Re: Inside Washington's Quest to Bring Down Edward Snowden
Posted: Tue Nov 24, 2015 11:05 pm
Case 1:14-cv-00197-TSC Document 19-2 Filed 05/22/15 Page 1 of 10
NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JASON LEOPOLD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 14-0197
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DAVID G. LEATHERWOOD
I, David G. Leatherwood, do hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true
and correct:
I. I am a career Department of Defense (DoD) civilian intelligence officer and have
served in various intelligence assignments for over 35 years. I currently serve as the Director of
Operations for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and as a member of the federal
government's Senior Executive Service. DIA is responsible for satisfying the military and
military-related requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the combatant commands, other DoD components, and, as appropriate, non-DoD agencies
of the federal government. As the Director for Operations, I am responsible for managing the
day-to-day intelligence collection operations of this Agency. I have been delegated authority to
function as an Original Classification Authority (OCA) pursuant to Executive Order 13526.
2. I previously provided a declaration to support the classification status of other
information at issue in this civil action. I am providing this supplemental declaration to support
the classification status of a supplemental release package that was released to the plaintiff in this
litigation on May 15, 2015. The supplemental release package consists of thirty-eight pages of
records, seven of which contain no classified information following a declassification review. I
have determined that the remaining thirty-one pages contain certain sections that remain
currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526. These classified sections
are therefore exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 1 of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). I will also address two additional issues connected to the classification of records
that are at issue in this case. This declaration accompanies the supplemental declaration of
Alesia Y. Williams, the head of this Agency's FOIA operations. Ms. Williams' declaration will
address other aspects of the handling of this FOIA request, while my declaration will generally
address national security classification matters only.
3. I have personally reviewed the documents contained within the supplemental
response package. The thirty-eight pages of responsive records that were located during the
supplemental search originated with the DIA Office of Corporate Communications and are
focused on the work of the Interagency Review Task Force assigned to assess the damage caused
by the activities of former National Security Agency contractor, Edward Snowden. These
particular records reflect the communications between DIA and Congressional leaders
concerning the Snowden disclosures. All of these documents were produced for or by, and
remain under the control of, the United States Government.
Basis for Classification
4. The current basis for classification of national security information is found in
Executive Order 13526. Section 1.1 of the Order authorizes an OCA to classify information
owned, produced, or controlled by the United States government if it falls within one of the
following eight classification categories specified in Section 1.4. The classification categories
that are asserted to classify this particular material include:
Section 1.4(a) - Information related to military plans, weapons systems, or
operations;
Section 1.4(c) - fnfonnation relatcd to intelligence activities (including special
activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
Section 1.4(e) - Infonnation related to scientific, technological, or economic
matters relating to the national security;
Section 1.4 (f) - Information related to United States government programs for
safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; and,
Section 1.4 (g) - Information related to vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems,
installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection
services relating to national security.
5. Section 1.2 of Executive Order 13526 provides that information covered by one
or more ofthese classification categories may be classified at one of three classification levels -
Top Secret (TS), Secret (S) or Confidential (C) - depending on the degree of harm that would
result from the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Information is classified at the
Confidential level when its release could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national
security. Information is classified at the Secret level when its release could reasonably be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Classification at the Top Secret level
is maintained if its release could reasonably be expectrd to cause exceptionally grave damage to
national security.
6. Exercising the classification authority delegated to me pursuant to Executive
Order 13526, I have determined that certain information within these reviewed documents was
properly classified by an Original Classification Authority under the Order and that it remains
currently and properly classified at the Secret and Top Secret levels. Other information has
been declassified because it no longer satisfies the standards set out for national security
classification. The remaining classified information must therefore be withheld from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption 1 of the FOIA in order to protect national security.
