India A History, by John Keay

That's French for "the ancient system," as in the ancient system of feudal privileges and the exercise of autocratic power over the peasants. The ancien regime never goes away, like vampires and dinosaur bones they are always hidden in the earth, exercising a mysterious influence. It is not paranoia to believe that the elites scheme against the common man. Inform yourself about their schemes here.

Re: India A History, by John Keay

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Part 1 of 2

Chapter 7: Gupta Gold
c300–500 AD

REDEEMED BY RUDRADAMAN


JUST OUTSIDE the town of Junagadh in the Saurashtra peninsula of Gujarat an isolated massif rears abruptly from low-lying fields and pastures. This is Girnar, or ‘Giri-nagar’ (‘city-on-the-hill’), one of the most remarkable mountains in India,1 whose several peaks, some over a thousand metres high, are strung about with a garland of the precariously situated temples so beloved of the Jains. Throughout the year a trickle of Jain pilgrims from all over Gujarat and Rajasthan converges on Junagadh to climb the mountain and make a parikrama (meritorious circuit) of its craggy shrines.

Their route begins along a trail of deceptive ease which, issuing from the west gate of the town, quickly leads to a bridge. Thence, by the shortest of detours, the curious may inspect Girnar’s least-visited attraction. Roughly seven metres by ten, the hump-backed mass of granite that bears Ashoka’s Major Rock Edict can hardly compare with the beetling cliffs and the airy vistas that lie ahead. Wayfaring Jains usually give it a miss. Whether bent to their staves or dangling from doolies (seats for one, suspended from a pole borne by two), they press on to the ethereal heights of their local Olympus.

Isolated and ignored in this remote extremity of the subcontinent, the Ashoka rock, ‘converted by the aid of the iron pen … into a book’ (as James Tod put it), yet retains the capacity to stir an indologist’s dusty emotions. Its improbable location speaks volumes for the extent of ancient India’s empires, and it is vastly more impressive than the much-reduced replica which slumps, equally ignored, outside the main entrance of New Delhi’s National Museum. It is also rather more informative. On close inspection, the rain-blackened rock is found to be neatly etched not only with the ‘pin men’ script of the Ashoka Brahmi inscription but also with two much later records. Both relate to repairs carried out on an irrigation system in the vicinity of Junagadh which has long since disappeared. One is of the reign of Skanda-Gupta, last of the five great Gupta emperors, and so dates from the mid-fifth century AD; an important and colourful piece of verse, it will be noticed later. The other is earlier (150 AD) and even more informative. It tells of the history of the dam, how it was constructed by Chandragupta Maurya’s governor (hence, as noted, providing the only evidence for the first Maurya’s conquests in Gujarat), and how subsequently Ashoka’s provincial governor, evidently a Yavana, added new conduits or canals. Thanks to such improvements, more land was no doubt cleared and more settlers flocked to Junagadh, whose fine soil must have rewarded the engineers’ skills with double cropping and handsome yields.

Sadly, though, according to this second inscription the whole irrigation system had since suffered severe storm damage. In fact it was thought to be beyond repair. Then ‘Maha-kshtrapa (‘Great Satrap’) Rudradaman’ decreed otherwise. Under the direction of his minister Suvisakha, a Pahlava (Parthian), the necessary rebuilding had been put in hand and the system was now, in 150 AD, again in operation. According to the inscription, the Great Satrap Rudradaman had done all this ‘without oppressing the people of the town or the province by exacting taxes, forced labour, donations or the like’. It had been paid for entirely out of his own treasury. Not unreasonably he claimed to be the most undemanding of rulers.

This episode, although presented as testimony of Rudradaman’s indomitable character, may also be taken as symptomatic of his redemptive reign, both of which the inscription describes in fulsome detail. For Rudradaman had inherited a kingdom which was every bit as badly in need of repair as the Junagadh dam. He was in fact one of those, probably Scythian, ‘Western Satraps’ who were offshoots of the Shaka kingdom established by Maues, Azes and Spalirises in Gandhara and the Panjab and which succeeded that of the Bactrian Greeks. In the Panjab the Shakas had subsequently been eased out by the Kushana, but in Gujarat their Western Satraps had soldiered on. Throughout the late first century AD they ruled, initially as kshtrapas (satraps) of Kushana overlords like Kanishka, then as increasingly independent maha-kshtrapas (great satraps) of Kanishka’s less illustrious successors. To their domains in Gujarat were added parts of what is now Rajasthan, while a satellite satrapy was established north of the Narmada in Malwa (now in Madhya Pradesh). Thence, from Ujjain, Malwa’s ancient capital, the Satraps had become embroiled with their richly trading Shatavahana neighbours in the western Deccan. The Periplus records the Satraps’ occupation of Broach and their blockading of Kalyan under a leader called Nahapana, while, inland, inscriptions in the cave temples of Nasik and Junnar further attest the Shaka presence in Shatavahana territory.

It seems, however, that the Shatavahanas did not long suffer this indignity. Under the great Gautamiputra Satakarni they successfully repelled the Satraps and completely ‘uprooted’ Shaka rule in Malwa. A large hoard of Shaka coins found near Nasik, most of which had been restruck by the Shatavahana king, would seem to confirm this victory. The Satraps were forced back into Gujarat and immediately began planning their revenge. A certain Chashtana, from his coins a wily-looking strategist, was chosen to lead the Shaka forces, and duly established his own satrapal dynasty. The task of restoring the power of the Western Satraps then started in earnest and, according to the Junagadh inscription, had now, in 150 AD, been successfully completed by Chashtana’s grandson, the Great Satrap Rudradaman.

Rudradaman had actually done rather better than that. As well as twice defeating the Shatavahanas and reconquering the whole of Malwa, he claimed to have made extensive acquisitions in Rajasthan and Sind and to have routed the Yaudheyas. The latter were ksatriyas who still followed their hereditary calling as professional warriors and who retained a republican form of government in their territory to the west of Delhi. Presumably Rudradaman encountered them somewhere further south, perhaps in Rajasthan; certainly he did not occupy their homeland. Whereas the claimed conquests of, say, Kharavela of Kalinga positively invite suspicion, Rudradaman’s are generally plausible. He avoids the usual clichés about an empire reaching from the ocean to the Himalayas; not one of his elephants had ever been watered in the Ganga. His coins, mostly silver, describe him simply as ‘Mahakshtrapa’; their royal busts, if we may assume that they are portraits, have been taken to ‘show a man of vivacious and cheerful disposition’.2

The Junagadh inscription, while failing to elaborate on this cheerful disposition, does add much personal detail. Rudradaman staunchly upheld dharma, possibly in imitation of Ashoka, with whose Edicts he was so happy to share rock-space. He was also a fine swordsman and boxer, an excellent horseman, charioteer and elephant-rider, universally praised for his generosity and bounty, and far-famed for his knowledge of grammar, music, logic and ‘other great sciences’. Clearly he aspired to what he took to be an essentially Indian ideal of kingship; and he succeeded so well that thereafter his name (which unlike ‘Maues’ and ‘Azes’ was a decidedly Indian one) was ‘repeated by the venerable … as if it was another Veda demanding assiduous study and devout veneration and yielding the most precious fruit’.3 He also, his inscription claims, wrote both prose and verse which were ‘clear, agreeable, sweet, charming, beautiful, excelling in the proper use of words, and adorned’. Moreover, as if to prove his point, he had taken the novel and perhaps presumptuous decision to have his memorial written in classical Sanskrit. Rudradaman’s Junagadh inscription is in fact ‘the earliest known classical Sanskrit inscription of any extent’.4

The records of Ashoka, Kharavela and Kanishka and all those Shatavahana cave inscriptions are in some form of Prakrit, usually Magadhi or Pali. These were the languages of everyday use which, since their adoption by early Buddhist and Jain commentators, had become the normal medium of record. Much-simplified derivatives of classical Sanskrit, the Prakrit languages have sometimes been unfairly likened to pidgin; after a further stage of adaptation, they would spawn the Indo-Aryan regional languages of today – Hindi, Marathi, Gujarati, Panjabi, etc. Sanskrit, on the other hand, remained a prestige language, imbued with sacral powers, reserved mainly for religious and literary purposes, and jealously guarded as well as principally understood by brahmans. Its unexpected emergence as a language of contemporary record in the second century AD, and its subsequent acceptance as the medium of courtly and intellectual discourse throughout India, may be taken as a sure sign of a brahmanical renaissance.

Such would indeed prove to be the case under the Guptas. The great era of all that is deemed classical in Indian literature, art and science was now dawning. It was this crescendo of creativity and scholarship, as much as the unevenly documented political achievements of the Guptas, which would make their age so golden; and it was to the wider use of Sanskrit and the exploration of its myriad subtleties that this awakening owed most.

In the development of languages the classical phase usually precedes the proliferation of vernacular derivatives; thus the Latin of Cicero, Virgil and Horace precedes the vulgarised vernacular from which the Romance languages developed. Sanskrit somehow reversed the process; it was making its great comeback when it should have been dying. Why this happened remains a puzzle. ‘The answer cannot be given in purely cultural terms,’ wrote D.D. Kosambi. A Marxist as well as a brahman, Kosambi sought an explanation in ‘the development of India’s productive systems’ and ‘the emergence of a special position for the brahman caste’.5 Behind the glittering façade of Gupta culture, society was about to undergo the profound changes associated with the Indian version of feudalism. A gradual process of unsensational devolution, it would give a new impetus to the Aryanising primacy of both the brahmans and their language.

One other linguistic question remains. How was it that Rudradaman and his minister anticipated such a quintessentially classical trend as the triumph of Sanskrit by a couple of centuries, and in an inscription so remotely located that it can have been seen only by a literate few? The suggestion has been made that the Satrap’s use of Sanskrit was ‘a method followed to endear a ruler of foreign descent to the indigenous ruling class’; thus, in the case of Rudradaman, a Shaka, and his deputy Suvisakha, a Parthian, the adoption of Sanskrit and the patronage of those who held it dear was designed to reconcile brahman opinion to a foreign ruler – or as Kosambi puts it ‘to mitigate the lamentable choice of parents on the part of both Satrap and governor’.6 This seems plausible and is generally accepted in respect of the Sanskrit inscriptions soon to be composed by, or for, Indophil rulers in Sumatra, Java, Indo-China and other parts of Indianised south-east Asia. The employment of a prestige language lent distinction and authority even to non-Indic dynasties. One wonders why, though, if Sanskrit offered such ready legitimacy it was not also adopted by the earlier Shakas or the contemporary Kushanas.

However objectionable to north Indian pride, the possibility must remain that in a little-regarded region of the subcontinent long-Indianised dynasts, albeit originally of foreign extraction, could actually have pioneered and popularised such a cardinal feature of the classical Indian tradition. Aryanisation was, as will appear, a two-way process; and many other cultural achievements associated with the Gupta age cannot readily be ascribed to Gupta rule. To the emerging ‘Great Tradition’ of Hinduism, borrowing from the subcontinent’s far-flung store of local custom and innovation was quite as natural as banking on the Indo- Aryan orthodoxies of the Gangetic heartland.

But the history of India’s so-called ‘regions’ (Gujarat, Bengal, Tamil Nadu and so on) is still today in its infancy. Habitually disparaged as divisive, ‘regional’ history has few champions in the Senior Common Rooms of power. Untypical and brave are the scholars who insist that Rudradaman of Gujarat did himself write such ‘clear, agreeable, sweet, charming, beautiful’ and altogether excellent Sanskrit; or that under the Satraps’ patronage classical Sanskrit was actively promoted (as is further suggested by its appearance in the donative inscription of a Shatavahana queen who was of Satrapal birth); or that ‘the Shakas had shown the way by using Sanskrit in their inscriptions … [and] the Guptas only perpetuated the tradition when they came to power.’7

THE ARM OF THE GUPTAS

History, whatever its parameters, is said to repeat itself. Seldom, though, does it oblige so readily as with the creators of ancient India’s two greatest dynasties. A Chandragupta had founded the Mauryan empire in c320; just so did a Chandragupta found the Gupta dynasty in c320. It could be confusing. But the first date was, of course, BC, the second AD; and to clarify matters further, the Gupta Chandragupta is often phonetically dismembered as ‘Chandra-Gupta’ or ‘Chandra Gupta’. Unfortunately there would be another Gupta Chandra-Gupta. The founder of the Gupta dynasty is therefore designated as Chandra-Gupta I – which naturally brings to mind the Mauryan Chandragupta. (Here the Gupta founder will be called Chandra-Gupta I and his Mauryan counterpart Chandragupta Maurya.) Coincidence, however, continues. As well as a name, the Gupta founder shares with his Mauryan predecessor a shadowy profile, a reputation for important but doubtful conquests, and the misfortune of being hopelessly upstaged by a more illustrious successor – Ashoka in the case of Chandragupta Maurya, Samudra-Gupta in the case of Chandra-Gupta I.

Of earlier Guptas before Chandra-Gupta I, a Sri Gupta and a Ghatotkacha Gupta are listed in inscriptions. The former would be remembered solely for having endowed a place of worship in Bihar for Chinese Buddhists. By the third century AD the first Chinese monks had begun trickling back along the Karakoram route to tour the sites associated with the Buddha’s life. For these foreign pilgrims to the Buddhist ‘Holy Land’ Sri Gupta built a temple; when first noticed in the fifth century, it was already in ruins. Sri Gupta was probably not a Buddhist but was raja of some minor polity near or within erstwhile Magadha. He was succeeded by his son Ghatotkacha. Their origins are unknown; their caste may have been vaisya.

Chandra-Gupta I was Ghatotkacha’s son. He is regarded as founder of the dynasty partly because he assumed a new title, partly because later Gupta chronology is calculated from what is taken to be the date of his accession (320 or 321 AD), and partly because by marriage or conquest he acquired more territory and authority than he inherited. The new title was Maharajadhiraja, ‘great raja of rajas’, an Indian adaptation of the Persian ‘king of kings’ as previously adopted by the Kushanas. Its assumption seems premature, but lofty titles and epithets would be important to the Guptas. They would soon up the stakes to paramaharajadhiraja and even rajarajadhiraja, ‘king of kings-of-kings’.

Presumably the title reflected growing ambitions. Chandra-Gupta I was the first of his line to feature on coins. According to the Puranas, his territory stretched along the Ganga from Magadha (southern Bihar) to Prayaga (the later Allahabad in Uttar Pradesh). Whether he conquered this rich swathe of the Gangetic heartland and, if so, from whom, is not known. Magadha, for instance, or part of it, may have come to him as a marriage settlement. Kumaradevi, his chief queen, was a Licchavi and so a descendant of one of those 7707 Licchavi knights-raja who had been defeated by Ajatashatru seven hundred years previously. The Licchavis had a distinguished pedigree which was doubtless highly desirable to unknowns like the Guptas. But the importance the Guptas attached to this union was of an altogether higher order. Chandra-Gupta I’s successor would style himself not ‘son of a Gupta father’ but ‘son of a Licchavi daughter’. There are even coins showing king and queen together, an unprecedented development; they bear, as well as the king’s name, that of ‘Kumaradevi Licchavayah’. It is known that the Licchavis had acquired territory in Nepal and it may be that ‘they had taken possession of Pataliputra, the city which had been built and fortified many centuries earlier for the express purpose of curbing their restless spirit.’8 Certainly it is probable that the Guptas and the Licchavis ruled adjacent territories ‘and that the two kingdoms were united under Chandra-Gupta I by his marriage with Kumaradevi’.9

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The Imperial Guptas: Probable Succession

Only under their son Samudra-Gupta does the dynasty emerge from obscurity. Once again this is mostly thanks to the survival of a single inscription. Like Kharavela’s, it advances extravagant claims, but, like Rudradaman’s, these claims are substantiated by other epigraphic and numismatic evidence. The inscription is probably the most famous in all India. Written in a script known as Gupta Brahmi (more elaborate than Ashoka Brahmi), and composed in classical Sanskrit verse and prose, its translation is often credited to James Prinsep of Ashoka fame, although it had been known and partially translated by earlier scholars. Its idiom and language echo that of Rudradaman. So does Samudra- Gupta’s choice of site; for as if aspiring to Mauryan hegemony, his panegyric appears as an addition to the Edicts of Ashoka on one of those highly polished Ashokan pillars.

The pillar stands in the city of Allahabad where, soon after Prinsep’s death, another Ashokan pillar, or part of it, was found in the possession of a contractor who used it as a road-roller. British antiquarians were mortified. A similar fate had almost befallen the pillar with the Samudra-Gupta epigraph. It had been uprooted in the eighteenth century and was discovered by Prinsep’s colleagues lying half-buried in the ground. They re-erected it on a new pedestal and designed an Achaemenid-style replacement for its missing capital. Supposedly a lion, the capital ‘resembles nothing so much as a stuffed poodle on top of an inverted flower pot’, wrote Alexander Cunningham, the father of Indian archaeology in the nineteenth century.

Cunningham also deduced that the Allahabad column had been shifted once before. Evidently later Muslim rulers had come to see these spectacular monoliths as a challenge to the excellence both of their sovereignty and their transport. They had therefore attempted to relocate them as totemic embellishments to their palatial courts. The truncated pillar which now tops Feroz Shah’s palace in Delhi originally stood near Khizrabad higher up the Jamuna. A contemporary (thirteenth-century) account describes how it was toppled onto a capacious pillow, then manoeuvred onto a forty-two-wheeler cart and hauled to the river by 8400 men. Lashed to a fleet of river transports, it was finally brought to Delhi in triumph.

Just so, the Allahabad pillar had apparently been shifted downriver from its original site in Kaushambi. It was meant to enhance the pretensions of the Allahabad fort as rebuilt by the Mughal emperor Akbar in the late sixteenth century. Akbar’s son Jahangir would add his own inscription to those of Ashoka and Samudra-Gupta; and thus it is that scions of each of north India’s three greatest dynasties – Maurya, Gupta and Mughal – share adjacent column inches in the heart of Allahabad, a city whose further claim to fame is as the home of a fourth great dynasty, that of the Nehru-Gandhis.

Miraculously, all that shunting around of the Allahabad pillar little damaged its inscriptions. That of Samudra-Gupta, if not posthumous, dates from near the end of his reign, which was a long one. He is thought to have succeeded as maharajadhiraja, or been so nominated by his father, in c335, and to have died in c380. The inscription may therefore be of about 375 and, with forty years’ achievements to cover, it has much to tell. The most important sections consist of long lists of kings and regions subdued by ‘the prowess of his arm in battle’, otherwise ‘the arm that rose up so as to pass all bounds’; indeed the pillar itself ‘is, as it were, an arm of the earth’ extended in a gesture of command.10 Some historians take these strong-arm conquests to be arranged in chronological order and, on that basis, have divided them into separate ‘campaigns’. Thus the first campaign seems to have taken Samudra-Gupta west where, with the strength of his arm, he ‘uprooted’ kingdoms in the Bareilly and Mathura regions of what is now Uttar Pradesh and in neighbouring Rajasthan. These were incorporated into the Gupta kingdom.

Next he headed south down the eastern seaboard and, perhaps in the course of several campaigns, elbowed aside a dozen more rivals. He turned back only after capturing Vishnugopa, the Pallava king of Kanchipuram (near Madras). Further campaigns in the north saw Gupta forces overrunning most of Bengal, ‘exterminating’ independent republics like that of the Yaudheyas west of Delhi, and establishing Gupta rule throughout the ancient arya-varta (the Aryan homeland – roughly the modern states of West Bengal, Bihar, UP, Madhya Pradesh and the eastern parts of Rajastan and the Panjab). This became the core region of Gupta rule, within which numerous tribal peoples were also deprived of their autonomy and where most extant inscriptions of the early Guptas have been found. Further afield the Kushanas in Gandhara, Great Satrap Rudradaman’s descendants in Gujarat and Malwa, various rulers in Assam and Nepal, and the kings of Sri Lanka and ‘other islands’ (which could mean the Indianised kingdoms of south-east Asia) are all said to have acknowledged Samudra-Gupta’s sovereignty and to have solicited his favour with deferential missions, handsome gifts and desirable maidens.

Now indisputably ‘the unconquered conqueror of unconquered kings’, Samudra-Gupta stood on the threshold of a pan-Indian empire. Other favourite epithets describe him as ‘conqueror of the four quarters of the earth’ and ‘a god dwelling on earth’. He performed the horse-sacrifice; 100,000 cows were distributed as gifts, presumably to his brahman supporters. His coins reveal Vaishnavite leanings but, as a world conqueror, he was seen not just as a devotee of Vishnu but as an emanation or incarnation of that deity. Universal dominion was his. Besides the Garuda symbol of Vishnu, some of his coins feature the one-umbrella of a samrat. Its welcome shade was seen to engulf the political landscape as he turned the cakravartin’s wheel of world-rule.

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Gupta Conquests

But what kind of empire was this? Not, it seems, a continually intrusive one. Gupta rhetoric had perhaps outstripped reality; alternatively its richly allusive phrasing may simply have been misinterpreted. For a close scrutiny of Samudra- Gupta’s rule reveals little of the bureaucratic interventionism associated with Mauryan empire; and despite the best efforts of patriotic scholarship, the claims advanced by zealous nationalists about his ‘unifying India’ and arousing a nation are hard to sustain. He may indeed have been ‘a man of genius who may fairly claim the title of the Indian Napoleon’;11 the Allahabad inscription certainly refutes the idea that only foreigners have conquered India. But it was a conquest to little lasting political purpose other than dynastic gratification. Just as the celebrity of the Guptas was only perceived after the translation of the Allahabad inscription in the nineteenth century, so a deeper design for their empire was only discovered in the twentieth century. ‘Far from the Guptas reviving nationalism it was nationalism that revived the Guptas,’ writes Kosambi.12

In such championship, Indian nationalism reveals as much about its own ambiguities as about those of the Guptas. Thus we learn that Samudra-Gupta ‘was not moved by a lust for conquest for its own sake. He worked for an international system of brotherhood and peace replacing that of violence, war and aggression.’13 A less likely candidate for the Gandhian mantle of nonaggressive satyagrahi it would be hard to find. Nor is this a very convincing explanation for Samudra-Gupta’s failure to consolidate his conquests. In the Deccan and elsewhere beyond the frontiers of his Gangetic arya-varta, he had made no attempt at annexation. ‘Uprooted’ kings were reinstated, their territories restored, and the Gupta forces withdrawn. A one-off tribute was exacted and on this the Gupta court waxed wealthy, with conspicuous patronage of the arts and a prolific output of the beautifully minted gold coins to which the Guptas first owed their ‘golden’ reputation. But unlike the directly administered empire of the Mauryas, this was at best a web of feudatory arrangements and one which, lacking an obvious bureaucratic structure, left the sovereignty of the feudatories largely intact.

In the fourth century BC the Mauryas had been able to extend their rule into politically virgin territories where state-formation, if it existed at all, had been in its infancy. Ashoka had carefully noted several foreign kings in his inscriptions but within India he found not one sovereign worthy of being so named; the ‘Cholas’ and ‘Keralaputras’ were families or clans; even Kalinga was just a place and a people. In such a vacuum, Mauryan empire had a pioneering quality and was necessarily one of agricultural settlement, administrative decree and fiscal organisation.

Six hundred years later the Guptas may have found a similar situation in Bengal and have pursued similar policies there. Elsewhere they faced more advanced opponents who were already administering their own states and taxing their own subjects. The submission of all these now carefully named and previously unconquered kings was, of course, most gratifying; ‘the Beloved of the Gods’ had been merely a raja, a ‘king’; the Guptas were maharajadhirajas, ‘kings of kings’. On the other hand they also recognised the difficulty of trying permanently to engross such distant and confident kingdoms. It was more expedient to content themselves with the rich pickings of conquest and to retain the option of perhaps repeating this feat when more such pickings had accumulated.

