Re: Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly
Posted: Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:22 am
PART 2 OF 2
Findings and recommendations
Finding 31
OIS investigations generally lack consistency.
Given the PPD’s current structure and process for OIS investigations, the only source of consistency and standardization comes from the IAD shooting team, which responds to all OISs and applies a standard protocol. Our evaluation of investigative quality also showed that shooting team investigators conducted the highest-quality interviews in our sample.
However, much of an OIS investigation is conducted by one of two units, which are vastly inconsistent in their approach. The homicide unit investigates fatal incidents and fields a team of six detectives to do so. The detective division investigates nonfatal incidents and fields a team of two detectives to do so. Notably, neither of these units has specialized training or experience in investigating OISs or any protocols in place for doing so. This distribution of investigative responsibilities can inhibit standardization across OIS investigations. Across all OIS investigations, we found a general lack of consistency in quality. Some investigations were very good and some were very poor. Crime scene photography and canvassing were among the most inconsistent aspects of the investigation.
Recommendation 31.1
The PPD should establish a single investigative unit devoted to criminal investigations of all deadly force incidents.
Deadly force incidents have unique characteristics that make the investigation of such incidents different from other criminal investigative work, even homicide cases. [150] Interview questions and techniques, crime scene analysis, and approaches to canvassing all need to account for the fact that the investigators are dealing with a police use of deadly force, as opposed to other homicides.
All deadly force investigations need to be conducted with the same thoroughness. Establishing a single unit devoted to these investigations will help ensure that a consistent standard is applied. For the purpose of this report, we will refer to this specialized investigative unit that conducts the criminal investigation as a deadly force investigation team (D-FIT). Whether the incident is fatal, injurious, or noninjurious, the decision by the involved officer(s) to use deadly force remains the same. The various outcomes (death, injury, or a miss) are determined by a number of factors such as shooting accuracy, distance, reaction time, and readily available medical care. Note that none of these outcomes is a result of the intent of the officer.
In response to a high number of OISs and calls for organizational reforms, other agencies have established specialized units. Examples are the Baltimore Police Department, [151] Seattle Police Department, [152] Portland (Oregon) Police Department, [153] and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. [154] The PPD’s newly established unit should investigate all deadly force incidents, excluding noninjurious accidental discharges and animal shootings. The PPD should staff the unit sufficiently to handle at least 50 OIS incidents annually. The unit should investigate not only OISs, but all deadly force cases and in-custody deaths.
The D-FIT will be the lead unit in the interviews of all civilians and officers, in collaboration with the shooting team. The one exception for interview officers will be any involved officers that must be compelled to give interviews under Garrity. Compelled officers should continue to be interviewed by shooting team investigators. D-FIT will compile the entire criminal investigation, gathering all pertinent facts, statements, and evidence.
Recommendation 31.2
PPD D-FIT members should have the experience and training necessary to conduct thorough and objective OIS investigations.
Members of the newly established unit should have prior major case investigation experience with a strong preference for homicide investigations. Furthermore, all members of the unit should receive specialized training in OIS investigations. The training may be obtained from a variety of vendors or can be developed in-house by instructors who have been certified through specialized courses. The department may also consider consulting with other agencies on their training requirements and programs for OIS investigations.
Recommendation 31.3
The PPD should develop a manual for conducting OIS investigations from a criminal standpoint.
The manual should describe a detailed, step-by-step protocol for investigators to follow and have as a reference point when conducting OIS investigations. The manual will serve as another mechanism for ensuring that all OIS investigations are conducted with a consistent, standard quality. This manual should be developed by staff members who have attended training in the investigation of OISs. The department may also review manuals and operating procedures developed by other large agencies.
The manual should include, at a minimum, the following standardized practices:
• Canvassing. Neighborhood canvassing efforts should be thoroughly documented. The investigators should publish a media release with email and phone contact information requesting that witnesses come forward, follow up with all addresses not contacted, and keep a complete list of addresses with the names of those contacted who were part of the canvass. The goal of a canvass is for investigators to be able to identify and interview any potential eye and ear witnesses. The effort should be conducted and documented in a way that makes it replicable.
• Crime scene management. All crime scenes should be managed to a quality standard, including consistent documentation in a crime scene log, assignment of a log officer, and setting of a perimeter. The management of the crime scene should be documented in detail in the final investigative report.
• Interviews and interrogations. The manual should clearly describe the appropriate practices for interviewing or interrogating all witnesses and involved persons, including interviews of civilian witnesses, witness officers, and discharging officers (if applicable); supervisor roles and responsibilities; taking of a public safety statement; and documentation of interviews and interrogation.
