Re: Historico-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Myt
Posted: Mon Mar 19, 2018 3:36 am
Lecture Three
LXXXI Literally “can a language,” meaning “be able to speak a language.”
LXXXII Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz, 1646-1716, German rationalist philosopher and mathematician. He conceived of the universe as a hierarchy of independent units or monads, synchronized by pre-established harmony. He also devised a system of calculus, independently of Newton, and had an admirable distrust of atoms (why should they be the same just because they are small?):
The translation is by Mary Morris. Vincent Icke provides what may be the answer: electrons, he writes, are so small that they are by nature indistinguishable. In other words, there is a limit to normal “smallness.”
LXXXIII “It appears to be the daughter of philosophy.” I have not yet found where Leibnitz says this.
LXXXIV I don't find that such a use of gender differences to express opposites exists in English. So when Schelling says “all languages” it is a good thing he puts an “if” in front of the clause. He would certainly have been aware of this (and one cannot really say that English is not a real language). Rémusat, in the work referred to on page 134, says that in English, as in many other languages, gender is perceived from the nature of the objects. It may still be true that every act of naming is a personification (an assignment of a fixed character), and it may also be true that some spiritual quality is absent from English if it lacks these distinctions of gender. And refer to my note to page 28 about Bacon and the assignment of names and sexes.
LXXXV In German, durchzuwirken, Schelling's special use, meaning “to act (or have an effect) by way of (or through).” Literally it does mean “work through,” but it is normally only used as a term in weaving, meaning “interleave.”
LXXXVI Sic, which would imply that the poetical and the scientific aspects are one, at least in this context.
LXXXVII Clairvoyance. Some time before this was written, presumably, Schelling jotted down the following, on the back of a sketch for the continuation of his dialogue Clara:
I am not sure whether he would wish to have this resurrected, considering that he did not, as far as I know, write much about the subject anywhere else, so it should not be taken very seriously. There is a sentence in the Stuttgart Private Lectures of 1810 [I 7, 448]:
LXXXVIII I offer two passages from Epicurus's Letter to Herodotus. (Refer to one of my notes to page 27 for a remark about their reliability.) This, about the transient images, is from section 46, translated by Cyril Bailey:
And this, from section 51, is about the images in dreams:
LXXXIX Published in 1818, this work, like all Hermann's dissertations, seems, with its thirty-six pages, very short. The title means “Dissertation on the Origins of Greek History.” It may be found in volume two of his collection Opuscula of 1827, at page 195.
XC Æschylus (c525‒c456 B.C.) depicted, in his play Prometheus Bound, the wanderings of Io, pursued by a gadfly.
XCI Wolf in his Prolegomena to Homer, already cited, does no more than make suggestions, as follows:
XCII In the original this “out of or within” is in oder unter (in or within). Over the following pages the expression aus oder unter (out of or within) appears four times. This latter makes sense, but I cannot make sense of “in or within.” I have therefore assumed that an early editor had a pass at it, changed his mind the second time he met the phrase, but forgot to remove the change he had made to the first occurrence. (The only distinction which might possibly be made by in oder unter is that referred to at the end of this paragraph, between the invention of individuals within (unter) the society and the instinctlike process. But I do not think this is likely as it would have been brought out more clearly.)
XCIII In English the quotation from page 44 reads: “They know no religion, nor cult, nor allegiance, nor laws, nor obligations, nor rewards, nor punishments.” The emphasis is Schelling's, and as he quotes it the word for “punishments” is spelt in the modern way, “châtiments.” The passage comes from Azara's tenth chapter, entitled “Of the Wild Indians.” I quote his complete sentence:
Next the passage on Azara's pages 90-91, still in chapter ten, about the Guanás (as he usually spells their name) of Paraguay:
The passage about the Lenguas from page 151 of the same chapter means “They recognize no cult, nor divinity, nor laws, nor chiefs, nor submission to authority, and they are in every way free.” Again the emphasis is Schelling's, and in the original Azara's sentence continues as follows:
On Azara's page 113, writing of the Mbayás, or the mbayás, as in fact he spells the name, he says:
Azara's page 43 about the caciques, who are, by the way, not assigned to the Indians from outside, but chosen from among them by outsiders, reads:
And it runs on into the first sentence quoted in this note. Finally Azara's page 16, about the Charruas:
LXXXI Literally “can a language,” meaning “be able to speak a language.”
LXXXII Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz, 1646-1716, German rationalist philosopher and mathematician. He conceived of the universe as a hierarchy of independent units or monads, synchronized by pre-established harmony. He also devised a system of calculus, independently of Newton, and had an admirable distrust of atoms (why should they be the same just because they are small?):
Two drops of water or milk looked at under the microscope will be found to be discernible. This is an argument against atoms, which, like the void, are opposed to the principles of a true metaphysic.