It also seems that the criteria associated with the status of cakravartin did not include sustained government or direct control. In the case of distant rulers a nominal submission looks to have been sufficient, while of those nearer at hand regular attendance on the cakravartin was also required. As will emerge, a world-ruler did not actually have to rule the world; it was enough that the world should acknowledge him as such; in fact his status as a maharajadhiraja was dependent on the survival of rajas, both within and beyond his arya-varta, who were powerful enough to justify the title. ‘The point here was not to do away with other kings as such and produce a single, absolute kingship, blessed by a monotheist deity, for all India.’ Tributary rajas, or kings, were essential as validating and magnifying agents. In the same way as local cults and lesser deities were harnessed to the personae of Lords Vishnu or Shiva, so lesser rulers were inducted into an enhancing relationship with the ‘world-ruler’. Precedence and paramountcy were what mattered, not governance or integration. ‘What distinguished an imperial court politically, and especially one whose king claimed to be the universal king of India, was that it was primarily a society of kings.’14

Samudra-Gupta’s immediate successors maintained his elevated status and continued his policies. No inscription as detailed as the Allahabad testimonial is available for any of them, but from minor inscriptions, coins and literary sources it is clear that the Gupta ‘empire’ now climbed to its ambiguous zenith. There were, however, setbacks and compromises. A sixth-century drama tells of a Rama-Gupta who is thought to have briefly succeeded Samudra-Gupta and who attempted to ‘uproot’ the Western Satraps in Malwa.15 The attempt went badly wrong. Rama-Gupta was defeated and, when he tried to disengage, he was informed that the price of escape would be the surrender of his queen. According to a much later biography, the Shaka Satrap sorely coveted the lovely Queen Dhruvadevi. No doubt she had been represented to him as lotus-eyed, with thighs like banana stems, and all the other ripe attributes of desirable womanhood as detailed in textual tradition and epitomised in the yaksi temptresses of Mathura and Sanchi sculpture. Aflame with desire, ‘the lustful Shaka king’ was adamant; Rama-Gupta, hopelessly unworthy of such a desirable consort, conceded defeat and agreed to hand her over.

But the ignominy was too much for Rama-Gupta’s younger brother. The latter somehow disguised himself as the shapely Dhruvadevi, was duly given entry to the enemy camp, and promptly slew the Satrap. He must also have made his escape for, Rama-Gupta having been irrevocably disgraced by this affair, it was the righteous brother who now took over the reins of empire as Chandra-Gupta II. He may have had to kill Rama-Gupta in the process; more certainly it was he who eventually claimed the hand of Dhruvadevi.

Not surprisingly Chandra-Gupta II’s main offensive was a continuation of this struggle against the Shaka Satraps. Judging by inscriptions in and around Sanchi he seems to have been in eastern Malwa for some years, presumably while he conducted the necessary campaigns. Patience was eventually rewarded. By the year 409 Chandra-Gupta II was issuing silver coins to replace those of the Satraps. The Shaka territories in western India had been annexed to those of the Guptas, and of the Western Satraps no more is heard.

The Guptas thus secured their western frontier and inherited whatever remained of the cultural traditions established by the Sanskrit-loving Rudradaman and his successors. On the evidence of a Buddhist site in northern Gujarat (Devnimori) which may date to about 375, it has been suggested that Gupta sculpture and architecture owed several motifs and design features to western India. It may also be significant that the cultural achievements usually associated with the Guptas are little in evidence in the fourth century and only become established after Chandra-Gupta II’s conquest of the Satraps.

Success against the Satraps also gave the Guptas access to the ports of Gujarat and to the profits of its international maritime trade. There and throughout central India, just as the Satraps had once become embroiled with their Shatavahana trading neighbours, so the Guptas became involved with the Vakatakas, the dynasty which had succeeded the Shatavahanas as the dominant power in the Deccan. For once, war was not the outcome; perhaps the campaigns against the Satraps were taking their toll. Instead, the Guptas opted for a dynastic alliance whereby Chandra-Gupta II’s daughter was married to Rudrasena II, the Vakataka king. The latter soon died and during the ensuing regency (c390–410) it was Prabhavati, this Gupta queen, who as regent controlled the Vakataka state in accordance with Gupta policy. Thereafter the Vakatakas continued as allies and associates of the imperial Guptas.

Other dynastic pairings suggest that the Guptas often made intelligent use of the prestige which attached to the maharajadhiraja’s bed-chamber. Prabhavati was Chandra-Gupta II’s daughter not by the coveted Dhruvadevi but by a princess of the Naga dynasty. This was an ancient lineage which seems to have re-established itself in Mathura and other parts to the west and south of the Jamuna in the wake of Kushana retraction. Since Samudra-Gupta had earlier ‘violently exterminated’ the Naga king, it would seem that marriage was used to consolidate existing acquisitions as well as to neutralise external rivals.

Chandra-Gupta II, like his predecessor Samudra-Gupta and his successor Kumara-Gupta, reigned for about forty years. Such longevity over three generations is exceptional and must have been another important factor in the stability of Gupta rule. Of further Gupta feats there is little evidence, the only notable exceptions being a doubtful record of far-flung campaigns by Chandra- Gupta II and an important defensive role undertaken during the reign of Kumara- Gupta.

The former, the campaigns sometimes attributed to Chandra-Gupta II, are recorded in a short inscription engraved on a pillar located at Mehrauli, once a village on the outskirts of Delhi. The pillar, unlike the stone pillars, or lats, of Ashoka, is made of iron, and the village is better known as the site where Delhi’s twelfth-century sultans would build the renowned Qutb minar and mosque. It is in fact the famously rust-resistant ‘Iron Pillar’ which now stands in the main courtyard of the mosque and attracts hordes of visitors, many of them convinced that wish-fulfilment awaits those whose arms are long enough to embrace its trunk. Fortunately out of reach, as it might otherwise have been erased by this activity, the inscription commemorates the erection of the pillar as ‘a lofty standard of the divine Vishnu’. Its donor was one ‘Chandra’, supreme world conqueror ‘on whose arm fame was inscribed by the sword when in battle in the Vanga countries’ and who, having ‘crossed in warfare the seven mouths of the [river] Sindhu’ defeated the ‘Vahlikas’. He also perfumed the breezes of the southern ocean with his prowess. Unfortunately no date is mentioned and, worse still, there is no sign of the word ‘Gupta’. ‘Chandra’ could therefore as well have been a Chandra-sena or a Chandra-varman, both attested kings of the period. And if a Chandra-Gupta, which one? Straining for clarification, scholars, even long-armed epigraphists, find their wishes unfulfilled. The identity of this fragrant ‘Chandra’ remains a mystery, as does the technology which enabled Guptan smelters to cast an iron obelisk of such rust-resistant purity that sixteen hundred monsoons have scarcely pitted its surface or defaced its inscription.

There is also doubt about this Chandra’s listed conquests. ‘Vanga’, like Anga, was an ancient janapada in west Bengal; the ‘Sindhu’ is usually the Indus; and the ‘Vahlikas’ have been taken to be the Bactrians. But military successes at such distant poles of the subcontinent strain credulity. In the west no corroborative evidence of Gupta intervention beyond the Indus, let alone beyond the Hindu Kush, is available. However, most of Bengal definitely was within the Gupta ambit. In fact the Guptas were the first north Indian dynasty to extend their rule into and across the heavily forested maze of swamps and waterways that was the Ganga-Brahmaputra delta. Hitherto little exposed to Aryanising influences except along its western seaboard, nearly all of Bengal was now claimed by the Guptas, and it seems reasonable to suppose an accelerated process of drainage, clearance and settlement. From the ruins of the Gupta empire would emerge east and central Bengal’s first historical states, amongst which Vanga would be eminent.

Kumara-Gupta, who ruled from c415 to c455, faced a different challenge. In his reign there seems to have been a major uprising in Malwa by one Pushyamitra. Briefly, in the words of the only inscription which refers to it, it ‘ruined the fortunes of the Gupta family’. Soon after there first appeared on the Indian scene the Hunas, otherwise described as a new breed of mlecchas (incomprehensible foreigners). These newcomers were a branch of the Hiung-nu of Chinese history and the Huns of European history. In a new wave of central Asian displacement, an offshoot of this horde, the Ephthalites or White Huns, had established themselves in Bactria in the late fourth century (thus making a Gupta conquest there unlikely). In the mid-fifth they followed their Yuehchi/ Kushana predecessors across the Hindu Kush and into Gandhara, and thence they pushed east against the Guptas.

Fortunately the Guptas produced a champion worthy of the occasion. In one inscription Skanda-Gupta, a son of Kumara-Gupta, is described as ‘subsisting like a bee on the wide-spreading water-lilies which were the feet of his father’. The bee, though, had a sting. It was Skanda-Gupta who took the field successfully against the upstart Pushyamitra. He then made good a doubtful claim to succeed his father. And finally, if only temporarily, he repulsed the Huns. It was also during the reign of Skanda-Gupta, he who ‘made subject the whole earth bounded by the waters of the four oceans and full of thriving countries round the borders of it’, that the last major addition was made to the great rock outside Junagadh in the Saurashtra peninsula. Following the inscriptions of Ashoka and Rudradaman, this third inscription tells of Skanda- Gupta’s governor in Gujarat and of his son. Both paragons of virtue, they built a massive embankment when Rudradaman’s reservoir was in its turn overwhelmed by floodwaters, and they also added a temple.

But if the temple was meant to guarantee the dam’s future security, it failed. Not even a trace of the irrigation system which prompted this unique series of inscriptions beneath the crags of Girnar remains. The rulers of Saurashtra soon deserted Junagadh, perhaps after another disastrous flood, and by 500 a new capital had been established at Vallabhi in the east of the peninsula. Only the hump-backed rock, converted into a book ‘by the aid of the iron pen’, still mutely protests the majesty of Junagadh’s distinguished benefactors.

A similar fate, redeemed only by the tenacity of tradition, now overtook the Gupta empire. After the death of Skanda-Gupta in c467, his nephew Budha- Gupta, then another nephew, his son and then his grandson continued to claim world dominion well into the sixth century. But their reigns were mostly brief and it is clear that by 510 other Guptas, who may or may not have been related to them, operated as independent rulers within the core area of the erstwhile empire. In that year the Huns, led by a formidable leader called Toramana, were again on the move. They overran Kashmir and the Panjab and defeated a Gupta army near Gwalior, thus extending their rule to Malwa. In the face of such disarray, even the fiction of the Guptas’ universal sovereignty was unsustainable. Their golden reputation fades from history as the famous gold coinage, debased under Skanda-Gupta, becomes crudely cast, increasingly stereotyped, of rare occurrence, and then non-existent.
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Re: India A History, by John Keay

Postby admin » Sat Dec 07, 2024 3:43 am

Part 2 of 2

THE GUPTA UTOPIA

‘Perfection has been attained,’ declares the last of the three Junagadh inscriptions. ‘While he [Skanda-Gupta] is reigning, verily no man among his subjects falls away from dharma ; there is no one who is distressed, in poverty, in misery, avaricious, or who, worthy of punishment, is over-much put to torture.’ Such a glowing depiction of Gupta society is to be expected from a royal panegyric. It is, however, corroborated by an alien and presumably impartial eye-witness.

The people are very well off, without poll tax or official restrictions … The kings govern without corporal punishment; criminals are fined according to circumstance, lightly or heavily. Even in cases of repeated rebellion they only cut off the right hand. The king’s personal attendants, who guard him on the right and the left, have fixed salaries. Throughout the country the people kill no living thing nor drink wine, nor do they eat garlic or onions, with the exception of the Chandalas only.16


To Fa Hian (Fa-hsien, Faxian, etc.), a Buddhist pilgrim from China who visited India in c400–410, Chandra-Gupta II’s realm was indeed something of a utopia. Descending to India by the Karakoram trail, Fa Hian travelled the length of the Gangetic basin in perfect safety as he visited everywhere of note associated with the Buddha’s life. Only the lot of the Chandalas he found unenviable; outcastes by reason of their degrading work as disposers of the dead, they were universally shunned and had to give warning of their approach so that fastidious caste-members could take cover. But no other sections of the population were notably disadvantaged, no other caste distinctions attracted comment from the Chinese pilgrim, and no oppressive caste ‘system’ drew forth his surprised censure. Peace and order prevailed. And if the peace was the peace of past conquests and the order the rigid social hierarchy of varna and the professional exclusivity of jati, no one was complaining.

From other sources we glimpse a society industrious as well as contented. Those highly influential guilds (sreni) regulated elaborate systems of quality control, pricing, distribution and training for every craft and calling. They also acted as bankers, even to the royal court; and their sresthin, or aldermen, met regularly in a joint council that has been likened to a chamber of commerce. Trade continued to flourish, both within India and overseas. When Fa Hian returned to China he did so not by the long overland route but aboard an Indian vessel sailing from Tamralipti in Bengal. After a near-shipwreck off the Burma coast he reached ‘Ye-po-ti’, which could be Java, Sumatra or Malaya. There, as also in Indo-China, he reported that ‘Brahmans flourish although the law of the Buddha is not much known.’ After more nautical mishaps, he regained China, again in the company of brahmans and so probably aboard an Indian ship.

In Fa Hian’s account of India, Magadha is made to sound especially impressive. Its towns were the largest and its people the richest and most prosperous as well as the most virtuous. True, some Buddhist sites already partook of the archaeological. Kapilavastu, the Sakyas’ ancient capital and the Enlightened One’s birthplace, was ‘like a great desert’ with ‘neither king nor people’; and of Ashoka’s palace in Pataliputra only the ruins remained. But for a Buddhist there was also much to celebrate. Stupas in their thousands, some manytiered and of gigantic proportions, dotted the landscape – much as they still do today at centres outside India like Pagan in Burma. But then, unlike now, Buddhism still enjoyed the support of large sections of Indian opinion. The monasteries were well-endowed; their monks could be numbered in thousands. Eight centuries after the Buddha, only Sri Lanka was more Buddhist. For Samudra-Gupta it had been particularly gratifying to receive a Sri Lankan embassy whose gifts, coupled with a request for permission to build a monastery on the site of the Buddha’s enlightenment at Buddh Gaya, he took to represent a form of tribute.

Not much concerned with political affairs, Fa Hian says nothing of the Gupta court nor of Chandra-Gupta II, its then maharajadhiraja. Perhaps, as was normal during the dry season, the court was on the move, receiving the obeisances and consuming the produce of its subject kings or conducting hostilities with the Satraps. In Pataliputra, which along with Ujjain seems to have served as the Gupta capital, the Chinese visitor was more impressed by an annual festival. It was marked by a magnificent procession of some twenty wheeled stupas whose bristling towers accommodated images of the gods decorated with gold and silver as well as sitting figures of the Buddha attended by standing Boddhisatvas. As the procession approached the city Fa Hian watched ‘the brahmacharis come forth to offer their invitations; the Buddhas then, one after another, enter the city’.17

As between the orthodox and the heterodox sects ecumenism was still the norm. The Guptas, although identifying themselves with Lord Vishnu and performing Vedic sacrifices, encouraged endowments to both Buddhist and brahman establishments with even-handed munificence. Yet the physical separation of the two communities, as implied in Fa Hian’s account, may be significant. Buddhist monasteries were usually located outside the main centres of population and influence, near enough for collecting alms and instructing the laity but far enough for tranquillity and seclusion. The ‘brahmacharis’, on the other hand, technically brahman students but here implying the whole brahman educational establishment, were now located within the city and close to the court.  

Hinduism as a religion with specific doctrines and practices was still unrecognisable. Arguably it still is. The criteria of orthodoxy lay – and lie – in conduct rather than belief. Deference and support to brahmans, acceptance of one’s caste, public participation in traditional rituals, festivals and pilgrimages, and the propitiation of familial or local deities remained of the essence. As already noted, concepts like those of dharma, karma and the transmigration of souls, though originally aired in the Upanisads and nowadays considered quintessentially Hindu, had hitherto been more zealously championed by the Buddhists. To the Buddhist practice of erecting and adorning stupas of dressed stone have also been traced the first experiments in stone architecture and in the devotional use of sculptural iconography. Only after achieving remarkable expertise in the portrayal of the Buddha figure and of animal and human, mainly female, figures did the stonemasons of Mathura and elsewhere turn to producing images of the deities of the orthodox ‘Hindu’ pantheon.

How the personae of these deities, especially Vishnu, Shiva and various forms of the mother-goddess, emerged – or converged (for all were composites) – and how they eventually displaced most of the earlier Vedic deities is not well-documented. Vedic sacrifices like the aswamedha remained essential to kingship during and long after the Gupta age, but from about this time onwards ‘we do not come across the case of a single individual ascribing his greatness or luck to a Vedic deity’.18 Personal seals found in Bihar and UP usually bear the emblems of either Shiva or Vishnu, and the inscriptions of nearly all the dynasties of the age protest their devotion to some form of these same two deities. Indeed the convergence of the various Shaiva and Vaishnava personae, as well as their growing popularity, may have been partly the outcome of dominant dynasties like the Guptas co-opting the resources, divine and supernatural as well as political and economic, of their conquered feudatories.

This certainly seems to have been the case with many of the legends, incarnations, consorts and relatives associated with Vishnu, including his identification with Krishna (the Yadava deity) and with Vasudeva and Narayana, all cults which seem to have originated in the Mathura region and western India. In Malwa and central India a more popular Vaishnava cult of the period was that of Vishnu in his Varaha incarnation as a colossal wild boar who, not unlike King Kong, hoists to safety a small and naked nymph representing the earth. The famous fifth-century sculptural representations of this myth at Eran, Udayagiri and elsewhere in eastern Malwa may well celebrate the incorporation of a local boar cult into the Vishnu persona as a result of Chandra-Gupta II’s long sojourn in the region while he fought the Satraps.

Whatever their genesis, sanction for this accretion and fusion of cults was provided by the Puranas and the epics as they were recast, expanded and written down during and after the Guptas. Brahmanic authority was thus gradually accorded to the new composite deities, and the sculptor responded by giving them concrete form. Awesome figures of legend, obscure local deities, and various fertility and tutelary spirits were duly transformed into worshippable images. Their identity with the gods and goddesses of orthodox scripture conferred prestige on them; at the same time it brought them within the brahmanic mainstream of what is now called the ‘Great Tradition’ of Hinduism.

It remained only to refine the nature of man’s relationship to the new generation of deities and to develop forms of worship suitable to it. This process may also have been influenced by Buddhist precedent in that the new relationship assumed a degree of divine proximity and compassion which is not often evident in the Vedas but is fundamental to legends concerning the Buddhist Boddhisatvas. The supplicant’s more personalised response, with its emphasis on devotion rather than propitiation, is evident in the famous Bhagavad Gita whose interpolation into the Mahabharata probably dates from the third to fourth centuries AD. But it was the much later Bhakti movement, drawing its inspiration and fervour from devotional practices in the south of India and Bengal, which would eventually endow Hinduism with its public fervour and its private intimacy of communion. Though seemingly at odds both with the dangerous business of Vedic ritual and the mind-boggling subtleties of Upanishadic metaphysics, this new devotional emphasis would become the most distinctive and endearing characteristic of what we now call Hinduism.

Instead of ‘Hinduism’, scholars sometimes use the term ‘brahmanism’ to distinguish the pre-Bhakti orthodoxies of the post-Vedic era from the teachings of the heterodox sects like the Buddhists and Jains. ‘Brahmanism’ would have been as meaningless to its supposed adherents as ‘Hinduism’, but the term does have the advantage of accommodating a variety of orthodox traits, including the authority accorded to the brahman caste, the innumerable cults to which brahmanical acceptance was extended, and the complex philosophical notion of brahman as an impersonal monotheistic entity which, like the Word in Christianity, subsumed all deities, the human soul as well as the divine, and indeed all creation.

In the Vedas brahma(n) denotes hymn, prayer, sacred word, formulation of truth, substratum etc., ideas that developed later to signify, on the practical level, the title brahman for the person who possessed the qualities conveyed by such ideas, and, on the conceptual level, their abstract summation as the immutable universal principle.19


Thus we learn that ‘the brahmanas attributed brahma power to the brahmans’, an unassailable observation but one of such elliptical import that it deters further enquiry by anyone ignorant of Sanskrit – a category which then as now included most Indians as well as nearly all non-Indians. For as will already be apparent, abstract terms like brahman pose insurmountable problems of translation. Their connotations change over the centuries and their associations, ramifying through the literary canopy like lianas, defy the lexicographer’s search for equivalent words in other languages. Dharma (‘religion’, ‘duty’, ‘order’),artha (‘wealth’, ‘politics’, ‘motive’),danda (‘authority’, ‘coercion’, ‘government’) and many other such concepts of crucial importance prove no less elusive. Conversely, English words like ‘divinity’, ‘sovereignty’, or ‘power’ have no exact Sanskrit equivalents. Torchless, the cultural explorer feels his way as through an unlit cave whose sculpted figures, traced with the fingertips and not unfamiliar, yet remain unrecognisable.

THEORIES AND DREAMS

Here is a lovely face – a madonna face. What eyes! … I wish I could make out this story; there is certainly a story. What can this all be?’

‘The fewer theories you form, the fewer blunders and dreams you will make.’

‘But we must form theories – we cannot remain awake and not do so.’20


In 1836 two English sportsman, an excited Captain Gresley and a cautious Mr Ralph, bivouacked in a gallery of caves above the Vagha river, a headwater of the Godavari river in Berar, anciently Vidarba, in the northern Deccan. To the sculpted façades, the chaitya halls and the pillared viharas of Ajanta’s now-famous cave temples the Englishmen were comparatively indifferent. Such wonders were familiar to Europeans from sites like Karli and Kanheri near Bombay. What sent Captain Gresley into such rhapsodies of delight (which he later related in the unusual form of a verbatim transcript), and what stirred even Ralph’s critical reserve, were the paintings. Already sadly vandalised, they covered great areas of wall and ceiling and, displaying an incredible brilliance of colour and form, preserved courtly scenes of opulence and sophistication far more convincing than anything conjectured by Sanskrit scholars or culled by archaeological research. At Ajanta more than anywhere the golden age of the Guptas is made manifest. Theories and dreams, like epigraphic uncertainties and semantic niceties, crumble into dry-as-dust irrelevance beside such spectacular evidence of an age of artistic eloquence. The confidence of the draughtsmanship and portraiture, the vitality and intricacy of the compositions, and the skilful use of the palette combine in scenes martial, devotional and sublimely sensual to convey irrefutable proof of a remarkable age.

Ajanta lay in Vakataka territory and, so far as is known, owed nothing to Gupta patronage. The pictorial themes are exclusively Buddhist, their narratives deriving from the Jatakas like those of the earlier stupa reliefs of Sanchi and Amaravati or the later ones of Borobudur in Java. Yet frescoes similar to Ajanta’s are well attested in domestic and public contexts; and from literary sources we know that Gupta society regarded painting as both a respected profession and a desirable social accomplishment. The art of Ajanta was not exceptional. Nor was its clarity and classicism unique. In terracotta and stone, as well as in language and literature, artists of the Gupta age excelled in conveying just such ordered and appealing visions – visions which, like Gupta imperialism itself as proclaimed in the Allahabad inscription, confidently balanced respect for a credible reality with reverence for an idealised abstraction.

Gupta sculptures have been distinguished as strongly intellectual in flavour and ‘composed deliberately as aesthetic objects’.21 The smooth serenity of the famous Buddha countenances is heightened by framing them within a hairstyle of tight knobbly curls and a large and intricately carved halo; grace of pose is accentuated by the hard outline of an evanescent robe or the ridged symmetry of its folds; the contours of the body are made flesh by the tightness of a waistband or the introduction of metallic accoutrements. Virtuosity is restrained; understatement is preferred. The sculptor of the Gupta age matched mastery of his art with an astonishing maturity of vision to create ‘some of the greatest sculptures ever produced anywhere in the world’.22 Emanating from the workshops of Mathura, inspiring the great school of Sarnath, and influencing a host of lesser centres throughout the Guptan arya-varta, this aesthetic set a standard of excellence, and established a canon of iconographic conventions which, as with Hellenic art, would last long and travel far. It may, in short and with complete confidence, be called ‘classical’.