Section 1.4(a) - Military Plans, Weapons Systems, and Operations
7. Certain information contained within the supplemental release package is
properly classified under Section 1.4(a) of Executive Order 13526. Section 1.4(a) of the Order
protects information pertaining to military plans, weapons systems or operations. This includes
information such as the strength and deployment of forces, troop movements, ship sailings, the
location and timing of planned attacks, tactics and strategy, operation of weapons systems, and
supply logistics. Protecting such information is critical to maintaining national security.
8. In one paragraph contained within page three of the release package, DIA
describes the classified discussions concerning the impact of the Snowden disclosures on
military plans and military operations. The paragraph refers to the assessment of the scope of
that impact, and thus warrants classification. I have determined that the disclosure of this
information would degrade the military capabilities of the United States and, therefore, cause
serious damage to national security. The information is therefore currently and properly
classified at the Secret level pursuant to Section 1.4(a) of Executive Order 13526.
Section I.4(c) -- Intelligence Sources and Methods
9. DIA withheld certain information from the supplemental release package because
it relates to intelligence sources and methods, and its disclosure could reasonably be expected to
cause either serious or exceptionally grave damage to national security. I have determined that it
is thus properly classified as Secret or Top Secret under Section 1.4(c) of Executive Order
13526. Section 1.4(c) recognizes that the disclosure of intelligence sources can cause damage to
national security. Intelligence sources can include individuals, foreign or American, foreign
entities, and the intelligence and security services of foreign governments. Intelligence sources
can only be expected to furnish information only when confident that they are protected from
retribution by the absolute secrecy surrounding their relationship to the United States
government. Sources that are compromised become extremely vulnerable to retaliation from a
variety of entities including their own governments or others having a stake in the confidentiality
of the information provided by the source.
10. Section 1.4(c) of Executive Order 13526 also recognizes that the release of
intelligence methods can cause damage to national security. Intelligence methods are the means
by which (or the manner in which) an intelligence agency collects information to support
military operations, assist in national policymaking, assess military threats, or otherwise
accomplish its mission. Detailed knowledge of the methods and practices of an intelligence
agency must be protected from disclosure because such knowledge would be of material
assistance to those who would seek to penetrate, detect, prevent, avoid, or damage the
intelligence operations of the United States.
11. I have determined that portions of twenty-eight pages and all of two additional
pages must remain classified pursuant to Section 1.4(c) because this information remains relates
to intelligence sources or methods. I have determined that the disclosure of this information
could reasonably be expected to enable persons and groups hostile to the United States to
identify U.S. intelligence activities, methods or sources, and to design countermeasures to defeat
them. The withheld information captures discussions about the extent to which these intelligence
sources and methods were affected by the Snowden disclosures. Protecting information about
our vulnerabilities in this area is absolutely critical. Disclosure could be expected to cause
serious damage to national security with respect to some of the withheld information and
exceptionally grave damage to national security with respect to other withheld information.
Therefore, this information remains currently and properly classified at the Secret and Top Secret
levels.
Section 1.4(e) - Scientific, Technological. or Economic Matters Related to
National Security, Which Includes Defense Against Transnational Terrorism
12. DIA also withheld certain information because it relates to scientific and
technological matters related to national security, and its disclosure could reasonably be expected
to cause serious damage to national security with respect to some of the withheld information
and exceptionally grave damage to national security with respect to other withheld information.
I have determined that this information is thus properly classified under Section 1.4(e) of
Executive Order 13526. Within portions of two pages of the supplemental release package, DIA
has classified information that discusses scientific or technological capabilities that may have
been affected by the Snowden disclosures. Release of this information would indicate to our
adversaries the extent to which the United States is affected. This information is currently and
properly classified at the Secret and Top Secret level pursuant to Section l.4(e) of Executive
Order 13526. This information is therefore exempt pursuant to Exemption 1 of the FOIA.
Section 1.4(f) - United States Government
Programs for Safeguarding Nuclear Materials or Facilities
13. Section 1.4(f) of Executive Order 13526 protects sensitive information about the
safeguarding of United States Government nuclear materials or facilities. In one paragraph on
page twelve of the supplemental release package, I have determined that there exists one
reference to such a nuclear program or facility that must remain classified at the Top Secret level
to prevent exceptionally grave damage to national security. This information is therefore exempt
pursuant to Exemption 1 of the FOIA.