The translation is by Mary Morris. Vincent Icke provides what may be the answer: electrons, he writes, are so small that they are by nature indistinguishable. In other words, there is a limit to normal “smallness.”
LXXXIII “It appears to be the daughter of philosophy.” I have not yet found where Leibnitz says this.
LXXXIV I don't find that such a use of gender differences to express opposites exists in English. So when Schelling says “all languages” it is a good thing he puts an “if” in front of the clause. He would certainly have been aware of this (and one cannot really say that English is not a real language). Rémusat, in the work referred to on page 134, says that in English, as in many other languages, gender is perceived from the nature of the objects. It may still be true that every act of naming is a personification (an assignment of a fixed character), and it may also be true that some spiritual quality is absent from English if it lacks these distinctions of gender. And refer to my note to page 28 about Bacon and the assignment of names and sexes.
LXXXV In German, durchzuwirken, Schelling's special use, meaning “to act (or have an effect) by way of (or through).” Literally it does mean “work through,” but it is normally only used as a term in weaving, meaning “interleave.”
LXXXVI Sic, which would imply that the poetical and the scientific aspects are one, at least in this context.
LXXXVII Clairvoyance. Some time before this was written, presumably, Schelling jotted down the following, on the back of a sketch for the continuation of his dialogue Clara:
1. Reality of the spirit-world (of the past)
2. Complete humanity of spirits.
3. Multitudinousness. Its representations.
I. Clairvoyance in general
II. In particular, what it consists in
a) Opposite to science; everything immediate, nothing indirect; perhaps something about the gradation of the sciences among themselves. Everything in immediate feeling.
b) Without struggle—the long rest; also no more sin.
c) No memory of things as absent. No past.
d) Inwardness of community from the previous section.
III. Whether the state of clairvoyance also applicable to damnation and whether no intermediate state between redemption and unredeemedness?
IV. Concerning the Where?
I am not sure whether he would wish to have this resurrected, considering that he did not, as far as I know, write much about the subject anywhere else, so it should not be taken very seriously. There is a sentence in the Stuttgart Private Lectures of 1810 [I 7, 448]:
Now that-which-produces, or the bond, if it is in unity with the product, is indeed nothing other than the inner life and weaving, the gentle muted flame of life, which burns in every being, even in the being apparently without life (clairvoyants see it): but in contrast to and in contradiction with that-which-is-produced it is consuming fire.
LXXXVIII I offer two passages from Epicurus's Letter to Herodotus. (Refer to one of my notes to page 27 for a remark about their reliability.) This, about the transient images, is from section 46, translated by Cyril Bailey:
Moreover, there are images like in shape to the solid bodies, far surpassing perceptible things in their subtlety of texture. For it is not impossible that such emanations should be formed in that which surrounds the objects, nor that there should be opportunities for the formation of such hollow and thin frames, nor that there should be effluences which preserve the respective position and order which they had before in the solid bodies: these images we call idols.
Next, nothing among perceptible things contradicts the belief that the images have unsurpassable fineness of texture. And for this reason they have also unsurpassable speed of motion, since the movement of all their atoms is uniform, and besides nothing or very few things hinder their emission by collisions, whereas a body composed of many or infinite atoms is at once hindered by collisions. Besides this [nothing contradicts the belief] that the creation of the idols takes place as quick [sic] as thought.
And this, from section 51, is about the images in dreams:
Now falsehood and error always lie in the addition of opinion with regard to [what is waiting] to be confirmed or not contradicted, and then is not confirmed [or is contradicted]. For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real, and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgement, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses.
LXXXIX Published in 1818, this work, like all Hermann's dissertations, seems, with its thirty-six pages, very short. The title means “Dissertation on the Origins of Greek History.” It may be found in volume two of his collection Opuscula of 1827, at page 195.
XC Æschylus (c525‒c456 B.C.) depicted, in his play Prometheus Bound, the wanderings of Io, pursued by a gadfly.