• Crime scene documentation. The manual should describe the appropriate steps for a thorough documentation of the crime scene, including video-recorded crime scene walk-throughs, photography, distance measurements, development of crime scene diagrams, and identification of physical and forensic evidence. Photographs should always be labeled with the perspective from which they were taken and items of importance. All suspects, involved officers, casings, and projectiles should be photographed and labeled.
• Report writing. All reports should thoroughly document the investigation, including complete statements, all photos (in a readable format), crime scene diagrams, and complete forensic and analytic reports. In addition, there should be a single source narrative document that provides a chronological summary of the incident, to include all precursor events, enforcement, and investigative actions taken.
Finding 32
PPD officers involved in a shooting provide a “public safety statement” to the transporting supervisor regarding the crime scene, evidence, suspects, and witnesses. In practice, the statement lacks structure and consistency.
The purpose of the “public safety statement” is to address any emergency circumstances that may exist, such as the need to capture a fleeing felon or search for additional victims, possible witnesses, the extent of the crime scene, and the direction of all rounds fired. However, the utility of these statements varies widely, depending upon the questions asked by the transporting supervisor.155 There is no established set of questions or information to be gathered by the transporting supervisor. A poor public safety statement can impact the ability of the investigators to reconstruct the crime scene and locate evidence and potential witnesses. Many of the public safety statements reviewed for this assessment were believed to be too informal. In many cases, reviewers did not believe that the statement collected from the transported supervisor constituted a “public safety statement.”
Recommendation 32.1
The PPD should develop a standard checklist of items constituting a public safety statement that transporting supervisors must obtain from an officer involved in a shooting.
The PPD should create a policy that specifies all pieces of information a transporting supervisor is expected to gather in the event of an OIS. All supervisors should be made aware of the policy and be issued a standard checklist to use when performing this duty.
The check list could include the following items: [156]
• Type of force used
• Direction of shots fired
• Knowledge of any injured persons and their location
• Knowledge of any suspects at large
• Time lapse of the event
• Any knowledge of witnesses, including names, descriptions, and locations
• Any knowledge of evidence at the crime scene
• The scope of the crime scene
Recommendation 32.2
The transporting supervisor should conduct a walk-through of the scene with the discharging officer(s).
It is currently not standard PPD practice for the transporting supervisor to conduct a walk-through of the scene with the discharging officer(s). This is a limiting factor, because the supervisor cannot visualize the scene while the officer is describing what occurred. By conducting a walk-through with the discharging officer(s), transporting supervisors will be better able to assist investigators in the crime scene investigation and incident reconstruction.
Finding 33
The PPD’s current practice for recording interviews of witnesses and discharging officers is through typed notes.
In all major case investigations, including OISs, PPD investigators take what they refer to as “verbatim statements” via typed transcriptions. This means that an investigator is sitting at a computer, typing in questions and answers as they occur in real time. These statements are often not signed by the officer. [157] The compelling concern with this practice is that the statements are not a verbatim recording of the information. Ultimately, responses will be summarized or rephrased when individuals without the skills and training or an actual stenographer are typing the transcriptions. This can lead to a number of issues, such as incompleteness, inaccuracies, or unintentional bias. This also poses difficulty in determining the appropriateness and thoroughness of interviewing techniques used by investigators.
Recommendation 33
The PPD should establish a policy that interviews of all critical witnesses and suspects in the course of an OIS investigation will be video and audio recorded.
Video recording interviews will increase public confidence and demonstrate fairness and impartiality in the PPD’s investigative procedures. From an investigative standpoint, video recordings can provide investigators, courts, and juries with an added perspective that photos and audio recording cannot provide. [158] A video-recorded interview will allow for an unadulterated, objective view of the interview and allow viewers to observe the behavior of both the interviewers and interviewees.
The policy should specify that interviews with all critical civilian witnesses, officer witnesses, suspects, and discharging officers should be video recorded. At a minimum, critical witnesses should include any officer or civilian who witnessed the shooting, any officer who discharged his or her firearm, and any supervisors who were involved in managing the incident before or during the use of force either by radio or on the scene.
Segments of the video-recorded interviews should be incorporated into the UFRB presentation and hearing. In addition, all video-recorded interviews, with the exception of the discharging officer (unless voluntary), should be included as part of the OIS case file sent to the SIU for review.
Finding 34
Control of the initial crime scene is assigned to the criminal investigators on an informal basis. As a result, there is a general lack of consistency in the quality of crime scene control and integrity.
Based on our review of PPD investigations, crime scene logs were frequently messy and incomplete. Sometimes, people signed in but did not sign out. Other times, there were multiple crime scene logs that did not match. In general, crime scene management was poorly documented in the PPD case files we reviewed.
