Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

"Science," the Greek word for knowledge, when appended to the word "political," creates what seems like an oxymoron. For who could claim to know politics? More complicated than any game, most people who play it become addicts and die without understanding what they were addicted to. The rest of us suffer under their malpractice as our "leaders." A truer case of the blind leading the blind could not be found. Plumb the depths of confusion here.

Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Thu Oct 31, 2013 11:46 pm


In May 1993, Pan Am's appeal was heard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and although a decision was not expected before the autumn, there seemed little doubt that the judgment against the airline in the 1992 liability trial would be set aside.

The issue had hinged on whether or not Pan Am had complied with FAA directives about the inspection of baggage. Counsel for the relatives had interpreted the regulations as requiring the airline physically to match all interline transfer bags with passengers, so that any bag not accompanied by a passenger would be identified and either hand-searched or left behind.

'To make out their liability theory,' Pan Am's attorneys argued, 'it was necessary for plaintiffs to prove that the bomb was in the suitcase, the suitcase was unaccompanied by any passenger, and the suitcase had been delivered into Pan Am's baggage system by interline transfer from another carrier, Air Malta.

'It was also necessary to show not only that Pan Am's baggage security procedure violated FAA requirements, as construed by plaintiffs, but also that Pan Am had adopted the procedure with a mindset so indifferent to safety as to constitute wilful misconduct.' (On this point, plaintiffs contended that the airline had wilfully broken the rules in order to save money and improve on-time performance.)

In its defence, Pan Am had maintained that it had not only complied with FAA requirements by making an 'administrative match' between passengers and bags, as allowed by the rules, but had also used state-of-the-art X-ray machines to inspect all interline bags, accompanied or not. (A physical match would have required passengers to go out on the tarmac and identify their bags before they were loaded aboard the aircraft, a process so time-consuming that no airline routinely performed such a match, not even El Al.)

The airline's counsel went on:

"Defendants attempted to show, but were precluded from showing, that because Pan Am believed the relevant FAA regulation to be unclear, it had obtained (or thought it had obtained) the FAA's concurrence with Pan Am's baggage security procedure. Defendants were also precluded from showing that Pan Am's X-ray inspection of interline bags was permitted by British aviation authorities, and defendants were precluded from rebutting the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert that unaccompanied bags posed such a unique risk as to make the use of X-ray inspection inappropriate.

"In addition, Pan Am set out to show, but was precluded from showing, that plaintiffs' theory of how the bomb was planted on board the aircraft was implausible and that other possibilities for which Pan Am would not be responsible were more likely."

This last point was crucial.

While fully accepting the implications of the hard, forensic evidence, Pan Am's counsel insisted that the Libyan/Air Malta theory, advanced by government and plaintiffs alike, rested on circumstantial evidence alone: namely, that the bomb bag had contained items of clothing purchased in Malta, that baggage records from Frankfurt airport purported to show that an unaccompanied bag from Flight KM180 had been transferred to Flight 103, and that a schedule prepared by the Scottish police had matched every bag with a passenger except one, the unaccompanied bag containing the bomb.

With testimony and records from Air Malta showing that no unaccompanied bag had been loaded aboard Flight KM180, and with substantial questions still unanswered about the validity of both Frankfurt's baggage records and the bag-matching schedule, in Pan Am's view, the plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence was simply not enough to establish how the bomb got aboard.

Denied access to official sources of information on grounds of 'national security', the airline had attempted to offset its handicap by calling five expert witnesses who, between them, would have discounted the Air Malta theory as both implausible and insufficiently supported by the evidence. Four of the five were not permitted to testify, however, and the fifth only on a minor, peripheral matter.

(Two of the excluded experts were British: John Horne and Peter Gurney, both with wide experience of terrorist bombings and bomb disposal operations gained in service with the British Army and Scotland Yard. Formerly in charge of the explosives section of the Yard's anti-terrorism branch, Gurney had personally disarmed a bomb intended for an El Al flight in 1986, and in 1991 had defused two IRA mortar bombs launched at 10 Downing Street.)

Worse still, at no point in the trial proceedings had Pan Am been allowed even to mention the possibility that a rogue bag might have been slipped into the system further down the line in order to bypass its security checks. Nor was it allowed to cross-examine one of the plaintiffs' own experts on the subject of 'rush-tag' bags, which, by definition, are unaccompanied by their owners.

This last turned out to be particularly damaging.

When Pan Am called Kurt Maier, operator of its baggage X-ray machine at Frankfurt on the day in question, he testified, first, that he had been told to call a supervisor if he saw a radio inside any bag, and second, that none of the 13 unaccompanied bags he screened for Flight 103 had contained a radio-cassette player. (When Maier's competence as an operator was challenged, Pan Am sought to demonstrate the X-ray machine to the jury in order to prove that anyone, trained or not, could identify a radio-cassette player from the image on its monitor, but once again, the airline was not permitted to do so.)

Maier's testimony was crucial because the plaintiffs (and the government) insisted that 12 of the 13 bags had been accounted for, and that the 13th was the one with the bomb.

Pan Am, on the other hand, contended that the 13th bag must have belonged to a Pan Am captain who had sent two suitcases home from Berlin via Frankfurt, rush-tagged to Seattle via New York, before piloting a flight to Karachi. One suitcase had unaccountably been left behind at Frankfurt. The other, containing Christmas presents for his family, was found at Lockerbie. As this was not among the 12 unaccompanied bags officially accounted for, and as all 13 had been X-rayed and cleared, the 13th bag could not, therefore, have contained the bomb.

On attempting to cross-examine one of the plaintiffs' own experts on the subject of rush-tag bags, however, Pan Am's counsel was specifically barred from asking if the 13th bag could not, in fact, have belonged to the pilot. They were also prevented from asking another of the plaintiffs' experts if it might not have been easier for a terrorist to have placed the bomb in a parcel of cargo rather than in an unaccompanied bag.

Having listed many instances where Pan Am's defence had been hampered, in counsel's opinion, by such rulings and by the improper exclusion of evidence, the airline's appeal documents then turned to those occasions when evidence for the plaintiffs had been improperly admitted. Depositions were allowed, for instance, alleging previous misconduct on Pan Am's part that had nothing to do with the plaintiffs' Libyan/Air Malta theory, and their experts were also permitted to give 'lengthy one-sided summaries of the evidence and to render expert opinions that [improperly] judged the credibility of witnesses.'

Closely reasoned, meticulously documented and including a catalogue of alleged procedural and technical errors, Pan Am's appeal brief, and the subsequent hearing in May 1993, left little doubt in anyone's mind that the original proceedings had been fatally flawed and that a new trial would be held before a different judge, probably in the spring of 1994.

Indeed, the only serious reservation expressed by legal observers about the outcome had less to do with the validity of Pan Am's appeal than with the integrity of the American judicial system under extreme government pressure. If a new trial is ordered, and if Pan Am is allowed to make its defence unhindered, the stage will be set for the final demolition of the plaintiffs' case against the airline, and with it, inevitably, the government's case against the two Libyans, al-Megrahi and Fhimah.

With a five-year cover-up to explain away, not to mention its cynical manipulation of the United Nations to engineer the imposition of international sanctions against Libya, the American government's commitment to the Libyan/Air Malta theory will subject the Federal judiciary to one of the most severe tests it has had to face since the separation of powers was written into the constitution.

If Lester Coleman's hopes are realized, the result of Pan Am's appeal may also persuade the octopus to leave him in peace at last, although, having gone to ground again in the face of Washington's vendetta, he now believes there is probably more to it than meets the eye. Since his story is now supported by no less an authority than Major Khalil Tunayb, a former chief of intelligence for the PFLP-GC, there would seem little point in continuing to harry him so relentlessly unless there were some wider reason.

(During the winter of 1992-1993, Tunayb surfaced in the media to confirm that Khalid Nazir Jafaar had been affiliated with Muslim fundamentalists in Lebanon and Detroit who knew he was working in drug operations for the DEA and CIA. According to Tunayb, Jafaar was used by the PFLP-GC as an unwitting accomplice to get the bomb bag aboard Flight 103 and had been escorted from Beirut by two equally unwitting American agents. Significantly, Tunayb's story supports much of the intelligence data provided in Juval Aviv's original Interfor Report.)

So what else did he know, Coleman wondered, that might account for Washington's unabated intent to silence or discredit him?

Looking back over his career as an American agent in the Middle East, he realized that most of his work had been concerned with tracking Syria's involvement in terrorism, hostage-taking and narcotics. In the course of his duties, he had helped compile dossiers on the likes of Rifat Assad, Monzer al-Kassar and Ali Issa Dubah which, in any civilized country without a death penalty, would have put them behind bars for life.

All else being equal ...

In fact, Rifat Assad, a vice president of Syria, returned home from exile in August 1992, and is thought to be undergoing a low-profile rehabilitation in Damascus with a view to succeeding his older brother, Hafez Assad, when the time comes. The President's health is poor, and his son, Basil, is generally regarded as too young and too lightweight for the job. As heir to the presidency, Rifat is clearly Washington 's best bet in countering the threat of a militant fundamentalist take-over on his brother's death -- and the fact that he was, or is, a CIA asset hardly undermines his qualifications!

Adding weight to the idea that the American government and its allies are lending a hand to clean up Rifat's act, the virtual disappearance of his partner Monzer al-Kassar after his arrest in Spain in the summer of 1992 neatly removed another awkward reminder of their controlling interest in America's heroin imports. (His conditional release a year later, on £10 million bail, was also a reminder of his enduring influence with the intelligence agencies of those governments.)

With Rifat's friend and colleague, General Ali Issa Dubah, promoted soon after to the post of Hafez Assad's deputy chief of staff for security affairs, and thus well clear of any further day-to-day involvement with the Syrian narcotics industry, Coleman was moved to wonder if, perhaps, he was now the last unmuzzled American witness who could testify directly as to Rifat Assad's unsuitability for any political role in the Middle East, most of all, that of America's key Arab ally.

Could it be, he asked himself, that what he knew about Lockerbie was just part of what he knew about Syria, and that what he knew about both left the whole of America's Syria-first policy open to question?

To see if a Democratic administration would take a more sympathetic view of his plight, Coleman addressed the following petition to President Bill Clinton, with a copy to the new Attorney-General, Janet Reno:

"'Mr. President,

"I spent two years assigned to the White House as a radio correspondent during the Carter administration. My work has been recognized with two Emmys and several other national reporting honors.

"In the mid-80's, I left journalism and became involved with two government agencies, the DIA and the DEA, affiliated with classified activities in Lebanon. My background in the Middle East was of interest to my government. I grew up in Iran and Libya, for example.

"I witnessed conduct within the US DEA in particular that was not conducive to operational security. I still feel this lax security at DEA Country Office Nicosia may have contributed to the bombing of Pan Am 103. I gave an affidavit, April 1991, that I observed a Lebanese, later identified as Khalid Jafaar, at a DEA office where I was working in 1988, six months prior to the bombing. Jafaar was killed on 103. DEA has repeatedly denied Jafaar had any connection with them.

"On May 2, 1990, I was arrested for making a false statement on a passport application, using a birth record provided to me by the US government. We now have conclusive evidence that this arrest was directly related to my knowledge of DEA's activities that may have been compromised by elements linked to the Pan Am bombing.

"My wife, children and I were subsequently harassed. Death threats were made to us, and I was warned by a DEA agent directly not to get DEA involved in my case.

"In 1991, in fear of our lives, we fled the USA and sought sanctuary in Sweden. I left the USA legally, with permission of the U.S. District Court in Chicago. After our arrival here, the FBI continued harassment by faking a doctor's appointment before the court. The doctor the FBI stated they had appointed declared that he was never contacted by the United States government. I complied with the terms of my bail release, reporting to pre-trial services biweekly up until the FBI's false doctor's appointment episode. Afterwards, I asked, and received, protection from the Swedish authorities for me, my wife and three children.

"We have since obtained a copy of a FBI file which was leaked by closet patriots within the Bureau. This file contains false statements about me regarding the passport case pending in Chicago.

"We have been waiting patiently, Mr. President, for the appointment of a new Attorney General who will hopefully clean out the gross misconduct under the Bush administration, which includes persecuting this American citizen, forced to flee his homeland.

"I request that Attorney General Janet Reno investigate this matter. We wish to return to America but will not do so until the United States government stops persecuting us, drops the charge in Chicago and shall look upon me as a witness, not a fugitive.

"A book entitled 'Trail of the Octopus' documenting the events of the last three years shall be published this fall. I hope your administration will extend an olive branch and distance itself from the conduct of a morally corrupt Bush Justice Department and arrange for us to come home."

Coleman sent his petition by fax, the machine confirming that the transmission had been received, and provided a fax number to which the White House could reply.

That was on 15 March 1993.

By mid June, having heard not a word, the Coleman family resigned itself to a life on the run.
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Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Thu Oct 31, 2013 11:48 pm



Excerpts From The Appellate Decisions Denying Pan Am’s Request for Retrial

Editor’s Note

Donald Goddard’s narration of events concludes with Pan Am’s submission of its appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Case Numbers 92-9251, 92-9253, and 92-9255. While Goddard was hopeful that what he saw as errors in the trial process would be remedied on appeal, he questioned whether the judicial process would be up to the challenge of doing justice where the result might be to reopen a chapter in history that the U.S. government clearly wanted closed.

Two appellate decisions rendered, the first on January 31, 1994, and the second on September 12, 1994. Neither decision accorded any substantial relief to Pan Am, and both were “split decisions,” by the three-judge panel. Both majority opinions were written by Richard J. Cardamone, a Reagan appointee who is still on the bench. Both dissenting opinions were written by Ellsworth Van Graafeiland, a Ford appointee who passed away in 2004.

Justice Cardamone’s smooth rejection of Pan Am’s position is in sharp contrast to the objections of Justice Van Graafeiland, who observed at the outset that the position he was obliged to take would make his “name anathema to the hundreds of people who are seeking recoveries probably in excess of $1 billion, and my long-time friendship with [District] Judge Platt may suffer some stress.” Apparently stung by the strong criticism of the District Judge’s refusal to allow testimony that the FAA had orally approved Pan Am’s policy of x-raying luggage rather than forcing travelers to open it up on the tarmac and affirm it as their own before boarding the plane, Justice Cardamone adjusted the contours of his reasoning somewhat after Pan Am sought and obtained a re-hearing. The September 14th Opinion liberally applied the doctrine of “harmless error,” which is to say that, that even if Pan Am had been able to introduce all of the evidence Judge Platt excluded from the case, the jury would’ve found Pan Am liable anyway.

The following excerpts are drawn from the text of the opinions. Ellipses have not been utilized, and professional readers are directed to the original decisions, easy to find by punching the case numbers into the Second Circuit decision database.