As the carvings of Mathura and Sarnath are to Indian sculpture, and as the frescoes of Ajanta are to Indian painting, so are the compositions of Kalidasa to Sanskrit literature. Other dramatists of the Gupta age are highly regarded, most notably Sudraka, whose ‘Little Clay Cart’, a risqué and action-packed charivari, has obvious appeal and has been much revived. Likewise other poets wrote courtly kavya (verses) in an impeccable and even more ingenious Sanskrit: Samudra-Gupta’s Allahabad inscription as composed by Harisena, one of his principal ministers, contains passages of great dramatic elegance; and the emperor himself, like Rudradaman, is said to have been a master of the style. But only Kalidasa wrote both plays and poetry, and he did so with an excellence which, by unanimous consent, justifies the inevitable comparisons with Shakespeare. It was Sir William Jones’s English version of Kalidasa’s famous Sakuntala which first roused the West to the merits of Sanskrit drama, and it was adaptations of Meghaduta (‘The Cloud Messenger’) which found their way into nineteenth-century anthologies and won for Sanskrit verse a reputation for superb evocations of nature.

Unfortunately all Sanskrit literature is so rich in metaphors, synonyms, allusions, double meanings and all manner of grammatical and phonetic pyrotechnics that satisfactory translation is impossible. To the uninitiated the word-play, the conventions of metre and the variants of meaning recherché mystique of the cryptic crossword. But ignorance may be compounded by our own conventions. Translations, according to A.L. Basham, merely ‘tarnish’ the beauty of the original; still more sadly, they have a habit of shying away from the erotic and explicit. Thus renderings of Kalidasa’s Kumarasambhava, a long poem which deals with the courtship of Lord Shiva and his consort, often omit as ‘abhorrent to Western taste’ the climactic canto in which this divine union is consummated – a subject of exquisite and eminently communicable interest which later probably inspired the famed sculpture of the Khajuraho temples and to which Kalidasa is said to have done glorious justice. Indeed, to witness the delight with which a Sanskritist savours the lines of Kalidasa is to be convinced that the considerable effort of learning a long-dead Indian language would not be wasted. ‘Few who can read [Kalidasa] in the original would doubt that, both as poet and as dramatist, he was one of the great men of the world.’23

When and where Kalidasa lived remains a mystery. He acknowledges no links with the Guptas; he may not even have coincided with them. Familiarity with Ujjain and telling descriptions of the lush Narmada valley suggest that he belonged to Malwa rather than Magadha. Tradition insists that he adorned the court of a shadowy King Vikramaditya whom chronology assigns to the first century BC. On internal evidence, however, he seems unlikely to have preceded the Guptas; and it may be significant that Vikramaditya was also one of the many epithets used by Samudra-Gupta. In another long poem, the Raghuvamsa, Kalidasa traces the lineage of King Rama of Ayodhya with particular emphasis on the empire-building exploits of Raghu, Rama’s grandfather. Raghu led his forces north, south, east and west. He conquered Bengal, erected victory pillars along the Ganga, overran Kalinga, crossed the Kaveri and exacted a tribute of pearls from the Pandyas; the dust clouds raised by his cohorts soiled the hair of the ladies of Kerala; his horses rolled in the sands of the Indus; hill-peoples quailed before his onslaught; and the winds of the Himalayas, soughing through the reeds, sang of his victories. In this poem it was as if Kalidasa, while celebrating India’s immensity, was consciously expanding on Samudra-Gupta’s Allahabad pillar inscription. ‘In this spirited and martial narrative we may justly see the reflex in the poet’s mind of Samudra-Gupta’s great conquests.’24

Not just the conquests but the poet’s vivid awareness of the terrain of the entire subcontinent argues strongly for a Guptan provenance. Though politically the empire of the Guptas was fragmentary, its culture was pervasive. Kalidasa may have been a great traveller; more probably he was a beneficiary of the traffic and trade which under Gupta rule enabled a stranger like Fa Hian to pass unmolested from one end of India to the other – and which tempted him to explore the south as well. The ideals of the Guptan age transcended frontiers and spanned seas. Gupta-style Buddhas have been found in Malaya, Java and even Borneo. There and in Indo-China the Sanskrit inscriptions which begin to appear during the third and fourth centuries mark the beginnings of literacy, nearly all the pre-Islamic scripts of south-east Asia being derivatives of Gupta Brahmi. In all these places as throughout India itself, Sanskrit now triumphed as the language of scholarship, record and courtly discourse. Moreover the reworking and recording of the Puranas, one of the most important achievements of the Gupta age, plus the raiding of the epics for suitable literary themes, ensured that Sanskritisation meant a universal currency not just for the language but for the influence and ideals of the brahman caste which these works inculcated.

On the conformity of these Sanskrit-borne religious, cultural, social and political ideals rests the case for India’s national integrity in pre-Islamic times. Many would argue that it was no more than an elitist veneer. Sanskrit was understood only by that minute percentage of the population whose sophisticated tastes and opulent lifestyle are so vividly portrayed in the Ajanta frescoes. It was for this leisured and aristocratic society that Kalidasa composed, a fact borne out by the convention that servants, members of the lower castes and all the female characters in his dramas speak and understand only Prakrit; Sanskrit is reserved for the ‘twice-born’ principals.

To this same courtly society the increasingly recherché exercises in Sanskritic obfuscation provided a delicious diversion. It was partly the fault of the language itself. As Patanjali, the second-century writer, had put it, one may order a particular design of pot from a potter but no one goes to a grammarian and says ‘Make me such and such a word.’ The vocabulary was constant, the grammar frozen. ‘Perfected’ by Panini, elevated by all, yet spoken by few, Sanskrit was the victim of its own prestige. Borrowings, once significant, became few. Ingenuity replaced innovation as writers strove to achieve succinctness by ever greater compression, and to extract additional meaning by repetition and juxtaposition. Sentences got longer and longer, sometimes running to several pages, while compound words ran to several lines. A word of twenty components with a total of fifty-four syllables is used in the Allahabad inscription to describe the nature of Samudra-Gupta’s feudatory sway. No doubt it is an elegant construction, but historians would willingly trade it for a single clear statement of policy.

There were astounding mnemonic developments, but they too contributed to the same end by over-specialisation and [the creation of] particular jargons for every discipline. There still exist sastris who can recite the whole of one veda in any order (literally backwards or forwards) without making a mistake in a single letter or accent. Others know the whole of Panini’s grammar and the Amarakosa dictionary without exciting special comment. Yet there is no individual who really knows the Sanskrit language as a whole.25


Important works on astronomy and, to a lesser extent, medicine indicate that science was not neglected under the Guptas. The length of the solar year was calculated with a precision which even the Greeks had not achieved, and Indian mathematics was probably the most advanced in the world. ‘At the lower level of achievement was the perfection of the decimal system and at the higher the solution of certain indeterminate equations’; pi was correctly calculated to four decimal places, and it was also at about this time that the concept of zero made its epigraphic debut, usually in the form of a dot.

Yet the works which embodied these findings were framed with such Sanskritic refinement as to make them incomprehensible to all but the initiated. The craftsman remained ignorant of them, and the mathematician remained jealous of them. Later works on iconography, architecture and painting are often cited as examples of Sanskrit’s contribution to applied science. Yet according to Kosambi, himself a scientist as well as a historian, their dicta ‘do not tally with the measurements of [actual] statuary and buildings or the chemical analysis of pigments’. Clearly ‘the artists and masons went their own way’. Likewise whoever cast the ‘Iron Pillar’ of Mehrauli was indisputably a master metallurgist; yet there is no known treatise on metallurgy.

Sanskrit’s monopoly of scholarship was not, then, fatal to creativity or the development of productive skills. Enormous achievements, especially in architecture, which are barely hinted at in the Gupta era, would soon follow. Nor was the exclusivity of Sanskrit any kind of deterrent to the propagation of its mythology and precepts. During and after the Gupta age the gods and heroes of Sanskrit literature, its endless canons and codes, and its impossible concepts and ideals continued to trickle down through society; they even seeped out into the hills and forests where tribal peoples continued to be absorbed into the caste hierarchy and tribal chiefs into that ‘society of kings’.

Although as much by default and exception as by observance and conformity, a degree of integrity was achieved. It was more than an upper-caste veneer. Awareness of India as a territorial entity with a distinctive and shared religiocultural heritage is clearly evident. Yet it fell far short of anything remotely resembling a national consciousness. The obvious comparison would be with contemporary Europe’s awareness of something called Christendom. Briefly a Charlemagne, like a Samudra-Gupta, might impose some semblance of political unity; more typically both these great cultural worlds were riven with rivalries as kings and princelings vied for hegemony and as dynasties rose and fell with bewildering rapidity.
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Re: India A History, by John Keay

Postby admin » Sat Dec 07, 2024 3:44 am

Chapter 8: Lords of the Universe c500–700

COPPER-PLATE FLOURISHES


GIVEN THE TASK of elucidating sixth-century politics for a volume of the monumental History and Culture of the Indian People, D.C. Sircar, an outstanding epigraphist and historian, writes at length on each of seventeen major dynasties. Numerous lesser dynasties also claim his attention; and the chapter in question covers only the Deccan. With the addition of western India, the Panjab, the north-west, Kashmir, Bengal, the south and the vast Gangetic arya-varta, the sixth century’s dynastic count could easily be doubled. All of which makes ‘happy hunting for professional historians’.1 The prospect of tracking three dozen royal houses at once may, however, discourage the nonspecialist, who will not be reassured to learn that during the next five centuries the situation gets, if anything, worse. Dynasties multiply, territories (insofar as they can be determined) diminish, authority erodes. Hemachandra Ray’s Dynastic History of Northern India charts the rise and fall of a further thirty dynasties between 900 and 1100 – and that excludes those of the Deccan, south, and western India. In the history of what used to be called ‘medieval’ India, the key words are ‘fragmentation’ and ‘regionalisation’.

Whether or not this represented a new state of affairs is debatable, but that it becomes progressively evident is because of the proliferation of a new kind of evidence. So far the reconstruction of India’s past has depended on very grudging materials: some enigmatic archaeology, long mostly religious texts of uncertain antiquity, snippets of surviving tradition, the patchy accounts of European and Chinese visitors, coins, and a few mostly stone-engraved inscriptions. All these continue to be relevant, but to them must now be added a more generous corpus of official records, or charters, plus the occasional piece of biographical literature.

The former, the charters, are the more informative. They have been found all over India, and along with royal panegyrics like the Allahabad inscription they are largely responsible for the dynastic log-jam. Indeed many royal lineages, as also the kingdoms over which they ruled, are known only because one or more of their charters happens to have survived. These charters (sasanas) usually record grants of land. They were originally written on palm leaves, but as title-deeds they were of sufficient value subsequently to be engraved, sometimes on a cave wall or a temple but more usually on plates of copper which were then kept in a safe place or hidden somewhere. ‘A large number of copper plates have been found immured in walls or foundations of houses belonging to families of the donees, or hidden in small caches made of bricks or stone in the fields to which the grant refers.’2 Some of these plates were used more than once, a cancelled charter being over-struck with a new one; all originally included a royal seal, often of brass; yet forgeries were not uncommon; and many charters were long enough to run to several plates which were then held together, like a heavy set of keys, with a stout copper ring.

It seems likely that such records had been in use since the beginning of the Christian era. The earliest authentic plates to have survived come from south India and were issued by kings of the Pallava dynasty of Kanchipuram in the fourth century AD. Some of these charters seem to date from before Samudra- Gupta’s uprooting of his Pallava contemporary and are in Prakrit. Thereafter they switch to Sanskrit and provide limited information on no less than sixteen early Pallava kings between 350 and 375. The Pallavas, whose origins are uncertain, had established themselves in the region known as Tondaimandalam, west of the later city of Madras. They had already elevated Kanchipuram into an important religious and intellectual centre but, on the evidence of these plates, they were having severe difficulties holding their own. Only after 375 would the Pallavas emerge as the first great south Indian dynasty, and not till the seventh to eighth centuries would they endow Kanchi and Mamallapuram (Mahabalipuram) with the reliefs and temples now associated with their greatness.

In north India similar, but not always helpful, glimpses of dynastic activity are provided by rare copper plates of the Gupta period. Thereafter such plates become more numerous and remain a prime source for many centuries to come. Muslim chroniclers would notice them and they were still in use in the eighteenth century when newcomers, like the European trading companies, sometimes relied on them as title-deeds to their coastal settlements. At the same time the more historically-minded of the companies’ employees began to collect them for scholarly study.

Legal documents not being renowned for originality or innovative phrasing, the charters, although written in numerous regional languages as well as Sanskrit, all follow much the same formula. After an invocatory word or passage, the text identifies the royal donor with a string of those compound Sanskritic titles and a long panegyric on his forebears, his exploits and his personal qualities. There then follow details of the grant itself, its recipient(s), the occasion for it, and a stern command that posterity respect it. Hefty, if wishful, penalties are detailed for any transgressor of this last provision: the crime of overruling a sasana was commonly equated with that of killing ten thousand Varanasi cows – a sacrilege of unthinkable enormity in a city of unassailable sanctity for which the penalty was that of being reborn as a dungworm with a lifespan of eighty-four thousand years.

Of all these standard components of a charter, that applauding the donor and his lineage has generally been found the most useful. As noted, entire dynasties and their histories have been reconstructed from the chance survival of a single such charter. Yet their extravagant language should in itself provide a warning. Whether on copper or stone, inscriptions can be misleading.

According to a neat two-plate charter issued in 571 at Vallabhi, which place had succeeded Rudradaman’s Junagadh as the capital of Saurashtra, the incumbent king was the son of a maharaja of truly spectacular memory. Maharaja Guhasena had ‘cleft the temples of the rutting elephants of his foes’; the toenails of his left foot emitted rays as dazzling as those of the jewels in the head-dresses of his enemies as they lay prostrate before him; in beauty he surpassed the God of Love, in lustre the Moon, in constancy the Lord of the Mountains, in profundity the Ocean, in wisdom the Protector of the Gods and in riches the Lord of Wealth. Carelessly showering his supporters with gifts, ‘he was, as it were, the personified happiness of the circumference of the whole earth’.3

The rulers of Vallabhi were indeed destined for some distinction, and their capital, misheard as ‘Balhara’, would be amongst the first to be noticed by Muslim chroniclers. But the ruler of all India whom these same chroniclers called ‘The Balhara’ was not the Maitraka king of Vallabhi but the ‘Valabharaja’, a title used by the later and much more significant Rashtrakut adynasty. Moreover in 571 the Maitrakas had barely established themselves at Vallabhi; descendants of a Gupta general, they had only just ceased to acknowledge Gupta suzerainty. Although typical of many other successor dynasties within the region of direct Gupta rule, they had scarcely begun the mysterious business of cleaving rutting elephants’ temples and were not politically significant in India as a whole.

The year in question was more notable for an event outside India. Also in 571, but across the Arabian Sea and in obscure circumstances, the wife of an impoverished merchant of the Quraysh tribe gave birth to a son of less suspect lustre. To him, forty years later and now known as Muhammad, the divine word would be revealed; and by him the world would be irrevocably and very rapidly changed. But it would be over a century before the Prophet’s followers made any impact on India. And by then most of those sixth-century dynasts, although not the Maitrakas, had long since ceased to outshine the moon and personify all earthly happiness.

No excuse, therefore, is offered for ignoring most of the dynasties which are known to have succeeded the Guptas and which, from their charters, may appear even to have outdone the Guptas. Some will be noted later. Here it is sufficient to mention that several claim to have turned the tide of Hun incursion. It will be recalled that from Gandhara the Huns had been rampaging across the Panjab and as far as Malwa since c500. In the north-west the great Buddhist establishments at Taxila, Peshawar and Swat suffered severely from their iconoclasm. Where Fa Hian in the fifth century had found packed viharas and towering stupas, Hsuan Tsang, another Chinese visitor but in the mid-seventh century, found only devastation. Taxila’s monasteries were ‘ruinous and deserted, and there are very few priests; the royal family being extinct, the nobles contend for power by force’. In Swat some fourteen hundred Buddhist establishments were ‘now generally waste and desolate’, their eighteen thousand monks having dwindled to a handful.4 Buddhism in the Indus basin would never recover from this blow; nor, until the advent of Islam, would the overland trade with China and the west. Although Hsuan Tsang found some commercial activity in Kabul, his omission of any mention of markets or trade in connection with Taxila and Peshawar is significant. The lifeblood of the region had dried up, and with it the all-important supply of equine blood-stock from central Asia to India. Henceforth horses reached India mainly by sea from Arabia, in a trade which would rapidly become a Muslim monopoly. Other frontier trails, like the pilgrim’s calvary that had been the Karakoram route, fell into disuse as Buddhist traffic shifted east to the Tibetan tableland.

The rest of India was spared from the Hun perhaps thanks to one Yasodharman of Malwa. Evidently a very successful adventurer if not a noted dynast, Yasodharman claims to have inflicted a defeat on the Huns in c530. Under their leader Mihirakula, the son of Toramana, the Huns then retired to Kashmir, there in a land of sad but incomparable beauty to burnish their reputation for persecution, vandalism and unspeakable atrocities for another generation.

Victories over the Huns are also claimed by Baladitya, a later Gupta, and by the Maukharis and the Vardhanas. The Maukharis, comprising one or more dynasties, had established themselves in central Uttar Pradesh with their capital at Kanauj on the upper Ganga (near Kanpur). Thereby dominating an important slice of the Guptas’ erstwhile arya-varta, they would provide a thread of legitimacy for the next and arguably the last north Indian cakravartin. This was the great Harsha of the Vardhana family from Thanesar near Delhi. The Vardhanas and the Maukharis were already closely allied and may have repelled the Huns in unison. Their territories, too, marched with one another; conjoined, they would soon form the nucleus of Harsha’s great empire.

But before returning to the dynastic fray, and lest the charters of the sixth century be dismissed simply as copper-red herrings, it is worth considering the information they provide not only about their royal donors but also about their beneficiaries and about the nature of the grants themselves. To the economic, as opposed to the dynastic, historian these are of great significance since they foreshadow a fragmentation and dispersal of resources far more ominous than what Kosambi calls the ‘nice but meaningless’ litany of dynasties.

Munificence was incumbent on any ruler and was an essential attribute of kingship; indeed a particularly generous sovereign is described as one who makes so many grants as to exhaust the supply of copper. Distributing land was a way of rewarding supporters and of gaining merit; it also had important economic connotations. In the Vallabhi charter of 571 already cited the beneficiary was a brahman called Rudrabhuti. Nearly all charters of the period are in favour of brahmans or religious establishments – notably temples, Jain communities and, now more rarely, Buddhist monasteries. In this case Rudrabhuti was granted the revenue and other rights in respect of certain lands, such proceeds to be used to finance in perpetuity various important sacrificial rituals. Where once the brahmans’ support and performance of rites might have been rewarded with a few hundred head of cattle, it was now prepaid with revenue.

Both the rights and the lands thus granted are specified in detail. Although the meaning of several technical terms is disputed,5 it seems that in this case the extensive lands were pastures belonging to certain named individuals. Rudrabhuti was to receive their yield in various dues and taxes, plus their mineral and other rights. He was exempted from royal exactions (as, for instance, for the support of the military establishment), and finally he was awarded rights to the forced labour of the incumbents. The lands themselves were not transferred; on the other hand their entire yield was irrevocably alienated so far as the royal exchequer was concerned.

Other grants often include the proceeds from fines for various crimes and the right to exclude royal troops and law-enforcers; even the administration of justice was being devolved. Rudrabhuti and his like were in effect becoming fief-holders. Although as yet grants were made largely to brahmans and for religious purposes, and although as yet they included no provision for the reciprocal military service associated with European feudalism, the basis of a quasi-feudal relationship was being laid. Soon state officials, who according to Fa Hian had been salaried even under the Guptas, were being remunerated with similar grants of lands, villages and even districts. Evidence of commendation (whereby villagers themselves sought the security and protection of a royally approved superior) and of sub-infeudation (when such a superior sub-leased parts of his feu to agents and supporters) would follow.

This ‘feudalism from below’ is sometimes contrasted with that ‘from above’, the latter being epitomised in the royal hierarchy of a maharajadhiraja surrounded by his proliferating feudatories or maha-samantas (literally ‘great neighbours’ but now signifying dependent dynasties and vassals). Both contributed to the process of fragmentation, ‘feudalism from above’ by regionalising authority even as the kings who exercised it shrilly proclaimed their universal sovereignty, and ‘feudalism from below’ by a more insidious erosion of the loyalties and resources on which all authority depended.

HARSHA-VARDHANA

As if to contradict such theorising, a new ‘king-of-kings’ was nevertheless about to shine forth in fleeting brilliance. A new chronological era, always a significant pointer, would be inaugurated; and another ‘victorious circuit of the four quarters of the earth’ (digvijaya) would be celebrated. In the early seventh century the rival dynasties, which like close-packed clouds had clustered over arya-varta ever since the great Guptas, began to thin. The monsoon, it seemed, had been delayed; northern India was about to experience a last searing glimpse of pre-Islamic empire.

Of the no doubt many sasana issued by Harsha-Vardhana of Thanesar (and later Kanauj) few survive. A single seal, once presumably attached to a copper plate, does however list Harsha’s immediate antecedents. Apparently he belonged to the fourth Vardhana generation; his father had been the first to assume the title maharajadhiraja and his brother the first to call himself a follower of the Buddha. Harsha seems to have adopted both styles, although his Buddhist sympathies would preclude neither aggressive designs nor the worship of orthodox deities. Sadly the seal in question has no room for further information, and were it, and his coins, the only evidence of Harsha, he would be but another shadowy dynast.

Mercifully, though, the somewhat sterile evidence provided by sasana is supplemented by two much more informative witnesses. One was Hsuan Tsang (Hiuen Tsiang, Hsuien-tsang, Yuan Chwang, Xuan Zang, etc. etc.), a Chinese monk and scholar who, inspired by Fa Hian’s pilgrimage to the Buddhist Holy Land two hundred years earlier, himself spent the years 630–44 visiting India. He returned to China with enough Buddhist relics, statuary and texts to load twenty horses, and subsequently wrote a long account of India which, except in the case of the extreme south, seems to have been based on personal observation.

The other and the more endearing witness was Bana, an outstanding writer and also, incidentally, a rakish brahman whose ill-spent youth and varied circle of friends ‘shows how lightly the rules of caste weighed on the educated man’.6 Of Bana’s two surviving works the most important is the Harsa-carita, a prose account of Harsha’s rise to power. Though more descriptive than explanatory, and though loaded with linguistic fancies and adjectival compounds of inordinate length, it rates as Sanskrit’s first historical biography as well as a masterpiece of literature. In it the hectic excitement of camp and court is conveyed with all the vivid incident of a crowded Mughal miniature. Forest and roadside teem with life as Bana minutely observes every detail of rural industry and identifies every species in the natural environment. No Kipling, no Rushdie better evokes India’s heaving vitality or the lifelong industry of its people.

Inevitably both Hsuan Tsang and Bana were interested parties. The former depended on Harsha’s protection and the latter on his patronage. In no sense is either of their works a critical appraisal. Hsuan Tsang was blinded by a Buddhist bigotry which he would fain hoist on Harsha, while Bana saw Harsha and history as combining to provide the material for a historical romance. Yet in a way each author complements the other, the Chinese monk providing the outline and the Indian author the detail, the Buddhist the libretto and the brahman the music.