Recommendation 34
The PPD should establish a policy that control of an OIS crime scene must be assigned to the criminal investigative unit.
D-FIT should work collaboratively with the IAD shooting team to sufficiently document the scene before the scene is released. The time of the release of the crime scene should be documented in each OIS investigation. In addition, the person(s) in charge of the crime scene and who authorized its release should be documented in each OIS investigation. All incidents should document the perimeter of the crime scene, the assignment of a log officer, and a complete crime scene log to maintain the integrity of the crime scene and its documentation. [159]
Finding 35
Crime scene photos of OIS incidents are inconsistent and often lack the appropriate perspectives and details.
We found that crime scene photos for OIS incidents were exceptional at times and inadequate at other times. This lack of consistency is evidenced in investigatory reviewers’ ratings on the overall quality of crime scene photos and the account of perspectives and items of importance in crime scene photos. Although most investigations included adequate crime scene photos and labeling, a sizable proportion did not, indicating an overall lack of consistency.
Recommendation 35.1
The PPD should establish a standard for OIS crime scene photography to be incorporated into its OIS investigations manual.
The PPD’s OIS investigation manual should outline or reference the proper techniques and documentation of crime scene photos from the lead investigator’s standpoint. All crime scene photos should be labeled with the perspective from which they were taken and any significant items that appear in the photos should be labeled. All officers and suspects (when possible) should be photographed in the attire they were wearing at the time of the incident. [160] All photos should be included in the investigative file and sent to the DAO and all PPD personnel involved in the administrative review of the incident.
Recommendation 35.2
The crime scene should be video recorded.
Preservation of the crime scene is essential to the integrity of the investigation. Although a photo log has sufficed throughout much of police history, an emerging practice in crime scene documentation is the use of video. In addition to photos, the PPD should video record the crime scene. Doing so will provide supervisors and investigators with an additional perspective on the incident and the spatial relationships between different parts of the crime scene. [161] In addition, still photos render light differently from video. For example, at night, photos show either a very brightly lighted scene or a very dark scene. Video shows a truer visual representation of the scene as it occurred. Investigators should conduct a video walk-through of the scene and capture relevant views and angles as they relate to the OIS.
Finding 36
The IAD shooting team waits for the DAO to decline charges against an officer before it interviews discharging officers and closes its investigation. As a result, most officers involved in shootings are not interviewed until three or more months after the incident occurred.
Presently, the IAD is the primary point of contact with the SIU, which reviews the criminal investigation of OISs and makes a decision on whether to pursue criminal charges. This puts the IAD in the peculiar position of serving as liaison for a potential criminal investigation of an officer and compelling statements from discharging officers that are protected from use in the criminal investigation. The PPD addresses the potential conflict of interest in part by not conducting the compelled interview with the discharging officer until after the DAO has declined charges. [162] As a result, the interview is often not conducted until months after the incident. In other words, a detailed interview with the most critical witness (the involved officer) doesn’t occur until many months after the incident. Yet research has shown that critical incidents can have a profound impact on officer memory. [163] The PPD’s approach calls into question the reliability of the officer’s recall and memory.
Recommendation 36.1
The PPD should revise its policy and practice so that the criminal investigative unit assigned to each OIS is the primary point of contact with the DAO. The IAD should be extricated from this role.
The criminal investigation of the incident should be led by a single investigative unit in the PPD. That unit should be the sole liaison with SIU and DAO’s criminal prosecutors. By doing this, the department will ensure that compelled statements and information derived from those statements are completely walled off from the criminal case. It will also enable the IAD to interview discharging officers sooner without concern of contamination between the administrative investigation and the criminal investigation.
The IAD will still have access to the entire criminal investigation file. Shooting team investigators will still be able to participate in any and all interviews that are part of the criminal investigation. However, the IAD will not have any responsibility or authority related to the criminal investigation. The IAD must conduct its own parallel administrative investigation.
Recommendation 36.2
The shooting team should conduct interviews with the discharging officer(s) as soon as practical, but not later than 72 hours of the incident.