Section 1.4(g) - Vulnerabilities or Capabilities of Systems. Installations, Infrastructure,
Projects, Plans or Protective Services Related to National Security
14. DIA also withheld portions of one paragraph of information because it relates to
vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructure, projects, plans or protective
services related to national security, its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to national security, and it is thus properly classified under Section
1.4(g) of Executive Order 13,526. Upon review, I have determined that this small amount of
information remains currently and properly classified at the Secret level with respect to some of
the withheld information and at the Top Secret level with respect to other withheld information.
This information is therefore exempt pursuant to Exemption I of the FOIA.
Segregability Review
15. My determination as the OCA is that the withheld classified portions of the
information contained within the thirty-eight page supplemental release package remains
currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526. Its public disclosure could
reasonably be expected to cause serious or exceptionally grave damage to the national security of
the United States. As the OCA responsible for determining the appropriate classification status
of the responsive information pursuant to Executive Order 13526, I understand that I am also
responsible for advising whether any unclassified portions of these documents could be
segregated for release to the requester. A release is required anytime the agency finds
unclassified information within a document containing currently and properly classified
information, if withholding of the unclassified information is not appropriate pursuant to the
provisions of another FOIA exemption.
16. I have determined that certain portions of the classified paragraphs and sections
can be declassified for release to the plaintiff because these portions do not contain classified
information. When it was unnecessary to assert any other exemption to protect this information,
Ms. Williams has prepared the document to segregate that non-exempt information. I have
determined that all reasonably segregable information has been provided to the requester.
Other Issues Raised in Plaintiffs Cross-Motion
17. I will also respond to the plaintiff's apparent misunderstanding or misconstruction
of a portion of my first declaration in this case. As I explained in paragraph 23 of that
declaration:
Mr. Leopold suggests this is not a logical or plausible explanation of foreseeable harm to
national security because the newspaper articles have already "been confirmed to contain
unlawfully disclosed classified information." To be clear, it has not been publicly confirmed by
the United States Government that the unlawfully disclosed, classified information in these
articles is genuine, accurate, or in fact classified. Rather, the Intelligence Community has
confirmed that stolen classified information appears in these articles. Releasing references to
those articles in the context of this case would allow sophisticated observers, including
adversaries of the United States, to conclude that the articles do, in fact, contain genuine,
accurate, and classified national security information. Even if such adversaries may already
suspect the information is genuine, providing further certainty can, in this context, be reasonably
expected to cause serious or exceptionally grave damage to national security by allowing those
adversaries to piece together a fully picture of the United States' intelligence and national
defense capabilities, and devise countermeasures to defeat our capabilities.
18. Finally, in order to address another issue raised by Mr. Leopold in his cross-motion,
I obtained a copy of the transcript of Lieutenant-General Flynn and Director of National
Intelligence Clapper's open testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on February 4, 2014. This testimony followed a closed session of the Committee the
prior day, in which classified information was discussed. I have examined and considered the
statements made to the Committee by LTC Flynn and DNI Clapper during their open testimony.