They also complement one another chronologically. Hsuan Tsang would coincide with the climax of Harsha’s career while Bana records only his early years, from his birth in c590 to his accession in c606 and his first campaign soon after. This period is of particular interest since Harsha, as a second son, was not the obvious successor. His father,Maharajadhiraja Prabhakara-Vardhana, died when Harsha and his elder brother were away, the latter fighting the Huns while the teenage Harsha enjoyed a spot of hunting. Harsha got home first and alone saw the dying king, at which meeting, according to Bana, he named him as his heir. The brother then returned victorious from the battlefield with his troops. Harsha said nothing of their father’s last wish and the brother therefore remained heir presumptive.

At this point Bana introduces yet another reason for Harsha’s succession. Apparently Rajya-Vardhana, the brother, was so overcome with grief over their father’s death that he declined the throne and opted to retire to a hermitage. Improbably he too, therefore, insisted that Harsha succeed their father. Yet from other sources, including Hsuan Tsang, it is known that in fact it was Rajya- Vardhana who succeeded. Bana, in short, protests too much. Perhaps he simply wanted to bolster Harsha’s legitimacy by suggesting that he was the direct heir. Or perhaps he had a less creditable motive. As a recent biographer delicately puts it, ‘it is hard to escape the conclusion that the unusual twists in the story … were rendered inevitable because of some episode uncomplimentary to the author’s hero.’7 More specifically it may be that Bana was trying to lull suspicions, still current at the time he was writing, that Harsha had had a motive, if not a hand, in Rajya-Vardhana’s imminent removal.

This came about as a result of more ‘unusual twists’. Rajya-Sri, the princes’ sister, had been married to their neighbour and ally, the Maukhari king of Kanauj. In the midst of the succession crisis in Thanesar, this Maukhari king was suddenly attacked by the king of ‘Malava’ (presumably Malwa). The Maukhari king died in battle; Rajya-Sri was taken hostage; and the victorious ‘Malava’ now moved to attack Thanesar. In this desperate situation it was not Harsha but again his brother who took the initiative. Suddenly abandoning his idea of a quiet life of grief, he now insisted on his right to revenge. Harsha’s wish to accompany him was swept aside and, taking ten thousand cavalry, the righteous Rajya-Vardhana raced off to give battle.

Clearly an awesome campaigner, Rajya-Vardhana duly routed the men from Malwa. But then the real villain of the piece emerged. Sasanka, king of Gauda in Bengal, had been assisting the Malwa forces. The victorious Rajya-Vardhana met Sasanka under a safe-conduct, presumably to arrange a truce, and was treacherously murdered. At last the stage was clear for the young and hitherto somewhat subdued Harsha to explode upon it.

Instantly on hearing this [the news of his brother’s murder] his fiery spirit blazed forth in a storm of sorrow augmented by flaming flashes of furious wrath. His aspect became terrible in the extreme. As he fiercely shook his head, the loosened jewels from his crest looked like live coals of the angry fire which he vomited forth. Quivering without cessation, his wrathful curling lip seemed to drink the lives of all kings. His reddening eyes with their rolling gleam put forth, at it were, conflagrations in the heavenly spaces. Even the fire of anger, as though itself burned by the scorching power of his inborn valour’s unbearable heat, spread over him a rainy shower of sweat. His very limbs trembled as if in fright at such unexampled fury...

He represented the first revelation of valour, the frenzy of insolence, the delirium of pride, the youthful avatar of fury, the supreme effort of hauteur, the new age of manhood’s fire, the regal consecration of warlike passion, the camp-lustration day of reckoning.8


Understandably his supporters were impressed. Ably, and of course volubly, encouraged by his commander-in-chief and then by the commandant of his elephant corps, Harsha mobilised ‘for a world-wide conquest’. Meanwhile his enemies were beset by all manner of ill omens: jackals, swarming bees and swooping vultures terrorised their cities; their soldiers fell out with their mistresses while some, looking in the mirror, saw themselves headless; a naked woman wandered through the parks ‘shaking her forefinger as if to count the dead’.

Sasanka, ‘vilest of Gaudas’, would be Harsha’s main objective but, Gauda being thousands of kilometres to the east of Thanesar, many other kings would have to submit first. One, evidently a hereditary rival of the Gauda kings, quickly entered into a treaty of friendship and subordinate alliance with Harsha. This was Bhaskara-varman, king of Kumara-rupa (Assam) on Gauda’s northern border. Sasanka would therefore have to fight on two fronts. Additionally Harsha could count on the forces of the Maukharis and on the defeated Malwa army which was now put at his disposal by his late brother’s commander.

The latter also brought news of the escape from her confinement in Kanauj of Rajya-Sri (Harsha’s sister and the queen of the Maukharis). Unfortunately she had fled into hiding in the Vindhya hills where, as a widow, she was thought to be about to commit sati. Harsha had other plans. He saw both merit and, though unmentioned by Bana, advantage in rescuing her. Dousing his rage, therefore, he led a search party into the wild tracts of central India. A community of pioneers who were busily engaged in harvesting forest produce and clearing trees knew nothing of her whereabouts. But at another settlement, this time of assorted Buddhists, brahmans and other renunciates who were pooling their insights in an admirable spirit of ecumenism, he heard tell of a party of grief-stricken ladies hiding nearby. Rajya-Sri, horribly scratched and reduced to rags by her forest odyssey, was amongst them. In the nick of time she was duly plucked from her funeral pyre and reunited with her brother.

Rajya-Sri’s only wish now was to become a Buddhist nun. Harsha would not hear of it. He needed her active support and insisted on her accompanying him. As the Maukhari queen, she was vital to his plans since, through her, he in effect controlled the Maukhari kingdom. As a result of this identity of interest he would subsequently move his capital from Thanesar to the more central and significant city of Kanauj. Kanauj now became the rival of Pataliputra as the imperial capital of northern India and, through many vicissitudes and changes of ownership, would remain so until the twelfth century.

Meanwhile the campaign could be renewed. Accompanied by Rajya-Sri and a Buddhist sage who was to act as her confessor, Harsha hastened back to rejoin his army encamped by the Ganga. There, as he related the story of his successful rescue mission, the shadows lengthened and the sun went down in a blaze of gory omens, each of which presaged an imminent victory. The evening, says Bana, advanced as if ‘leaning on the clouds’ which were flecked and bright with the setting sun, like an ocean sunset. Then, with darkness closing in, the Spirit of Night respectfully presented Harsha with the moon; it was ‘as if the moon were a cup to slake his boundless thirst for fame’, says Bana, or even ‘a sasana of silver issued by king Manu himself entitling Harsha to conquer the seven heavens and restore the golden age’. And so, somewhat unexpectedly, amidst a welter of page-long adjectival compounds and with a well-flagged trail of conquest stretching into the distant future, Bana’s tale abruptly ends.

If there was more, it has not survived. Instead there is only the odd inscription plus the testimony of Hsuan Tsang, by the time of whose visit Harsha the teenage Galahad had become Harsha the middle-aged Arthur and his little kingdom on the Jamuna a universal dominion over the ‘Five Indies’. What this term actually comprehended is not clear. ‘He went from east to west,’ says Hsuan Tsang, ‘subduing all who were not obedient; the elephants were not unharnessed, nor the soldiers unbelted. After six years he had subdued the Five Indies.’9 The division of India into five parts – north (uttarapatha), south (daksinapatha), east, west and centre (madhyadesa or arya-varta ) – was fairly standard; but if this was what Hsuan Tsang meant by the ‘Five Indies’, he was grossly exaggerating. Harsha had indeed triumphed throughout much of north India, but his conquests were often tenuous and short-lived; they would take much longer than six years; and they certainly never included the Deccan or the south.

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Harsha's Probable Empire c640AD [pg 193]

From his camp beside the Ganga, where Bana had left him basking in the prospect of bloody victories to come, Harsha seems to have continued east. Prayaga (Allahabad), Ayodhya, Sravasti, Magadha and a host of minor kingdoms in UP and Bihar, many of them previously under Sasanka’s sway, must have submitted before he sighted his quarry. According to a much later source, the great encounter with Sasanka of Gauda took place at Pundra in northern Bengal. Sasanka was apparently defeated, but not so decisively as to forfeit his kingdom, for he continued to rule Gauda itself and seems even to have reclaimed parts of Orissa and Magadha. Only after Sasanka’s death in c620–30 did Harsha successfully claim these kingdoms and apparently share them with his Assamese ally.

His other ‘campaigns’ and ‘conquests’ are no less vague. That he did indeed overrun all of north India from Kashmir to the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal is well-attested. The Maitrakas of Vallabhi in far-off Gujarat were forced to flee their capital, Kashmir was obliged to part with a cherished relic of the Buddha, Sindh and Orissa look also to have been invaded. To reach these places, kingdoms which intervened or were adjacent to the probable line of march must also have submitted. Likewise those kingdoms which were subordinate to Harsha’s new vassals, including most of the Panjab hill states in the case of Kashmir. On this evidence, and on Hsuan Tsang’s failure to indicate that they were fully independent, numerous other kingdoms and tribes stretching from the eastern Panjab to Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh are presumed to have formed part of Harsha’s empire. But whether he held all of them simultaneously, for how long, and on what terms is very uncertain. The Maitrakas of Saurashtra, for instance, soon returned to their capital of Vallabhi and, despite being united with Harsha’s family by a matrimonial alliance, seem to have pursued independent policies.

But perhaps the most persuasive argument for the ephemeral nature of Harsha’s empire rests on its sudden and total eclipse. An intimation of troubles ahead had been provided by Hsuan Tsang when he was witness to an attempt on Harsha’s life. Those responsible he identified as ‘heretics’, the Buddhist’s term for disaffected brahmans. Evidently by the seventh century not all religious rivalries were being resolved in friendly debate. Sasanka’s ‘vileness’ seems to have had a lot to do with his having allegedly harassed Buddhists and cut down the sacred Boddhi tree under which the Buddha received enlightenment. Elsewhere in arya-varta it was the other way round, with orthodox opinion being antagonised by Harsha’s growing preference for, and generosity to, the Buddhist sangha.

At a lavish ceremony organised by Harsha to celebrate his meeting with the king of Kamarupa, these dissidents attempted sabotage by setting fire to the tower in which the Buddha image was placed. Harsha, according to Hsuan Tsang, put out the flames not by blowing but, no less miraculously, by rushing headlong into them. Frustrated, the ‘heretic’ fanatics then persuaded one of their followers to make an attempt on Harsha’s life. The assassin lunged, knife in hand, but Harsha, still nimble on his feet despite advancing years, dodged the blow and then seized and disarmed his assailant. Hsuan Tsang makes much of the clemency later shown to those responsible. Only their leader was ‘punished’, which probably means that he was executed; the rest were pardoned. Nevertheless five hundred brahmans had to be packed off into exile. Obviously, if not a rebellion, this was much more than an intrigue.

How Harsha eventually died is not known. But when in 647 his long reign finally ended, so did his empire; it simply fell apart. No Chandra-Gupta II stepped forward to round off his conquests and no Ashoka arose to consolidate his dominions. Confederate kingdoms simply allowed their allegiance to lapse; subject dynasties simply resumed their old rivalries.

The throne itself was usurped by one of Harsha’s brahman ministers, who was then badly discredited by the mismanagement of a Chinese embassy. Harsha had cultivated good relations with the new T’ang empire and, thanks to his Buddhist sympathies and his generous treatment of visitors like Hsuan Tsang, several diplomatic missions had been exchanged. But, according to Chinese sources, a T’ang embassy which arrived immediately after his death found India in confusion. In what looks like an incident born more of sectarian than political rivalry, the Chinese were robbed and taken captive while the Celestial Emperor’s emissary barely escaped to Tibet with his life. Thence he organised reprisals which apparently culminated in a resounding Chinese victory, ‘whereupon India was overawed’.

Although there is no mention in Indian sources of this first trans-Himalayan incursion, and although it was probably no more than a raid into northern Bengal, it was indicative of the vacuum left by Harsha. Thanks to Bana, his personal fame would indeed last, and in that he also sponsored religious debate, championed scholarship, and himself wrote plays, he has often been compared with Akbar, greatest of the Mughals. But there would be no ‘House of Harsha’ to bestride India during succeeding generations, no ‘Vardhana Age’ to foster the memory of northern India’s last cakravartin, and no ‘Kanauj School’ to continue his patronage of Buddhist ‘universities’ like Nalanda (Bihar) and of scholars like Bana. The red-hot coals vomited so freely by the fiery Harsha were extinguished in a hiss of steam as the political monsoon finally broke over the arya-varta heartland of northern India.

ROUND AND ROUND THE MANDALA

It was not so elsewhere. Indeed there is ample evidence that the ideal of a universal, or pan-Indian, sovereignty simply shifted ground. With Harsha the hegemony so long assumed by northern India came to an end. Sixty years after his death, Arabs would establish a Muslim bridgehead in Sind, their task eased by his own incursions into that region. The north-west, or in other words most of what now comprises the rest of Pakistan, had been irrevocably humbled by the Huns and was now politically irrelevant. Into the Gangetic heartland itself, adventurous dynasts from Kashmir, Bengal and the Deccan were about to raid, indeed briefly rule, with impunity. And where Harsha had signally failed to make of the Gupta tradition of paramountcy any more than a fragile and fleeting confederacy, other great dynasties, especially those of the Deccan and the south, would so refine and substantiate the concept as to make it their own.

In the course of his wanderings round India, Hsuan Tsang traversed an area of the western Deccan which he calls ‘Mo-ho-la-ch’a’. The translation of proper names from Chinese back into Sanskrit often stretches credulity, but in this case there is little room for doubt: by ‘Mo-ho-la-ch’a’ Hsuan Tsang meant Maharashtra. This was the land either side of the Western Ghats, once the patrimony of the trading Shatavahanas whose cave temples pocked its rocky outcrops, then of the Vakatakas who so loyally served the Guptas, and nowadays more or less the modern state of Maharashtra centred on Bombay. Hsuan Tsang found the soil rich and fertile, which in parts it is; the people were honest but implacable, and they included ‘a band of champions’ who, when both they and their elephants were fired up on alcohol, proved irresistible in battle. ‘No enemy can stand before them,’ wrote the visitor, wherefore their king was able to ‘treat his neighbours with contempt’.10

The name of this contemptuous sovereign was given as ‘Pu-lo-ki-she’, otherwise Pulakesin II, and according to Hsuan Tsang his ambitions were extensive. At the time in question, c630, he was confidently defying even Harsha who, despite summoning all his troops plus the ablest commanders from his ‘five Indies’, and despite himself leading this horde in battle, had failed to impress Pulakesin II’s gladiators or to dent his roving ambitions.

Hsuan Tsang, and no doubt Harsha, saw this impasse as a stalemate; Pulakesin not unreasonably celebrated it as a victory. He belonged to a dynasty, the Chalukya, which because of its long-lasting consequence and numerous offshoots (whence it is often distinguished as the ‘Western Chalukya’) deserves special attention. The Chalukyas hailed from Karnataka to the south, and in the course of a couple of generations had soared to prominence at the expense of various neighbours, including the Kadambas, their erstwhile suzerains. Their capital, fortified by Pulakesin I, founder of the dynasty and the first to perform the horse-sacrifice (and also Pulakesin II’s grandfather), was situated at Vatapi, now Badami, a small town scrabbling up both sides of a cliff-stepped ravine in northern Karnataka.

There or thereabouts the Chalukyas would continue to celebrate their successes with a remarkable series of temples, at first cut into the rock but by the time of Pulakesin II already free-standing buildings. They were not the first structural temples, timber and brick having been used for such constructions since long before the time of Christ. Nor were they the first stone-built temples: at Sanchi, Nalanda, Buddh Gaya and several other sites in eastern Madhya Pradesh, UP and Bihar a dozen scattered temples from the Gupta period survive in various degrees of dilapidation or over-zealous restoration. But at Badami and its neighbouring sites (Aihole, Mahakuta and Pattadakal) the feast of architecture and sculpture heralds a new identity between dynasty and endowment in which temple-building becomes an expression and paradigm of a sovereign’s authority.

On one of these temples, a rather plain construction dedicated to a Jain saint at Aihole, the poet Ravikirti recorded Pulakesin II’s successes. Reminiscent of Samudra-Gupta’s great Allahabad inscription, this record has the bonus of a date, equivalent to 636 in the Christian calendar. It makes the shrine ‘one of the earliest dated temples in India’11 and, as noted earlier, has provided a benchmark for chronological calculations reaching back even to Manu and the Flood. Here too, in presumptuously comparing his literary talents with those of Kalidasa, Ravikirti provides the earliest dated reference to ‘Sanskrit’s Shakespeare’; whenever Kalidasa lived, he must have been well dead by 636.

Of more relevance to the Chalukyas is the detailed listing of Pulakesin II’s extensive conquests. Since he succeeded to the throne after a period of internal strife, he had first to consolidate his hold on the Badami region, his base, by again subduing the Kadambas, Gangas and other rival kings in Karnataka. It was probably after this feat that he assumed the titles of maharajadhiraja and paramesvara (‘lord of the others’). The west coast (Konkan) from Goa up to and beyond where Bombay now stands was also subjugated while several of its islands, probably including that of Elephanta, were assaulted by the Chalukyan navy. Further north the Malavas of Malwa and the Gurjaras of southern Rajasthan submitted; and a Chalukyan viceroyalty was established in Gujarat. Clearly Chalukyan forces had crossed both the Tapti and Narmada rivers and were therefore threatening Harsha and his confederates.

Next in the Aihole listing comes Harsha himself. His stature is acknowledged in a well-worn cliché about his lotus feet gleaming with the jewels of those who bowed to his sway. But in identifying this formidable challenger the poet also introduces a neat pun on the word harsa (‘harsha’). Harsa as a noun means ‘joy’, and thus Pulakesin’s victory is signified by a phrase about how ‘the harsa [of his enemy] was melted away by fear’. Another source has it simply that the lord of the Daksinapatha (the ‘South’) routed the Lord of the Uttarapatha (the ‘North’).

Pulakesin’s circuit of conquest then continued east, flattening more rivals and reaching the Bay of Bengal in Orissa. Most of the rich lands comprising the Kistna and Godavari deltas in what is now Andhra Pradesh were placed in the care of his younger brother, whose descendants would constitute the ‘Eastern Chalukyas’, a dynasty which would survive until the eleventh century when it merged with its Chola allies of Tamil Nadu. From Vengi, as the Eastern Chalukya kingdom would be called, Pulakesin II resumed his victorious progress down the east coast into Pallava territory. Again his champions and their punch-drunk elephants triumphed as the Pallava king was forced to seek safety within the walls of Kanchipuram. There, unwisely in view of the sequel, Pulakesin left the Pallava and continued south. He crossed the Kaveri and completed his circuit by accepting overtures of friendship from the ancient kingdoms of the extreme south – the Cholas of the Kaveri delta, the Pandyas of Madurai and the Cheras of the Kerala coast.

Now ‘lord of both the eastern and the western seas’ and indisputably master of all India south of the Vindhya hills, Pulakesin II returned to Badami. Hsuan Tsang calls him a ksatriya yet credits him with magnanimity and foresight, qualities rarely accorded to a ‘heretic’ by the devout Buddhist, let alone to an enemy of his beloved Harsha. He is not mentioned in any other Chinese sources but some authorities insist that an Indian mission received by Khusru II of Persia in 625 must have been from the Chalukyan king.

However far-flung his fame, Pulakesin II’s manoeuvres as listed in the Aihole inscription are of great interest as an illustration of the theory of Indian paramountcy. The assumption is usually made that his triumphs, like those of Samudra-Gupta as recorded on the Allahabad pillar, are organised in chronological sequence. It cannot be proved; but what here is self-evident is that, whether chronological or not, they were certainly logical. Pulakesin was doing the rounds of his neighbours. South, west, north, east, and back to the south, the Chalukyan was circling – or was seen to be circling – a universe of territory, riding its bounds as it were just like Raghu in Kalidasa’s Raghu-vamsa. Both kings were, in Indian terms, defining a raja-mandala, the diagram of concentric ‘circles of kings’ which is discussed at length in Kautilya’s Arthasastra and other works on political theory.

In Indian cosmology the mandala design commonly serves as a map. At the centre is the sacred Mount Meru, the axis of the world, outside which the innermost circle is divided into four lands (dvipa); one of these four, jambudvipa (‘ the land of the rose-apple’), is the earth. Outside this, the next circle is the sea, the next more land, then more sea and so on. The seas are filled with, or named after, familiar liquids – obviously salt-water in the case of the first, then treacle, wine, butter and other kitchen ingredients. To literal minds, like that of Thomas Babington Macaulay, minds which had been schooled on the scientific certainties and rational arguments of the European Enlightenment, these ‘seas of treacle and butter’ would seem contemptible absurdities; India’s only hope of advancement lay in forsaking such nonsense, and to this end Macaulay, in a famous minute on Indian education in the 1830s, would issue a damning and still resented indictment of Indian culture as he insisted that India’s schools forsake Sanskrit and adopt a Western-style curriculum.

A no less exasperated attitude is detectable in many nineteenth-century attempts to reconstruct India’s history. From inscriptions and sasana the flowery epithets about lotus-footed ancestors and star-bright toenails were ruthlessly discarded in an effort to extract some credible nugget of political or genealogical import. The raja-mandala as a useful symbol of political relations suffered the same fate. Crudely, it represented the idea that just as cosmic harmony depended on the hierarchy of gods and men actively participating in the triumph of dharma, so political harmony depended on the triumph of dharma through an ordered hierarchy of kings. But because this earthly hierarchy was constantly under threat from the matsya-nyaya (the ‘big fish eats little fish’ syndrome), it required frequent adjustments.

The raja-mandala, in which the maharajadhiraja took the place of Mount Meru at the centre or axis, demonstrated the basic principle of these adjustments. Thus the immediate neighbours of the axial ‘king of kings’, those therefore within the first circle, are to be regarded as his natural enemies; those beyond them in the next circle are his potential allies; those in the third circle are his enemies’ potential allies, those in the fourth his allies’ natural allies, and so on. According to Kautilya, this was the basis of all external relations and of any world order.

Additionally the raja-mandala, when represented as a diagram, was divided by vertical and horizontal radials into four quadrants or quarters. These were seen to correspond to the four dwipa, or lands, of a mandala map. Harsha’s digvijaya, or ‘conquest of the four quarters’, was therefore a bid for universal dominion. In the same way the maharajadhiraja who would be a cakravartin, a ‘wheel-turning’ world-ruler, must as it were weld the rims to the hub by spokes of conquest and alliance and so oblige the kings within each circle of the mandala-raja to acquiesce in and harmonise with his new and, of course, self-centring world order. This geography, indeed geometry, of empire was crucial. It presupposed that ‘society of kings’ already mentioned and it necessitated frequent or, in the case of Harsha and Pulakesin, almost continual perambulation of one’s domains. But it also made conflict a largely dynastic affair which, though of great frequency, may have been of low intensity. The troops involved seem to have been professional warriors who, while dependent on local supplies and transport, otherwise left the agricultural classes alone, as in Megasthenes’ day. Acts symbolic of submission were highly prized; so was the acquisition of accumulated wealth, war elephants, musical instruments, jewels and other symbols of sovereignty. On the other hand the heavy casualties and widespread devastation implied by boasts of ‘annihilation’ cannot be substantiated, nor is there evidence of any consequent economic collapse. On the contrary, the ease with which ‘uprooted’ kings again took root suggests an almost ritualised form of warfare not unlike that which survived, even into the twentieth century, amongst another society of Hindu kings – namely that on the Indonesian island of Bali.