There is no consensus on the timeframe in which discharging officers should be interviewed in the wake of an OIS. There is little research specific to the effect of time on officer recall of an OIS. One noteworthy pilot study found that officers in simulated critical incidents had better recall immediately after the event than they had three days later. However, the authors urge caution and call for more research on the topic, concluding that police departments should consider the timing of officer interviews on a case-by-case basis. [164]
Some agencies have a policy to interview the officer immediately, as has been recommended by the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC). [165] The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Psychological Services Section insists that officers be given some time to recover after an incident while noting that this can range from a few hours to several days. Many departments afford officers anywhere from one to three sleep cycles, which is consistent with guidelines set forth by Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE). [166] In the PPD, administrative investigations should no longer wait for the completion of a criminal investigation or the declination of charges by the DAO. PPD shooting team investigators should interview officers as soon as all other interviews have been completed but not longer than 72 hours after of an OIS, which would bring the department within current guidelines and common practices for OIS investigations. [167]
Recommendation 36.3
The IAD should set a goal to close administrative investigations within 30 days of the DAO’s declination.
From 2007 to 2013, it took the IAD an average of 100 days to complete an administrative case after the DAO declined to pursue charges. With adoption of the new practice of discharging officers being interviewed soon after the OIS, this lag in the completion of the investigation should be significantly reduced. The PPD should set a goal to close administrative investigations within 30 days of the DAO’s declination. This will, in turn, move up the timeframe in which the UFRB can take place and therefore improve the timeliness with which the department rectifies any issues identified in the administrative investigation.
Recommendation 36.4
All interviews of discharging officers should be video recorded.
Current PPD policy states that IAD investigators will take the officers’ statements and ask them to sign each page as it transcribed by the investigators. This sort of documentation is subject to error through miscommunication or unintentional bias in the investigator’s interpretation of what was said. Our review of investigative files noted that these interviews did not appear to be transcribed verbatim. Video recording interviews with officers can increase public confidence and demonstrate fairness and impartiality in PPD’s investigation of officers involved in shootings. From an investigatory perspective, video can provide investigators, courts, and juries with an added perspective that photos or audio recordings cannot provide. Video recorded interviews should be part of the UFRB presentation and hearing. If the interview is compelled, the transcript and video should not be sent to the DAO as part of the investigative file, as they are protected by Garrity. All video interviews should be protected from public disclosure through policy and protocols set forth by the PPD.
Finding 37
The PPD lacks official training requirements for IAD shooting team members.
The IAD shooting team has significant experience in conducting internal affairs and OIS investigations. However, there are no official requirements for shooting team investigators in terms of experience or training.
Recommendation 37
Current and future members of the shooting team should be required to receive specialized training in OIS investigations.
All shooting team investigators should be required to complete specialized training on OISs. The training can be obtained from a variety of vendors or developed in-house by instructors who have been certified in one of these specialized courses.
Finding 38
The shooting team does not have a formal process for consulting with subject matter experts to inform their investigation and findings.
The shooting team occasionally consults with other members of the department, but this process has not been formalized. These sorts of discussions and insights were frequently missing from investigative files reviewed by our investigation review panel.
Recommendation 38
The shooting team should establish a policy to review its investigation and findings with other departmental experts.
Investigators should consult with training staff, tacticians, and other experts to address officer decision making and tactics during the OIS. Experts in specialized topics such as defensive tactics, officer safety, firearms training, crime scene management, or crisis intervention can illuminate conflicts in the officers’ actions and departmental procedure and training.
Finding 39
The scope of shooting team investigations focuses solely on policy while largely neglecting officer tactics and decision making.
Our review of OIS investigative files found that there was rarely any discussion of tactics and decision making by the IAD. The incident analysis was found to be minimal. Tactical reviews are an emerging best practice. They aid the department in identifying performance issues that do not reach the threshold of policy violation, but require remediation through training and possibly department-wide reforms. [168]
Recommendation 39.1
The shooting team should significantly enhance its investigative scope to include officer tactics and decision making.
In addition to their policy investigation, the shooting team should investigate the tactics and decision making of all officers, dispatchers, and supervisors, including but not limited to communications, assessment of backdrop, officer safety, officer coordination, cover and concealment, less-lethal options, exhaustion of other alternatives, supervision, incident command, and de-escalation. This enhanced scope should be reflected in interview questions, consultations with other department experts, and investigative reports.
Recommendation 39.2
Shooting team investigative reports should highlight findings and any inconsistencies in policy, procedure, and training for the UFRB to evaluate in its decision.
Shooting team reports, by design, describe the incident, crime scene evidence, and witness accounts of the incident. Given the shooting team investigator’s knowledge and experience investigating the case, they should clearly delineate officer actions and relevant departmental policy, procedure, and training. This will foster better deliberation during UFRB hearings and ultimately more informed decisions.
Recommendation 39.3
The shooting team should develop an operations manual delineating all of its investigative activities, reporting, and role in the review process.
The manual should describe a step-by-step process for conducting an administrative investigation of OISs. It should be written in a way that each investigation will be standardized and replicable from start to finish. The shooting team manual should be separate from the criminal investigation manual for OISs.
