court’s mandate (which said no more than that the Government’s application was “granted”) is patently inappropriate. Cf. ante, at 3. That the Government accuses the District Court, whose orders it has consistently ignored, of “unprecedented defiance,” is more extraordinary still. Motion for Clarification 1. Even now, the Government seeks to defy this Court’s clear holdings that it must afford noncitizens with due process of law before removing them.
In the end, the majority ignores the Court’s Rules for seeking emergency relief and creates new law on civil contempt, all to allow the Government to circumvent the appellate process with respect to an order it continues to defy. In so doing, the Court focuses on dictum in Mine Workers at the cost of discarding that case’s central message: “‘An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction . . . and served upon persons made parties therein . . . must be obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the court may be.’” 330 U. S., at 293–294.
For all that, moreover, the majority does not actually clarify its prior decision. The majority says it expects “that the District Court will now conform its order to our previous stay,” ante, at 2, but it refuses to explain what such conformity would involve. As a result, today’s order not only excuses (once again) the Government’s undisguised contempt for the Judiciary; it also leaves the District Court without any guidance about how this litigation should proceed. The District Court cannot adjudicate plaintiffs’ serious due process claims on their merits without ensuring, byway of injunctive relief, its jurisdiction over the case. Yet this Court refuses to explain what injunctive relief, if any, it believes the District Court can issue.
Perhaps the majority hopes that, in light of its content-less stay order, the District Court will simply give up on
6 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
adjudicating this case. But if this Court wishes to permit the Government to flout the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, it cannot avoid accountability for that lawlessness by tasking the lower courts with inventing a rationale. The Court’s continued refusal to justify its extraordinary decisions in this case, even as it faults lower courts for failing properly to divine their import, is indefensible.
* * * “In a democracy, power implies responsibility. The greater the power that defies law the less tolerant can this Court be of defiance. As the Nation’s ultimate judicial tribunal, this Court, beyond any other organ of society, is the trustee of law and charged with the duty of securing obedience to it.” Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 312 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). This Court continues to invert those principles. Today’s order clarifies only one thing: Other litigants must follow the rules, but the administration has the Supreme Court on speed dial. Respectfully, I dissent.

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