Excerpts From the January 31st Majority Opinion

On December 21, 1988 a bomb exploded on Pan Am Flight 103 causing it to crash over Lockerbie, Scotland. The 243 passengers and 16 crew members aboard the flight traveling from London to New York all perished. Numerous plaintiffs, including those in the cases before us, brought wrongful death actions against Pan Am and Alert, a Pan Am affiliate that provided security services in London and in Frankfurt, where Flight 103 originated. All those actions were consolidated for trial in the Eastern District of New York.

On July 10, 1992 the jury found that the defendants engaged in wilful misconduct that led to this fatal crash. The trial's liability phase centered on Pan Am's alleged noncompliance with FAA directives concerning baggage inspection, particularly with regard to unaccompanied baggage that might contain explosives. Additional proof was introduced regarding other alleged misconduct on the air carrier's part. Plaintiffs contended that the bomb entered the flight on an unaccompanied bag that Pan Am, through its wilful misconduct, failed to inspect and detect. Under plaintiffs' theory -- detailed by several expert witnesses -- the bomb was hidden inside a radio-cassette player packed in a bronze Samsonite suitcase. The suitcase supposedly traveled from Malta to Frankfurt on Air Malta Flight 180. There, the experts posited, it was transferred to the first leg of Flight 103 from Frankfurt to London, where it was then placed on Flight 103 bound for New York.

Although bags transferred from other flights to Flight 103 in Frankfurt were x-rayed, plaintiffs asserted the airline's x-ray procedure violated security requirements contained in the FAA ACSSP, particularly those regulations ensuring that bags matched passengers and that any unaccompanied bags be physically inspected. Pan Am unsuccessfully argued to the jury that its actions did not amount to wilful misconduct, and that it was impossible to determine how the bomb was planted on Flight 103. To meet plaintiffs' claims of wilful misconduct, Pan Am and Alert emphasized that the transferred bags had been examined using x-ray equipment, but that no bomb was discovered. They challenged plaintiffs' theory of causation and suggested that even if there were any misconduct on their part, it did not lead to the crash.

Appellants … focus on … three different lines of proof they were not allowed to present to guide the jury's application of that standard, that is, the oral waiver, the British regulations, and expert testimony regarding the threat posed by unaccompanied baggage.

Defendants maintain that an FAA official granted them an oral waiver excusing strict compliance with certain FAA regulations, and that Chief Judge Platt abused his discretion when he disallowed their evidence purporting to demonstrate their belief in this waiver. Defendants' argument essentially is that this evidence would have shown that their x-ray inspection of interline bags complied with FAA requirements or that, regardless of FAA requirements, they did not act with conscious or reckless disregard of the probable consequences of their x-ray procedures since they thought the safety precautions they were following were permissible.

In support of this point, Pan Am points out that a regulation may be interpreted orally, and that the regulation at issue is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to such an interpretation. As a matter of law the FAA regulation at issue here -- ACSSP XV C.1.(a) -- is not ambiguous, as the following Discussion demonstrates.

Pan Am and Alert assert that physical inspection could be interpreted to mean an x-ray inspection. For several reasons, we think this a strained reading of the unambiguous regulation. First, the FAA promulgated "Physical Inspection Guidelines" in the ACSSP which specified that physical inspection involves opening and inspecting all compartments of baggage. The guidelines do not mention x-ray as an acceptable means of inspection. Second, the jury heard testimony from Pan Am's own General Manager at Heathrow, and other witnesses as well, that physical inspection under the regulations involved opening up bags and that x-raying them did not satisfy the regulation. Third, ACSSP regulations applicable at other, lower security airports explicitly permitted x-ray or physical inspections. Thus, it is plain that the regulations applicable at Frankfurt and London's Heathrow were unambiguous: they did not permit x-ray inspections as a substitute for a physical inspection. We hold, therefore, that the district court did not err in refusing to allow witnesses -- like the co-chair of the Pan Am Security Task Force, Richard Cozzi -- to testify that they thought the regulations were ambiguous.

Given that the FAA regulation in question is not ambiguous, Pan Am next asserts it obtained an oral waiver of the regulation from the FAA and that the district court erred in disallowing evidence of that waiver. But since FAA regulations state that any waiver of its requirements must be obtained from the FAA in writing, appellants would not have been justified in relying on an oral waiver.

The Director of the Office of Civil Aviation Security at the FAA at the time of the Pan Am bombing, Raymond Salazar, testified that in order to obtain an exemption from an ACSSP regulation an air carrier would have to file a written request and follow a specific procedure that was then in place. Plaintiffs produced the e-mail message that Pan Am security officer Daniel Soneson had sent to the regional Pan Am security representatives at Heathrow and Frankfurt. The e-mail message, dated March 28, 1988, stated in part, "the Dir. FAA R Salizar has granted x ray as and [sic] alternative to searching pass. baggage." Salazar testified that that representation was inaccurate and a misrepresentation, and when pressed by counsel, characterized it as "a falsehood."

The excluded evidence concerning the oral waiver primarily involved the testimony of two witnesses. We are told that the first witness, Daniel Soneson, would have testified that he approached the FAA in 1986 and received a verbal authorization for the x-ray-only inspection of interline bags, though he could not recall who gave this authorization. He would have testified further, so defendants state, that at an October 1987 meeting with Salazar and others he was advised that x-ray inspection would comply with ACSSP requirements. The trial Judge suggested that an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury be made regarding this witness' proposed testimony, but for some reason Pan Am chose not to make such an offer:

The second witness proffered by the defense was a former co-chair of the Pan Am Security Task Force, Richard Cozzi. Although Cozzi testified at trial, he was not permitted to testify as to Pan Am's purported verbal authorization from the FAA. Even had Cozzi been permitted to testify on this issue, his statement respecting what Soneson reported would have been inadmissible hearsay and would not have been admissible at trial in any event.

In a series of oral rulings repeated throughout the record, the trial Judge stated that any testimony by defense witnesses as to the purported verbal authorization would be excluded. It treated the proffered defense as an attempt to mount a so-called government authorization defense, the bounds of which will be discussed shortly. Chief Judge Platt believed that a government authorization defense may only be predicated on authorization from a government official with power to grant such authorization. He held the defense unavailable because anyone who might have given a verbal exemption at the FAA would have had no authority to do so.

We believe what appellants sought to present at trial was essentially a mistake of law defense, that is to say, defendants thought what they were doing was in accordance with the law and, even if they were mistaken, they think under such a circumstance they should not be held liable for wilful misconduct. The usual standards defining the permissibility of a mistake of law defense are as effective where the mistaken law is a regulation.

There is cause to be wary because of the ease with which air carriers could fabricate sham defenses and ignore with impunity safety regulations. Instead, where one of the handful of corporations in the business of transporting the public by air asserts a mistake of law as its defense to wilful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention, it may only present its objectively reasonable beliefs as to the law's requirements. To state this in other words, because of the legal status of the FAA regulations and the duty of air carriers to know and follow them, an absence of wilful misconduct -- when based on a claim of a mistaken understanding of those regulations -- must be supported by objectively reasonable evidence as to that mistaken understanding. When a law, rule or regulation that pertains to passenger and crew safety is clear and no reasonable air carrier would have believed it was authorized to act in contravention of it, we hold that an air carrier may not successfully mount a defense based on its assertion that it did not know the law.

Pan Am and Alert presented a strong defense to the jury that even if they violated the ACSSP, their actions did not amount to wilful misconduct. They insisted that a bomb contained in a suitcase would have been visible on x-ray. In fact, the parties stipulated to that fact. Appellants' counsel emphasized in closing argument and elsewhere the safety and expense of the x-ray technology purchased and employed by Pan Am, the fact that even an untrained person could spot a radio on one of their x-ray machines, and made the point that FAA inspections had shown Pan Am x-ray equipment to be in compliance with regulations.

Appellants' motion to exclude proof not tied to the Air Malta theory of causation (that the bomb bag came from an interline transfer) was denied by the trial court. It observed that since appellants planned to contest the Air Malta theory, plaintiffs were entitled to present evidence of alleged other misconduct on defendants' parts. The trial Judge reasoned that even if the Air Malta theory did not explain the bomb's presence on Flight 103, other pervasive and extensive wilful misconduct by defendants must have accounted for the bomb's presence.

Plaintiffs asserted that a contempt for security pervaded Pan Am from the highest to the lowest levels of the corporation, and that the totality of security failures would permit the jury to infer wilful misconduct. We have approved consideration of the totality of a defendant's wrongdoing in determining whether wilful misconduct existed.

Various attempts by appellants to suggest other specific causation theories were … rebuffed by the trial court. Pan Am and Alert challenge the exclusion of the testimony of four defense witnesses: two offered as experts on terrorism, Noel Koch and Dr. Ariel Merari, and two offered as experts on terrorist bombings, Peter Gurney and John Horne of Scotland Yard. Pan Am also contends it was error to restrict its cross-examination of plaintiffs' experts, Billie Vincent and Rodney Wallis (the former Director of Security for the International Air Transport Association), with respect to other methods of bombing. The trial Judge based his rulings largely on the fact that he found appellants had offered nothing to show there was any other specific bombing theory. Because there was no evidence presented with respect to other possible methods of causation that might explain how this tragic event occurred, and because appellants never sought to show that any other specific method of bombing could have caused it, any testimony relating to such other causes would necessarily be speculative.

It was also not error to decline to receive the testimony of terrorist bombings experts Peter Gurney and John Horne. Their testimony as to the importance of x-rays would have been cumulative since similar testimony was adduced from other witnesses. Additionally, these witnesses' expertise as to x-rays was questionable. Both witnesses were explosives officers with Scotland Yard who specialized in street bombings.

Scottish Detective Constable Derek Henderson provided deposition testimony as to his work in the Flight 103 investigation. He was assigned responsibility for matching certain bags -- the ones that might have been placed in the flight container that was determined to have held the bag with the bomb -- with passengers on the aircraft. Henderson prepared his report largely through compiling computerized records of bags. These computerized records had been set up to amass reports from passengers' and crew members' friends and relatives, and from evidence obtained at the scene of the crash.

Pan Am and Alert also sought to include an x-ray demonstration as part of their defense to show how clearly a radio-cassette player would appear on the screen. Such a demonstration was ultimately ruled irrelevant, given plaintiffs' offer to stipulate that a radio-cassette player would be visible on an x-ray screen. Pan Am and Alert nevertheless declare the demonstration would have generally supported Pan Am x-ray operator Kurt Maier's testimony that he x-rayed all the interline bags transferred to Flight 103 in Frankfurt.

From the January 31, 1994 Dissenting Opinion

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

Writing a Dissenting opinion in the instant case is not a pleasant task. My name will be anathema to the hundreds of people who are seeking recoveries probably in excess of $1 billion, and my long-time friendship with Judge Platt may suffer some stress. However, because I am convinced that Pan Am*fn1 did not receive a fair trial, I would be shirking my duties as a Judge if I did not say so.

At one point near the end of the trial, Pan Am's counsel said to the court:

“Now, Judge, I would tell you, on a scale of 1 to 10, doing what I want in this courtroom, I have been about a minus 2, or maybe imaginary numbers would be a better way to describe as the level to which I have gone.”

I have read the record dispassionately, and I completely agree with this observation. Plaintiffs' attorneys were permitted to range far and wide with prejudicial, irrelevant testimony, while Pan Am's counsel was precluded time and again from presenting relative and probative proof. Because I recognize that evidentiary rulings are largely discretionary and because I want to follow the somewhat unusual practice, at least for me, of quoting at length from the record, I will limit my Discussion to what I deem the major reversible errors.

At the outset, I want to state one clear and uncontrovertible fact: NO ONE KNOWS WHEN, WHERE OR HOW THE BOMB GOT ON THE PAN AM PLANE EXCEPT THE PERSON WHO PUT IT THERE.

The jury had to content itself with "expert" testimony, more properly described as educated guesses. My colleagues summarize the plaintiffs' proof as follows:

Under plaintiffs' theory--detailed by several expert witnesses--the bomb was hidden inside a radio-cassette player packed in a bronze Samsonite suitcase. The suitcase supposedly traveled from Malta to Frankfurt on Air Malta Flight 180. There, the experts posited, it was transferred to the first leg of Flight 103 from Frankfurt to London, where it was then placed on Flight 103 bound for New York.

The accuracy of the supposition that a suitcase carrying the bomb was sent unaccompanied from Malta to Frankfurt, was transferred there to a Pan Am plane in which it was flown to London, where it was transferred to the plane in which it subsequently exploded, was a crucial issue in the case, because plaintiffs' theory of liability was based upon Pan Am's allegedly deficient baggage checks during the two transfers. If there were no transfers, there could not have been any willfully deficient screenings. The district court permitted plaintiffs' experts to testify in support of the supposition but precluded any testimony by defendant's experts in opposition thereto. Having read the testimony of Pan Am's experts that the district court kept from the jury, I am convinced that had the jury been permitted to hear this evidence, there is a strong likelihood it would have rejected plaintiffs' contention that the bomb which exploded began its deadly journey in Malta.

The jurors who had suffered through the same experiences that many of us have, with missed planes and lost luggage during connecting airline flights, probably wondered how presumably clever and experienced terrorists reasonably could have expected an unaccompanied bag containing a bomb to travel from Malta to Frankfurt to London, through two sets of baggage checks, to be smuggled finally aboard Pan Am Flight 103 and explode only after the plane had left London. The jurors' willingness to accept the plaintiffs' theory undoubtedly would be influenced in large measure by what Pan Am's witnesses said.

The first refutation of plaintiffs' supposition came from Wilferd Borg, the general manager of ground operations for Air Malta, one of the few witnesses produced by defendant whose testimony was admitted:

Q What were the circumstances under which you saw the flight file at that time?

A. Our office in Germany had received a request from the German police requesting us whether we had any passengers or baggage connecting to Pan American flights out of Frankfurt. They said they were investigating this, they wanted this information in view of the Lockerbie incident in December, '88.

Q. And what did you do with respect to their request?

A. The request was passed along to me by our office in Germany. I requested the manager responsible to keep these records, to give me this relevant flight file. I went through it and gave the relevant replies to the German police.

Q. What were those replies?

A. We had no passengers connecting on the flights out of Frankfurt. We had no baggage destined to go in flights out of Frankfurt. And, we had no unaccompanied luggage on that flight.

Q. Now, sir, based upon everything that you've read and all the investigation that you did, are you able to tell this jury whether or not there was an unaccompanied bag on Flight 180?

A. No, there was no such bag.

Q. Were there any bags destined for Pan Am, any Pan Am flights?

A. No, there are no bags.

Q. Any passengers destined for any Pan Am flights?

The following testimony of Dr. Ariel Merari of Tel Aviv University, an expert on terrorism and bombing, also would have shed unfavorable light on the Malta-origin "theory." However, this testimony was kept from the jury.