Findings and recommendations
Finding 31
OIS investigations generally lack consistency.
Given the PPD’s current structure and process for OIS investigations, the only source of consistency and standardization comes from the IAD shooting team, which responds to all OISs and applies a standard protocol. Our evaluation of investigative quality also showed that shooting team investigators conducted the highest-quality interviews in our sample.
However, much of an OIS investigation is conducted by one of two units, which are vastly inconsistent in their approach. The homicide unit investigates fatal incidents and fields a team of six detectives to do so. The detective division investigates nonfatal incidents and fields a team of two detectives to do so. Notably, neither of these units has specialized training or experience in investigating OISs or any protocols in place for doing so. This distribution of investigative responsibilities can inhibit standardization across OIS investigations. Across all OIS investigations, we found a general lack of consistency in quality. Some investigations were very good and some were very poor. Crime scene photography and canvassing were among the most inconsistent aspects of the investigation.
Recommendation 31.1
The PPD should establish a single investigative unit devoted to criminal investigations of all deadly force incidents.
Deadly force incidents have unique characteristics that make the investigation of such incidents different from other criminal investigative work, even homicide cases. [150] Interview questions and techniques, crime scene analysis, and approaches to canvassing all need to account for the fact that the investigators are dealing with a police use of deadly force, as opposed to other homicides.
All deadly force investigations need to be conducted with the same thoroughness. Establishing a single unit devoted to these investigations will help ensure that a consistent standard is applied. For the purpose of this report, we will refer to this specialized investigative unit that conducts the criminal investigation as a deadly force investigation team (D-FIT). Whether the incident is fatal, injurious, or noninjurious, the decision by the involved officer(s) to use deadly force remains the same. The various outcomes (death, injury, or a miss) are determined by a number of factors such as shooting accuracy, distance, reaction time, and readily available medical care. Note that none of these outcomes is a result of the intent of the officer.
In response to a high number of OISs and calls for organizational reforms, other agencies have established specialized units. Examples are the Baltimore Police Department, [151] Seattle Police Department, [152] Portland (Oregon) Police Department, [153] and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. [154] The PPD’s newly established unit should investigate all deadly force incidents, excluding noninjurious accidental discharges and animal shootings. The PPD should staff the unit sufficiently to handle at least 50 OIS incidents annually. The unit should investigate not only OISs, but all deadly force cases and in-custody deaths.
The D-FIT will be the lead unit in the interviews of all civilians and officers, in collaboration with the shooting team. The one exception for interview officers will be any involved officers that must be compelled to give interviews under Garrity. Compelled officers should continue to be interviewed by shooting team investigators. D-FIT will compile the entire criminal investigation, gathering all pertinent facts, statements, and evidence.
Recommendation 31.2
PPD D-FIT members should have the experience and training necessary to conduct thorough and objective OIS investigations.
Members of the newly established unit should have prior major case investigation experience with a strong preference for homicide investigations. Furthermore, all members of the unit should receive specialized training in OIS investigations. The training may be obtained from a variety of vendors or can be developed in-house by instructors who have been certified through specialized courses. The department may also consider consulting with other agencies on their training requirements and programs for OIS investigations.
Recommendation 31.3
The PPD should develop a manual for conducting OIS investigations from a criminal standpoint.
The manual should describe a detailed, step-by-step protocol for investigators to follow and have as a reference point when conducting OIS investigations. The manual will serve as another mechanism for ensuring that all OIS investigations are conducted with a consistent, standard quality. This manual should be developed by staff members who have attended training in the investigation of OISs. The department may also review manuals and operating procedures developed by other large agencies.
The manual should include, at a minimum, the following standardized practices:
• Canvassing. Neighborhood canvassing efforts should be thoroughly documented. The investigators should publish a media release with email and phone contact information requesting that witnesses come forward, follow up with all addresses not contacted, and keep a complete list of addresses with the names of those contacted who were part of the canvass. The goal of a canvass is for investigators to be able to identify and interview any potential eye and ear witnesses. The effort should be conducted and documented in a way that makes it replicable.
• Crime scene management. All crime scenes should be managed to a quality standard, including consistent documentation in a crime scene log, assignment of a log officer, and setting of a perimeter. The management of the crime scene should be documented in detail in the final investigative report.
• Interviews and interrogations. The manual should clearly describe the appropriate practices for interviewing or interrogating all witnesses and involved persons, including interviews of civilian witnesses, witness officers, and discharging officers (if applicable); supervisor roles and responsibilities; taking of a public safety statement; and documentation of interviews and interrogation.