Back in the south India of the seventh century, while Pulakesin II was still celebrating his success in overrunning the rich Pallava country in Tamil Nadu, the Pallava king was ready to take the field again. At Polilur, a place near Kanchipuram where the British would suffer one of their worst defeats in India, the Pallava king claims to have ‘annihilated his enemies’, presumably the Chalukyas, and by 642 he was marching on their capital at Badami. Pallava records claim that Badami was then destroyed and that the Pallava king, Narasimha-varman I, made such a habit of defeating the great Pulakesin II that he fancied he could read the word ‘victory’ engraved on his adversary’s backside as he again took to flight. More certainly Narasimha-varman engraved a record of his success on a rock at Badami and thereafter assumed the title of Vatapikonda, ‘conqueror of Vatapi [i.e. Badami]’.

The Chalukyas would return the compliment. Pulakesin seems to have died in the midst of these reverses and the Chalukyan kingdom to have remained in relapse during a succession crisis. But in 655 one of Pulakesin’s sons, Vikramaditya I, claimed the throne, quickly reasserted Chalukyan sovereignty, and was soon hammering again at the Pallavas. This time Kanchi was surrendered. Then once again the Pallavas struck back. With intermissions while the Pallavas dealt with the Pandyas of Madurai to the south or went to the aid of their allies in Sri Lanka, and while the Chalukyas saw off their own rivals, including the first Arab incursion into Gujarat, the ding-dong struggle between the paramount powers of the arid Deccan and lush Tamil coast continued for over a century. Not infrequently it well demonstrated the Kautilyan raja-mandala. The Pandyas, the southern neighbours and so natural enemies of the Pallavas, assisted the Chalukyas, while the Pandyas’ neighbours and natural enemies, the Cheras of Kerala and the kings of Sri Lanka, rendered support to the Pallavas.

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Chalukyas and Pallavas in the 7th Century

In c740 Vikramaditya II, a Chalukya, again captured Kanchi and this time took the opportunity to leave a record of his success. His inscription in the soft sandstone of one of the pillars of the Pallavas’ just-built Kailasanatha temple is still legible and boasts not only of his conquest but also of his generosity to the city, which he spared, and to the temple, to which he returned the gold that belonged to it. Significantly, as with the Pallava inscription at Badami, no attempt seems to have been made to erase this patronising record when the Pallavas duly recovered their capital.

Nor does this almost constant warfare with its frequent ‘annihilations’ seem to have inhibited either dynasty in the practice of kingship. The sasanas, from which our knowledge of their struggles is largely derived, continued to be issued; and the great temples, for which both dynasties are now best remembered, continued to be built. Narasimha-varman I, Pulakesin II’s eventual conqueror, was also known as Mahamalla or Mamalla (‘great wrestler’), and after him the Pallavas’ main port at Mamallapuram (Mahabalipuram) was named. There the famous stone-cut temples, or raths, each hewn from a single giant stone, were probably the work of Narasimha-varman II (also known as Rajasimha), who ‘assumed titles galore – about 250 of them’12 – and reigned from c695-c728. He also built the so-called Shore temple at Mamallapuram, and began the Kailasanatha at Kanchi.

His Chalukya contemporary was Vijayaditya, the grandson of Vikramaditya I and another man of many titles and many temples; most of the structures at Aihole belong to his reign. He also began, but never completed, the first temple at Pattadakal. A level site lying between the twin towns of Badami and Aihole, Pattadakal would under his successors usurp the ceremonial role of both places as the commemorative capital of the Chalukyas. Here during the first half of the eighth century the Chalukyan temples assumed a size and magnificence of ornamentation unsurpassed by anything in contemporary India and rivalled only by the temples of Kanchi. But whereas today the latter are scattered about a large city richly endowed with later architecture, at Pattadakal, always a site rather than a city, the temples now rear up amongst soggy fields of sugarcane where a mud village and a milky cup of tea is the height of modern magnificence.

Two of these temples, parked side by side like vehicles from another planet, were commissioned by two sisters who were the successive wives of Vikramaditya II, he who left his mark on Kanchi’s Kailasanatha temple. Celebrating this victory, the sisters’ twin temples closely resemble the Kailasanatha and so are indisputably of the so-called Dravida style (which climaxes with the great eleventh-century Chola temple of Tanjore). Others, however, both here and at Aihole, show features like the curvilinear sikhara (tower) which are distinctive of what used to be called the Nagara or northern style of temple (as famously represented by the later Khajuraho temples). There are also examples of the straight-sided pyramidal style of tower later associated with the Orissan temples, especially of Bhuvaneshwar. It seems unlikely that, as once thought, all these variations were developed by the Chalukyas’ architects. Sculpture and iconography show Gupta influences and imply rather that the far-ranging Chalukyas, in their architecture as in their empire, made of the great Deccan divide a bridge between north and south.

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The Chalukyas and the Pallavas: The Rival Successions

Culturally their Pallava rivals look to have performed the same bridging role between the Indian subcontinent and the Indic kingdoms of south-east Asia. No region or dynasty of India had a monopoly of south-east Asian contacts. We know that Bengal had regular contacts with both mainland south-east Asia and its archipelago; Fa Hian sailed for Indonesia or Malaya from the Bengali port of Tamralipti, and many Chinese and south-east Asian Buddhists reached the great university of Nalanda in Bihar via the same port. Orissan influences have also been traced in Burma and the Indies; failing any better explanation, it is quite possible that ‘Kling’, the name by which people of Indian origin are still known in Sumatra and parts of Malaysia, derives from ‘Kalinga’, the ancient Orissan kingdom. Likewise Kerala and Gujarat seem to have had regular contacts with south-east Asia, which with the entry of the Arabs into the carrying trade of the Indian Ocean would be greatly increased.

However, the most pervasive influence in south-east Asia during the fifth to seventh centuries seems to have been that exercised by the Pallavas of Kanchi. In mainland south-east Asia an important new kingdom had begun to emerge in the sixth century. Based in Cambodia, it would soon absorb Funan, the Indic kingdom on the lower Mekong from which it had probably broken away, and would eventually emerge as the great Khmer kingdom of Angkor. Its kings, like many of those of Funan and Champa (another Indic state in Vietnam), almost always bore names ending in ‘-varman’, just like the Pallavas. More significantly, they claimed descent from the union of a local princess with a certain Kambu whose descendants were known as ‘Kambujas’.

From this word came ‘Cambodia’ and ‘Khmer’. But the Kambujas, as both a people and a place, first occur in the epics and the Puranas where they are located in the extreme north-west of the Indian subcontinent, a good three thousand kilometres from Cambodia. It has already been suggested that the sacred geography of the Sanskrit classics tended to get replicated as new regions became Sanskritised (e.g. Mathura, Madurai, and Madura in Indonesia). Kambuja’s improbable removal from the upper Indus to the lower Mekong looks to be another case in point. Moreover the adoption of Kambu as a common ancestor would seem to show how such transpositions might have come about, with kings as far away as Indo-China laying claim to the legitimacy provided by an adopted Sanskritic forebear. But what is also significant is that this particular myth seems to have been a revision of the story of the brahman Kaundinya and ‘Willow-Leaf’, his ill-clad local queen. And that in its turn ‘shows a certain kinship with the genealogical myth of the Pallavas of Kanchi’,13 indeed ‘is strikingly similar’ to it.14

Indo-China apart, the Pallavas are known to have become involved in dynastic struggles in Sri Lanka, to have developed Mamallapuram as a long-distance trading station, and to have had diplomatic relations with China. No doubt commercial, religious and political factors all played their part in promoting a more direct, if still conjectural, Pallavan influence in the south-east Asian archipelago. An inscription found in Java uses the Pallava script and that island’s earliest surviving Hindu temples, small stone-built shrines scattered across the misty highlands of Dieng and Gedong Songo, show clear affinities with the architecture of Mamallapuram.

In Indonesia as in Indo-China important political developments were under way. The eighth century saw the emergence from obscurity of Srivijaya, a maritime power and possibly a dynasty, which would control a seaborne empire stretching from Sumatra to Malaya, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. In terms of national psyche the watery imperium of Srivijaya is as important to modern Indonesia, itself ‘a pelagic state’, as is the continental empire of the Mauryas to Indian centralists. Like Champa and Cambodia, Srivijaya was nevertheless a decidedly Indianised polity, although apparently more Buddhist than brahmanical. Its capital, near Palembang in south-eastern Sumatra, looks to have been the place where in the late seventh century I-tsing (I-ching), another Chinese scholar, found a thriving monastic community. From its monks he received preliminary instruction before proceeding on to Bengal and Nalanda. Returning, he lived with the Srivijayan Buddhists for several years as he worked on the translation of texts acquired in India.

Also in the seventh and eighth centuries there arose in central Java the rival, but eventually joint, kingdoms of the Sailendra and Sanjaya. The origins of these dynasties and their relationship with Srivijaya, let alone India, are subjects of much debate; but to one or both of them must be ascribed the first glorious phase of Javanese temple-building which began c780. As in the Deccan and south India, the temples are all clustered within a small compass, here centred on the city of Jogjakarta. Moreover many conform in all but detail to the norms of layout and elevation found at the Pallavan and Chalukyan sites.

The one glowering exception is the sculptural colossus of Borobudur, much the most outstanding if enigmatic example of Indian cultural transference in south-east Asia. As a stepped stupa of unprecedented proportions, possible prototypes for it have been inferred from the descriptions offered by Hsuan Tsang of now vanished north Indian stupas and from archaeological evidence of massive ruins and plinths at sites like Nandangarh and Paharpur in Bengal. On the other hand, if the stupa was originally a hill which was then cut into terraces and clad with stone, local parallels with the elaborately terraced landscape of Java and its pre-Indic mountain deities may be more relevant.

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India and South East Asia

The archaeology of the building does nothing to resolve these contradictions. Apparently begun about 775, it only assumed its final shape in 840, by which time it had been frequently redesigned and even reinterpreted. ‘The monument was built in at least four different stages … it was probably begun as a Hindu temple, and was transformed into a Buddhist place of worship after its second stage.’15 However this may be, there is universal consensus that the ground-plan of Borobudur, both as originally conceived and as finally realised, represents a classic mandala. Its four sides, each about as long as the touchline of a football pitch, are progressively indented so as to round, as it were, the corners, and render the four-square outline as near circular as rectangular masonry will allow. Succeeding tiers, the inner circles on the ground plan, follow the same pattern until the three topmost, or innermost, are in fact circular. Moreover each tier is accessible only by flights of steps located in the middle of each side and which, connecting, divide the monument into four quadrants.

A similar design can be detected in the base-plan of contemporary temples, as opposed to stupas, in both Java and India. Elevations add a further important dimension to this symbolism, as will appear from the soaring ambitions of the Chalukyas’ successors in the Deccan. Here it will suffice to note that building temples had now become a royal prerogative. All, except subsidiary shrines, were in part intended as expressions of royal paramountcy designed to impress subjects, remind vassals, and challenge rivals.

Hence ‘the construction of a temple, Buddhist or Hindu, was an important political act,’16 indeed ‘as much an act of war as it was an act of peace’.17 It could, though, be misconstrued. As new Islamic challengers ventured across the deserts of Sind and over the Hindu Kush, India’s dynasties appeared to be woefully indifferent as they lavished all available resources not on forts and horsemen but on flights of architectural fantasy. In fact they were meeting the new threat by a gloriously defiant assertion of self-belief in their superior sovereignty.
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Re: India A History, by John Keay

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Chapter 9: Dharma and Defiance
c700–c900

THE DAWN MUEZZIN


THE URGENCY WITH WHICH the followers of the Prophet carried his teachings out of Arabia resulted in one of the campaigning wonders of world history. Within twenty years of his death in 632, Arab forces, although lacking in military pedigree and with no prior knowledge of siegecraft, had overrun much of the Byzantine empire in Syria and Egypt and all of the Sassanid empire in Iraq and Iran. Forty years later, with the addition of North Africa, Spain, most of Afghanistan, and vast areas of central Asia, the Arab domains spanned three continents in a broad swathe of conquest which stretched from the Atlantic to the Indus and from the upper Nile to the Aral Sea. Alexander had been upstaged, Caesar overshadowed. If Muslim authors celebrated this success with the chronicles, geographies and travelogues which now constitute important source materials for the period, it was hardly surprising; evidence of Islam’s triumph was proof of Islam’s truth. By 700 China and India shared uncertain borderlands with Islamic neighbours just as did the Frankish kingdom in western Europe and what remained of Byzantium’s empire in Anatolia.

This phenomenal rate of expansion could not be sustained. External resistance hardened, internal stresses led to the breakaway of peripheral provinces. When in 750 the Umayyad caliphate of Damascus was succeeded by the Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad a long period of consolidation and cultural distinction set in. In the east the Arabs had reached the Indus a hundred years earlier, yet only rarely had they ventured beyond it. Their Turkish successors in Afghanistan, reluctant rulers if less reticent raiders, would also for long be content merely to ravage India’s northern cities.

Islam’s Indian frontier would therefore come to assume a near permanence. Running roughly up the Indus from Sind in what is now Pakistan to Kabul in Afghanistan, it would scarcely advance for three centuries. Kanauj and India’s other front-line kingdoms had, like Constantinople, ample time to become acquainted with their new neighbours, with the faith they held so dear and with the tactics they used so well. None would seem invincible. Moreover, a catastrophe that takes centuries to materialise loses some of its menace. Illusions of successful resistance were nursed; prospects for co-existence were explored. The India which finally succumbed to Muslim dominion in the thirteenth century, though politically more divided than ever, would be both more resilient and more receptive than the brittle dynastic structures of the eighth century. Similarly the Islamic conquerors who would eventually hoist their standards over Delhi, though no more tolerant of idolatry than their Arab predecessors, had few illusions about the mass conversion of India’s multitudes, but real expectations of a fruitful and lasting Indian dominion.

Arab forces, possibly including a few grey-bearded disciples who had prayed with the Prophet himself, had first ventured onto Indian soil by crossing the Bolan pass (near Quetta in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan) in c663. The pass provides comparatively easy access from southern Afghanistan into valleys which thread their way down to the Indus in upper Sind. Much further south, on the coast of lower Sind, desultory naval raids had preceded this assault. Maritime objectives would remain important. In fact twenty years earlier the first Muslims to reach India had been newly converted Arab merchants trading across the Arabian Sea to India’s west coast. Their destinations included the port-cities of the Maitrakas in Saurashtra, of the Chalukyas in Maharashtra, the Cheras in Kerala, and even the kings of Sri Lanka. By the mid-seventh century there were sizeable communities of Muslims in most of these ports. Without provoking undue hostility amongst already cosmopolitan populations, the newcomers rapidly engrossed the valuable carrying trade in Arabian horses to India and in Indian and south-east Asian spices to Arabia. The protection of this route and those who sailed it was thus an early Arab priority; and it called for particular attention to the coastal regions of Sind, whose estuarine inlets provided a muddy sanctuary amidst the mangroves for scavenging sea tribes and hereditary pirates.

Whether it was also the Arabs’ intention to use Sind as a springboard for the invasion of India is less certain. The idea would surface in the eighth century, but in the seventh the more usual route to India via Kabul and the Khyber Pass seems to have been preferred and had already resulted in a succession of abortive Arab raids directed at the Kabul valley. Sind, on the other hand, was something of a dead-end as well as a backwater. This was because any eastward progress was largely barred by the Thar, otherwise the Great Indian Desert, where now runs the Indo–Pakistan border. Even history, as if aware that the lower Indus would have more than its fair share of exposure after the Harappan discoveries, has little to report of the region during the thousand years since Alexander and his men had come sailing downriver. That it was then already Aryanised is clear from the ferocious opposition which the Macedonians encountered even from brahman communities.

Subsequently Buddhism had also claimed many followers in Sind and seems to have become the predominant creed. Hsuan Tsang, writing only twenty years before the first Arab incursion, found innumerable stupas, amongst them perhaps those in the vicinity of Mohenjo-daro which thirteen centuries later would attract the first glimmer of archaeological interest in Harappan prehistory. He also reported on Sind’s ‘several hundred sangharamas occupied by about ten thousand monks’. Admittedly the monks, being of the Hinayana school of which the Chinese Mahayanist heartily disapproved, seemed somewhat ‘indolent and given to indulgence and debauchery’. But the people as a whole were ‘hardy and impulsive’ and their kingdom, then one of Harsha’s confederate states, was famed for its cereal production, its livestock and its export of salt.1

Unfortunately Hsuan Tsang’s generally reliable, if partisan, account says nothing about the political situation, only that Sind’s unnamed king was of sudra caste. He was also ‘an honest and sincere fellow’ who, not unexpectedly after such a character reference, ‘reverenced the law of the Buddha’. Presumably he was of the Rai dynasty, and probably the last of that dynasty for, according to Muslim sources, in c640 the throne of the Rais was usurped by a brahman named Chach. For an infidel, Chach would be rated highly by Muslim writers. In the Chach-nama, an Islamic history of Sind compiled in the thirteenth century but supposedly based on contemporary accounts, he is said to have immediately set out ‘to define the frontiers of his kingdom’.2

No charters of his reign survive, but it may be supposed that what Muslim historians saw as an exercise in border demarcation Chach intended as a traditional digvijaya. Nor, as ‘conquests of the four quarters’ go, was it inconsiderable. In the north, we learn, he reached ‘Kashmir’. Even if this meant not the Kashmir valley but Kashmir territory, which then extended down to the plains of the Panjab, he must at least have entered the Himalayan foothills, for he marked his frontier by planting a chenar, or plane tree, and a deodar, or Himalayan cedar; both are native to the hills. Heading west he laid claim to Makran, the coastal region of Baluchistan where he planted date palms, and heading south he reached the mouth of the Indus. Chach’s kingdom lacked only the erstwhile Gandhara in the north-west to qualify as a proto-Pakistan. Similarly, as a digvijaya, his conquests were incomplete only in respect of the mandala’s eastern quadrant where lay the fearful sands of Thar.

As if to make up for this omission, it was Chach, or his governor in upper Sind, who successfully saw off the Arab attack of 663 via the Bolan pass. No further assaults materialised, and in c674, after what was undoubtedly a glorious reign, Chach ‘died and went to hell’, this being the invariable fate of even the noblest infidel in Muslim histories. It was therefore his son, Dahar (Dahir), who in c708 faced the next and more determined Arab invasion.
This time the trouble is specifically attributed to a flagrant act of piracy. A ship from Sri Lanka, whose Basra-bound passengers included a bevy of maidens, had been waylaid off the port-city of Debal (in the vicinity of modern Karachi) by the dreaded Meds. The Meds were pirates while the maidens, all daughters of deceased Muslim merchants, had been intended as a courtesy from the king of Sri Lanka to al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, the Caliph’s governor of Iraq and viceroy for the eastern empire. In what reads like an early-eighth-century version of quarrels which would recur in the late eighteenth century over the policing of the Arabian Sea, al-Hajjaj demanded that King Dahar of Sind secure the release of the maidens. But Dahar, even if willing, was unable to oblige. As he explained, ‘They are pirates who have captured these women, and over them I have no authority.’3 Unsatisfied with this reply, al-Hajjaj despatched a naval force to Debal. It was defeated and its commander killed. Another armada met a similar fate. Whether or not Dahar took an active part in these skirmishes, he was clearly doing nothing to restrain his coastal subjects. Al-Hajjaj therefore continued to hold him responsible and resolved on the all-out amphibious offensive of c708.

Command of the caliph’s forces was given to Muhammad ibn Qasim, al- Hajjaj’s cousin and an able leader, who was to be supplied with siege engines by sea and with six thousand crack Syrian troops for the march through Makran. Nothing was left to chance; according to al-Biladuri, one of the earliest Muslim chroniclers, ibn Qasim ‘was provided with all he could require, without omitting even thread and needles’. Although apparently just a figure of speech, this reference to needlecraft would be of some significance for Muhammad ibn Qasim.

More immediately the siege engines came into their own. The land forces had effected a rendezvous with the seaborne reinforcements outside Debal, but they were unable to force entry to the city. Even the manjanik, a gigantic martinet, or calibrated catapult, which required five hundred men to operate it, was ineffective against Debal’s stout walls. But by shortening its chassis so that it aimed high, the manjanik was trained on a flagstaff whose bright red flag fluttered defiantly from the top of Debal’s temple tower. After no doubt several misses, the manjanik-master struck lucky and the flagstaff was shattered, ‘at which the idolaters were sore afflicted’. In fact, they threw caution to the wind and, issuing forth to avenge this sacrilege, were easily routed. ‘The town was thus taken by assault and the carnage endured for three days,’ says al-Biladuri. The temple was partly demolished, its ‘priests’ (who may have been Buddhists or brahmans) were massacred, and a mosque was laid out for the four-thousand-man garrison which was to remain in Debal.

Image
The Arab Conquest of Sind in the 8th Century

Meanwhile ibn Qasim moved inland, then up the west bank of the Indus. Some ‘Samanis’ (presumably sramanas, or Buddhist monks) of ‘Nerun’ (perhaps the Pakistani Hyderabad) were reminded of their vows of non-violence and came to terms with the invader. Thanks to these ‘Buddhist fifth-columnists’,4 as an eminent Indian historian mischievously calls them, Nerun capitulated. On the opposite bank of the river, a despondent Dahar was apparently safe since ibn Qasim seemed unable or unwilling to cross the flood. Eventually orders came from Governor al-Hajjaj in Baghdad to do just that. A bridge of roped boats was assembled on the west bank. With one end released into the current, it swung into place and the Arabs began crossing immediately.

‘The dreadful conflict which followed was such as had never been heard of,’ reports al-Biladuri. It does, though, bring to mind Alexander’s titanic struggle with Poros; for again the Indian forces displayed exceptional bravery and again the outcome hung in the balance until decided by the ungovernable behaviour of panic-stricken elephants. The beast ridden by Dahar himself, a rather conspicuous albino, was hit by a fire-arrow and plunged into the river. There Dahar made an easy target. He fought on with an arrow in his chest but, dismounting, was eventually struck by a skull-splitting sword blow. It was towards evening, according to al-Biladuri, and when Dahar ‘died and went to hell’, ‘the idolaters fled and the Mussulmans glutted themselves with massacre’.

Muhammad ibn Qasim then resumed his march upriver. Brahmanabad (the later Mansurah), then Alor (Rohri) and finally Multan, the three principal cities of Sind, were either captured or surrendered, probably during the years 710–13. Astronomical casualty figures are given, yet both al-Biladuri and the Chachnama agree that ibn Qasim was a man of his word. When he offered, in return for a peaceful surrender, to spare lives and guarantee the safety of temples he was as good as his promise. Hindu and Buddhist establishments were respected ‘as if they were the churches of the Christians, the synagogues of the Jews or the fire temples of the Magians [Zoroastrians]’. The jizya, the standard poll-tax on all infidels, was imposed; yet brahmans and Buddhist monks were allowed to collect alms, and temples to receive donations. Ibn Qasim was no mindless butcher. When he was disgraced and removed following the death of his patron al-Hajjaj, it may well be that ‘the people of Hind wept’.

Al-Biladuri merely explains that Muhammad ibn Qasim was sent back to Iraq as a prisoner and there tortured to death because of a family feud with the new governor. The Chach-nama gives a different story and much more detail. Apparently ibn Qasim had previously captured two of Dahar’s virgin daughters and sent them to Baghdad as an adornment to Caliph Walid’s seraglio. There one of the young princesses, Suryadevi, caught the caliph’s eye; but when he deigned to draw her near, ‘she abruptly stood up’. As she very respectfully explained, she felt unworthy of the royal couch since both she and her sister had been similarly favoured in Sind during their detention by Muhammad ibn Qasim. The caliph was not pleased. ‘Overwhelmed with love and letting slip the reins of patience’, he immediately dictated a missive ordering the perpetrator to ‘suffer himself to be sewed up in a hide and sent to the capital’.