Q. Do you think, sir, that it is conjectural how the bomb got on board?

A. Could you please rephrase the question.

Q. Do you know how the bomb got on board?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Do you think any, based upon the readings you have done in this record, a fair-minded, honest, so-called expert, with a reasonable degree of professional certainty, could opine how the bomb got on board?

A. Well, of what I have read, including the trial transcripts, I cannot see how anybody can say with any degree of certainty how the bomb got on board.

Q. Do you have any level of familiarity with what our government has been saying with respect to the indictments of two Libyans?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. And have you had, to the extent you can discuss this in this forum, a conversation with any representatives of security or secret services of any governments on that subject?

A. Yes.

Q. Has whatever knowledge that has come to you through those discussions in any way changed your view that an honest and reasonable chap cannot say to a reasonable degree of professional certainty how this bomb got on board?

A. No. I still feel that I don't know how the bomb got on board and I don't think that at this particular stage, before more intelligence information comes in, which may be a long time after the incident, in some cases, I still feel that I don't know how the bomb got on board and I don't think anybody knows for sure or even in any degree of reasonable certainty how the bomb got on board at this time, except for the terrorists, of course.

Q. Is it possible that a bomb was smuggled on board Pan Am 103 by an unwitting courier?

A. I think it is.

Q. Has that possibility been widely discussed secretly in the intelligence community?

A. Yes, it has.

Even stronger refutation of the Malta theory was given by Peter Gurney, a Scotland Yards bomb expert, whose testimony also was kept from the jury:

Q. Let me ask you this: Do you have an opinion based upon your review of the data made available to you of the existence of the fire system that existed in that Neus Toshiba bomb B 453 radio cassette?

A. I do have an opinion.

Q. What is it?

A. I cannot see how such a device could have been used on a multi leg journey with one of the earlier legs being of longer duration than the flight on which the explosion took place.

Q. If you were a bomb designer wanting to blow up Pan Am 103 over the Atlantic Ocean on [sic] off the coast of the United Kingdom would you use the Air Malta routing suggested in this case?

A. I'm not a bomb designer. We often have to think like terrorist [sic] in order to combat them. I would think that that was very unlikely because air travel there are many delays in air travel. Normally on the ground. So to work up the exact timing to get the thing to go off when you want it and not have it go off on the ground could be extremely difficult. This is used in a straightforward timer, sir.

Finally, the defense made an unsuccessful offer of proof of testimony by Noel Koch, a security consultant for the United States Department of Defense. If Koch had been permitted to testify on the subject, he would have said that the Air Malta theory is "widely at variance with modus operandi of Middle Eastern Terrorists attacks and specifically attacks on United States airlines," and that the "Air-Malta theory involves far too many variables to jibe with usual modus operandi." He also would have testified that the Pentagon relies on x-rays to scan baggage.

Admittedly, a district Judge has wide discretion in determining whether to admit evidence. However, this discretion "may not be utilized to exclude the otherwise admissible opinion of a party's expert on a critical issue, while allowing the opinion of his adversary's expert on the same issue." "Rule 403 requires even-handedness." The district Judge's lack of even-handedness cannot be justified by his reliance on the indictment of two unapprehended, unquestioned and unapproachable Middle Eastern terrorists:

THE COURT: And I must view the evidence that we're talking about in that light, not in the light of a criminal case, because we're not in a criminal case.

MR. CODDINGTON: Exactly. And my submission to you is that you may not give any evidentiary weight to the fact of that indictment.

THE COURT: No, But I may give evidentiary weight, probable cause weight to the fact that a grand jury has returned the indictment. Not in a criminal case, but in the civil case, for purposes of, I may not so instruct the jury, but as a qualifier from my standpoint, I may give it that weight. In fact I must.

Because the house of cards to the effect that the bomb entered the stream of commerce in Malta was constructed entirely of opinion testimony introduced by plaintiffs, simple Justice required that defendant's experts be given an opportunity to demolish it. "The admission of a report containing 'Conclusions' is subject to the ultimate safeguard--the opponent's right to present evidence tending to contradict or diminish the weight of those Conclusions." Denial of this "ultimate safeguard" in the instant case was prejudicial reversible error.

Everyone who boards an airplane justifiably believes that guns, bombs and other dangerous devices will be detected by x-ray screening and barred from the flight. That, obviously, is what Pan Am believed, and Pan Am wanted to show that it was encouraged in this belief by assurances from Raymond Salazar, Director of the Federal Aviation Administrations Office of Civil Aviation Security, that x-ray inspection of interline baggage would satisfy FAA requirements. Plaintiffs' attorney knew from pretrial depositions that testimony to this effect would be given by Daniel Sonesen, Pan Am's Assistant Director for Security, and the attorney determined to meet this testimony head on. He did this by offering in evidence in his affirmative case an E-mail message from Sonesen to Pan Am's airport security officers, which read in part as follows:

PER MESSAGE OF 10 MAR-88 ANSWER: FAA R SALIZAR HAS GRANTED X-RAY AS AND [sic] (alternate to searching Pass.)

Following this piece of evidence, plaintiffs' counsel offered the following testimony of Salazar:

Q. This document is something more than that, isn't it, sir? It says that you granted x-ray as an alternative doesn't it?

A. Yes, that is what the document says.

Q. You just said to me that you never granted that to Mr. Sonesen?

A. That's correct, I did not.

Q. You had never even spoken to Mr. Sonesen, did you?

A. About this issue, I have no specific recollection of speaking to Mr. Sonesen about this issue.

Q. Therefore, sir, if you didn't grant permission to Mr. Sonesen, and he said in this document you did, isn't that a lie?

A. It is an improper interpretation.

Q. It is an improper interpretation. I am not talking interpretation now of the procedures, I am talking about the statement: R. Salazar granted. Is that statement accurate?

A. No, it is false.

Q. So that statement, as it goes, R. Salazar has granted, is a lie.

Q. Can we agree that when Mr. Sonesen said that you had granted, in this phrase, that that was a falsehood?

A. That was a falsehood.

On the basis of Salazar's testimony, the district Judge made a colossal blunder by a sua sponte ruling [Editor’s note: sua sponte means “on his own initiative”] that was so contrary to established legal precedent and simple Justice that it smacked of a due process violation--he declared that he would receive no testimony from Sonesen or any other Pan Am employee in support of Sonesen's assertion of what Salazar had told him, Sonesen, whose testimony was an important part of Pan Am's defense, was branded a liar, and the district court precluded Pan Am from attempting to prove that he was not. So far as the jury knew, a substantial part of Pan Am's defense was built upon a lie, or as plaintiffs' counsel described it in summation, "a concocted piece of baloney."

Now, to lay to rest any argument that the district Judge was not fully aware of what Pan Am intended to prove in response to Salazar's testimony, I quote from the trial testimony:

THE COURT: As I understood, your position is somebody in the FAA, I don't know who, told Sonesen or somebody in Pan Am verbally once they had the x-ray machine they didn't have to physically search a couple of bags.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: That's correct.

THE COURT: That is your position.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: I understand.

THE COURT: I won't allow that offhand remark in when I have no basis for it at the moment.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: What I propose to do is end my examination at this point and raise this question as part of my direct case.

THE COURT: Based on what I know I won't let that in.

THE COURT: Mr. Sonesen's testimony was, as I recall it, and it's right here before us, Sonesen's testimony was that I got this verbal permission from Salazar, we discussed it up and down the hierarchy which would include these Discussions here right up to what's his name.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Your Honor, what Salazar and Billie Vincent said was that Salazar had the authority, he just couldn't do it orally.

THE COURT: Salazar had the authority, but there has been nothing produced in writing and Sonesen said he got it orally and he acted on it orally and he told all of these people that he had the authority from the FAA and it's irrelevant what he told people in the Pan American organization on this subject, because he didn't have the authority. It's like my saying to you that I have the authority to go over and remove the money from the Chase Manhattan Bank. You know I don't, and you can't go and say gee, whiz, I'll go spend that sum of money that he promised me from the whole because you know that it's ill-gotten gains and you know that it's that simple.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: No, it's not.

THE COURT: Yes, it is.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: No, it's not. This is not a statute that's being violated. This is not even a regulation that is being violated. This is a rule promulgated under the regulations that is being violated.

THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference. According to the very rule, that cannot be altered or modified except in writing. And you're charged with that knowledge and all of these people are charged with that knowledge and they never did have any writing.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: So I take it that all of the conversations among these people are out?

THE COURT: Obviously they're not objecting to it, but I'm going to sustain those three questions that he's objected to and I'm going to--you might as well know now that I'm going to sustain the questions and answer on page 78.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: And anything else that they object to in between I'm going to sustain because I think it's irrelevant.

The district Judge never budged from his misunderstanding of the law:

THE COURT: The proposition before us is that Sonesen says--Sonesen not being Pan Am corporation, about whom we are talking, but only an employee [sic] of Pan Am. Sonesen says he got verbal permission from Salazar. The cases are quite clear, that that is in admissible under the issue of lawfulness or otherwise, and I have never seen anything at the moment, recently, that casts any doubt on it.

THE COURT: Ever heard the expression, an individual may not bind the government?

MR. CODDINGTON: Ever heard the expression that an individual may not bind the government? Yes, I have.

THE COURT: The government enacted a regulation or promulgated a regulation, I may not take off my robe, I may not work until executive capacity authorizes to make that. United States against Sorenson [sic] regulates, while on this subject, said: Whoever had the authorization from the DIA and C.I.A. to smuggle guns to Russia, and so forth and so on, and the 2d. Circuit upheld, may not do that verbally. That's the law. This theory of yours, if you have verbal authorization from somebody to violate a regulation, I will have to charge the jury that an individual may not do that.

MR. CODDINGTON: Well, certainly I'm happy to brief that.

THE COURT: Brief it all you want, because I sweated blood over this issue, because this was really quite serious. This was the business of taking armaments from this country and swapping it over from Russia, all on the okay of D.I.A. and C.I.A., And I wouldn't let them put that defense before the jury, and the 2d. Circuit said I was right. I went through a tremendous amount of research and wrote an opinion on this, and it was published, United States -vs- Schwartz. You may not as an individual authorize somebody to do something against the regulation, whether you are high-ranking. I don't think the President may do it. I didn't have to decide.

THE COURT: In any event, nobody approved this in writing. So the whole defense is a non-entity. I know you don't want to get rid of it from your mind, but there it is. If you want to stop the trial and mandamus me to the Second Circuit and have your ears pinned back, fine. But that's it, that's the ruling, you've got to live with it. You've got to stop trying to sneak it in through the back door or I'm going to have to take appropriate action.

THE COURT: You might have some validity to it if--if there was any kind of an acknowledgment from Salazar that he--that he had any such conversation, but he emphatically denies it. Everybody says it is not within anybody's power to give it or--and the regulation itself says you've got to have any modification in writing. It just doesn't make any sense to me that anybody in his right mind would rely--would, in fact did rely on any such permission. It just didn't exist.

Wilfulness is a question of fact for the jury. A trial Judge cannot take the question from the jury and answer it himself by applying his own objective standard of wilfulness. We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals' requirement that a claimed good-faith belief must be objectively reasonable if it is to be considered as possibly negating the Government's evidence purporting to show a defendant's awareness of the legal duty at issue. Knowledge and belief are characteristically questions for the factfinder, in this case the jury. Characterizing a particular belief as not objectively reasonable transforms the inquiry into a legal one and would prevent the jury from considering it. It would of course be proper to exclude evidence having no relevance or probative value with respect to willfulness; but it is not contrary to common sense, let alone impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant of his duty based on an irrational belief that he has no duty, and forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision. My colleagues clearly err, therefore, in holding that "an absence of wilful misconduct--when based on a claim of a mistaken understanding of [FAA] regulations--must be supported by objectively reasonable evidence as to that mistaken understanding." Because these are the crucial issues in the instant case, the trial court should have followed a liberal policy in admitting evidence directed towards establishing the Captain's subjective state of mind. No evidence which bore even remotely on this issue should have been kept from the jury, unless it interjected tangential and confusing elements which clearly outweighed its relevancy.

We would be blinking reality if we did not hold that the district Judge's erroneous rulings were prejudicial. Indeed, as disclosed by the following excerpt from the argument on appeal, plaintiffs' counsel admitted as much:

JUDGE VAN GRAAFEILAND: Let me ask you this, Mr. Kreindler: If I read the record, I listen to your argument and I read the record, and I decide that Judge Platt said I'm not going to hear from Mr. Sonesen no matter what, would you concede that that is very prejudicial error in this case?

MR. KREINDLER: Under those circumstances, yes. But that's not what happened. That's--

JUDGE VAN GRAAFEILAND: I'm not asking you that. I'm asking you if I read this record and I decide that that is what happened--leave this offer of proof business out--if I decide that Judge Platt just simply said, I'm not going to hear Mr. Sonesen, that would be prejudicial error; wouldn't it, in this case?

MR. KREINDLER: Your Honor, even--

JUDGE VAN GRAAFEILAND: Counsel, wouldn't it be prejudicial error?

MR. KREINDLER: Of course, if the Judge were hearing--

JUDGE VAN GRAAFEILAND: Of course, it would. Then we have got the issue: did he refuse to hear him, or didn't he?


JUDGE VAN GRAAFEILAND: All right, that's the issue. I'll read the record very carefully, Mr. Kreindler.

Even my colleagues concede that the district court erred in excluding evidence of British Airway regulations which, in the face of bombings by Irish terrorists organizations, permitted Pan Am and other carriers to x-ray unaccompanied baggage at Heathrow Airport. This proof, my colleagues recognize, "undercut[s] the allegation that [Pan Am] consciously or recklessly disregarded the probable consequences of its x-ray procedures" and "clearly was relevant." My colleagues continue, "[a] showing that Pan Am and Alert complied with British security directives--whether or not they violated the ACSSP-might have made it somewhat less likely to believe that they acted recklessly in adopting an x-ray-only approach to inspecting interline bags." I regret that in my colleagues' apparent eagerness to affirm, they hold this error to be harmless. It was not harmless. It went squarely to a crucial issue in the case, i.e., whether Pan Am knew that its use of x-ray screening probably would result in injury.

Evidence that, shortly after the Lockerbie accident the FAA amended its regulations so as to permit x-ray screening, also went squarely to the issue of whether Pan Am should have anticipated danger in its pre-amendment use of x-rays. The district court's refusal to permit the jury to receive this evidence exacerbated all of the court's similar rulings that pervaded the trial. In short, it was another indication that the district court misunderstood the law. The issue was not whether Pan Am violated the regulation; it was whether Pan Am wilfully used x-ray screening with knowledge that its use would probably result in injury or in reckless disregard of the probable consequences.