• Crime scene documentation. The manual should describe the appropriate steps for a thorough documentation of the crime scene, including video-recorded crime scene walk-throughs, photography, distance measurements, development of crime scene diagrams, and identification of physical and forensic evidence. Photographs should always be labeled with the perspective from which they were taken and items of importance. All suspects, involved officers, casings, and projectiles should be photographed and labeled.
• Report writing. All reports should thoroughly document the investigation, including complete statements, all photos (in a readable format), crime scene diagrams, and complete forensic and analytic reports. In addition, there should be a single source narrative document that provides a chronological summary of the incident, to include all precursor events, enforcement, and investigative actions taken.
Finding 32
PPD officers involved in a shooting provide a “public safety statement” to the transporting supervisor regarding the crime scene, evidence, suspects, and witnesses. In practice, the statement lacks structure and consistency.
The purpose of the “public safety statement” is to address any emergency circumstances that may exist, such as the need to capture a fleeing felon or search for additional victims, possible witnesses, the extent of the crime scene, and the direction of all rounds fired. However, the utility of these statements varies widely, depending upon the questions asked by the transporting supervisor.155 There is no established set of questions or information to be gathered by the transporting supervisor. A poor public safety statement can impact the ability of the investigators to reconstruct the crime scene and locate evidence and potential witnesses. Many of the public safety statements reviewed for this assessment were believed to be too informal. In many cases, reviewers did not believe that the statement collected from the transported supervisor constituted a “public safety statement.”
Recommendation 32.1
The PPD should develop a standard checklist of items constituting a public safety statement that transporting supervisors must obtain from an officer involved in a shooting.
The PPD should create a policy that specifies all pieces of information a transporting supervisor is expected to gather in the event of an OIS. All supervisors should be made aware of the policy and be issued a standard checklist to use when performing this duty.
The check list could include the following items: [156]
• Type of force used
• Direction of shots fired
• Knowledge of any injured persons and their location
• Knowledge of any suspects at large
• Time lapse of the event
• Any knowledge of witnesses, including names, descriptions, and locations
• Any knowledge of evidence at the crime scene
• The scope of the crime scene
Recommendation 32.2
The transporting supervisor should conduct a walk-through of the scene with the discharging officer(s).
It is currently not standard PPD practice for the transporting supervisor to conduct a walk-through of the scene with the discharging officer(s). This is a limiting factor, because the supervisor cannot visualize the scene while the officer is describing what occurred. By conducting a walk-through with the discharging officer(s), transporting supervisors will be better able to assist investigators in the crime scene investigation and incident reconstruction.
Finding 33
The PPD’s current practice for recording interviews of witnesses and discharging officers is through typed notes.
In all major case investigations, including OISs, PPD investigators take what they refer to as “verbatim statements” via typed transcriptions. This means that an investigator is sitting at a computer, typing in questions and answers as they occur in real time. These statements are often not signed by the officer. [157] The compelling concern with this practice is that the statements are not a verbatim recording of the information. Ultimately, responses will be summarized or rephrased when individuals without the skills and training or an actual stenographer are typing the transcriptions. This can lead to a number of issues, such as incompleteness, inaccuracies, or unintentional bias. This also poses difficulty in determining the appropriateness and thoroughness of interviewing techniques used by investigators.
Recommendation 33
The PPD should establish a policy that interviews of all critical witnesses and suspects in the course of an OIS investigation will be video and audio recorded.
Video recording interviews will increase public confidence and demonstrate fairness and impartiality in the PPD’s investigative procedures. From an investigative standpoint, video recordings can provide investigators, courts, and juries with an added perspective that photos and audio recording cannot provide. [158] A video-recorded interview will allow for an unadulterated, objective view of the interview and allow viewers to observe the behavior of both the interviewers and interviewees.
The policy should specify that interviews with all critical civilian witnesses, officer witnesses, suspects, and discharging officers should be video recorded. At a minimum, critical witnesses should include any officer or civilian who witnessed the shooting, any officer who discharged his or her firearm, and any supervisors who were involved in managing the incident before or during the use of force either by radio or on the scene.
Segments of the video-recorded interviews should be incorporated into the UFRB presentation and hearing. In addition, all video-recorded interviews, with the exception of the discharging officer (unless voluntary), should be included as part of the OIS case file sent to the SIU for review.
Finding 34
Control of the initial crime scene is assigned to the criminal investigators on an informal basis. As a result, there is a general lack of consistency in the quality of crime scene control and integrity.
Based on our review of PPD investigations, crime scene logs were frequently messy and incomplete. Sometimes, people signed in but did not sign out. Other times, there were multiple crime scene logs that did not match. In general, crime scene management was poorly documented in the PPD case files we reviewed.