Neither senior leader divulged information contained within any withheld portions of the records
processed for release to plaintiff as part of his FOJA request. The topics are certainly related, but
the dividing line between classified and unclassified information used by both senior officials in
discussing information in the open testimony matches that of the subject matter experts and
classification officials who reviewed this information for release as part of this case. Put another
way, the information discussed publicly by LTC Flynn and DNI Clapper is not as specific as or
identical to any information withheld as classified (or otherwise) from Mr. Leopold in response
to his FOIA request that is the subject of this case.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
Executed this 21st day of May 2015
David O. Leatherwood
Director for Operations
Defense Intelligence Agency
NOTICE: THIS WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT
YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JASON LEOPOLD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 14-0197
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DAVID G. LEATHERWOOD
I, David G. Leatherwood, do hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true
and correct:
I. I am a career Department of Defense (DoD) civilian intelligence officer and have
served in various intelligence assignments for over 35 years. I currently serve as the Director of
Operations for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and as a member of the federal
government's Senior Executive Service. DIA is responsible for satisfying the military and
military-related requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the combatant commands, other DoD components, and, as appropriate, non-DoD agencies
of the federal government. As the Director for Operations, I am responsible for managing the
day-to-day intelligence collection operations of this Agency. I have been delegated authority to
function as an Original Classification Authority (OCA) pursuant to Executive Order 13526.
2. I previously provided a declaration to support the classification status of other
information at issue in this civil action. I am providing this supplemental declaration to support
the classification status of a supplemental release package that was released to the plaintiff in this
litigation on May 15, 2015. The supplemental release package consists of thirty-eight pages of
records, seven of which contain no classified information following a declassification review. I
have determined that the remaining thirty-one pages contain certain sections that remain
currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526. These classified sections
are therefore exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 1 of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). I will also address two additional issues connected to the classification of records
that are at issue in this case. This declaration accompanies the supplemental declaration of
Alesia Y. Williams, the head of this Agency's FOIA operations. Ms. Williams' declaration will
address other aspects of the handling of this FOIA request, while my declaration will generally
address national security classification matters only.
3. I have personally reviewed the documents contained within the supplemental
response package. The thirty-eight pages of responsive records that were located during the
supplemental search originated with the DIA Office of Corporate Communications and are
focused on the work of the Interagency Review Task Force assigned to assess the damage caused
by the activities of former National Security Agency contractor, Edward Snowden. These
particular records reflect the communications between DIA and Congressional leaders
concerning the Snowden disclosures. All of these documents were produced for or by, and
remain under the control of, the United States Government.
Basis for Classification
4. The current basis for classification of national security information is found in
Executive Order 13526. Section 1.1 of the Order authorizes an OCA to classify information
owned, produced, or controlled by the United States government if it falls within one of the
following eight classification categories specified in Section 1.4. The classification categories
that are asserted to classify this particular material include:
Section 1.4(a) - Information related to military plans, weapons systems, or
operations;
Section 1.4(c) - fnfonnation relatcd to intelligence activities (including special
activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
Section 1.4(e) - Infonnation related to scientific, technological, or economic
matters relating to the national security;
Section 1.4 (f) - Information related to United States government programs for
safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; and,
Section 1.4 (g) - Information related to vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems,
installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection
services relating to national security.
5. Section 1.2 of Executive Order 13526 provides that information covered by one
or more ofthese classification categories may be classified at one of three classification levels -
Top Secret (TS), Secret (S) or Confidential (C) - depending on the degree of harm that would
result from the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Information is classified at the
Confidential level when its release could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national
security. Information is classified at the Secret level when its release could reasonably be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Classification at the Top Secret level
is maintained if its release could reasonably be expectrd to cause exceptionally grave damage to
national security.
6. Exercising the classification authority delegated to me pursuant to Executive
Order 13526, I have determined that certain information within these reviewed documents was
properly classified by an Original Classification Authority under the Order and that it remains
currently and properly classified at the Secret and Top Secret levels. Other information has
been declassified because it no longer satisfies the standards set out for national security
classification. The remaining classified information must therefore be withheld from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption 1 of the FOIA in order to protect national security.
Section 1.4(a) - Military Plans, Weapons Systems, and Operations
7. Certain information contained within the supplemental release package is
properly classified under Section 1.4(a) of Executive Order 13526. Section 1.4(a) of the Order
protects information pertaining to military plans, weapons systems or operations. This includes
information such as the strength and deployment of forces, troop movements, ship sailings, the
location and timing of planned attacks, tactics and strategy, operation of weapons systems, and
supply logistics. Protecting such information is critical to maintaining national security.