If all of the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence dealing with such matters as television commercials and the private lives of Pan Am employees, together with the colloquies of court and counsel arising out of the district court's "425" erroneous rulings, were eliminated from this case, it could be retried in several weeks. Particularly in view of the fact that the outcome in over two hundred cases hinges upon the judgment in the instant case, Justice demands that the matter be remanded so that it can be tried fairly.
I Dissent.
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Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Thu Oct 31, 2013 11:49 pm


Excerpts from the September 12th Majority Opinion

[T]he evidence offered by Pan Am regarding its mistaken view of what was required by the ACSSP was inadmissible for the purposes of mounting a mistake of law defense. Notwithstanding the foregoing, appellants insist the oral waiver evidence was admissible on the question of their wilful misconduct, which is of course the ultimate issue in this Warsaw Convention case…. On Vinieris v. Byzantine Maritime Corp., 731 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1984), we addressed the question of admissibility of evidence going to a defendant's state of mind in the context of a statute that required "conscious misconduct" be proven for a seaman to recover under the penalty provision in a wage-withholding statute. We held that "no evidence which bore even remotely on [state of mind] should have been kept from the jury, unless it interjected tangential and confusing elements which clearly outweighed its relevancy." Id. at 1064. This formulation is in some sense a restatement of the well-known balancing test contained in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Whether the problems to be anticipated by admission of the oral waiver evidence in the present case clearly outweighed the evidence's relevancy is a close question. Analysis of this issue cannot exist in a vacuum. Because the oral waiver evidence was so intertwined with the government authorization and mistake of law defenses, which as a matter of law were not available to defendants, we believe that admission of such evidence might well have been unnecessarily confusing and perhaps prejudicial so as to justify the trial court's refusal to allow its admission.

Nonetheless, even were it an abuse of discretion to deny admission of the oral waiver evidence on the foregoing grounds, we hold that such an error was harmless. An evidentiary ruling is harmless when we are fairly assured that it had no substantial effect on the jury's verdict. See Rea,958 F.2d at 1220. In the instant case, the record is replete with evidence that wholly undermines Pan Am's claim of good faith. The overwhelming evidence presented during the course of the three and one-half month trial established that Pan Am officials ignored repeated warnings and signals that its security measures were insufficient.

The scope and nature of this evidence needs to be set forth in some detail. We begin in 1983 when a Pan Am flight leaving Rome, Italy for New York was the target of a bomb planted in an unaccompanied interline suitcase. Disaster was averted only when Turkish authorities conducted a passenger/bag match that uncovered the suitcase. Pan Am thus knew of this type of sabotage and that physical matches of suitcases were successful in averting such a terrorist act.

In 1985 a bomb hidden inside a radio and packed in an unaccompanied interline bag exploded on an Air India 747 over the North Atlantic, killing all aboard. The dangers of a bomb hidden inside radios packed in interline bags were well known to Pan Am and the airline industry. These two incidents not only led to the adoption of ACSSP XV.C.1(a), but they conveyed clear warnings that what actually happened at Lockerbie was a distinct possibility.

In September 1986 Pan Am received a report from a group of Israeli security experts commissioned to review Pan Am security at various airports, including Heathrow and Frankfurt. The security experts concluded that "under the present security system, Pan Am is highly vulnerable to most forms of terrorist attack. The fact that no major disaster has occurred to date is merely providential." The report specifically cautioned Pan Am on the use of x-ray machines as substitutes for physical searches, and the dangers of interline unaccompanied bags.

In October 1988 Alert Manager for Germany Ulrich Weber wrote a memo to New York headquarters citing the need for more personnel to remedy Frankfurt's security shortcomings. Only minimum efforts were made to remedy them.

In July 1988 the FAA issued a Security Bulletin warning of the high threat of a terrorist retaliatory attack because of the downing of an Iranian Jetliner. In November 1988 Pan Am received an FAA Security Bulletin warning that a raid on a terrorist group had uncovered a bomb built into a Toshiba radio cassette player. (Toshiba Warning). The bulletin warned that the bomb was difficult to detect by the use of normal x-ray.

The most wilful disregard of passenger safety, bordering on the outrageous, was in December 1988 when Pan Am received an FAA Security Bulletin advising that the United States Embassy in Helsinki had received a telephone warning that a Pan Am flight from Frankfurt to London and on to New York would be bombed. (Helsinki Warning). The Helsinki warning came just 14 days before the instant tragedy and specifically referred to the Toshiba Warning. Despite these warnings, Pan Am failed to conduct searches of unaccompanied interline luggage, and instead inspected such bags only by x-ray. Pan Am did not even alert x-ray technicians to watch for Toshiba radios. It violated FAA regulations by failing to match the bags with particular tickets without advising the FAA in writing that interline bag match had been discontinued. And it violated other FAA regulations by failing to warn pilots about the unaccompanied bags on board for fear that the crews might become "jittery." Additionally, Pan Am did not replace several members of its security team who were woefully undertrained given their responsibility for thwarting terrorist attacks.

Moreover, the Helsinki Warning was deliberately placed under a pile of papers on the desk of the security officer who received the bulletin and was first discovered in the morning following the downing of Flight 103. There was also evidence that Weber, the security officer in charge, ordered the Pan Am employee who discovered the bulletin after the explosion to backdate the warning to give government investigators the impression that the warning was timely disseminated when received. The district court found that the backdating was evidence of consciousness of guilt on the part of Pan Am for its part in the wrongful causation of the crash.

This and other evidence overwhelmingly supported the jury's Conclusion that but for Pan Am's wholly inadequate terrorist prevention techniques and its deliberate indifference and overt acts of wilfulness, the bombing and the senseless loss of life would not have occurred. Even had Pan Am been permitted to present Sonesen's deposition testimony to the jury, the above recited proof, plus the additional fact that any waiver of FAA regulations had to be in writing, make it plain to us that it would not have affected the jury's finding that Pan Am was guilty of wilful misconduct. Its exclusion was therefore harmless error.
Consequently, for all of the above reasons, the district court's refusal to permit the admission of Pan Am's oral waiver evidence -- on government authorization, mistake of law, and state of mind grounds -- does not constitute a sufficient basis for the granting of a new trial.

Various attempts by appellants to suggest other specific causation theories were then rebuffed by the trial court. Pan Am and Alert challenge the exclusion of the testimony of four defense witnesses: two offered as experts on terrorism, Noel Koch and Dr. Ariel Merari, and two offered as experts on terrorist bombings, Peter Gurney and John Horne of Scotland Yard. Pan Am also contends it was error to restrict its cross-examination of plaintiffs' experts, Billie Vincent and Rodney Wallis (the former Director of Security for the International Air Transport Association), with respect to other methods of bombing. The trial Judge based his rulings largely on the fact that he found appellants had offered nothing to show there was any other specific bombing theory.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of defense experts Koch and Merari because their Conclusions as to more likely explanations for the bombing were speculative. Any testimony as to some other particular method of bombing -- without any foundation that such method might explain the Flight 103 bombing -- was clearly conjectural.

It was also not error to decline to receive the testimony of terrorist bombings experts Peter Gurney and John Horne. Their testimony as to the importance of x-rays would have been cumulative since similar testimony was adduced from other witnesses. Additionally, these witnesses' expertise as to x-rays was questionable. Both witnesses were explosives officers with Scotland Yard who specialized in street bombings. Neither had experience in aviation bombings or security. Moreover, neither had any background or knowledge concerning the Flight 103 bombing itself; the trial court found this rendered their proposed testimony unhelpful and largely irrelevant. This ruling was well within the trial court's Fed. R. Evid. 702 discretion.

Appellants admit that at trial they sought to argue that the method of bombing was not established and concede they were unable to suggest a specific alternate theory. They vigorously argued that the method of bombing was unclear, and accomplished this through extensive cross-examination of plaintiffs' experts. Pan Am and Alert also were not deterred from attacking plaintiffs' weaker theory that widespread misconduct on defendants part more likely than not caused the bomb to be loaded on Flight 103. In sum, Pan Am and Alert exercised the ample opportunities given them to undermine plaintiffs' causation theory. Thus, the rulings limiting cross-examination and expert testimony were unremarkable and without error.

Excerpts from the September 12th Dissenting Opinion

I am convinced that Pan Am did not receive a fair trial, I would be shirking my duties as a Judge if I did not say so. Before undertaking the unpleasant task of discussing where I believe the district court erred, I find it necessary to undertake the even more unpleasant task of commenting briefly upon my colleagues' amended opinion, a substantial portion of which is devoted to a rebuttal of arguments that Pan Am never made. As will be discussed below, the district court clearly erred in rejecting all evidence offered by Pan Am in support of its contention that it received and relied upon an oral interpretation from Salazar. Although my colleagues devote seventeen pages of their amended opinion to a Discussion of the "oral waiver," "government authorization," and "mistake of law" defenses, none of these defenses was asserted by Pan Am or is relevant to the pertinent issue herein.

Because, as in my Dissent to the original majority opinion, I deem it necessary in the interest of uncontrovertible accuracy to quote at length from the record, I will not prolong this opinion by an extended counterstatement of the facts. Indeed, what is perhaps the most crucial fact has been established by stipulation: [Pan Am] insisted that a bomb contained in a suitcase would have been visible on x-ray. In fact, the parties stipulated to that fact. Majority opinion at 31. It is worth noting, however, how this stipulation came into being. After Pan Am was satisfied that it could use x-ray examination of luggage, it purchased for the Frankfurt airport the most expensive up-to-date x-ray machine on the market, the Astrophysics Linescan X-ray Screening System.

Q. Does your company make a larger machine than this?

A. This is the largest machine we make.

Q. Does your company make a more expensive machine that this?

A. No, sir.

Q. At the time it was sold, was there a newer or more advanced state of the art machine than this?

A. No, sir.

(Testimony of Derek Kemp, an Astrophysics Company official).

Pan Am wanted the jury to see the machine and how it operated, and for this purpose it had the machine transported to the courthouse. For obvious reasons, plaintiffs' counsel did not want the jury to have the benefit of this first-hand observation, and he stipulated what an examination of the machine would have shown. Although Pan Am should not have been required to accept this stipulation in lieu of actual observation, see United States v. Gantzer,810 F.2d 349, 351 (2d Cir. 1987), the district court gave it no choice. At the district court's direction, the machine sat in the basement of the courthouse, alone and unobserved. The fact that plaintiffs' counsel objected to a jury inspection is evidence in and of itself that the district court erred in not permitting it.

My colleagues' Discussion of the Helsinki warning is in the nature of a half-truth that calls for exposition. Pan Am's response to this warning, as described in the testimony of Wolfgang Schwab, a Pan Am supervisor at Frankfurt, was quite different than what my colleagues would have us believe:

Q. Prior to the Lockerbie disaster, had it been brought to your attention that there was a warning received by the United States Embassy in Helsinki to the effect that a Pan Am flight to the United States would be bombed?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell us, please, when and how that was brought to your attention?

A. I am not able to give you the exact point in time but it was certainly before Lockerbie, when we were told that a female Finnish passenger would try to smuggle a bomb aboard.

Q. Were you warned to pay particular attention to all female passengers or only Finnish female passengers?

A. Particularly to a female Finnish passenger.

Q. Did you ever issue any instructions to look out for Finnish women or to pay particular attention to Finnish women?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. When was that?

A. Before Lockerbie.

Q. What instructions or suggestions did you issue?

A. Now, I told the screeners and the staff that they were to pay particular attention to female Finnish passengers or woman coming from that region up there and I told them that one person would try to smuggle a bomb aboard a plane.

Q. Do you remember if you did it personally or if you asked someone else to do it?

A. I did it personally.

Because the house of cards to the effect that the bomb entered the stream of commerce in Malta was constructed entirely of opinion testimony introduced by plaintiffs, simple Justice required that defendant's experts be given an opportunity to demolish it. Obviously any testimony concerning how the bomb got on the plane had to be conjectural. However, the burden of proof on this issue was on the plaintiffs, not the defendant. Pan Am nevertheless offered expert testimony to challenge plaintiffs' contentions, which the district court refused to receive.

If Pan Am's experts were correct in opining that no expert could testify with any degree of reasonable certainty how the bomb got on the plane, the district court's refusal to permit Pan Am's experts to so testify meant that the district court deprived Pan Am of all means of contesting the testimony of plaintiffs' experts on this important issue. The constitutional implications of such a result are obvious. "The admission of a report containing 'Conclusions' is subject to the ultimate safeguard -- the opponent's right to present evidence tending to contradict or diminish the weight of those Conclusions." Denial of this "ultimate safeguard" in the instant case was prejudicial reversible error.

A carrier covered by the Warsaw Convention cannot limit its liability to $75,000 if a plaintiff's damages were caused by the carrier's "wilful misconduct." Wilfulness as thus used involves the issue of intent, not an intent to violate an FAA regulation, but the intent to perform an act with knowledge that it probably will result in injury and with disregard of that probable consequence. Because the issue of intent, or state of mind, is crucial in any determination of wilful misconduct, the following generalizations concerning proof of intent will be helpful in the Discussion that follows. A court has no right to reject testimony dealing with a person's state of mind because it deems the testimony incredible or lacking in persuasive force. The pertinence of the above legal generalizations in the instant case is readily apparent. It cannot be gainsaid, for example, that resolution of the issue of wilfulness involves consideration by the jury of the mental processes of Pan Am officials. As stated above, the state of mind of these officials was a fact question to be proved the same as any other fact, and the district Judge had no right to reject testimony dealing with this fact because he deemed it incredible or unpersuasive. Any evidence which has a material bearing upon the intent with which a person acted and which fairly tends to a disclosure thereof, or which is explanatory of the intent or purpose with which an act was done, or is to be done, is admissible. The record is clear that both the district court and plaintiffs' counsel had ample notice of Pan Am's intention to offer evidence of Sonesen's conversation with Salazar concerning the propriety of using x-ray screening.

The district Judge even precluded Pan Am from showing that FAA officials inspected Pan Am's operations both before and after the bombing and made no complaints of irregularities. The district Judge's ruling on this issue is illustrative of his mind-set.

THE COURT: I'm satisfied, Mr. Shaughnessy, this is another back-door method of getting Mr. Sonesen's unilateral interpretation of his authority to bury the FAA regulations before this jury. I don't like you doing it. I think the next time you attempt to do it you should alert the Court that this is what you're attempting to do. I have ruled upon it. Had you gotten this before the jury before alerting me and one had been asleep, I probably would have had to declare a mistrial. We're six weeks into this trial. The law has been stated by me to be that based upon two Second Circuit decisions, both of which went to the Supreme Court and certiorari was denied, you have promised me that you were going to show me the law was otherwise. You haven't. You may not do this.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: All I wanted was to ask the witness –

THE COURT: You attempted to get this FAA report in before this jury with, knowing that this man was operating under this assumption, that what they were doing was correct and was in direct violation of the FAA regulations, and he was doing it on the basis of this verbal authorization of Mr. Sonesen who said he had reached him. According to FAA officials, testified he didn't have, and the regulations themselves say he couldn't have, and you can't do it. You do it again and I'm going to have to take appropriate action.