XCI Wolf in his Prolegomena to Homer, already cited, does no more than make suggestions, as follows:
But what if the conjecture of some scholars is probable—that these and the other poems of those times were not consigned to writing, but were first made by poets in their memories and made public in song, then made more widely available by the singing of the rhapsodes, whose peculiar art it was to learn them? And if, because of this, many changes were necessarily made in them, by accident or design, before they were fixed, so to speak, in written form? And if for this very reason, as soon as they began to be written out, they had many differences, and soon acquired new ones from the rash conjectures of those who rivaled one another in their efforts to polish them up, and to correct them by the best laws of the art of poetry and their own usage? And if, finally, it can be shown by probable arguments and reasons that this entire connected series of the two continuous poems is owed less to the genius of him to whom we have normally attributed it, than to the zeal of a more polite age and the collective efforts of many, and that therefore the very songs from which the Iliad and Odyssey were assembled do not all have one common author? If, I say, one must accept a view different from the common one about all these things—what, then, will it mean to restore these poems to their original lustre and genuine beauty?
XCII In the original this “out of or within” is in oder unter (in or within). Over the following pages the expression aus oder unter (out of or within) appears four times. This latter makes sense, but I cannot make sense of “in or within.” I have therefore assumed that an early editor had a pass at it, changed his mind the second time he met the phrase, but forgot to remove the change he had made to the first occurrence. (The only distinction which might possibly be made by in oder unter is that referred to at the end of this paragraph, between the invention of individuals within (unter) the society and the instinctlike process. But I do not think this is likely as it would have been brought out more clearly.)
XCIII In English the quotation from page 44 reads: “They know no religion, nor cult, nor allegiance, nor laws, nor obligations, nor rewards, nor punishments.” The emphasis is Schelling's, and as he quotes it the word for “punishments” is spelt in the modern way, “châtiments.” The passage comes from Azara's tenth chapter, entitled “Of the Wild Indians.” I quote his complete sentence:
For the rest, they cultivate no land at all; they do no labour; they are ignorant of the art of sewing and of making fabrics; they know no religion, nor cult, nor allegiance, nor laws, nor obligations, nor rewards, nor punishments, nor musical instruments, nor dances; but they often become intoxicated.
Next the passage on Azara's pages 90-91, still in chapter ten, about the Guanás (as he usually spells their name) of Paraguay:
They, no more, know consideration, nor rewards, nor punishments, nor binding laws, nor religion. But since they consort with Spaniards a great deal, and these last speak to them about Christianity, and rewards, and the punishments to come, their most common reply, when they are questioned about this, is to say that there is a principle or a material and corporeal thing which is situated one knows not where, and which rewards the good and punishes the bad; but which always rewards the Guanás, because it is impossible for them to be bad, nor for them to do evil. As I say, the small number of these savages who express themselves thus have taken the basis of these ideas from the Spaniards, because there is not one single Guaná who worships the divinity or who recognizes him, either outwardly or inwardly. Thus it is the interested parties who themselves resolve their differences, and as a last resort they come to terms by means of blows with their fists. They also appear to converse with each other somewhat more, and even, although rarely, to meet together to chat.
The passage about the Lenguas from page 151 of the same chapter means “They recognize no cult, nor divinity, nor laws, nor chiefs, nor submission to authority, and they are in every way free.” Again the emphasis is Schelling's, and in the original Azara's sentence continues as follows:
. . . in every way free; but among themselves they make use of a singular formula of civility, when they see someone again after an absence of some length of time. This is what it amounts to: the two Indians shed a few tears before they address a single word to each other; to act in any other way would be an insult, or at least proof that the visit is not welcome.
On Azara's page 113, writing of the Mbayás, or the mbayás, as in fact he spells the name, he says:
They do not, as one might think, have a chief, neither in war nor during times of peace; because their government is reduced to assemblies where the caciques, the old men and the best trusted Indians carry the votes of the others. With each expedition, they content themselves with bearing away a single prize. Were this not so, there would today no longer be a Spaniard in Paraguay, nor a Portuguese in Cuiabá.
Azara's page 43 about the caciques, who are, by the way, not assigned to the Indians from outside, but chosen from among them by outsiders, reads:
I have not seen this inequality of riches in clothing and adornment among other Indian nations at all. They too have chiefs or caciques who, without having the right to give orders, to punish, nor to demand anything, are nevertheless highly regarded by the others who normally adopt all their suggestions, because they believe that they have more talent, finesse, and strength. Every chief lives in a different district, with those of his band (horde); but they come together when it is a matter of making war, or when the common interest demands it. For the rest, they cultivate . . .
And it runs on into the first sentence quoted in this note. Finally Azara's page 16, about the Charruas:
It is the parties themselves who resolve their particular differences: if they do not reach agreement, they assault each other with blows of their fists, until one of the two turns his back and leaves the other, without speaking about the matter again. In these duels, weapons are never used; and I have never heard tell of anyone being killed. Blood, however, is often spilled, because they hit each other on the nose, and sometimes they even break a tooth.