8. In one paragraph contained within page three of the release package, DIA
describes the classified discussions concerning the impact of the Snowden disclosures on
military plans and military operations. The paragraph refers to the assessment of the scope of
that impact, and thus warrants classification. I have determined that the disclosure of this
information would degrade the military capabilities of the United States and, therefore, cause
serious damage to national security. The information is therefore currently and properly
classified at the Secret level pursuant to Section 1.4(a) of Executive Order 13526.
Section I.4(c) -- Intelligence Sources and Methods
9. DIA withheld certain information from the supplemental release package because
it relates to intelligence sources and methods, and its disclosure could reasonably be expected to
cause either serious or exceptionally grave damage to national security. I have determined that it
is thus properly classified as Secret or Top Secret under Section 1.4(c) of Executive Order
13526. Section 1.4(c) recognizes that the disclosure of intelligence sources can cause damage to
national security. Intelligence sources can include individuals, foreign or American, foreign
entities, and the intelligence and security services of foreign governments. Intelligence sources
can only be expected to furnish information only when confident that they are protected from
retribution by the absolute secrecy surrounding their relationship to the United States
government. Sources that are compromised become extremely vulnerable to retaliation from a
variety of entities including their own governments or others having a stake in the confidentiality
of the information provided by the source.
10. Section 1.4(c) of Executive Order 13526 also recognizes that the release of
intelligence methods can cause damage to national security. Intelligence methods are the means
by which (or the manner in which) an intelligence agency collects information to support
military operations, assist in national policymaking, assess military threats, or otherwise
accomplish its mission. Detailed knowledge of the methods and practices of an intelligence
agency must be protected from disclosure because such knowledge would be of material
assistance to those who would seek to penetrate, detect, prevent, avoid, or damage the
intelligence operations of the United States.
11. I have determined that portions of twenty-eight pages and all of two additional
pages must remain classified pursuant to Section 1.4(c) because this information remains relates
to intelligence sources or methods. I have determined that the disclosure of this information
could reasonably be expected to enable persons and groups hostile to the United States to
identify U.S. intelligence activities, methods or sources, and to design countermeasures to defeat
them. The withheld information captures discussions about the extent to which these intelligence
sources and methods were affected by the Snowden disclosures. Protecting information about
our vulnerabilities in this area is absolutely critical. Disclosure could be expected to cause
serious damage to national security with respect to some of the withheld information and
exceptionally grave damage to national security with respect to other withheld information.
Therefore, this information remains currently and properly classified at the Secret and Top Secret
levels.
Section 1.4(e) - Scientific, Technological. or Economic Matters Related to
National Security, Which Includes Defense Against Transnational Terrorism
12. DIA also withheld certain information because it relates to scientific and
technological matters related to national security, and its disclosure could reasonably be expected
to cause serious damage to national security with respect to some of the withheld information
and exceptionally grave damage to national security with respect to other withheld information.
I have determined that this information is thus properly classified under Section 1.4(e) of
Executive Order 13526. Within portions of two pages of the supplemental release package, DIA
has classified information that discusses scientific or technological capabilities that may have
been affected by the Snowden disclosures. Release of this information would indicate to our
adversaries the extent to which the United States is affected. This information is currently and
properly classified at the Secret and Top Secret level pursuant to Section l.4(e) of Executive
Order 13526. This information is therefore exempt pursuant to Exemption 1 of the FOIA.
Section 1.4(f) - United States Government
Programs for Safeguarding Nuclear Materials or Facilities
13. Section 1.4(f) of Executive Order 13526 protects sensitive information about the
safeguarding of United States Government nuclear materials or facilities. In one paragraph on
page twelve of the supplemental release package, I have determined that there exists one
reference to such a nuclear program or facility that must remain classified at the Top Secret level
to prevent exceptionally grave damage to national security. This information is therefore exempt
pursuant to Exemption 1 of the FOIA.