A threat of contempt for attempting to introduce evidence that FAA officials who, after personally inspecting Pan Am's operations found no fault with them, is pretty strong medicine. However, it illustrates once again that the district Judge was fully aware of what Sonesen's testimony would have been.

Even my colleagues concede that the district court erred in excluding evidence of British Airway regulations which, in the face of bombings by Irish terrorist organizations, permitted Pan Am and other carriers to x-ray unaccompanied baggage at Heathrow Airport. I regret that in my colleagues' apparent eagerness to affirm, they hold this error to be harmless. It was not harmless. It went squarely to a crucial issue in the case, i.e., whether Pan Am knew that its use of x-ray screening probably would result in injury.

Evidence that, shortly after the Lockerbie accident the FAA amended its regulations so as to clarify the permissible use of x-ray screening, also went squarely to the issue of whether Pan Am should have anticipated danger in its pre-amendment use of x-rays. The district court's refusal to permit the jury to receive this evidence exacerbated all of the court's similar rulings that pervaded the trial. In short, it was another indication that the district court misunderstood the law. The issue was not whether Pan Am violated the regulation; it was whether Pan Am used x-ray screening with knowledge that its use would probably result in injury or in reckless disregard of the probable consequences.
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Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Fri Nov 01, 2013 12:19 am


Cub Scout Lester Knox Coleman III aged eight.

Boy Scout executive Lester Knox Coleman III in 1988 on the eve of Operation Shakespeare, his last mission as an agent of the United States' Defense Intelligence Agency.

The beachfront villa in Beirut where Coleman lived in 1985 during his first DIA undercover assignment. Posing as Middle East correspondent for the Christian Broadcasting Network, he was on a mission to serve as linkman for the DIA's Lebanese spy network and to frustrate an Iran-Contra arms deal engineered by Oliver North.

The identity badge and pass issued to Coleman in 1987 when he taught a course in audio and video surveillance at the National Intelligence Academy in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

Coleman's DIA spy kit. Consisting of off-the-shelf commercial equipment that anyone might buy, it included the Sony video camera that was still signed out to him at the time of his arrest by the FBI in 1990 on a trumped-up passport charge.
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Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Fri Nov 01, 2013 12:24 am

Two of Coleman's DIA-issue tape recorders and 'bugs'. The Sony voice-activated machine was used to record the conversation with a DEA attache Micheal Hurley seven months before Lockerbie in which Coleman warned him of the 'disaster waiting to happen'.

The identity papers seized by the FBI at the time of Coleman's arrest in May 1990. Most of them are in the name of Thomas Leavy, a cover identity originally provided by the CIA in 1982 and reinforced by the DIA in 1990 for Operation Shakespeare.
The Thomas Leavy birth certificate issued to Coleman in 1982 by the CIA. In 1990, he was charged with applying for a copy of a birth certificate in that name and using it to make a fraudulent passport application. The FBI has yet to explain why he would have needed another copy when he already had one.

A rare moment of relaxation for Lester and Mary-Claude Coleman in the Bakamo-Galaxen refugee camp after they sought political asylum in Sweden in 1991.
Front-pages news, 19 October 1992. Eighteen months after the Colemans' arrival iDAG, Sweden's national afternoon newspaper, tells the story of the first American citizens to seek asylum in that country since the Vietnam war.
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Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Fri Nov 01, 2013 12:30 am

Embassy of the United States of America

Office of the Legal Attache
24 Grosvenor Square
London, England WIA LAE

11 June, 1992


Sigvard Ronnback
Head of Interpol
Box 12 256
S-102 26 Stockholm

Your File: IP1513/92/AC


Reference is made to your communication dated 6 May, 1992 and a telephone call between Mr. Anders Claesson of your office and myself.

Enclosed per a request of Mr. Claesson is a report detailing the background of Lester Knox Coleman.

As Coleman is a fugitive, we would greatly appreciate any information you may be able to provide on his current status in Sweden and the possibility Swedish law would allow for his deportation to the United States.

As always, your assistance is greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Susan A. Sprengel
Assistant Legal Attache

For: R. John Theriault, Jr.
Legal Attache

Smoking gun I: Washington tries to persuade Stockholm to deport Coleman to the United States.

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chicago, Illinois 60604
March 30, 1992

aka Thomas Leavy;


Investigative Summary prepared: March 30, 1992

Basis for Investigation:

This investigation was instituted on February 7, 1990, when New London, Connecticut Resident Agency, New Haven Division, reported they had been notified by the New London Bureau of Vital Statistics that a person identifying himself as THOMAS LEAVY, had requested a copy of his birth certificate. LEAVY's Date of Birth (DOB) was listed July 4, 1948, his parents were listed as JOHN and MARY LEAVY and THOMAS LEAVY's address was listed as 416 County Line Road, Barrington, Illinois. A computer check of the Bureau of Vital Statistics Records revealed that the real THOMAS LEAVY had died in New London, Connecticut, two days after his 1948 birth.

On April 6, 1990, RICHARD BECKMAN, Chicago Passport Office, 230 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, advised the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) Chicago, that he had a possible passport violation. An application, submitted by a THOMAS LEAVY on March 26, 1990 at the Arlington Heights Post Office, had a number of indicators that pointed to a violation.

The first indication was the birth certificate for the dead baby. Other indicators were recently issued driver's license and Social Security Account Numbers. Also the home and work addresses on the applications came back to two separate mail drop locations. The home contact telephone number on the application is not a north suburban telephone exchange. The listing is for a cellular telephone.

Another indicator was that the contact person listed on the application was a relative. The contact is LESTRE COLMAN, 415 West County Line Road, Barrington, Illinois, telephone number (708) 381-1056, listed as a brother-in-law. The telephone number, 381-1056, comes back to ARTHUR MCINTOSH, 416 West County Line Road, Barrington.

Investigation to date:

Investigation at Chicago revealed that the owner of one mail drop and the Office Manager of the second, identified the photo from the passport application as LESTER KNOX COLEMAN. The owner of a printing shop advised that LESTER COLEMAN had ordered two sets of business cards. One was in the name LESTER COLEMAN, the other THOMAS LEAVY.

Numerous checks at the address listed for emergency contact, which was the same address the birth certificate was to be mailed to, failed to reveal any tenants. On April 16, 1990, the next door neighbor was approached for information. The neighbor advised that LESTER COLEMAN was house sitting for the owner of the home, ARTHUR T. MCINTOSH. The neighbor identified the photo from the application as LESTER COLEMAN. She advised that the COLEMAN family left on April 7, 1990 for California. COLEMAN was to go to Japan and on his return flight stop in Hawaii to meet the rest of the family. The neighbor stated that on April 11, 1990, KOLDON MOVING AND STORAGE, 410 Telser Road, Lake Zurich, Illinois arrived to move COLEMAN's belongings to storage.

On April 17, 1990, Magistrate W. THOMAS ROSEMOND, Jr., Northern District of Illinois, issued a warrant for LESTER KNOX COLEMAN, III. This warrant was for willfully and knowingly making a false statement in an application for a passport, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1542.

On April 25, 1990, KOLDEN MOVING AND STORING advised that COLEMAN can be reached at telephone number (205) 540-2448. The telephone number was sent to the FBI office in Mobile, Alabama. On May 1, 1990 LESTER KNOX COLEMAN, III, was arrested without incident at Townhouse Residence SE-14, 1616 Fort Morgan Road, Fort Morgan, Alabama.

After his arrest COLEMAN claimed to have petitioned to have his name changed to THOMAS LEAVY. A check with Jefferson County Probate Records Department, Birmingham, Alabama, revealed that COLEMAN did not petition the court until April 12, 1990 to change his name.

Smoking gun II: he FBI's so-called 'Investigative Summary' which accompanied the letter to Stockholm, setting out the basis for the passport charge.

To Whom it May Concern:

I am a journalist working on a book project which indirectly involves American foreign policy.

On January 18th, 1993, I called the Records Office in New London, Connecticut, and asked to speak to the Clerk, Gloria Hatfield. I asked Ms. Hatfield if the New London records showed that a Thomas Leavy had died on the 6th of July, 1948. Ms. Hatfield examined her files and informed me that she had looked under 1946, '47, '48 and '49, but could find no record of such a person. When I asked if she had information showing the birth of a Thomas Leavy as being July 4, 1948, she replied that obtaining a birth record required the presentation of documents, which I did not have.


Diana Holdsworth
January 25, 1993

State of Connecticut

Smoking gun III: The sworn statement of Diana Holdsworth contradicting the FBI's assertion that the 'real' Thomas Leavy died on 6 July 1948.

Fugitive warrant ploy: Ordered by the Federal court to report to Dr. Hakan Hallberg in Trollhattan for a medication examination, Coleman discovers that Dr. Hallberg knows nothing about the arrangement. Although Coleman submits a written statement from the doctor to that effect, a bench warrant is issued for Coleman's arrest on grounds of 'failure to appear.'
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Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Fri Nov 01, 2013 12:32 am



Judicial Officer: Magistrate William H. Steele




Employment: Self-emp: Journalist

Address: No permanent address in U.S.

Time in Community: 2 weeks

Monthly Income: $3500

Time in Empl.: Over 10 yrs.


1. The information below was gathered through interview of the defendant and through contact with DEA Headquarters, NBC News, and the subject's attorney.

I. Lester Coleman was born in Pensacola, FL on September 25, 1943.

II. Although Mr. Coleman's employment history sounds quite improbable, information he gave to the Pretrial Services Officer has proven to be true. Coleman is a free-lance journalist, specializing in the Middle East, who has also worked as an undercover investigator for the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States. NBC News Foreign Correspondent Brian Ross contacted this office on May 3, 1990 to verify Coleman's relationship with NBC News. He also indicated Coleman has worked with other news agencies, as well. Ross indicated Coleman has contributed stories regarding Middle East terrorism and drug trafficking to NBC News numerous times throughout the 1980's. They have interviewed him on the air, on NBC nightly news, as an expert in terrorism and drug production in the Middle East. Ross also verified that Coleman has testified before Senate committees on these same subjects.

Ray Tripiccio, an agent with DEA in Washington, D.C., verifies that Coleman has formerly worked in a relationship with the Drug Enforcement Administration. The only information he could give on this secret activity is that Coleman was deactivated as a contract consultant as of 6-24-88.

Joseph Boohaker of the Counsel of Lebanese-American Organizations, verifies that Coleman has been employed with that group in the past, for about a year. His contract ended 3-31-90, and it appears likely that Coleman has not had a regular pay check, since that time. Coleman indicates that he is currently working on a book, and that he was attempting to make arrangements to return to the Middle East, in order to do more research. (It is noted that Coleman has gone to Jefferson County Probate Court in Birmingham, to have his name legally changed to, "Thomas Leavy.") Joseph Boohaker, the subject's attorney, verifies that this was accomplished sometime in April. (The present charge from Chicago apparently pre-dates the legal name change.) Coleman states that he needed a passport in a different name, because his name is known to drug traffickers in the Middle East.

IV. I have no information indicating that Mr. Coleman has ever been arrested.
Coleman's Pretrial Services Report, in which the Drug Enforcement Administration describes him, correctly, as a 'contract consultant' engaged in 'secret activity.'



90 CR 365

UNDER RULE 16(a)(1)(C)

Now comes the defendant Les Coleman by his undersigned counsel and respectfully requests the following government documents which are material to the preparation of defendant's defense:

1. All records by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and any other United States Intelligence or Law Enforcement Agency reflecting their employment and/or working relationship with the defendant, Les Coleman, including all DEA records referring to DEA Informant ID #SX9860002, all records of DIA MC 10 pertaining to the defendant, as well as all files from the CIA and DEA related to an operation named "COREA" from December 1987 to January 1989.

Included in the document request are all documents or other writings reflecting payment, work assignments, evaluations, travel authorizations, equipment requisitions or any other reference to a Les Coleman, Benjamin B, Thomas Leavy, Jr., Stevens Mantra Corp., Middle East Television, Condor Television Ltd., AMA Industries, and Wildwood Video. All of these names are code names and front companies under which defendant worked for the government.

In support of this request defendant states that his defense to the charge in making a false statement in application for a passport, is that he was working for the government at the time he made such false statements and that the alleged false birth certificate upon which the false statement is based was supplied to him by the government and was used to obtain a passport to conduct a secret intelligence operation for the government. Consequently, all documents showing the defendants working relationship with government intelligence agencies would be corroborative of his claim and material and necessary for his defense.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: August 30, 1990

Attorney for Defendant
343 S. Dearborn
Suite 1607
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 235-0070

Defending himself against the passport charge, Coleman seeks a court order on 30 August 1990, requiring the DEA, the DIA and other agencies to produce his government employment records. Washington refused to comply on grounds of 'national security.'




Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs,

- against -


Third-Party Defendant.

M.D.L. 799 (TCP) (All Cases)

(JMS 7190)




LESTER K. COLEMAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am currently self-employed as a freelance writer, author and security consultant. I am a United States citizen and am temporarily residing outside of the United States.

2. I am fully familiar with the facts in this affidavit, and all of the statements contained in this affidavit are made on my personal knowledge except as otherwise stated. I make this affidavit in opposition to the motion of third-party defendant, United States of America (the "Government"), for an order dismissing the claims of the third-party plaintiffs against the Government or, alternatively, for an order granting the Government summary judgment on those claims.


3. I was raised in the Middle East where I lived in Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia, and I speak Arabic in three ...


MAY 1 1988 TIME: 10:10 a.m. CYPRUS LOCAL















Coleman's affidavit in Pan Am vs USA, to which was appended a transcript of his conversation with Micheal T. Hurley in which, seven months before Lockerbie, he warned the DEA attache about 'a disaster waiting to happen.'




Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs,

- against -


Third-Party Defendant.

M.D.L. 799 (PLATT, CH. J.)


I, Terry E. Bathen, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army, Assistant General Counsel, Defense Intelligence Agency, do hereby declare the following to be true and correct:

5. My review of Department of Defense HUMINT records reveals that Mr. Coleman was formerly associated with a Department of Defense intelligence activity. On or about October 25, 1985, Coleman contacted Defense Intelligence Agency personnel by telephone and volunteered to provide information concerning the Middle East. Mr. Coleman's offer to provide video tapes associated with his travels in that part of the world was favorably evaluated, and he became affiliated with a classified Department of Defense Intelligence activity during December 1986.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Terry E. Bathen
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Assistant General Counsel
Defense Intelligence Agency

Executed this 29th day of May 1991.
Limited hang-out I: The declaration of DIA counsel in Pan Am vs USA which unexpectedly admits that Coleman worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency, although it plays down the extent and nature of his employment as a HUMINT agent.
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Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Fri Nov 01, 2013 12:36 am




Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs,

- against -


Third-Party Defendant.