The order was obeyed to the letter; the needles and the thread were at last put to good use and ibn Qasim, trussed and labelled, was despatched to Baghdad. Two days into this long and excruciating journey ‘he delivered his soul to God and went to the eternal world’. When finally the unsavoury package was delivered to Walid, the princesses were invited to bear witness to the caliph’s awesomely impartial justice. Not without glee they surveyed the grisly cadaver and then bravely, if unwisely, revealed that Muhammad ibn Qasim had in fact behaved with perfect propriety.

But he had killed the king of Hind and Sind, destroyed the dominion of our forefathers, and degraded us from the dignity of royalty to a state of slavery. Therefore, to retaliate and revenge these injuries, we uttered a falsehood and our object has been fulfilled.


So Muhammad ibn Qasim had been stitched up in more ways than one. Again the Caliph was mightily displeased, ‘and from excess of regret he bit the back of his hand’. Then he consigned the princesses to lifelong incarceration.5

Like most good stories, this one has not always been endorsed by professional historians, although why a Muslim should have fabricated a tale so creditable to the infidel is not explained. It does, moreover, offer a plausible reason for the downfall of Sind’s respected and highly successful conqueror. His like would be hard to find. The next Arab governor of the province died on arrival, and his successor seems to have made little impact on a situation which had already declined, with Brahmanabad back under the control of Dahar’s son. The latter, in c720, accepted Baghdad’s offer of an amnesty whereby in return for adopting Islam he was granted immunity and the chance to participate in government. But this looks to have been a tactical move for, as a succession crisis engulfed the Umayyad caliphate, the Sindis happily discarded both their allegiance and their new faith.

Dahar’s son was eventually captured and killed by Junaid ibn Abdur Rahman al-Marri, who in the mid-720s seems to have recovered much of the province – and more besides. His successors fared less well, and there is evidence of the caliph’s governors being penned within fortified enclaves before again ‘seizing whatever came into their hands and subduing the neighbourhood whose inhabitants had rebelled’.6 This pattern continued to repeat itself during the early years of the Abbasid caliphate. Baghdad’s control of the entire province remained a rare phenomenon until, c870, the local governors, or amirs, gradually threw off their allegiance to the caliph and managed matters for themselves. By the tenth century the province was divided between two Arab families, one ruling from Mansurah in the south and the other from Multan in the north. In Multan the resentment of the still largely non-Muslim population was curbed only by their Muslim masters threatening to vandalise the city’s most revered temple whenever trouble stirred or invasion threatened. If conquest had been difficult, conversion was proving even more so. Yet the obstinacy of the idolaters, if indulged, could be put to some advantage, and if condemned, always afforded an excellent justification for pillage and plunder. So it was in Sind and so it would be in Hind (i.e. India). In fact Sind’s governors had already had a foretaste of what lay ahead. Muhammad ibn Qasim may have pushed east towards Kanauj, Junaid certainly tried his luck in western India, and later governors may have followed suit.

Their experiences, in so far as they can be inferred from the scanty evidence, would not be encouraging. Al-Biladuri claims conquests for Junaid which extended to Broach in Gujarat and to Ujjain in Malwa. From a copper plate found at Nausari, south of Broach, it would appear that the Arabs had crossed Saurashtra and so must have squeezed through, or round, the Rann of Kutch. This was the incursion which put paid to the Maitrakas of Vallabhi, they of the dazzling toenails whose enemies’ rutting elephants had had their temples cleft. It was also the incursion which was finally halted by, amongst others, a vassal branch of the Chalukya dynasty. The date is thought to have been c736.

Ujjain and Malwa look to have been the target of a separate and probably subsequent offensive by way of Rajasthan.7 It too was defeated, in this instance by a rising clan of considerable later importance known as the Gurjaras. Clearly, when the subcontinent first faced the challenge of Islam, it was neither so irredeemably supine nor so hopelessly divided as British historians in the nineteenth century would suppose.

THE RISE OF THE RASHTRAKUTAS

In contemporary Indian sources these first marauding disciples of Islam are occasionally identified as Yavanas (Greeks),Turuskas (Turks) or Tajikas (Tajiks or Persians), but more usually as mlecchas. The latter term meant what it always had: foreigners who could not talk properly, outcastes with no place in Indian society and, above all, inferiors with no respect for dharma. Like all mlecchas the Muslims were seen as essentially marginal, negative and destructive, just like the Huns. There is no evidence of an Indian appreciation of the global threat which they represented; and the peculiar nature of their mission – to impose a new monotheist orthodoxy by military conquest and political dominion – was so alien to Indian tradition that it went uncomprehended.

No doubt a certain complacency contributed to this indifference. As al-Biruni (Alberuni), the great Islamic scholar of the eleventh century, would put it, ‘the Hindus believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no king like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs.’ He thought they should travel more and mix with other nations; ‘their antecedents were not as narrow-minded as the present generation,’ he added.8 While clearly disparaging eleventh-century attitudes, al-Biruni thus appears to confirm the impression given by earlier Muslim writers that in the eighth and ninth centuries India was considered anything but backward. Its scientific and mathematical discoveries, though buried amidst semantic dross and seldom released for practical application, were readily appreciated by Muslim scientists and then rapidly appropriated by them. Al-Biruni was a case in point: his scientific celebrity in the Arab world would owe much to his mastery of Sanskrit and access to Indian scholarship.

Aspects of eleventh-century India which al-Biruni omitted from his catalogue of criticism were its size and its wealth. Unlike Alexander’s Greeks, Muslim invaders were well aware of India’s immensity, and mightily excited by its resources. As well as exotic produce like spices, peacocks, pearls, diamonds, ivory and ebony, the ‘Hindu country’ was renowned for its skilled manufactures and its bustling commerce. India’s economy was probably one of the most sophisticated in the world. Guilds regulated production and provided credit; the roads were safe, ports and markets carefully supervised, and tariffs low. Moreover capital was both plentiful and conspicuous. Since at least Roman times the subcontinent seems to have enjoyed a favourable balance of payments. Gold and silver had been accumulating long before the ‘golden Guptas’, and they continued to do so. Figures in the Mamallapuram sculptures and the Ajanta frescoes are as strung about with jewellery as those in the Sanchi and Amaravati reliefs. Divine images of solid gold are well attested and royal temples were rapidly becoming royal treasuries as successful dynasts endowed them with the fruits of their conquests. The devout Muslim, although ostensibly bent on converting the infidel, would find his zeal handsomely rewarded.

Thanks to the peculiarities of the caste system, Indian society also seemed admirably stable, if excessively stratified. But although in theory the ritual-and-pollution- based varna, and in practice the profession-based jati, precluded social mobility, Muslim writers seldom correctly identified the four varnas or divined the variety of the innumerable jatis. It would seem, then, that the ‘system’ was not obviously systematic. Kings of sudra or brahman origin, like those of Sind, were as common as those whose forebears were, or pretended to be, of the supposedly royal and martial ksatriya varna.

Nor was caste wholly prohibitive and repressive. Indeed it has been argued that caste membership conferred important rights of participation in the economic and political processes as well as obligations of social conformity. In other words, it was as much about being a citizen as being a subject. Through various rural and, more obviously, urban assemblies like caste and guild councils, endorsement of a particular leadership was demonstrated by attendance in the myriad rituals of state. ‘Rather than being excluded from the life of Indian polities, [castes] actively participated in it. Indeed, by doing so, they partly constituted it.’9 Such participation in, for instance, the elaborate ceremonies involved in installing a new king or launching a digvijaya signified assent to the traditional fiscal and military expedients available to such a leader. But by caste councils, as by reluctant feudatories and vassals, such connivance in the political order might always be subtly withheld or transferred.

A further argument has it that caste assumed its passive and static connotations only after the Muslim conquest, when religious discrimination and oppressive taxation conspired to remove opportunities for political participation and economic advancement. Caste membership, shorn of its influence, then became primarily a distinguishing characteristic of orthodox Indianness, or ‘Hinduism’. The notion of karma – whereby one’s status was determined by one’s conduct in past lives and could in subsequent lives be improved by one’s conduct in this – provided a rational explanation for the system as well as a welcome solace for those most disadvantaged by it; their prospects now depended not on the exercise of caste rights but on resignation to caste obligations. The doctrine of karma, first scouted in the Upanisads, then elaborated in Buddhist teaching, thus came, like caste, to be perceived as fundamental to Hindu orthodoxy.

Politically, according to Muslim observers, India comprised many kingdoms, each with a formidable army that included elephants and cavalry as well as infantry. According to a Baghdad adage quoted by al-Biruni, the Turks were famous for their horses, Kandahar (for some reason) for its elephants, and India for its armies. One of India’s rulers, ‘the Balhara’, was reckoned as being amongst ‘the four great or principal kings of the world’ according to the much-travelled merchant known to us simply as Suleiman (the other great rulers were the kings of Baghdad, of Byzantium-Constantinople, and of China). Admittedly ‘the Balhara’s’ claim to be India’s king of kings was constantly under threat; but in the opinion of Suleiman, who made several trips to India during the first half of the ninth century, this did not necessarily occasion great upheaval. India had learned to contain conflict and to minimise its effects.

The Indians sometimes go to war for conquest, but the occasions are rare. I have never seen the people of one country submit to the authority of another, except in the case of that country which comes next to the country of pepper [i.e. the Malabar coast]. When a king subdues a neighbouring state, he places over it a man belonging to the family of the fallen prince who carries on the government in the name of the conqueror. The inhabitants would not suffer it to be otherwise.10


Once again one is reminded of Megasthenes’ description of agriculturalists ‘ploughing in perfect security’ while armies did battle in the next field. Although the ploughmen may have had a stake in the outcome of the battle or may have contributed to the equipage of one of the protagonists, they were not expected to get involved. Warriors fought with warriors; the ploughman’s dharma was to plough.

Bearing this peculiarity in mind – and not without a deep breath – one may return to the dynastic fray as it intensified during the eighth to eleventh centuries. In the Deccan the century and a half of glorious domination by the Chalukyas of Badami came to an end around 760. Distracted if not exhausted by their endless wars in the south with the Pallavas of Kanchi, the Chalukyas had allowed one of their northern officials to accumulate considerable territory on the upper Godavari river in Berar, a region as near the dead centre of India as anywhere and now dominated by the city of Nagpur. From c735–56 the senior member of this rising family was Dantidurga and, since his function within the Chalukyas’ empire was that of rastrakuta or ‘head of a region’, the dynasty he founded is known as that of the Rashtrakutas.

After loyally serving the Chalukya Vikramaditya II in his Pallava wars and possibly also against the Arabs of Sind, Dantidurga took the opportunity of Vikramaditya’s death in 747 to enlarge his territories. In a modest digvijaya which carefully avoided the Chalukyan heartland of Karnataka, he expanded his authority to include much of Madhya Pradesh and parts of southern Gujarat and northern Maharashtra. Additionally, according to a set of copper plates from Ellora (which place he seems to have adopted as his ceremonial capital), he assumed the title of prithvi-vallabha. Vallabha means ‘husband’ or ‘lover’, while prithvi means ‘the earth’ and is also the name of the earth goddess who was one of Lord Vishnu’s consorts. Dantidurga and his successors were therefore advancing an ambitious claim to be acknowledged as Lords of the Earth and emanations of Vishnu. Incidentally, it was also this title, abbreviated to vallabha, which registered with Muslim observers and reappeared in their writings as ‘the Balhara’.

Compared to the Byzantine emperors or any of the other ‘four great or principal kings of the world’, the Balhara’s rise to fame was rapid and comparatively painless. Dantidurga completed his digvijaya by belatedly confronting the Chalukyan king who, also belatedly, had just awoken to the danger of this rival on his northern frontier. Again it was the Rashtrakuta who triumphed, although in mysterious circumstances: ‘success seems to have been due to a stratagem, for his court poet tells us that he overthrew the Karnataka army by a mere frown of his brow, without any effort being made and without any weapons being raised or used.’ The fruits of this victory, if such it was, were proportionately modest. The Chalukyas were soon back in the field and Dantidurga would frown no more. He died prematurely in c756 ‘probably owing to the pressing requests [for his company] of the heavenly damsels’, suggests one record.11

Being childless, he was succeeded on the Rashtrakuta throne by his uncle Krishna I. Krishna it was who concluded matters with the Chalukyas. In what looks to have been a rather violent battle – and which could be that to which the merchant Suleiman would refer as involving ‘the country which comes next to the country of pepper’ – Krishna decisively disposed of his family’s erstwhile suzerains; ‘the ocean of the Chalukya army’ was well and truly ‘churned’, we are told, and from its waves arose the ‘Goddess of Royal Glory’. Badami fell and all Karnataka was added to the Rashtrakutas’ territories, while subsequent campaigns secured the submission of the Konkan coast and of the eternally hard-pressed Ganga dynasty (of the Mysore area). Additionally, in the east, one of Krishna’s sons triumphed over the Chalukyas of Vengi who were a satellite branch of the Badami family. These ‘Eastern Chalukyas’ were now wedded to the Rashtrakuta cause by a matrimonial alliance.

When Krishna I died in c773 the Rashtrakutas were undisputed masters of the entire Deccan. Further conquests could only be made at the expense of the kingdoms of the extreme south or by crossing the Vindhya hills into the Gangetic plains. No Deccan-based dynasty had yet tried its luck in the hallowed and hotly contested arya-varta but under Dhruva, who in c780 ended a short and chaotic reign by his brother, the Rashtrakutas did just that. Dhruva first secured his southern flank by again rubbishing the Gangas and rattling the Pallavas. Then in c786 he forded the Narmada, a veritable Rubicon, and led his best troops north. Malwa quickly submitted. Following the Chambal river along the well-worn trail once known as the Daksinapatha, Dhruva crossed into the Gangetic basin and headed for Kanauj.

THE KANAUJ TRIANGLE

Centrally sited and beside the holy Ganga, Kanauj had been acknowledged as the seat of northern empire ever since Harsha’s day. By the ninth century, though, it was a capital without much of a kingdom, its ruler being generally a puppet of one or other of the two great powers that were contesting the hegemony of the north. These were the Palas from eastern India and the Gurjara- Pratiharas from western India. With the eruption onto the scene in c786 of the Rashtrakutas from the Deccan this became a three-sided contest. It would last for two centuries and, though its details are anything but clear, the evidence suggests glorious interludes during which one or other of the contestants successfully performed a digvijaya, laid claim to Kanauj, and grandiloquently advertised his universal paramountcy. Hence the period is sometimes called the ‘Imperial Age of Kanauj’. But the chronology is too confused for anything but a conjectural narrative, and of the temples and fortifications of Kanauj itself too little remains to inspire even a hopeful reconstruction.

More interesting than the power struggle is the very different provenance of the participants. All three are noticed by Muslim writers who understandably have least to say about the remotest, namely ‘Rahma’, ‘Rahmi’ or ‘Ruhmi’. The word may derive from Dharmapala who ruled c775–810, and certainly it seems to refer to his dynasty, that of the Palas of Bengal. The Pala country, we learn, was on the coast but stretched well inland; it produced very fine cottons and aloe wood, and the king possessed fifty thousand elephants and more troops than either of his rivals. Dharmapala was the son of Gopala, who looks to have founded the dynasty in c750. Unusually, but not uniquely since similar claims are made for one of the Pallavas and for a king of Kashmir, Gopala’s elevation is said to have been the result of a selection, if not an election, process. Perhaps already a minor king of northern Bengal, he was invited to assume sovereignty over the whole of Vanga, or eastern Bengal, and then rapidly consolidated his rule throughout Bengal and Bihar.

Dharmapala continued his father’s expansionist policies. Excepting for Sasanka’s brief and uncertain challenge in Harsha’s day, this was the first Bengali bid for control of arya-varta, and it began badly. But eventually, taking full advantage of the disruption caused by the first Rashtrakuta incursion, Dharmapala reached Kanauj and there held a great ceremony at which his chosen candidate was installed as a tributary king. The loan of Dharmapala’s own golden pitcher for the sacred ablutions essential to this induction neatly demonstrated his primacy. Kings from all over north India, including an unexplained ‘Yavana’ (possibly a Muslim from Sind), witnessed the event and ‘paid homage with the bending down of their quavering diadems’.12

Through as many setbacks as triumphs, the Palas clung to their supremacist claims for the best part of a century. As with the Guptas, this was partly thanks to their longevity. Dharmapala reigned for forty years and Devapala, his son, seems to have lasted quite as long (c810–50). To their collection of ‘quavering diadems’ were briefly added those of the kings of Kamarupa (Assam), Utkala (an Orissan kingdom) and possibly other kings from lands as far-flung as the deep south and the extreme north-west. This, however, temporarily exhausted the Palas’ taste for earthly dominion. Although there would be a brief revival in the eleventh century, in the tenth their role was simply as a whipping boy for their rivals. ‘The Pala empire, shorn of its plume, lay tottered,’ writes an Indian historian.13 Seemingly it disintegrated under a succession of rulers of a ‘pacific and religious disposition’.14 One renounced the throne to become an ascetic, others attended to their spiritual advisers and to the welfare of the monastic establishments which still flourished in the Pala heartland of Bihar and Bengal.

For the Palas were Buddhists, indeed the last major Indian dynasty to espouse Buddhism. Their lavish endowments included the revival of Nalanda’s university and a colossal building programme at Somapura, now Paharpur in Bangladesh, where sprawling ruins and foundations, all of brick, attest ‘the largest Buddhist buildings south of the Himalayas’.15 They also founded an important new centre of learning at Vikramashila, which was somewhere on the Ganga in Bihar. The fame of all these places travelled widely and suggests that Pala patronage was crucial to the future of Buddhism as a world religion. To the Pala kingdom came students from Sind, Kashmir, Nepal, Tibet, China, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Pala architecture probably influenced the final remodelling of Borobudur and would be echoed in the stupas and temples of Pagan (Burma) and Prambanam (Java). Pala images, often in highly polished stone and bronze, anticipated and inspired the distinctive iconography of Tibet and Nepal. And the Mahayanist Buddhism of both these countries developed its peculiar traits and doctrines under Pala patronage.

It was a Buddhism far removed from that preached by the Enlightened One, indeed as remote from it in both time and spirit as was medieval Christianity from the New Testament. Although originally a rationalisation of the human condition and a code of ethics, both of which largely ignored the deities and rituals associated with conventional religion, Buddhism had been steadily assuming the trappings of orthodox religious practice ever since the Buddha’s death. In the Boddhisattvas it had long since acquired a pantheon whose myths and attributes rivalled those of Shiva and Vishnu; now, in their numerous Taras, or spouses, it acquired glamorous female counterparts of Parvati and Lakshmi. Indeed Buddhist icons of the Pala period are so anatomically exaggerated and so generously provided with extra heads and arms that only a trained eye would identify them as Buddhist.

In eastern India the demarcation between Buddhists and non-Buddhists was further blurred by both countenancing the efficacy of mantras (repetitious formulae), yantras (mystical designs), mudras (finger postures) and the numerous other practices associated with Tantricism. Tantras were esoteric texts of uncertain origin and profoundly difficult import which offered initiates the chance of communing with the divinity and assuming supernatural powers and states. The rituals and disciplines involved were complex and secret. Some mimicked the sexual imagery of myths involving the union of the deity and his shakti, or female counterpart. Breaking the taboos of caste, diet, dress and sexual fidelity, practitioners might enjoy both a liberating debauch and an enhanced reputation, even if magical powers eluded them.

But it goes without saying that these mystic whisperings, obscurantist doctrines and orgiastic covens were far removed from the Buddha’s ‘Middle Way’. Worse still, compromise was proving counter-productive for Buddhism. In bidding for popular support and competing with other cults as a parallel religion, the sangha had been losing ground throughout India since the time of the Guptas. Populist devotional cults emanating from south India (the so-called bhakti movement) were pre-empting Buddhism’s traditional appeal as a refuge from brahman authority and caste prejudice. At the same time a reform movement started by Sankara (788–820), a brahman from Kerala, was reclaiming for a distilled essence of Vedic philosophy (vedanta) the high moral and doctrinal ground previously enjoyed by the Noble Eightfold Path. As a result Buddhism was already largely confined to the peripheral regions of Sind, Kashmir, Nepal, and of course the Pala heartland in eastern India.

Whether the Pala empire was in any sense a Buddhist state it is hard to say. But in that reference to the ‘election’ of Gopala, its founder, there could be an echo of the more contractual ideas underlying early Buddhist notions of kingship. His successors, while adopting conventional titles like maharajadhiraja and paramesvara, seem to have paid particular heed to their religious advisers, and it may not be fanciful to imagine the Palas reviving the mythology of their illustrious predecessors in Magadha – Ajatashatru, Bimbisara and Ashoka. Certainly Pala patronage of Buddhist institutions afforded to India’s greatest religio-cultural export a last climax under Dharmapala and Devapala and then a last refuge under their successors.

It is, however, their mortal rivals for supremacy in northern India who have attracted the closest scrutiny by Indian historians. Based in western India at the opposite extremity of arya-varta, the Gurjara-Pratiharas have been awarded an imperial sway greater even than Harsha’s and a national resolve worthy of the Congress Party. ‘They were of the people and did not stand away from their hopes, aspirations and traditions.’16 ‘The spearhead of a religio-cultural upsurge’, the Gurjara-Pratiharas were ‘bulwarks of defence against the vanguards of Islam’17 and ‘protectors of dharma’. Yet despite such confident statements, despite comparatively frequent references by Islamic writers, and despite a succession of well attested rulers, the Gurjara-Pratiharas remain as much an enigma as their composite title suggests.

‘The king of Jurz maintains numerous forces and no other Indian prince has so fine a cavalry,’ reported merchant Suleiman in the ninth century. There was also ‘no greater foe of the Muhammadan faith’. Moreover Jurz territory comprised ‘a tongue of land’, presumably Saurashtra in Gujarat, which if correct provides a clue to the identity of its king. For Jurz, sometimes spelled ‘Juzr’, is taken to be a variant of ‘Gurzara’ or ‘Gurjara’, a place or people visited by Hsuan Tsang and mentioned in several inscriptions, including that of the great Chalukya, Pulakesin II, at Aihole. The same word is today found in ‘Gujarat’, ‘Gujranwala’ and numerous other place-names as well as in ‘Gujars’, a ubiquitous community of pastoralists frequenting many parts of the Panjab from the north-west frontier to Uttar Pradesh. This trail of ‘Guj-’ words suggests that the Gurjaras, or Jurz people, had been on the move. Some suppose that they originated beyond the north-west frontier and moved into the Panjab and then western India in the wake of the Hun invasions. Others suppose that any such migration was more probably in reverse, that they originated in western India and then moved north.

Al-Masudi, writing in the early tenth century, has little to say of Jurz but makes much of ‘the Bauura, king of Kanauj’. His forces were reckoned at an incredible three million, and were divided into four armies, one to engage the Arabs of Multan, another to deal with the Balhara (i.e. the Rashtrakutas) and the other two ‘to meet enemies in any direction’. Such a description could only apply to the Pratiharas, a late-eighth-to tenth-century dynasty known to have wrested Kanauj from the Palas and to have been occasionally humbled by the Rashtrakutas. And since the Pratiharas are known to have originated in Rajasthan, whence one branch of the family had first set up in a kingdom in Gujarat, it is now generally accepted that Jurz and the Gurjaras refer to kingdoms and rulers closely related to the Bauura and the Pratiharas. In fact the Pratiharas are taken to be one of several Gurjara clans and are hence known as the ‘Gurjara-Pratiharas’.

The subject is of more than passing interest because the Pratiharas and their descendants are often numbered amongst those more famous clans known as rajputs. In the centuries immediately preceding and following the Muslim conquest of India, the rajputs were destined to play an often heroic and always pivotal role. Their territories would stretch way beyond Rajputana, or Rajasthan, and would eventually constitute the most numerous of the ‘princely states’ under British rule. In fact to the British the rajputs would come to represent the quintessence of all that was admirable in India’s martial traditions. ‘In a Rajpoot,’ wrote Colonel James Tod, their annalist and champion, ‘I always recognise a friend.’