Recommendation 34
The PPD should establish a policy that control of an OIS crime scene must be assigned to the criminal investigative unit.
D-FIT should work collaboratively with the IAD shooting team to sufficiently document the scene before the scene is released. The time of the release of the crime scene should be documented in each OIS investigation. In addition, the person(s) in charge of the crime scene and who authorized its release should be documented in each OIS investigation. All incidents should document the perimeter of the crime scene, the assignment of a log officer, and a complete crime scene log to maintain the integrity of the crime scene and its documentation. [159]
Finding 35
Crime scene photos of OIS incidents are inconsistent and often lack the appropriate perspectives and details.
We found that crime scene photos for OIS incidents were exceptional at times and inadequate at other times. This lack of consistency is evidenced in investigatory reviewers’ ratings on the overall quality of crime scene photos and the account of perspectives and items of importance in crime scene photos. Although most investigations included adequate crime scene photos and labeling, a sizable proportion did not, indicating an overall lack of consistency.
Recommendation 35.1
The PPD should establish a standard for OIS crime scene photography to be incorporated into its OIS investigations manual.
The PPD’s OIS investigation manual should outline or reference the proper techniques and documentation of crime scene photos from the lead investigator’s standpoint. All crime scene photos should be labeled with the perspective from which they were taken and any significant items that appear in the photos should be labeled. All officers and suspects (when possible) should be photographed in the attire they were wearing at the time of the incident. [160] All photos should be included in the investigative file and sent to the DAO and all PPD personnel involved in the administrative review of the incident.
Recommendation 35.2
The crime scene should be video recorded.
Preservation of the crime scene is essential to the integrity of the investigation. Although a photo log has sufficed throughout much of police history, an emerging practice in crime scene documentation is the use of video. In addition to photos, the PPD should video record the crime scene. Doing so will provide supervisors and investigators with an additional perspective on the incident and the spatial relationships between different parts of the crime scene. [161] In addition, still photos render light differently from video. For example, at night, photos show either a very brightly lighted scene or a very dark scene. Video shows a truer visual representation of the scene as it occurred. Investigators should conduct a video walk-through of the scene and capture relevant views and angles as they relate to the OIS.
Finding 36
The IAD shooting team waits for the DAO to decline charges against an officer before it interviews discharging officers and closes its investigation. As a result, most officers involved in shootings are not interviewed until three or more months after the incident occurred.
Presently, the IAD is the primary point of contact with the SIU, which reviews the criminal investigation of OISs and makes a decision on whether to pursue criminal charges. This puts the IAD in the peculiar position of serving as liaison for a potential criminal investigation of an officer and compelling statements from discharging officers that are protected from use in the criminal investigation. The PPD addresses the potential conflict of interest in part by not conducting the compelled interview with the discharging officer until after the DAO has declined charges. [162] As a result, the interview is often not conducted until months after the incident. In other words, a detailed interview with the most critical witness (the involved officer) doesn’t occur until many months after the incident. Yet research has shown that critical incidents can have a profound impact on officer memory. [163] The PPD’s approach calls into question the reliability of the officer’s recall and memory.
Recommendation 36.1
The PPD should revise its policy and practice so that the criminal investigative unit assigned to each OIS is the primary point of contact with the DAO. The IAD should be extricated from this role.
The criminal investigation of the incident should be led by a single investigative unit in the PPD. That unit should be the sole liaison with SIU and DAO’s criminal prosecutors. By doing this, the department will ensure that compelled statements and information derived from those statements are completely walled off from the criminal case. It will also enable the IAD to interview discharging officers sooner without concern of contamination between the administrative investigation and the criminal investigation.
The IAD will still have access to the entire criminal investigation file. Shooting team investigators will still be able to participate in any and all interviews that are part of the criminal investigation. However, the IAD will not have any responsibility or authority related to the criminal investigation. The IAD must conduct its own parallel administrative investigation.
Recommendation 36.2
The shooting team should conduct interviews with the discharging officer(s) as soon as practical, but not later than 72 hours of the incident.
There is no consensus on the timeframe in which discharging officers should be interviewed in the wake of an OIS. There is little research specific to the effect of time on officer recall of an OIS. One noteworthy pilot study found that officers in simulated critical incidents had better recall immediately after the event than they had three days later. However, the authors urge caution and call for more research on the topic, concluding that police departments should consider the timing of officer interviews on a case-by-case basis. [164]
Some agencies have a policy to interview the officer immediately, as has been recommended by the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC). [165] The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Psychological Services Section insists that officers be given some time to recover after an incident while noting that this can range from a few hours to several days. Many departments afford officers anywhere from one to three sleep cycles, which is consistent with guidelines set forth by Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE). [166] In the PPD, administrative investigations should no longer wait for the completion of a criminal investigation or the declination of charges by the DAO. PPD shooting team investigators should interview officers as soon as all other interviews have been completed but not longer than 72 hours after of an OIS, which would bring the department within current guidelines and common practices for OIS investigations. [167]
Recommendation 36.3
The IAD should set a goal to close administrative investigations within 30 days of the DAO’s declination.