M.D.L. 799 (PLATT, CH. J.)


I, MICHEAL T. HURLEY, declare and say:

1. I am a Special Agent (criminal investigator) of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a component of the United States Department of Justice. I have been employed by DEA and its predecessor agencies since September 1968.

2. I submit this declaration in connection with the allegations against the United States Drug Enforcement Administration regarding the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988.

6. Coleman was established as a DEA-cooperating individual ("CI") on January 31, 1986, partially because of his technical capabilities and he said that he could establish a CI network in Lebanon. He was to recruit sub-sources to collect data regarding opium production in Lebanon. The data would enable DEA to develop strategic information on opium production in that region, including crop estimates, crop eradication, and major trafficking routes.

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this 31st day of May, 1991.

Special Agent
Drug Enforcement Administration

Limited hang-out II: The declaration of Micheal Hurley in Pan Am vs USA in which he concedes that Coleman worked for the DEA in Cyprus, while playing down the nature of his assignment, and from which it is clear that Coleman was working for the Defense Intelligence Agency at the same time.



Docket Nos. 92-9251, 92-9253 and 92-9255


JUDITH A. PAGNUCCO, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Robert I. Pagnucco, deceased; MOLENA A. PORTER, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Walter L. Porter, deceased; and DONA BARDELLI BAINBRIDGE, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Harry M. Bainbridge,





On Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York


Clinton H. Coddington
Coddington, Hicks & Danforth
Suite 300
555 Twin Dolphin Drive
Paragon Center, Redwood Shores
Redwood City, California 94065
(415) 592-5400

James M. Shaughnessy
Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives
156 West 56th Street
New York, New York 10019
(212) 237-1000

Richard M. Sharp
Frederick C. Schafrick
Eric C. Jeffrey
Lisa A. Landsman
Shea & Gardner
1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 828-2000

Attorneys for Pan American World Airways, Inc. and Alert Management Systems, Inc.

Under Seal Version Dated: January 28, 1993
Redacted Version dated: February 9, 1993

2. Defendants' Contention: The Method of Bombing Was Not Established. Defendants contended that it could not be determined from the evidence developed by the parties how the terrorists had planted the bomb on Flight 103. [6] Defendants were precluded from presenting the opinions of three experts (Airel Merari, Noel Koch, and Peter Gurney) [7] that the plaintiffs' theory as to how the bomb got on board was implausible and the evidence was insufficient to permit an expert to conclude that the bomb bag had been transferred in Frankfurt from Air Malta (e.g., J.A. 3465-68). In consequence, the jury heard only one expert for the defense (Dr. Lee Grodzins), and his testimony, as truncated by another ruling (see pp. 8-9 below), related to technical aspects of x-ray that were not in dispute by the parties (Tr. 5728-57).

Defendants were permitted to adduce testimony and records from Air Malta to show that no unaccompanied bag had been loaded onto Flight KM 180. [8] Plaintiffs' supposedly contradictory baggage records from varying sources in the FAG, defendants contended,


6. In a series of discovery rulings, defendants were prevented from obtaining discovery from the United States as to information that it might have regarding how the bombing was committed.

7. See J.A. 4435-38 (Gurney); J.A. 3498-502 (Merari); Offer of Proof for Noel Koch, J.A. 448.

8. On Air Malta, the head loader must physically count the number of bags loaded in a plane's cargo hold to ensure that it equals the number on the baggage manifest (J.A. 3358 (Agius)). Moreover, no baggage of any kind from Flight KM 180 had been designated on the passenger transfer message (J.A. 1151) for transfer to Pan Am Flight 103 (J.A. 3367 (Borg)).

Extracts from Pan Am's appeal brief against the finding 'wilful misconduct' by a New York jury in the 1992 compensation suit brought by the families of the victims of the Lockerbie disaster.

contained so many demonstrable errors and omissions that no reliable conclusion could be based on them (J.A. 3603-12).

Defendants also adduced testimony that plaintiffs' theory of the bombing (the "Air Malta theory") was wrong because a bag containing a radio-cassette player had not been seen by the operator who x-rayed the interline bags that were loaded on to Pan Am Flight 103 in Frankfurt. Kurt Maier, who performed that inspection on December 21, 1988, testified that his duty report (J.A. 1099-1100) showed that he had x-rayed 13 bags for Flight 103, that he had been told to call a supervisor if he saw a radio inside any bag, and that none of the 13 bags x-rayed for Flight 103 contained a radio-cassette player (J.A. 3382-83, 3388-89, 3392-93). [9] Plaintiffs contended that Mr. Maier had not been properly trained as an x-ray operator and that he had not been wearing his eyeglasses (J.A. 2967 (Vincent)). Mr. Maier rejoined that his eyeglasses were only reading glasses that he did not need or use to perform his job (J.A. 3379-80).

Pan Am was precluded from presenting a demonstration of the x-ray equipment that would have supported Mr. Maier's testimony and would have shown the freeze-frame image produced on the monitor by a Toshiba radio-cassette player inside a Samsonite suitcase. The demonstration would have been presented by Dr. Lee Grodzins of M.I.T. The court ruled that the demonstration was irrelevant on the ground that plaintiffs, in effect, stipulated that radio-cassette players would be visible on the x-ray's monitor (J.A. ____); even though plaintiffs contended that Maier himself had been incapable of detecting such a radio.

Twelve of the 13 bags x-rayed by Maier for Flight 103 could be traced to passengers. Plaintiffs asked the jury to infer that the thirteenth bag was the alleged unaccompanied bomb bag from Air Malta. Defendants introduced evidence that the thirteenth bag was not the bomb bag, but rather was the unaccompanied "rush-tag" bag [10] of a Pan Am pilot, Captain Hubbar, who had sent two bags home, one of which was found at Lockerbie. [11]

B. The Parties' Contentions On Wilful Misconduct Relating to Plaintiffs' Air Malta Theory

1. The Alleged Violation of the ACSSP. Plaintiffs contended that Pan Am's x-ray procedure violated the aviation security requirements contained in the FAA's Air Carrier Standard Security Program ("ACSSP"). At the time of the Lockerbie disaster, ACSSP § XV.C.1(a) required that carriers at "extraordinary security" airports, such as Frankfurt, Heathrow, and other major European airports:


9. Maier was intensely cross-examined on, among other subjects, earlier deposition testimony that appeared to say that he stopped bags with radio-cassette players only if they appeared "suspicious." Maier explained that he would have stopped any radio-cassette player as being suspicious (J.A. 3394-96, 3408-09). Some of the difficulties with Maier's deposition appear to have been caused by the poor quality of the translation between English and German. (Maier does not speak English.) See, e.g., J.A. 3411 (in-court translator notes video deposition translation as "poor German, and ambiguous").

10. A "rush-tag bag" is a bag that has become separated from its owner/passenger. This is a common, some would say routine, occurrence on every airline. The general practice of the airlines is to specially ticket the bags ("rug-tag") and send them on their way. At Frankfurt, Pan Am x-rayed such bags before carrying them. See note 11 infra.

11. Captain Hubbard tagged two bags for carriage from Berlin to his home in SEattle, and then he piloted an aircraft to Karachi (Tr. 5420-43). One of his bags arrived at Seattle; the other was found at Lockerbie. Pan Am introduced evidence to show that because it required rush-tag bags to be x-rayed, one could infer that the Hubbard bag found at Lockerbie had been x-rayed by Maier before being placed on board Flight 103. (J.A. 1120-23; Tr. 5241 (Wunderlich).) Plaintiffs contended either that Hubbard's bag was put on Flight 103 in London (J.A. 762 (memo. of Jones)) or that it was not x-rayed in Frankfurt (Tr. 5263-66 (Wunderlich)).


Syria, President Bush and Drugs -- the Administration's Next Iraqgate --

November 23, 1992 [1]

Chairman Charles E. Schumer of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice directed the Subcommittee majority staff to prepare this report. This report has not been reviewed or approved by other Members of the Subcommittee.

... Syrian Government involvement and the ____ some military units or Syrian officials, U.S. Government officials publicly claim that they are not in a position to substantiate such charges. However, Subcommittee staff spoke with former government officials who confirmed the existence of satellite photos showing Syrian military units, including tanks, artillery, and infantry encampments, strategically placed in, and adjacent to, recognized fields and known heroin laboratories.

Another source with intimate knowledge of the U.S. Government's files on Lebanese drug traffickers informed Subcommittee staff that the U.S. Government now possesses extensive intelligence information implicating many Syrian Government officials in the Lebanese drug trade. Much of this information is raw intelligence in the form of reports from confidential informants, intercepted wire and telephone communications, and other intelligence information received from foreign governments.

1. Monser al-Kassar -- "The Drug Prince of Marbella" and "The Godfather of Terrorists"

To better understand why the U.S. Government is apparently hesitant to act on such information, consider our Government's response, or lack thereof, to the infamous Monser al-Kassar.

The al-Kassar family has been part of the present Damascus regime since Hafez Assad took power in 1970. Monser's father, Mohammad al-Kassar, served in the Syrian diplomatic corps. The al-Kassars have been characterized as "the largest drug and arms dealing family in Syria."

Extracts from a congressional report prepared by the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice documenting Syria's involvement in Lebanese narcotics trafficking.
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Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Fri Nov 01, 2013 1:27 am

2. Rifaat Assad

From about 1976 until about 1984, President Assad's younger brother, _____, leading baron of the Lebanese drug trade. He used Syrian military trucks, aircraft and diplomatic pouches as tools of his international drug network which he based out of the northern Bekaa. The 569th Syrian Army division which he commanded was reportedly little more than "muscle" for his drug trafficking organization.

Specializing in opium and heroin, Rifaat amassed an illicit fortune. After an unsuccessful attempt to depose his brother, Hafez, he was effectively exiled and now leads a life of luxury in his heavily-guarded villa on the French Riviera. He reportedly continues to play a substantial role in Bekaa Valley drug trafficking with the tacit approval of some Western governments. Two of Rifaat's sons, Darid and Firas, are also reportedly based in France and involved in smuggling arms and drugs throughout the Mediterranean.

3. Mustafa Tlass, Syrian Minister of Defense

Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass is associated with at least three known drug traffickers including Hamad Ali al-Kis from Baalbak. Tlass was recently involved in procuring an exit visa for a very high-profile trafficker who had to leave Syria quickly, presumably to avoid "problems." This is consistent with other reports of his obtaining visas for traffickers traveling to Argentina, Spain and Germany.

During August 1989, the Syrian Defense Ministry reportedly distributed more than 1,000 "laissez passer" or travel permits at $10,000 each to "friends" of the Defense Ministry. This report is consistent with news accounts that drug smugglers from Lebanon were intercepted on their way to Israel and Egypt with special travel passes signed by "M. Tlass." At least one government source has told the Subcommittee staff that the U.S. Government presently possesses sufficient information to indict Tlass for drug trafficking.

4. General Ali Dubah, Commander of Syrian Military Intelligence

Dubah, related to Monser al-Kassar by marriage, is one of President Assad's closest friends and confidantes. He is connected with many major Lebanese trafficers including the Jaffar clan.

He also coordinates Syrian extortion efforts to ensure that sufficient drug profits are left over from the "personal corruption" so that the Syrian military intelligence service is not deprived of its institutional share. Dubah's role in the drug trade has been characterized as "having his hand in everyone's cookie jar."

Kenaan has also been shown to arbitrate disputes between _____ known drug trafficking clans, presumably for a fee.

Tlass, Dubah and Kenaan have all personally issued travel passes to known drug traffickers. Such passes allow the dealer to move freely in Lebanon and/or Syria "with his car, his personal weapon and cargo, without being searched or detained."

Working together with the Lebanese clans who have traditionally controlled the drug trade, these and other lesser officers are heavily involved with the Lebanese trafficking networks to serve essentially their own purposes:

(1) They rake off whatever immediate drug profits they can for personal enrichment;

(2) They use the drug money for other purposes related to their military/intelligence activities (i.e. they buy informers); and

(3) They use their ability to manage the drug trade of any of the organized groups by either threatening to seize that group's drugs, or more subtly, by allowing one group to move its product to market more quickly and cheaply.

VI. Syrian Military and Diplomatic Officials Have Been Repeatedly Linked to Drug Trafficking During the Last Ten Years.

Syrian military and intelligence officials in occupied Lebanon are involved in the drug trade at all levels: cultivation, production and transportation. Such connections between high-level Syrian Government officials and drug traffickers are not coincidental. These bonds are merely a representative sample of the Syrian Government's widespread pattern and practice of associating itself with those who peddle poison around the world.


575 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022, SUITE 1006, TEL. 212-605-0375, TLX: 237699 WWBUS, FAX: 212-3089834



As the overall assignment, Defense trial counsel retained us to investigate the facts of the disaster, gather intelligence, develop leads, locate witnesses, locate and obtain physical evidence, and to locate expert witnesses and advise and consult with counsel as it may direct. The first stage assignment was to determine the facts and then to identify the sources, nature, extent, form and quality of available evidence; and then to recommend the action to obtain such evidence in court-admissible form, and to estimate the likelihood of obtaining same and the costs.


The assignment commenced some six months after the disaster during which time law enforcement agencies of Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States have investigated the matter. Reports of their results and theories have been published in various journals via direct quotes attributed and unattributed from official investigative sources. Review of same shows that many key facts have been established while others remain in dispute. Therefore, it is useful to summarize same before we state our independent findings.

A. Facts Generally Agreed by Law Enforcement:

The flight originated in Frankfurt on a Boeing 727 on December 21, 1988. The flight landed in London's Heathrow airport. A second plane, a Boeing 747, was then used for the continuation leg to New York JFK under Number 103. All continuing passengers deplained in Heathrow and then boarded the 747 with the London passengers. The flight crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland, due to a bomb explosion, with all lives lost.

Law enforcement investigators have determined that the bomb was made of Samtex explosive and concealed in a suitcase which was in a cargo hold, that it weighed approx. 1.25 pounds (568 grams), that it exploded over Lockerbie, and that it was sufficient in explosive power to cause the plane to crash.


Source 1 is comprised of six persons working in different units of the intelligence community of a Western government. Reliability of this information is very good. Generally this group of agencies is only fair to good among the various persons reporting based on our prior experience and its past record. However, the very number of separate sources in these agencies (not necessarily sympathetic to each other), all sharing the conclusion, as well as the depth of the intelligence gathered, and the agencies' considerable resources and special interest in the matter, justifies rating this information as very good.