Tod spent ten years amongst the still-independent rajputs as a political agent in the early nineteenth century. In his subsequent Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, one of the most substantial and sonorous works of British Indian scholarship, he would claim to have established ‘the common origin of the tribes of Rajasthan and those of ancient Europe’. Invoking ‘the Scythic tribes’ as the common link, this was simply a variation, albeit less remote, of the Indo-Aryan hypothesis advanced by philologists like Jones. Tod also delved deeply into the Puranic pedigrees whereby the various rajput houses claimed descent from heroes of the epics and Vedas. And he valiantly tried to trace each clan to its original homeland. But he failed to explain the greatest mystery of all: why the rajputs, so prominent in Indian history throughout the second millennium ad, had figured in it not once during the first millennium. Where, in short, had the rajputs sprung from?

The mystery is still unresolved. Even if rajput clans like the Pratiharas were really Gurjaras, they can still only be traced back to c500; and there remains the problem of where the Gurjaras sprang from. Legends common to some families of both Gurjaras and rajputs associate them with the region around Mount Abu. Upon the dewy downs of this vast upthrusted plateau in southern Rajasthan a great fire-sacrifice was reputedly held at which the progenitors of these clans were accorded ksatriya status and incorporated into royal lineages going back to Lords Rama and Krishna, themselves scions of descent groups from the Sun and the Moon. Clearly in the not too remote past the fortunes of these clans had improved substantially as a result of some dramatic transformation. But whether they were previously indigenous desert tribes who, like those of Arabia, were abruptly inspired to undertake martial exploits in more favoured lands, or whether they should be seen in the context of those republican and tribal entities, like the Yaudheyas, who from roughly the same regions of western India had once offered a stout resistance to Rudradaman of the Junagadh inscription and to Samudra-Gupta of the Allahabad inscription, and whether earlier still they had migrated from somewhere outside India – all such mysteries remain.

What is certain is that the Gurjara-Pratiharas represented a social and political grouping very different from those of their Pala and Rashtrakuta rivals for the imperial patrimony of Kanauj. When they first emerged it was as the most successful amongst several related Gurjara royal families; their extensive conquests were often made and subsequently controlled by feudatories who were often relations; and when their ‘empire’ disintegrated, it did so into powerful local kingdoms ruled by families who claim a similar ksatriya status and a similar Gurjara-rajput provenance. This prevalence of loose, kin-based relationships suggests that tribe and clan were important to the Gurjara- Pratiharas. Unlike the Buddhist Palas, their religious allegiance was variable: some were devotees of Vishnu, others of Shiva, Bhagavati or the Sun-God. And unlike the Rashtrakutas, who were veritable sticklers for ritual refinement, they seem not to have gloried in the elaborate ceremonies of paramountcy. Theirs was a more informal, less rigid and perhaps more effective power structure which, breaking from the mandala conventions of the past, anticipated the more flexible relationships demanded by the dire centuries ahead.

Nevertheless, the Gurjara-Pratiharas observed the conventions and assumed the traditional epithets of paramountcy. Vatsaraja, who from Ujjain appears to have ruled over Malwa and much of Rajasthan in the 780s, had been the first to assume the titles of maharajadhiraja and paramesvara. Despite defeat by Dhruva, the Rashtrakuta king who first threatened Kanauj, Vatsaraja’s son would continue to use and to add to these titles. The son, Naghabhata II, was also the first of his line to seize Kanauj from its Pala puppet and to lay claim to extensive conquests in arya-varta. His success was short-lived, but Bhoja, his grandson, more than made amends. Ruling for at least fifty years (c836–886), Bhoja (and then his son Mahendrapala) accumulated by conquest and alliance more feudatory territories than any contemporary. As the Pala empire retracted under Devapala’s successors and as the Rashtrakutas entered a period of uncharacteristic quiescence, Bhoja looks to have commanded kings and kingdoms which stretched in a great arc from Saurashtra in Gujarat to Magadha and Bengal.

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The Kanauj Triangle c750-900: Rashtrakutas, Palas and Gurjara-Pratiharas

If Kanauj was Bhoja’s capital, Gwalior, a natural fortress of immense strategic value astride the Daksinapatha south of Agra, may have served as the fulcrum of his empire. Thereabouts was found the most important of the Pratihara inscriptions, and henceforth Gwalior’s bluff and increasingly fortified cliffs would loom large in the affairs of north India and provide something of a barometer of current dominion. Its loss in c950 to the Chandelas of Bundelkhand, soon to win immortality as the builders of Khajuraho, signalled the disintegration of Pratihara dominion. Thence Gwalior quickly passed to the Kacchwahas, later of Jaipur, and eventually to the Tomars, later of Delhi. It was one of the Tomars who would build atop Gwalior’s sun-drenched cliffs the unsurpassed Man Singh palace. Significantly all these dynasties, representing a veritable roll-call of rajput prowess, first emerge as feudatories and associates of the Pratiharas.

Only against the Rashtrakutas had Bhoja made little headway. Under Dhruva (c780–93), then Govinda III (c793–814) and much later Indra III (c914–28) the Rashtrakutas repeatedly intervened in the north. Not to be outdone by the parallels between Bhoja and Julius Caesar drawn by latter-day champions of the Gurjara-Pratiharas, Govinda III’s generalship has been likened to that of Alexander or Arjuna.18 After victories in the south, he conducted a dazzling digvijaya in the north, defeating the Gurjara-Pratiharas under Nagabhata II somewhere near Gwalior and securing the submission of both Kanauj and the Pala ruler. As was normal the kingdoms of the south took advantage of his absence, but they too were soon favoured with a return visit. By 805 Govinda had brought the Gangas, Cheras and Pandyas to heel and had stormed and occupied Kanchipuram. The drums of the Deccan were heard, we are told, from the Himalaya’s caves to the shores of Malabar, and truly Govinda appeared invincible. Yet neither he nor his successors showed much interest in developing their empire. Retaining anything more than the nominal allegiance of distant dynasties was not the Rashtrakuta way.

The Rashtrakuta objective, it has been argued, was much more subtle. Instead of dominating arya-varta, their ambition was to appropriate and relocate it; not content with making history, the Rashtrakutas were about to make geography by transposing the sacred Aryan heartland to the Deccan. Their capital was eventually settled at Manyakheta (Malkhed), a place where the frontiers of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh now meet. To the Rashtrakutas its significance seems to have lain in its being between the Godavari and the Kistna, the two great rivers of the Deccan. A counterpart to the land between the Jamuna and the Ganga where Kurus and Pandavas had once fought their Mahabharata war, this was to be the new aryavarta, the Doab of the Deccan. Likewise Manyakheta was to be the new Hastinapura, or a Kanauj of the Deccan. There, in an enormous hall, the Rashtrakutas would enact before a larger-than-life image of the deity, itself cast in gold, the bejewelled ceremonials of a universal dominion by which the world-ruler asserted the triumph of dharma.

Before adopting Manyakheta, the Rashtrakutas had patronised today’s much better known site at Ellora, above a tributary of the Godavari in northern Maharashtra. Here, where an exposed rock-face, two kilometres long, had already been perforated with the most ambitious of India’s cave temples, they took over and rededicated a just-completed Buddhist foundation. This was the vast and airy ‘Do Thal’ vihara, three storeys high and with halls and courtyards of suitably palatial proportions. An inscription also credits Dantidurga with patronage of the nearby Dasavatara cave. Both were evidently stopgaps, for further along the ‘street of rock’ a new and more conventional-looking temple was begun by Krishna I. Although architecturally very similar to the Chalukyas’ later temples at Pattadakal, this was not, however, architecture; it was sculpture. For the Krishnesvara, or Kailasa as it was also called, is a free-standing excavation, a temple of cathedral proportions complete with precinct, cells, shrines, gateway and pillars all hewn from the same rock stratum. Seeing it, according to a contemporary copper plate, even the gods were moved to favourable comment, and marvelled that human art could produce such beauty. Its creator was no less amazed. ‘Oh, how was it that I created this,’ he rather touchingly exclaimed.

Indisputably the most elaborate and imposing rock-cut monument in the world, the Kailasa still triumphantly confirms the Balhara’s status as ‘one of the four great or principal kings of the world’. It also provides a further illustration of the Rashtrakutas’ attempt to appropriate the sacred geography of arya-varta. Mount Kailasa in the Himalayas is the earthly abode of Lord Shiva. The new Kailasa temple at Ellora, also wrought of rock and also dedicated to Shiva, was designed to reposition Mount Kailasa in the Deccan and so, by implication, to make of the gentle Vindhya hills a Himalayas-in-the-Deccan which would be the northern frontier of the new arya-varta. Similarly and symbolically, to the new Kailasa was added a shrine with images of Ganga, Jamuna and Saraswati, the three river deities of arya-varta. King Dhruva, we learn, on his invasion of the north had ‘taken from his enemies their rivers’, a reference which could apply to the deities but seems more probably to mean that the Rashtrakutas actually ‘brought the waters of these streams back with them in large jars’. ‘So it seems clear that the Rashtrakutas, who had made Mount Kailasa appear in the mountain range north of their domains, also caused the rivers which had originated there, the rivers which defined the middle region of India, to appear in their empire in the Deccan.’19

All empires, even those which would refashion the earth as well as rule it, must pass. Assailed in the south by the rising power of the Cholas and in the north by the Paramaras, erstwhile feudatories of the Gurjara-Pratiharas, the Rashtrakutas dwindled into insignificance in the late tenth century. The dream of a Deccan aryavarta died with them, although much further south something similar would imminently be attempted by the Cholas of Tanjore. They too would reach the Ganga, and they too would then laboriously haul its waters home to their own arya-varta at the mouth of the Kaveri river.

But in the interim northern India had been ravaged by the first Muslim incursions. Any attempt to transpose its sacred geography now looked less like sincere imitation and more like a desperate act of preservation. The real aryavarta had been violated, and the Cholas’ boast to have watered their horses in the mighty Ganga would merely echo that of a more formidable foe who cared nothing for the gilded fantasies and rock-cut conventions of early India’s imperial formations.
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Re: India A History, by John Keay

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Part 1 of 2

Chapter 10: Natraj, the Rule of the Dance
c950–1180

THE LION OF GHAZNI


APART FROM the Arabs’ conquest of Sind and their raids into Gujarat and Rajasthan, all in the early eighth century, no major confrontation with Islamic intruders is known to have taken place before the late tenth century. Indeed Hindu–Muslim relations may often have been amicable. The Rashtrakuta king is said to have afforded generous protection to Muslim merchants. As one of them put it, ‘none is to be found who is so partial to the Arabs as the Balhara; and his subjects,’ he added, ‘follow his example.’1 Literal application of the mandala principle meant that the Rashtrakutas saw the Gurjara-Pratiharas, their immediate neighbours in western India, as their obvious enemy; the immediate neighbours of this enemy, the Arabs of Sind, were therefore their natural allies. If no formal alliance is in fact recorded, it was probably not because the amirs of Mansurah and Multan were Muslims but because they were rarely in a position to render any worthwhile aid to India’s ‘king of kings’.

Similarly the Gurjara-Pratiharas, though undoubtedly considered hostile by the Arabs, cannot certainly be credited with any campaigns designed either to evict or contain them. As a title, pratihara does indeed mean a ‘door-keeper’ or ‘gate-keeper’. But by the dynasty so named it was said to signify their impeccable descent from the pratihara of Lord Rama’s city of Ayodhya. By the Rashtrakuta king, on the other hand, it was taken to mean that they were fit only to man the gates of his own relocated arya-varta.

Those to be kept out, it seems, were not just the Muslim rulers of Sind, but any other marauding neighbours, including Hindus like the kings of Kashmir. Around the year 900 a Gurjara feudatory in the Panjab was obliged to relinquish to Kashmir a sliver of territory in the vicinity of the Chenab river. Previously acquired by the empire-building King Bhoja, it was apparently surrendered to preserve the rest of the Gurjara-Pratihara empire, an action which was likened by Kalhana, the author of an important chronicle of Kashmir, to that of severing a finger to save the rest of the body. East of the Panjab, no Muslim power was as yet even a remote contender for primacy in arya-varta, while westward, the thrust of Baghdad’s global ambitions had been redirected into Afghanistan and Turkestan. India’s so-called ‘bulwark of defence against the vanguards of Islam’, if there was such a thing, must be sought not in Kanauj beside the Ganga but in Kabul beyond the Indus.

There, in a kingdom reminiscent of the Kushanas’ Gandhara which straddled the north-west frontier and extended deep into Afghanistan, an Indian dynasty known to history as the Shahis had risen to prominence in the mid-ninth century. The name ‘Shahi’ clearly derives from the ‘king-of-kings’ title (shah-in-shahi) adopted by the Kushana in imitation of Achaemenid practice. Al-Biruni actually links the Shahis with the great Kushana emperor Kanishka, and this may not be totally fanciful since Hsuan Tsang in the seventh century had found the kings of the Kabul region to be still devout Buddhists. Latterly a palace revolution not unlike that engineered by Chach in Sind had brought about the downfall of the last Buddhist king and the succession of his brahman minister, Lalliya. It is the latter and his successors who comprise the Hindu Shahis, and in the late ninth century great was the fame of these far-flung Indian dynasts.

According to Kalhana ‘their mighty glory outshone the kings in the north just as the sun outshines the stars.’ He likened their capital to aryavarta in that it was hemmed about not by the Himalayas and the Vindhyas but by the Turuskas (Turks) and other equally formidable barbarians; within its borders, however, kings and brahmans found sanctuary. In the Panjab the Shahis jostled with Gurjara, Kashmiri and Sindi rivals, sometimes as allies, sometimes as enemies; while in Afghanistan their feudatories clung to considerable territories to the south and east of Kabul. These latter were the first to go, and in 870 Kabul itself was captured. In Afghanistan the Shahis retained only Lamghan or Lughman, which was that part of the Kabul river valley west of Jalalabad. But in the Panjab they consolidated their kingdom and established a new capital first at Hund or Ohind near Attock on the Indus and later, seemingly, at Lahore.

Meanwhile in Afghanistan those territories seized from the Shahis in the name of Islam invited the interest of would-be adventurers from further afield. Muslim conquests in eastern Iran and Turkestan had brought a host of Turkic peoples into the Islamic fold. Arab influence there was already on the wane, and in central Asia Baghdad’s authority had been eclipsed by that of Bukhara, whose Safarid and Samanid dynasties zealously carved out Islamic empires north of the Hindu Kush. In 963 Alptigin, an ambitious but out-of-favour Samanid general, crossed the Hindu Kush from Balkh and seized Ghazni, a strategic town on the Kabul–Kandahar road. Himself once a Turkic slave, Alptigin was succeeded in 977 by Sabuktigin, also an ex-slave and also a Turkic general whose elevation owed nothing to scruple. Sabuktigin’s kingdom-building ambitions brought him into conflict with the Shahis. In c986, ‘girding up his loins for a war of religion’, says the Muslim historian Ferishta, ‘Sabuktigin ravaged the provinces of Kabul and Panjab’.

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The Land of the Shahis c1000AD

Jayapala (Jaipal), the Shahi king, responded with the utmost reluctance. ‘Observing the immeasurable fractures and losses every moment caused in his states … and becoming disturbed and inconsolable, he saw no remedy except in beginning to act and to take up arms.’ This he did with some success, mustering a vast army and conducting it across the north-west frontier to confront Sabuktigin from a fortified position amongst the crags of Lughman. Hindu and Muslim then joined in battle.

They came together upon the frontiers of each state. Each army mutually attacked the other, and they fought and resisted in every way until the face of the earth was stained red with the blood of the slain, and the lions and warriors of both armies were worn out and reduced to despair.2


The battle, in other words, ground to an indecisive standstill. Foremost amongst the lions of Ghazni was Mahmud, the eldest son of Sabuktigin and a man with an awesome reputation in the making. Yet even he, the future conqueror of a thousand forts, could see no way of overcoming Jayapala’s position. Then, supposedly thanks to a bit of Islamic sorcery, the weather intervened; seemingly it was the beginning of the Afghan winter. A contemporary chronicler says it was more like the end of the world: ‘fire fell from heaven on the infidels, and hailstones accompanied by loud claps of thunder; and a blast calculated to shake trees from their roots blew upon them, and thick black vapours formed around them.’3 Jayapala thought his hour had come. He immediately sued for peace while his troops, unaccustomed to the cold and ill-equipped to bear it, embraced the prospect of a quick withdrawal. Sabuktigin, pleasantly surprised by this development, settled for an indemnity of cash-plus-elephants and a few choice fortresses. Finally, in a scene rich in instruction for nineteenth-century imperialists and twentieth-century superpowers, the benumbed and humiliated infidels trailed through the fearful gorges of the Kabul river back down to India as Sabuktigin’s jubilant mujahideen watched from their crags.

Jayapala did not apparently regard this as a defeat. His troops had given a good account of themselves and for once it was the elements, rather than the elephants, which had deprived them of victory. When safely back in the Panjab, he therefore treated Sabuktigin’s envoys as hostages. The Ghaznavid responded by again ‘sharpening the sword of intention’ and swooping on the luckless and now undefended people of Lughman. In a taste of things to come, the Muslim forces butchered the idolaters, fired their temples and plundered their shrines; such was the booty, it was said, that hands risked frostbite counting it.

To avenge this savage attack, Jayapala again felt obliged to take up arms. Al- Utbi, young Mahmud’s secretary, says that the Shahi king assembled an army of 100,000, but we have only the much later testimony of the historian Ferishta that it included detachments from Kanauj, Ajmer, Delhi and Kalinjar. If so, it represented a notable mobilisation of those erstwhile feudatories of the Gurjara- Pratiharas who would claim rajput descent. Kanauj seems to have been still in Pratihara hands; Ajmer (in Rajasthan) was in territory ruled by the Chahamana rajputs; Delhi, founded in 736 but still a place of little consequence, belonged to the Tomara rajputs of Haryana; and Kalinjar (west of Khajuraho in Madhya Pradesh) was the stronghold of the rising Chandela rajputs. Additionally Jayapala himself may have been a rajput of the Bhatti clan, since his name and those of his successors, all ending in ‘-pala’, have been taken to indicate a break with the earlier Shahis who were brahmans.

Sabuktigin, surveying this host from a hilltop, was not impressed. ‘He felt like a wolf about to attack a flock of sheep,’ says al-Utbi. The Ghaznavid horse were divided into packs, each five hundred strong, which circled and swooped on the enemy in succession. Evidently the battle was this time being fought in the open, probably somewhere in Lughman, and under a merciless sky. The Indian forces, ‘being worse mounted than the cavalry of Subuktigin, could effect nothing against them’, claims Ferishta. Close-packed and confused by the barrage of assaults, they were also suffering from ‘the heat which arose from their iron oven’, says al-Utbi. When satisfied that the enemy were well kneaded and baked, Sabuktigin’s forces massed for a concerted attack. So thick was the dust that ‘swords could not be distinguished from spears, nor men from elephants, nor heroes from cowards’. When it settled, the outcome was clear enough. The Shahi forces had been routed and those not dead on the field of battle were being butchered in the forest or drowned in a river. No mercy was to be shown: God had ordained that infidels be killed, ‘and the order of God is not changed’.

As well as two hundred elephants, ‘immense booty’, and many new Afghan recruits eager for a share of India’s spoils, Sabuktigin acquired by this victory the region west of Peshawar including the Khyber Pass. A foothold on Indian soil, this corner of the subcontinent would serve well as a springboard for more ambitious raids. These, however, were delayed. Sabuktigin next led his troops north across the Hindu Kush and, after a series of victorious campaigns in the Herat region, was recognised by the Baghdad caliph as governor of vast territories embracing all northern Afghanistan plus Khorasan in eastern Iran. He died in Balkh in 997 and was succeeded by his son Mahmud, who quickly secured his father’s conquests in central Asia.

Mahmud, though a military genius, has few admirers in India. If the Hindu pantheon included a Satan, he would undoubtedly be that gentleman’s avatar (incarnation). ‘Defective in external appearance’, he even looked the part. While gazing in the mirror he once complained that ‘the sight of a king should brighten the eyes of his beholders, but nature has been so capricious to me that my aspect seems the picture of misfortune.’4 His empire, now stretching from the Caspian to the Indus, afforded a more encouraging prospect; there misfortunes could be discounted provided he could somehow consolidate it. While continuing the God-given duty of every Muslim to root out idolatry, he needed to maintain and reward his large standing army and to make of Ghazni a worthy capital, focus of loyalty and citadel of Islamic orthodoxy. These ambitions, he decided, could best be realised by trouncing his infidel neighbours and appropriating their fabled wealth. He therefore resolved on a pattern of yearly incursions designed to serve both God and Ghazni. Intent, we are told, on ‘exalting the standard of religion, widening the plain of right, illuminating the words of truth, and strengthening the power of justice’, he ‘turned his face to India’. The frontier was crossed, on what would be the first of perhaps sixteen blood-and-plunder raids, some time during the post-monsoon months of the year 1000.

Thanks to secretary al-Utbi’s contemporary account, and additional details provided by the likes of Ferishta, more is known about the Ghaznavid invasions than any other military campaign since Alexander’s. We even have a few dates. If for no other reason than that ‘it happened on Thursday the 8th of Muharram, 392 AH’ (i.e. 27 November 1001), Mahmud’s next crushing defeat of the everobliging Jayapala is something of a milestone; a date so precise carries conviction. The encounter took place near Peshawar in the course of Mahmud’s second invasion; and this time ‘the enemy of God’, otherwise Jayapala ‘the villainous infidel’, ‘polluted idolater’, etc., commanded a much smaller force. He still lost an unlikely fifteen thousand men and was himself taken prisoner along with many of his household. Although freed for a fifty-elephant indemnity, Jayapala acknowledged the loss of caste implicit in capture and did the noble thing. He abdicated in favour of his son Anandapala; then, like Calanus, he climbed onto his own funeral pyre.

In 1004 Mahmud was back in India. This time he crossed the Indus and, after another hotly contested battle, took the city of Bhatia (possibly on the Jhelum). He then lost most of its wealth along with his baggage when overtaken by early monsoon rains and belated enemy raids. The following year he determined to attack Multan, whose amir, though a Muslim, was now a heretical Ismaili Shi’ah. Anandapala refused Mahmud safe passage through his domains and duly felt ‘the hand of slaughter, imprisonment, pillage, depopulation and fire’ once again. Then Multan fell, ‘heresy, rebellion and enmity were suppressed’, and Mahmud’s fame occasioned comment as far away as Egypt. In fact, al-Utbi boasted that it now ‘exceeded that of Alexander’.

The raids continued. In 1008 Anandapala suffered the Shahis’ most crushing defeat as Mahmud overran the whole of the Panjab and then took the great citadel and temple of Kangra (in Himachal Pradesh), in whose vaults had been stored the Shahis’ accumulated wealth. Here the gold ingots hauled away by Mahmud weighed 180 kilos and the silver bullion two tonnes, while the coins came to seventy million royal dirhams. Also included was a house, in kit form and fashioned entirely from white silver. The Ghaznavid’s appetite for dead Indians, desirable slaves and portable wealth was whetted, but not satisfied. In 1012 it carried him to Thanesar, Harsha’s original capital due north of Delhi. Anandapala, whose kingdom was now reduced to a small corner of the eastern Panjab and whose status was little better than that of a Ghaznavid feudatory, tried to intercede. He offered to buy off Mahmud with elephants, jewels and a fixed annual tribute. The offer was refused, Thanesar duly fell, and ‘the Sultan returned home with plunder that it is impossible to recount’. ‘Praise be to God, the protector of the world for the honour he bestows upon Islam and Musulmans,’ wrote al-Utbi.