Section 1.4(g) - Vulnerabilities or Capabilities of Systems. Installations, Infrastructure,
Projects, Plans or Protective Services Related to National Security
14. DIA also withheld portions of one paragraph of information because it relates to
vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructure, projects, plans or protective
services related to national security, its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to national security, and it is thus properly classified under Section
1.4(g) of Executive Order 13,526. Upon review, I have determined that this small amount of
information remains currently and properly classified at the Secret level with respect to some of
the withheld information and at the Top Secret level with respect to other withheld information.
This information is therefore exempt pursuant to Exemption I of the FOIA.
Segregability Review
15. My determination as the OCA is that the withheld classified portions of the
information contained within the thirty-eight page supplemental release package remains
currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526. Its public disclosure could
reasonably be expected to cause serious or exceptionally grave damage to the national security of
the United States. As the OCA responsible for determining the appropriate classification status
of the responsive information pursuant to Executive Order 13526, I understand that I am also
responsible for advising whether any unclassified portions of these documents could be
segregated for release to the requester. A release is required anytime the agency finds
unclassified information within a document containing currently and properly classified
information, if withholding of the unclassified information is not appropriate pursuant to the
provisions of another FOIA exemption.
16. I have determined that certain portions of the classified paragraphs and sections
can be declassified for release to the plaintiff because these portions do not contain classified
information. When it was unnecessary to assert any other exemption to protect this information,
Ms. Williams has prepared the document to segregate that non-exempt information. I have
determined that all reasonably segregable information has been provided to the requester.
Other Issues Raised in Plaintiffs Cross-Motion
17. I will also respond to the plaintiff's apparent misunderstanding or misconstruction
of a portion of my first declaration in this case. As I explained in paragraph 23 of that
declaration:
DIA asserted Exemption I to protect unclassified references to newspaper articles
in the public domain that have been confirmed to contain unlawfully disclosed
classified information. Confirmation that these specific newspaper articles
contain classified information through the release of these references under the
FOIA would cause harm to national security by offering validation that the stolen
information is classified.
Mr. Leopold suggests this is not a logical or plausible explanation of foreseeable harm to
national security because the newspaper articles have already "been confirmed to contain
unlawfully disclosed classified information." To be clear, it has not been publicly confirmed by
the United States Government that the unlawfully disclosed, classified information in these
articles is genuine, accurate, or in fact classified. Rather, the Intelligence Community has
confirmed that stolen classified information appears in these articles. Releasing references to
those articles in the context of this case would allow sophisticated observers, including
adversaries of the United States, to conclude that the articles do, in fact, contain genuine,
accurate, and classified national security information. Even if such adversaries may already
suspect the information is genuine, providing further certainty can, in this context, be reasonably
expected to cause serious or exceptionally grave damage to national security by allowing those
adversaries to piece together a fully picture of the United States' intelligence and national
defense capabilities, and devise countermeasures to defeat our capabilities.
18. Finally, in order to address another issue raised by Mr. Leopold in his cross-motion,
I obtained a copy of the transcript of Lieutenant-General Flynn and Director of National
Intelligence Clapper's open testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on February 4, 2014. This testimony followed a closed session of the Committee the
prior day, in which classified information was discussed. I have examined and considered the
statements made to the Committee by LTC Flynn and DNI Clapper during their open testimony.
Neither senior leader divulged information contained within any withheld portions of the records
processed for release to plaintiff as part of his FOJA request. The topics are certainly related, but
the dividing line between classified and unclassified information used by both senior officials in
discussing information in the open testimony matches that of the subject matter experts and
classification officials who reviewed this information for release as part of this case. Put another
way, the information discussed publicly by LTC Flynn and DNI Clapper is not as specific as or
identical to any information withheld as classified (or otherwise) from Mr. Leopold in response
to his FOIA request that is the subject of this case.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
Executed this 21st day of May 2015
David O. Leatherwood
Director for Operations
Defense Intelligence Agency