Source 2 is comprised of three persons working in different units of the intelligence agency of a second Western government. Reliability of this information is very good, not so much due to prior experience with the sources, which is good to very good, but because of their position to know the particular facts.

Source 3 is one person working for the intelligence agency of a third Western oriented government. Reliability of this information is excellent based on our prior experience with both the agency and the particular person, its and his prior record, and its position to know first hand these matters.

Source 4 is one person working for the intelligence agency of a fourth Western government. Good. It is normally rated very good but is conservatively downgraded as to this matter because its information seems in some aspects to be derivative, i.e. in great part based on information received from other agencies.

(It must be emphasized that these sources did not have as their objective the acquisition of evidence for the apprehension and trial of the perpetrators; rather, their objective is to monitor terrorist acts, draw conclusions based on their expertise, and then use what they learn so as to defend their countries in the future.)

Source 5 is an experienced Director of airport security for the most security conscious airline. He was in a position to receive the inside consensus of various security officers at Frankfurt Airport, which he reported to us. He also receives daily terrorism intelligence from his company's liaison with its host country's highly regarded intelligence service, and ...

Extracts from a confidential report on the Flight 103 disaster commissioned from Juval Aviv, of Interfor Inc., by James M. Shaughnessy in the course of Pan Am's own investigation.


The subject disaster resulted from planning and events ___ a couple of years earlier.

Libya's Qadaffi is a major funder of terrorism. He tired of the ineffectiveness and costs of the internal jealousies among terrorist factions, wanted more effective terrorism against America, yet did not want to suffer further American retaliation. He demanded that the more skilled terrorist groups coordinate better, and do it so as to preserve his deniability.

At the same time, Syrian intelligence, which had been exposed as planning the Hindawi bomb attempt against El Al in London out of its embassy there, sought deeper cover and backed Ahmed Jibril's PFLP as its front team.

Meetings were then held among leaders of various factions: Ahmed Jibril of PLFP, Abu Nidal, George Habash, Ali Issa Duba of Syrian intelligence, and Iranian radicals, (named by us hereafter for convenience as the "Interterror Group"). They agreed to cooperate and seek secure routs for smuggling contrabad and people for terrorism while raising additional funds. (Some of these groups had been doing so individually for some time). They never trusted each other, kept secrets from each other, and never worked together in full cooperation, but there were frequent although wary joint contacts and operations.

They set up a complex drug and arms smuggling operation via various European cities. Eventually Abu Nidal ran the drugs-arms operations, while Ahmed Jibril concentrated on arms and terrorist planning.

Monzer Al-Kassar, born 7/1/47, in Nabak, Syria, is married to Raghda Duba, the sister of Syrian intelligence chief Ali Issa Duba, (sometimes spelled Douba). Al-Kassar is a major arms and drug smuggler who has played a key role in terrorism banking and "diplomacy" among terrorist groups, and has acquaintances with certain Western leaders. For example, he is known to have had friendly contacts with former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

Al-Kassar has had long term romantic affairs with Raja Al-Assad, the daughter of Rifat Assad, who is the brother of Syrian President Hafez Assad, spending time with her at her ...


The PanAm Frankfurt smuggling operation worked as follows: an accomplice boarded flights with checked luggage containing innocent items. An accomplice Turkish baggage handler for PanAm was tipped to identify the suitcase, then switched it with an identical piece holding contraband, which he had brought into the airport or otherwise received there from another accomplice. The passenger accomplice then picked up the baggage on arrival. It is not known how this method passed through arrival customs where such existed, but this route and method worked steadily and smoothly for a long time.

The Turkish baggage handlers attended mosques in Cologne and Bonn which were fundamentalist Islamic sects. It was there that they were recruited.

Khalid Jafar was a regular "passenger" accomplice for the drug route.

The BKA/DEA/CIA surveillance operation continued to monitor the route without interfering with it, apparently seeking intelligence. As they realized the extent of the oepration they decided to try to channel the operation into less numerous areas so that they could concentrate their surveillance focus. So BKA began a combination of arrests and visible police presence at other drug operation locales in West Germany, which eventually induced the operators to concentrate where there was no such visible presence, at Frankfurt airport, PanAm.

CIA had another motive to channel the operation to PanAm's baggage area. It had for some time been surveilling separate activities there involving shipments (contents unspecified) to and from the East Bloc via PanAm through Frankfurt, Berlin and Moscow. This would enable them to more efficiently monitor both operations now.

The CIA unit involved in this Frankfurt airport surveillance works in West Germany with BKA and has a control at an unknown location in the Washington area. We cannot say with certainty that the activities of this unit were fully reported if at all up the channels to CIA HQ; it appears that it eventually operated to some or a large extent as an internal covert operation without consistent oversight, a la Oliver North or Edwin Wilson. To distinguish what it knew as opposed to what CIA HQ definitely knew, we refer to that unit as CIA-1.



From this perspective the apparent contradictions in the reports of the official investigations might be explained as follows: (1) Jafar checked a suitcase, possibly in a manner which was not recorded or noticed, and we stand by our sources as to this; (2) The signs of an explosion in the CIA luggage was likely an anti-entry small explosive often used by them, and was likely triggered by the first explosion or a hurtling object; (3) the nervous CIA presence and strange behavior at the crash site indicates the sensitivity of the contents of the CIA passengers' luggage.

It is pointless to try to pin down further the exact motives and identities and roles of the terrorists. All had the same goal: to strike at America. They are known to work together, albeit in duplicity. Confusion of funders, planners, perpetrators and motive is a mark of Syrian intelligence planning.

We are also persuaded by the intelligence as to the BKA-CIA-1 surveillance, videotape and possession of key evidence by the U.S. Government, as well as the communications codename. The persons so reporting spoke from what appears to be detailed knowledge. It was our impression that more than one of these persons prefers to keep the truth hidden (and assumes that it will remain so) while others prefer that it emerge, although not in a position to do so.

From the perspective of intelligence analysis our findings are conclusive. From the perspective of journalists it is publishable speculation. From the perspective of trial lawyers it probably remains inadmissible speculation or hearsay.

The police authority of Trollhattan, Sweden, hereby merely certifies that this is a copy of a page in a passport, which has been presented before the police authority by a gentleman, who states that his name is Lester Knox Coleman and who has applied for asylum in Sweden on political grounds. The police authority does not certify the authenticity of the passport in question.


Ulrica Ericsson
Deputy Police Superintendent

Specimen pages from Coleman's still valid American passport with some of the visas and entry and exit stamps that support his account of his movements as a DIA secret agent.
Site Admin
Posts: 25051
Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am