From 2007 to 2013, it took the IAD an average of 100 days to complete an administrative case after the DAO declined to pursue charges. With adoption of the new practice of discharging officers being interviewed soon after the OIS, this lag in the completion of the investigation should be significantly reduced. The PPD should set a goal to close administrative investigations within 30 days of the DAO’s declination. This will, in turn, move up the timeframe in which the UFRB can take place and therefore improve the timeliness with which the department rectifies any issues identified in the administrative investigation.
Recommendation 36.4
All interviews of discharging officers should be video recorded.
Current PPD policy states that IAD investigators will take the officers’ statements and ask them to sign each page as it transcribed by the investigators. This sort of documentation is subject to error through miscommunication or unintentional bias in the investigator’s interpretation of what was said. Our review of investigative files noted that these interviews did not appear to be transcribed verbatim. Video recording interviews with officers can increase public confidence and demonstrate fairness and impartiality in PPD’s investigation of officers involved in shootings. From an investigatory perspective, video can provide investigators, courts, and juries with an added perspective that photos or audio recordings cannot provide. Video recorded interviews should be part of the UFRB presentation and hearing. If the interview is compelled, the transcript and video should not be sent to the DAO as part of the investigative file, as they are protected by Garrity. All video interviews should be protected from public disclosure through policy and protocols set forth by the PPD.
Finding 37
The PPD lacks official training requirements for IAD shooting team members.
The IAD shooting team has significant experience in conducting internal affairs and OIS investigations. However, there are no official requirements for shooting team investigators in terms of experience or training.
Recommendation 37
Current and future members of the shooting team should be required to receive specialized training in OIS investigations.
All shooting team investigators should be required to complete specialized training on OISs. The training can be obtained from a variety of vendors or developed in-house by instructors who have been certified in one of these specialized courses.
Finding 38
The shooting team does not have a formal process for consulting with subject matter experts to inform their investigation and findings.
The shooting team occasionally consults with other members of the department, but this process has not been formalized. These sorts of discussions and insights were frequently missing from investigative files reviewed by our investigation review panel.
Recommendation 38
The shooting team should establish a policy to review its investigation and findings with other departmental experts.
Investigators should consult with training staff, tacticians, and other experts to address officer decision making and tactics during the OIS. Experts in specialized topics such as defensive tactics, officer safety, firearms training, crime scene management, or crisis intervention can illuminate conflicts in the officers’ actions and departmental procedure and training.
Finding 39
The scope of shooting team investigations focuses solely on policy while largely neglecting officer tactics and decision making.
Our review of OIS investigative files found that there was rarely any discussion of tactics and decision making by the IAD. The incident analysis was found to be minimal. Tactical reviews are an emerging best practice. They aid the department in identifying performance issues that do not reach the threshold of policy violation, but require remediation through training and possibly department-wide reforms. [168]
Recommendation 39.1
The shooting team should significantly enhance its investigative scope to include officer tactics and decision making.
In addition to their policy investigation, the shooting team should investigate the tactics and decision making of all officers, dispatchers, and supervisors, including but not limited to communications, assessment of backdrop, officer safety, officer coordination, cover and concealment, less-lethal options, exhaustion of other alternatives, supervision, incident command, and de-escalation. This enhanced scope should be reflected in interview questions, consultations with other department experts, and investigative reports.
Recommendation 39.2
Shooting team investigative reports should highlight findings and any inconsistencies in policy, procedure, and training for the UFRB to evaluate in its decision.
Shooting team reports, by design, describe the incident, crime scene evidence, and witness accounts of the incident. Given the shooting team investigator’s knowledge and experience investigating the case, they should clearly delineate officer actions and relevant departmental policy, procedure, and training. This will foster better deliberation during UFRB hearings and ultimately more informed decisions.
Recommendation 39.3
The shooting team should develop an operations manual delineating all of its investigative activities, reporting, and role in the review process.
The manual should describe a step-by-step process for conducting an administrative investigation of OISs. It should be written in a way that each investigation will be standardized and replicable from start to finish. The shooting team manual should be separate from the criminal investigation manual for OISs.