Re: Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut To Lockerbie

Postby admin » Fri Nov 01, 2013 1:29 am

-- Index --

Abbas, Abu 82, 86
ABC Network 49, 103, 146, 180-1,
186, 217-18, 223, 252-3, 262, 266-7,
275, 295
Aharoni, Daniel 292
Air Jordan 152, 156
Air Malta 73, 75, 113, 177-8, 183, 236,
238, 298-9
al-Assad, Raja 82
al-Kassar, Monzer 16-19, 50, 80, 82-6,
107-8, 119, 142, 166-7, 169-71, 197,
201, 235-6, 284
al-Megrahi, Abdel 183-4, 186, 301
al-Mogbrabi, Mahmoud 112, 233, 277
Al Shiraa 136
al-Zawi, Ahmed 187
Alabama, University of 191-2, 200,
205, 259
Alert Management Inc. 270
Alford, Bob 295
AMA Industries 13 0
Amal militia 108-9, 152-3
American Victims of Flight 103 52
Ammerman, Bert 52
Anderson, Jack 50
Anderson, Terry 130
Antoine 102
Aoun, Gen. Michel 4, 208-10
Arlington Hall 7, 21, 25, 28, 91-2
Arnett, Peter 4, 211
Asmar, Tony 3, 101-4, 109-10, 121,
128-30, 132-5, 189, 194, 198, 203-6
Assad, Pres. Hafez 50, 86, 132, 167-8,
172, 208, 302
Assad, Rifat 16-18, 30, 82, 119, 151, 153,
166-7, 302
Auburn University 132, 136, 149, 259
Aviv, Juval 42, 78-88, 90, 138-42, 181,
219, 224, 235-9, 241, 251, 256, 265-8,
272-6, 290-7, 302, 318
Baabda 4, 210-11
Bahamas 57, 61-4
Baker, James 139
Baltimore 65
Bank of Credit & Commerce International
(BCCI) 107, 121, 247
Barber, Alden 38, 40
Barr, William 182
Barron's 181-2, 266, 292
Barhen, Lt-Col. Terry E. 228, 230-2, 244,
263, 276-7
Beaini, Fohad 154
Bechari, Ibrahim 186
Beckman, Richard 288-9
Behrens, Lesley 5-9, 23
Beirut 4, 19, 50, 83, 96, 98-110, 129-32,
142, 161, 168, 192, 203, 209, 256
Bekaa Valley 17-19, 29, 119, 122, 152-3,
163-5, 167, 170, 226
Bell, Ian 179, 182
Bern 169-70
Bernard, Laurie 66
Berri, Nabi 108-9, 152, 156
Bitar, Victor 210
Black September 41-2, 44
Boohaker, Joseph L. 8, 21-4, 26, 208-10,
Boutros, Marcel 210
Boy Scouts of America 37-40, 45, 57,
205, 208-9, 259-60
Boyce, William D. 37
Boy's Life 57
Broadcasting 95
Brokaw, Tom 20, 45, 206
Bufkins, Russ 38
Buhler, Gregory W. 139, 146-7,
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) 14-19, 42, 46,
49, 56, 71-2, 74-7, 82-6, 117, 142,
166, 221, 245-6
Burchette, Lloyd 200, 251, 254, 257-8,
263-4, 267
Bush, George 49-51, 70, 114, 117, 119,
172, 184, 186, 209, 280, 304
Byron, Christopher 255-65, 268, 287,
291, 294, 296
Cable News Network (CNN) 66, 129-30,
175, 211, 218-19, 228, 250, 261
Calero, Adolfo 102
Calero, Mario 102, 106
Cannistraro, Vincent 175-6, 181,
291-3, 295
Casey. William 96, 101, 103, 108, 122,
130, 149, 256
Casolaro, Danny 247-51, 255
CBN 95-8, 101-2, 105-10, 121
CBS News 67-8, 258, 290, 294, 296-7
Cetera, Mario 190
Channon, Paul 49, 186
Christian Broadcasting Network 95, 101,
159, 231, 256
Christian Lebanese Forces 102, 106, 142,
205-8, 211-12
CIA 7, 15-19, 30, 45-6, 57, 61, 64, 66,
79-89, 92, 116, 139, 149, 153, 156,
165-6, 169, 172-6, 181, 190, 193, 197,
214, 217, 230, 236-7, 256, 293
Clayton, Mark 37, 41
Clinton, Bill 303
Coddington, Clinton 271
Colby, William 27
Coleman, Jocelyn 36, 58, 60
Coleman, Lester Knox 31-2
Coleman Jr., Lester Knox 31, 34, 297
Coleman III, Lester Knox 2-10, 13,
20-45, 47-8, 56-69, 87-8, 91-110,
120-36, 146-70, 173, 175-6, 189-221,
226-31, 235-7, 239-41, 243-69,
275-7, 281-90, 294, 297, 301-2,
305-6, 308-13, 320
Squeal 61, 64, 159
Coleman, Margie 213, 282
Coleman, Mary-Claude 4, 6-9, 24, 26,
100, 104-5, 108-10, 126, 129, 148,
189, 203, 205-7, 212, 220-1, 229
Commission on Aviation Security
& Terrorism 114-17, 266,
Condor Television Ltd 121-2, 124-5,
133, 231
Connelly, Phillip 46-7, 138, 226, 233,
274, 277
Connors, John J. 244-5
Contras 16, 83, 101-3, 106, 108, 110,
149, 166, 201, 207, 247, 256
COREA see Operation Corea
Council of Lebanese-American
Organizations 210
Crane, David 66-7
Cronkite, Walter 38-9, 57
Cypriot Police Force Narcotics Squad
(CPFNS) 153-5, 193, 195, 197
Cyprus 3, 17-18, 29-30, 42, 50, 56, 107,
109-10, 121, 124, 126, 138, 142, 146,
148-66, 188, 192-204, 218, 225-6,
229, 252, 292, 313
Daily Mail 78
Daily Telegraph 78, 185
Dakar 172, 175-6
Dalkamoni, Hafez Kassem 14-16, 47-9,
71, 187, 233, 277
Damascus 50, 142, 302
Daod, Abou 155-6
DeCesare, Don 67-8
Defense Intelligence Agency (D1A) 2,
19, 24-8, 45, 48, 56, 65, 91-4, 97-8,
101-2, 105-8, 121, 129-30, 142-4,
149, 192, 194, 197, 200, 206, 209,
213-17, 227-8, 230-2, 253, 260, 310,
312-13, 320
Deutsch, Michael 214, 243-4
Dhyer, Pierre 106
Donaghue, Ethel 60
Donleavy, Bill 93-5, 97-100, 105, 107-8,
110, 121-9, 132-5, 148-50, 160, 164,
166-8, 189-92, 194, 196, 205-6, 232
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
1-2, 6-7, 17-19, 22-3, 25, 27-30,
42, 48, 50, 81-3, 87, 122, 138-9,
145-6, 148-9, 153, 160, 163-5, 169,
175-6, 180, 182, 188-90, 192-7, 204,
207, 213-20, 225-32, 235, 245-6,
255, 261-3, 265-7, 272, 294, 303,
309-11, 313
Dubah, Gen. Ali Issah 82, 86, 167,
171, 302
Dumfries & Galloway Constabulary 45,
Eddi, Raymond 210
El Al 14, 55
El-Jorr, Ibrahim 42, 151-2, 189, 192-6,
198-9, 202-3, 258
Elias, Abu 187
Emerson, Steven 158, 175, 218, 2S0, 257,
261, 265-8, 287, 291, 295
Esseff, John A. 210, 220, 260
Esseff, Joseph 210
Esson, George 111-12
Eurame Trading Company 29, 146,
193-8, 202, 204
Evans, Michael 251
Express, L' 172-3
Fadellah, Sheik Mohammed Hussein 102
Fatal Accident Inquiry 111, 114, 179, 276
FBI 4-5, 7, 9, 28, 47, 61, 89, 139, 141,
157, 174, 176-7, 180, 182, 214,
216, 235, 238-9, 243, 282, 288_90,
303-4, 306-7
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 28,
52-4, 114-16, 225, 271, 298_9
Federal Tort Claims Act 145, 180
Fenton, Tom 67
Fhimah, Lamen Khalifa 183-4, 186, 301
Fitzgerald, A. Ernest 247-50
Fitzwater, Marvin 184
Flint, Julie 174-5
Foster, Tom 223
Frankfurt 16, 80, 84, 88, 119, 125
Airport 14, 17, 19, 46-7, 49, 51-5,
71-8, 82-3, 113, 115-16, 119, 137,
145-6, 224-5, 270-1, 299
Franks, Michael 102-3, 108, 110, 200-1,
256, 268, 275
Fraser, Lord 49, 111, 113, 184, 186
Freedom of Information Act 223-4, 273
Frezeli, Charles 209
Fulbright Commission 192, 254
Gaddafi, Col. Muammar 16, 82, 126-8,
173-4, 176, 186-7
Gallagher, Neil 47
Ganem, Fred 164, 195, 199
Gannon, Matthew Kevin 83, 85, 143, 206
Gauci, Tony 183
Gavzer, Bernie 26
Gazarik, Richard 237
Geagea, Shamir 211-12
Geohagen, Tom 40-1, 43
George (Syrian) 151, 155, 162, 170,
190-1, 194, 205, 259, 275, 282, 285
George (Taxi) 151, 155
Gerardo, Frank 107
Germany 46, 183, 185, 233
Ghadanfar, Abdel Fattah 14-16, 47, 49,
71, 233, 277
Gilbey, Emma 223
Goben, Mobdi ('the Professor') 15, 84
Graham, Gen. Danny 40, 43-4, 62
Greene, Stephen H. 180, 225
Grissom, Gregory 88-9
Guardian 78
Gurney, Peter 299-300
Habib, Dany 125, 150-1, 164, 196, 216
Haddad, Khaisar 187
Hadjiloizu, Penikos 155
Hallberg, Dr Hakan 244, 308
Hamadan, Jamal 153-4, 156-8
Hamilton, Adrian 186
Hamilton, William 247-9
Haser, Arman Jirayer 169-71
Hashim, Gushan 102, 106, 108-10
Hatfield, Gloria 289
Hayes, Dr Thomas 178, 233, 239, 277
Helms, Richard 93
Helsinki 19, 53, 175
Henderson, DC Derrick 276
Hershow, Sheila 28-9, 50
Hezbollah 17, 109, 122, 129, 131
H.M. Customs & Excise 18-19, 46-7, 54,
138, 226
Holdsworth, Diana 307
Hoobaka, Eli 106-7, 205
Horne, John 299
hostages (Beirut) 129-32, 168, 192, 204
House Government Operations Subcommittee
28, 180
House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee
on Crime & Criminal Justice 316
Hudson, Paul 182
Hurd, Douglas 186
Hurley, Michael T. 1-3, 7, 18, 25-9,
110, 122-5, 148-56, 158-66, 168-70,
189-92, 194-204, 215-16, 218,
227-32, 244, 253-4, 257-8, 261, 267,
275-7, 311, 313
Hussein, Saddam 4, 50, 119, 169, 172,
181, 209
iDAG 287
Imandi, Marten 112, 117
Independent 74, 78, 172-5, 181
Inslaw Inc. 198, 247, 249
Intelligence & Security Command 95
Interfor Report 78-89, 139, 141, 181-2,
219, 224, 237-8, 251, 256, 266, 291,
302, 318
Iran 13, 17, 20, 32, 34, 70, 83, 102, 112,
117, 135-7, 142, 166, 174, 184-6, 188,
197, 236, 241
Iranian Airbus 1, 11, 13, 17, 20, 143
Iraq 4, 181, 190, 209, 262
Israel 4, 19, 106, 183, 185
Israeli Defence Forces 143, 225
Jafaar, Khalid Nazir 29-30, 47-8, 83-6,
146, 170, 180, 196, 229, 239-40, 246,
263, 267, 301-3
Jafaar, Sami 152-4, 156-8, 169-71, 190
Jafaar clan 17-19, 29-30, 152-3,
189-90, 195-6
Jeffries, Jan 58
Jiacha, Abdu Maged 183-4
Jibril, Abmed 13-14, 16--17, 19, 47,
82, 84-5, 119, 175-6, 181, 185, 187,
235, 242
Johnston, David 46
Jones, Michael F. 46-7, 138, 226, 274
Kabbara, Zouher & Nadim 152, 189-90
Kappler, Lt. Gen. James 92
Kasikopu, Andreous 154
Keefe, James 88-9
Keenan, Brian 130
Kenaan, Gen. Ghazi 130, 132, 167-8
Khomeini, Ayatollah 13
Khreesat, Marwan Abdel 14-16, 71, 74,
82, 118, 179
Kimbrough, Walton 33-4
King, David 200-1
Kohn, Aaron 58
KPI Repon 53-4, 56
Kreindler, Lee 235, 238, 270, 291-2
Kurz, Anat 185
Langotsky, Yossi 53
Lamaca 121, 151, 190, 195
Lasser, Stanley 169-70
LBC 106
Leavy, Thomas J. 3, 7, 22, 63-4, 94,
149, 210-12, 216--17, 221, 231, 245,
288-90, 307
Lebanese Army 209
Lebanon 3, 17-19, 102, 121, 196, 204,
208-11, 262
Leppard, David 74, 81, 112-13, 116, 178,
238-42, 277
Lester, Jocelyn see Coleman, Jocelyn
Levin, Jerry 129-30
Libya 16, 20, 34, 44, 70, 73--4, 76, 82,
113, 117, 119, 125-8, 168, 172-9,
182-8, 239, 241, 270-1, 299, 301
Libyan Arab Airlines 183-4
Lindsey, John 139
Lockerbie 1, 12, 20, 45-6, 48, 116,
172-3, 186
Incident Centre 48, 112
Lovejoy, David 19, 143, 201, 225, 236,
256-8, 275
Luqa Airport 72-4, 178, 183-4, 236
McAteer, Det. Insp. Watson 178, 241
McCarthy, John 130-1
McCloskey, James B, 65-6, 68, 91-2, 94,
110, 121, 231, 248-9
McDermott, Martin 192
McFarlane, Robert 102, 135-6
Mack, Linda 218
McKee, Major Charles 45, 83, 85, 143,
204, 206, 235-7
McLaughlin, Ann 114
MacMichael, David 251-4
MacQuarrie, James 11
Magharian, Berkev & Jean 169-71
Mahan, Danny 60-1
Maier, Kurt 300
Major, John 186
Malta 73-4, 76, 89, 112-13, 173, 176,
178, 181, 183, 236, 239, 270-1, 299
Marchetti, Victor 181
Maroni, Walid 210
Martin, Conrad 247
Martz, Ron 200, 251-S, 257-8, 261, 267
Mayer, Hartmut 42, 44, 166, 220-1, 233,
245-6, 277
Megrahi, Abdel see al-Megrahi
Merritt, John 77, 81, 118-19, 141, 237-8
MI6 95, 98, 106
Middle East Media Operations 161
Middle East Television (MET) 95-7,
102, 105
Mikalis, Sgt 155-6
Miller, Marshall Lee 26-8, 120, 147, 213
Miller, Neal 192, 205-6
Mills, David 159-60, 218
Mims, Lambert 37
Mobile 5, 21, 23-4, 35-7
Mogamarat 167, 170-1
Mogbrabi, Mahmoud see al-Moghrabi
Mohtashemi, Ali Akbar 13, 187, 241
Moran, James B. 214, 216, 243-5, 255
Mossad 15, 17, 19, 42, 84-5, 102,
194, 292
Mowat, Sheriff Principal 276
Mueller, Robert 182, 184
Mugraby, Dr Muhamad 210
Munich Olympics 41-2, 152, 166
Mutual Radio 126-7, 159
Nader, Pierre Abu 107
NARCOG 149, 151-3, 155, 159, 161,
163-4, 166, 168, 170, 192, 198, 201,
204, 207, 220
National Alliance of Lebanese Americans
(NALA) 208, 210
National Intelligence Academy 191-2, 259
National Security Agency 92, 139,
223, 224
NBC News 20, 22, 45, 145-6, 159,
180-1, 206-7, 217-18, 266-7,
275, 295
Neuss 14-16, 112-13, 117
New York 255, 259-60, 262, 265, 269,
287, 291
New York Post 53
New York Times 172, 186
Newsday 184
Newsweek 159, 218
Newton, Wayne 159
Nicosia 18, 25, 29, 50, 121, 146, 149,
154, 161, 164, 192-3, 195
Nidal, Abu 82, 84, 167
Niknam, Hussein 143
North, Lt-Col. Oliver 16, 48, 101-2,
107-8, 110, 130, 135-6, 159, 166,
200, 256
Observer 71-2, 77-81, 84, 88-9, 113-14,
118, 141, 174, 179, 186-7, 237-8,
254, 266
O'Connor, Bonnie 184
Olmert, Yossi 185
O'Neill, Roland 88-90, 140, 274
Operation Blessing 108
Operation Corea (Courier) 80, 86, 88,
146, 180, 236, 263
Operation Dome 193
Operation El Dorado Canyon 126, 159
Operation Goldenrod 152-3, 158, 169
Operation Polar Cap 169, 190
Operation Shakespeare 3, 23, 56, 192,
211, 216, 260, 290
Operation Steeplechase 101, 105-6
Operations Sub-Group on Terrorism 152
Orr, DCS John 48-9, 51, 71-2, 74, 112
Overseas Press Services Inc. 102-3
Owens, Richard 169
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
163, 183, 187, 194
Pan Am 2, 19, 46, 50-6, 71-6, 82-5,
89-90, 114-16, 138--41, 207, 215,
217-18, 220, 239-40, 311-14, 318
Flight 103 1, 12, 19, 30, 48, 53, 80, 85,
88, 118-19, 143, 145, 206
lawsuits 78, 81, 137-8, 145, 180-1,
222-6, 233-5, 255-6, 264-8,
270-80, 291, 294, 298-301, 311_15
Pan American World Services 270
Parkinson, Cecil 50-1
Passic, Gregory 169
Pavlick, Michael 152, 170
Pedemonti, Richie 60-1
Pentagon 7, 26, 94, 209, 216
Phillippo, Ron 38
Philps, Alan 185
Pindling, Lyndon O. 63--4
Pindsorf, Bert 221, 233, 245, 277
Plaskett, Thomas G. 114-15, 139,
271, 294-5
Platt, Judge Thomas C. 140-2, 144,
233-5, 240, 242, 255, 271, 274, 278
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
13-17, 19, 47, 49-50, 70-5, 82, 84,
112, 117, 119, 142-3, 167, 174-5,
177-9, 185, 187-8, 198, 235-6, 302
Private Eye 51, 185-6
PROMIS Ltd 197-8, 247, 249
Racep, Ali 84
Rath, Volker 185
Rather, Dan 67
Reagan, Ronald 152, 157-8, 184
Rebmann, Kurt 80
Reefe, James 274
Reich, Rocky 36
Reno, Janet 303-4
Richardson, Elliot L. 247-9
RKO Radio Network 59
Robertson, Pat 48, 95-7, 101-3, 109-10,
159, 231
Robertson, Tim 96-7, 106, 109
Rockwell, Norman 57
Rogers III, Capt. Will 13
Romeo 95-6
Rosenthal, A.M. 186
Ross, Judge Allyne 141, 224, 238
Ross, Brian 22, 29, 146, 159, 218, 255-6,
261, 276
Rowan, Roy 235-8, 240, 251, 255-6,
260-1, 284
Salazar, Raymond 114-15
Salinger, Pierre 49, 146, 186-7, 218, 252,
255-6, 262-3, 275
Sands, Jim 35
Sarnoff, Robert W. 38
Sasser, Col. John 110, 121-2, 124, 158
Saudi Arabia 67-8, 258
Schafer, Michael see Franks, M.
Schreiber, Manfred 42
Schweitzer, Peter 67-8, 258
Shaughnessy, James M. 81, 87-9, 138-45,
147, 222-7, 230-1, 233-4, 236-7, 244,
256, 271-80, 292-4, 297, 318
Shaw, Connor 32
Silverman, Ira 159
Singlaub, Gen. John K. 101-2, 110
Skunk Kilo 154-5, 157
Sleigh (Sly), Robert 205, 282-7
Slizewski, Tom 257
Smith, Raymond 114
Soldier of Fortune 228-9, 252, 254, 257-8
Starnes, Evelyn 126-7
Steele, William H. 23-4
Stephen, Andrew 114
Stetham, Robert 152
Stringer, Howard 67
Suit, W. Dennis 102-3, 159-60
Sunday Correspondent III
Sunday Telegraph 53
Sunday Times 49, 74, 81, 112-13
Sweden 112, 117-18, 221, 233, 243-4,
246, 251, 281-3, 287-8, 290,
297, 305-6
Swire, Dr James 184-5
Syracuse Post Standard 223
Syria 14, 16-20, 50, 70, 82, 102, 115,
117-19, 131-2, 153, 165, 168, 172,
174, 181, 184-6, 188, 208_9, 241,
302-3, 316
Talar, Abou 154
Talb, Mohammed Abu 16, 73, 112, 117,
183, 233, 277
Teresa, Mother 221, 247
Terrell, Jack 200
Thatcher, Margaret 49-51, 70
Theodolus, Mike 254
Thompson, Charlie 28
Time 235-41, 251, 256, 258, 260-1,
264-7, 284, 295
Times 47, 78, 185, 251
Traficant, James 78-9, 81, 139
Trelford, Donald 187
Tribune-Review 237
Tripiccio, Ray 22, 261
Tripoli 113, 125-7, 173, 175, 184, 186
Tunayb, Major Khalil 301
Turner, Ed 130
Tuzcu, Kilin Caslan 88-90, 140, 274
TWA 747 hijack 152, 156
Unclassified 251-2
United States
Department of Defense 94, 97, 251
Justice Department 23, 81, 183, 198,
214, 222, 244-5, 247, 249, 262,
272-3, 276, 278, 280, 288, 297, 304
State Department 18-20, 53, 85, 88,
139, 209
US Aviation Underwriters 291
Van Atta, Dale 50
Vincennes, USS I, 11, 13, 20
Waite, Terry 130-1, 185
Wallace, Mike 290-6
Washington Journalism Review 265,
269, 287
Washington Post 50, 238-9, 241
Watson, Peter 270
Webster, William 139
Wehbe, Nabile 84
Werbell III, Lt Gen. Mitchell 103
Westinghouse 58-9
WFSB-TV 60-1
Whelen, James 101
Whitaker, Lawrence G. 178, 241
White House press corps 59-60
Wilkinson, Paul 174-5, 185
Williams, Hollis 226
Wilson, Edmund 20
Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives 81, 138
WMAR-TV 65-6
Woonie Radio 36-7
WSGN 58, 126, 129
WTN 131
Yeffet, Isaac 53-4
Younis, Fawaz 152-4, 156-7, 169,
190, 218
Zurich 126, 128, 170
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