In 1018 it was the turn of Mathura, a well-endowed place of pilgrimage beside the Jamuna which was sacred to Lord Krishna as well as the source of so much Gupta sculpture. Here the main temple, a colossally intricate stone structure, impressed even Mahmud. Already busy endowing Ghazni with stately mosques and madrassehs, he reckoned that to build the like of the Mathura temple would take at least two hundred years and cost a hundred million dirhams. According to al-Utbi, the building was simply ‘beyond description’ – though not desecration. After tonnes of gold, silver and precious stones had been prised from its images, it shared the fate of the city’s countless other shrines, being ‘burned with naptha and fire and levelled with the ground’.

Kanauj itself was then sacked as Mahmud at last reached the Ganga. The Pratihara ruler seems to have left his capital, with its ‘seven forts and ten thousand temples’, almost undefended. Evidently the reputation of the uncompromising Ghaznavid and his bloodthirsty zealots now preceded them. Al- Utbi quotes a letter written by ‘Bhimpal’, possibly the son of the Pratihara leader, to one of his father’s less defeatist feudatories which sums up Indian consternation at this new form of total warfare. It also betrays Bhimpal’s ambivalence about offering resistance.

Sultan Mahmud is not like the rulers of Hind … it is obviously advisable to seek safety from such a person for armies flee from the very name of him and his father. I regard his bridle as much stronger than yours for he never contents himself with one blow of the sword, nor does his army content itself with one hill out of a whole range. If therefore you design to contend with him, you will suffer; but do as you like – you know best.5


From this campaign Mahmud returned with booty valued at twenty million dirhams, fifty-three thousand slaves and 350 elephants. There followed expeditions even further afield into what is now Madhya Pradesh to chastise the Chandela rajputs. These look to have been less rewarding, but in 1025 he targeted Somnath, another templecity and place of pilgrimage. To reach this sacred site on the shore of the Saurashtra peninsula meant crossing the ‘empty quarter’ of Rajasthan from Multan to Jaisalmer and then penetrating deep into Gujarat. It was new territory, and this was his most ambitious raid. But, taking only cavalry and camels, Mahmud swept across the desert, thereby taking his would-be enemies by surprise, and reached the Saurashtra coast with scarcely a victory to record.

Somnath’s fort looked more formidable. It seems, though, to have been defended not by troops but by its enormous complement of brahmans and hordes of devotees. Ill-armed, they placed their trust in blind aggression and the intercession of the temple’s celebrated lingam (the phallic icon of Lord Shiva). With ladders and ropes Mahmud’s disciplined professionals scaled the walls and went about their business. Such was the resultant carnage that even the Muslim chroniclers betray a hint of unease. What one of them calls ‘the dreadful slaughter’ outside the temple was yet worse.

Band after band of the defenders entered the temple of Somnath, and with their hands clasped round their necks, wept and passionately entreated him [the Shiva lingam]. Then again they issued forth until they were slain and but few were left alive … The number of the dead exceeded fifty thousand.6


Additionally twenty million dirhams-worth of gold, silver and gems was looted from the temple. But what rankled even more than the loot and the appalling death-toll was the satisfaction which Mahmud took in destroying the great gilded lingam. After stripping it of its gold, he personally laid into it with his ‘sword’ – which must have been more like a sledgehammer. The bits were then sent back to Ghazni and incorporated into the steps of its new Jami Masjid (Friday Mosque), there to be humiliatingly trampled and perpetually defiled by the feet of the Muslim faithful.

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[i]Ghaznavid Empire under Mahmud of Ghazni c1030[/b]

With this supreme gesture of devotion – or sacrilege – Mahmud’s career soared to its zenith. He made one more Indian expedition, an amphibious assault into southern Sind, but died in 1030. He would not be forgotten. ‘Mahmud was a king who conferred happiness upon the world and reflected glory on the Mohammedan religion,’ declaims Ferishta. The historian goes on to admit that he was sometimes accused of ‘the sordid vice of avarice’, but concludes that this was all in a noble cause; for ‘no king ever had more learned men at his court, kept a finer army, or displayed more magnificence.’7 The great scholar al-Biruni enjoyed his patronage; so did Firdausi, the poet, although he found it niggardly; and the Ghazni they adorned was indeed transformed into a worthy capital. Yet for Hindus, this paragon of valour and piety would ever be nothing but a monster of cruelty and iconoclasm.

Either way, the trouble with such a well-documented career is that the richness of detail may obscure the results; certainly the partisan enthusiasm of the chroniclers leads them to gloss over setbacks. Mahmud terrorised and plundered to sensational effect, but despite all those campaigns he acquired little territory. Only the Shahi lands in the Panjab were actually retained under Ghaznavid rule. Elsewhere, and notably in Kashmir, central India and Gujarat, he made no attempt to secure his conquests or even to organise future tribute. In fact he seems often to have had considerable difficulty just in extricating himself. The great rajput fortresses of Gwalior and Kalinjar did not fall into his hands, although both were attacked. And attempts to employ as feudatories Indian princes who had supposedly adopted Islam often proved as short-lived as their conversions.

Mahmud’s forces, better led than those of his adversaries, and much better mounted thanks to their access to central Asian bloodstock, enjoyed a definite tactical superiority. They were also powerfully motivated by religious zeal, plus the prospect of booty and women in this world or something equally agreeable in the next. The Indian forces, on the other hand, betrayed an understandable reluctance to engage. The most they could expect from battles with these rough-riding ghazis from the wilds of central Asia was perhaps a fleeter horse and a slim chance of survival. Victory, were it ever attained, promised only reprisals; and for Hindus no particular merit attached to the massacre of mlecchas. In fact there is good evidence that the superior prospects on offer to the champions of Islam induced some Hindus from the north-west frontier to switch both religion and allegiance and to fight for the Ghaznavids.

One can hardly blame them. The exemplary resolve displayed by the Shahis was conspicuously absent amongst most of their fellow kings. Kalhana, whose Rajatarangini provides the only non-Muslim references to the period, gives an interesting illustration. In 1013 Trilochanapala, the son of Anandapala and the last of the Shahis to offer any serious resistance to Mahmud, was forced to seek safety in Kashmir territory. Hotly pursued, he took up a strong position high above a precipitous valley in the Pir Panjal, the outermost of the Himalayan ranges, whence he urged King Samgramaraja of Kashmir to come to his aid. Instead the king sent Tunga, his commander-in-chief. Originally a goatherd to whom a queen of Kashmir had taken a fancy, Tunga was an experienced warrior who thought nothing of seeing off the Ghaznavids. In fact he was so confident that he scorned the Shahi’s prudence and declined to take even elementary precautions like sending out scouts or setting night watches. Trilochanapala tried to cool his ardour. ‘Until you have become acquainted with the Turuska warfare,’ he told him, ‘you should post yourself on the scarp of this hill and restrain your enthusiasm with patience.’ But Tunga would have none of it. He even crossed the river to give battle to a small Ghaznavid reconnaissance party. Then came Mahmud himself, the master tactician, ablaze with rage and in full battle array. Tunga took one look at his massed ranks and fled, his troops dispersing into the hills.

‘The Shahi, however,’ we are told, ‘was seen for some time moving about in battle.’ In what seems to have been the Shahis’ last stand, Trilochanapala was eventually dislodged and became a refugee in Kashmir. But while he dallied there, Mahmud would leave the valley alone. Samgramaraja retained his independence and, under the Lohara dynasty which he founded, Kashmir enjoyed another three centuries of Hindu rule. ‘Who would describe the greatness of Trilochanapala whom numberless enemies even could not defeat in battle?’ asks the patriotic Kalhana. Amazingly it was a Muslim, indeed one of Mahmud’s protégés, who provided the answer. To al-Biruni, the greatest scholar of his age, the Shahis owe their epitaph.

The dynasty of the Hindu Shahis is now extinct, and of the whole house there is no longer the slightest remnant in existence. We must say that, in all their grandeur, they never slackened in the ardent desire of doing that which is good and right, and that they were men of noble sentiment and bearing.8
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Re: India A History, by John Keay

Postby admin » Sat Dec 07, 2024 3:48 am

Part 2 of 2

THE TIGERS OF TANJORE

In the Hindu cycle of rebirth, death is but the prelude to life. Acts of destruction become acts of creation, as in Lord Shiva’s manifestation as Nataraja, ‘the Lord of the Dance’, he who whirls the world to perdition and so to regeneration. The now clichéd image of the deity pirouetting in a tangle of arms, legs and dreadlocks within a halo of flames first appears, as if on cue, in bronze figures from the Tamil country of the tenth century. Troubled times, one might suppose, heightened the popularity of both the idea and the image. Yet in the Tamil south this was not an inordinately turbulent age, more in fact of a golden age. And if one may judge by the officially inscribed panegyrics of practically any ruler since the time of Ashoka, cycles of order and disorder, of construction and destruction, expansion and retraction were constants of the Indian scene.

Dynasties died only to make way for yet more dynasties; deities were subsumed only to make room for yet more deities; and Mahmud, seemingly, ravaged only to revive. Even as he was demolishing some of the north’s greatest temples, others were being built; even as he carted away their wealth, more was accumulating elsewhere. It was as if his labours in casting down one idol merely caused a couple more to rise up. Heracles would have sympathised. For every fifty thousand idolaters that were massacred, fifty thousand equally unregenerated devotees swarmed to some other place of pilgrimage or centre of politico-religious significance. The levelling of Mathura and Kanauj coincided precisely with the rise to architectural glory of other dynastic temple complexes. All this flatly contradicts the once popular notion that the Islamic invasions found India atrophied and supine. In fact ‘dynamic’ would seem better to describe a society so productive of soaring monuments, ambitious dynasties, dazzling wealth and buzzing devotion.

India’s largest concentration of temples, at what is now the Orissan capital of Bhuvaneshwar, were constructed over many centuries and by a succession of dynasties. Although they display a remarkably consistent style – pineapple-shaped sikharas with strongly horizontal vaning being particularly distinctive – some date from as early as the seventh century and others from as late as the thirteenth. But the most celebrated, amongst them the exquisite Mukteshvara, the chaste Rajarani and the colossal Lingaraja, all belong to the late tenth to late eleventh centuries. While, in the west, the temples of Mathura and Somnath were being levelled, in the east structures equally ‘beyond description’ were being gloriously erected.

In between, at Khajuraho, the ceremonial capital of the Chandelas in central India, the chronological clustering is even more notable. Of the twenty more-or-less intact temples, none is earlier than the beginning of the tenth century or later than the early twelfth. Indeed the Vishvanatha temple with its much-loved Nandi (Lord Shiva’s bull) carries an inscription of the reign of King Dhanga, who was ruling when Mahmud first invaded India. Nearby the Khandariya Mahadeva, the largest and most sculpturally elaborate of this justly famous complex, seems to have been constructed within a decade or so of the Ghaznavid assault on the Chandelas’ stronghold of Kalinjar. If temple-building was indeed ‘a political act’, there could be no more eloquent testimony to the Chandelas’ defiance of both their erstwhile Pratihara suzerains and the Muslim invader.

Later waves of iconoclasm under Muhammad of Ghor and the Delhi sultans will account for the disappearance of many other north Indian temple complexes of the tenth to twelfth centuries. Bhuvaneshwar and the other Orissan sites (Puri and Konarak) were spared only because they were sufficiently remote not to attract early Muslim attention. Khajuraho, on the other hand, looks to have survived thanks to its timely desertion by the Chandelas when the axis of their dwindling authority shifted eastwards. Five hundred years later, when a British antiquarian, Captain Burt, stumbled upon ‘the finest aggregate number of temples congregated in one place to be met with in all India’, he found the site choked with trees and its elaborate system of lakes and watercourses overgrown and already beyond reclaim. Like Cambodia’s slightly later Angkor Wat when it was ‘discovered’ by a wide-eyed French expedition, the place had been deserted for centuries and the sacred symbolism of its elaborate topography greedily obliterated by jungle. Nor was there any local recollection of either site having ever been otherwise. Henri Mouhot at Angkor would echo, almost word for word, the surprise of Burt who, noting the then scant population of villagers who frequented Khajuraho, ‘could not help expressing a feeling of wonder at these splendid monuments of antiquity having been erected by a people who have continued to live in such a state of barbarous ignorance’.9

The inscriptions of the Chandelas have since revealed something of that dynasty’s distinguished history, while the study of Khajuraho’s deliciously uninhibited iconography has established the importance of the site as a centre of Shaivite worship.10 ‘Barbarous ignorance’ may now be emphatically discounted. But of the rituals which Khajuraho witnessed, of its construction and maintenance, and of its economic and dynastic function, an idea can best be formed by looking at sites more comprehensively documented and less sensationally neglected. Such are to be found on or beyond the tidemark of Muslim encroachment, and most notably in the Tamil south.

By chance Mahmud’s raids into the Ganga-Jamuna Doab at the western extremity of the ancient arya-varta had coincided with another unexpected incursion at the eastern end of arya-varta. No less adventurous, this surprise attack had originated in the extreme south of the peninsula. Far from the interminable plains of northern India and the wooded Vindhya hills where Harsha had once sought his widowed sister, beyond the Narmada river whence the Rashtrakutas had launched their challenge for ‘Imperial’ Kanauj and the bald Deccan plateau whence the Chalukyas had interminably challenged the Pallavas, below the teak forests and hill pastures of the Eastern Ghats, in a land without winter where the Kaveri river fans out into the lushest of rice-rich deltas – there, in the extreme south of Tamil Nadu, this spectacularly traditional retort to Mahmud’s iconoclasm had been mounted by the Chola king Rajendra I.

The date seems to have been about 1021, so just before Mahmud turned his attention to Somnath. Upstaging even the Rashtrakutas of the Deccan, and reversing the trend of conquest set by the Mauryas and Guptas, the Cholas were the first south Indian dynasty to intervene in the north. Nor was this by any means the most ambitious of their foreign adventures. Turning the supposed hegemony of north India on its head, the Cholas were in fact the most successful dynasty since the Guptas. In terms of literature, architecture, sculpture and painting, theirs is an equally distinguished tradition; and thanks to it, and to their prolific output of inscriptions and copper plates, recent scholarship has constructed a uniquely detailed picture of the Chola state. It may not be entirely representative of other contemporary kingdoms; and as so often, the benefit of more evidence has generated the bane of more controversy. But here at least there are clues as to the dynamics of dynastic expansion as well as to its extent.

The Cholas, a Dravidian people first mentioned in Ashoka’s inscriptions, seem to have occupied the region of the Kaveri delta since prehistoric times. During the long Pallava supremacy over the Tamil south from the sixth to ninth centuries they figure as a tributary lineage of their more assertive northern neighbours. But as the Pallavas vainly pursued their vendettas with Chalukyan and then Rashtrakutan rivals in Karnataka and with the Pandyan kingdom of Madurai, Chola ambitions revived. A decisive battle seems to have taken place in c897 when the Chola king Aditya, having withstood a Pandyan invasion, intervened in a Pallavan succession crisis. This brought outstanding results, with the overthrow of the mighty Pallavas and the acquisition of Tondaimandalam, the Pallava heartland (around Madras) which included Kanchipuram and Mamallapuram. A subsequent victory over the Pandyas encouraged Aditya to call himself Madurai-konda, ‘Conqueror of Madurai’, and he is said to have lined the banks of the Kaveri with stone temples. Initially his son Parantaka improved on this digvijaya; but in 949 he suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Krishna III, the last of the great Rashtrakutas. Now it was the Rashtrakuta who termed himself ‘Conqueror of Kanchipuram’ and even ‘of Tanjore’, the Chola capital. For the next forty years Chola endeavours were directed towards recovering lost ground.

The classic expansion of Chola power began anew with the accession of Rajaraja I in 985. Campaigns in the south brought renewed success against the Pandyas and their ‘haughty’ Chera allies in Kerala, both of which kingdoms were now claimed as Chola feudatories. These triumphs were followed, or accompanied, by a successful invasion of Buddhist Sri Lanka in which Anuradhapura, the ancient capital, was sacked and its stupas plundered with a rapacity worthy of the great Mahmud. Later still Rajaraja is said to have conquered ‘twelve thousand old islands’, a phrase which could mean anything but is supposed to indicate the Maldives.

In the north the Cholas ran up against stiffer resistance in the shape of a dynasty which had just overthrown the Rashtrakutas. Claiming descent from the Rashtrakutas’ original suzerains, these new overlords of the Deccan considered themselves another branch of the ubiquitous Chalukyas, once of Badami and Aihole. Usually known as the Later Western Chalukyas (of Kalyana in Karnataka), they may still be confused with that other branch, the earlier Eastern Chalukyas (of Vengi in Andhra Pradesh). But the Eastern Chalukyas now looked to the Cholas as allies and patrons; and it was while championing them, the old Eastern Chalukyas, against the new Western Chalukyas, that the Cholas became embroiled in the affairs of both Vengi and the Deccan.

In the course of perhaps several campaigns, more triumphs were recorded by the Cholas, more treasure was amassed, and more Mahmudian atrocities are imputed. According to a Western Chalukyan inscription, in the Bijapur district the Chola army behaved with exceptional brutality, slaughtering women, children and brahmans and raping girls of decent caste. Manyakheta, the old Rashtrakutan capital, was also plundered and sacked. But the Cholas did not have it all their own way, and their efforts served to make of the Western Chalukyas not obedient feudatories but inveterate enemies. The ancient rivalry between upland Karnataka and lowland Tamil Nadu, once epitomised in the struggle between the Chalukyas of Badami and the Pallavas of Kanchi, was revived as between the Cholas and the new Western Chalukyas. The old Eastern Chalukyas, on the other hand, became faithful subordinates with whom the Cholas inter-married.

These northern campaigns of the Cholas look to have been masterminded, if not conducted, by the son of Rajaraja I who would succeed as Rajendra I in 1014. As Rajaraja’s reign drew to an end he not only secured the succession but set about memorialising his remarkable achievements. This he did by constructing in Tanjore a temple. Conceived as a single entity, built within about fifteen years and little altered since, it remains the most impressive, and allegedly ‘the largest and the tallest’,11 in all India. To many, it is also the loveliest. Additionally it hosts a veritable Domesday Book of contemporary inscriptions and a small gallery of partially obscured Chola paintings. A monumental lingam in the main shrine beneath the sixty-five-metre sikhara proclaims it as sacred to Lord Shiva, a dedication which is confirmed by its current designation of ‘Brihadesvara’ and its original title of ‘Rajarajesvara’, or ‘Rajaraja’s Lord [Shiva]’ temple. The latter name, however, makes the more important point: Tanjore’s great temple is as much about the king as his god.

Muslim writers who chronicled the successes of Mahmud were often scandalised by the hordes of celebrants, musicians, dancing-girls and servants who were attached to Indian places of worship. The five hundred brahmans and as many dancers reported at Mathura or Somnath might be taken for an exaggeration were it not clear that the Rajarajesvara in Tanjore supported a complement even larger. As well as contributing to its construction and embellishment, king, court and a variety of other military and religious donees deluged the temple with grants of land, produce, and treasure to provide for the maintenance of this retinue and for the performance of a calendar of impressive rituals. The yields of villages dotted throughout the Chola kingdom and as far away as Sri Lanka were in this way attached to the temple, which reciprocated by reinvesting some of its accumulated wealth as loans to such far-flung settlements. The temple, in other words, was like a metropolitan community which served as a centre for both the redistribution of wealth and the integration of the Chola kingdom. No less important, since the supervision of the temple’s economy was undertaken by royal officials, it also ‘provided a foothold for the kings to intervene in local affairs’.12

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The Chola Kingdom c1030 and the Expeditions of Rajendra I

It is clear from the inscriptions that Rajaraja himself was the main donor, and that many of his donations were in the form of war booty. They included the equivalent of 230 kilos of gold, yet more of silver, and jewels by the sackful. Other temples also benefited from this largesse. To the Cholas as to the Ghaznavids, plunder was evidently a necessity and so a prime motive in military adventures. Indeed it has been argued that the prestige of conducting rewarding raids, and the subsequent liberality which they made possible, were what held the Chola kingdom together. Its sensational expansion through ‘quixotic’ forays into neighbouring kingdoms, and still further afield, was therefore prompted by domestic necessity, and could even be taken as a measure of royal vulnerability rather than of an autocratic supremacy.

The comparison sometimes made is with the Frankish kingdom of early medieval Europe. ‘As for these kings,’ writes the distinguished French historian Georges Duby, ‘their prestige was a reflection of their liberality; they would plunder with seemingly insatiable greed only to give more generously.’13 Thus every royal occasion became the pinnacle of ‘a regular system of free exchange, permeating the whole social fabric and making kingship the real regulator of the economy’. Commenting on these observations, an American authority on early south India draws the obvious parallel. ‘The treasures allocated to pious causes by Charles Martel and Charlemagne have their exact counterparts in the treasures which Rajaraja I looted from the Cheras and Pandyas and then donated to his great temple of Tanjavur [Tanjore].’14

This notion of ‘the politics of plunder and gift-giving’ assumes that the Cholas inherited a ‘peasant’ or ‘segmentary’ state whose rural units enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and communal ownership which, in the absence of an effective central bureaucracy, made tax-collection difficult. Such a situation may have existed in Pallava times and earlier, but the evidence for the high Chola period is more ambiguous. The inscriptions reveal a host of what look like bureaucratic titles, and there are other pointers to the creation of a more integrated, amenable and taxable society.

For instance, the practice, well attested in the Tanjore inscriptions, of making land grants to brahmans (brahmadeya) may have been more than a royal expedient for rewarding brahman support and ensuring its continuance. Established by royal order and flourishing under royal protection, these grants also gave brahman recipients domination and direction of the non-brahman population. Brahmadeyas thus became a way of furthering political integration and, since brahmans were knowledgeable about subjects like irrigation, also of promoting productivity. The Cholas seem to have exploited such grants quite systematically so that two or three such brahman settlements became implanted in every district in their kingdom. In effect brahmadeyas became ‘the local nuclei of the Chola power structure, their function being to integrate and control the surrounding non-brahmadeya villages’.15

Likewise the Cholas successfully harnessed and institutionalised the various cults associated with the popular bhakti (‘devotional’) movement in southern India. In the dark vestibule between the main shrine and the outer walls of the Tanjore temple, paintings depict not only Lord Shiva in his nataraja and tripurantaka (‘demon-destroying’) aspects but also delightful narrative scenes from the legends of Sundramurti and his associate Ceraman Perumal. Both were Nayanars, Tamil saints associated with the worship of Lord Shiva. There were also Alvars, who were Vaishnavite saints. The number of these local Tamil and Keralan intermediaries was considerable. Some were women, some paraiyar outcastes, and many were non-brahmans. If one may judge by occasional demands for equal access to temples, the bhakti movement had originally contained an element of protest against brahman exclusivity. As such it had competed with Jainism and Buddhism for followers and patrons and had occasioned some sectarian persecution, especially of Jains. More typically it sidetracked brahmanic ritual by its emphasis on a direct personal relationship of love and impassioned subservience between the devotee and the deity.

In this manifestation as a popular (and cheaper) form of worship, bhakti revivalism had been sweeping the entire subcontinent, stirring up, for instance, the fervent devotion shown for Lord Krishna at Mathura or for Lord Jagganath at Puri, and encouraging traditions of pilgrimage and temple festivals. But the phenomenon of bhakti saints had been strongest in, if not peculiar to, the south, where it drew heavily on regional literary traditions dating back to the Sangam age. Cutting across political, caste and professional divisions, ‘it promoted a new Tamil consciousness which has significantly contributed to the Tamil heritage’.16 By the tenth century, though the movement retained its mass appeal, it centred on the celebration in hymns, verses and local tradition of the often miraculous exploits, and the always ecstatic devotion, of the saints themselves. The Cholas seem consciously, as in their Tanjore paintings, to have cultivated this tradition. ‘They adopted, elaborated, and zealously practised [its] ideology through various measures like the collection of the bhakti hymns, their popularisation through temple rituals and grants for such rituals, and the construction of temples in all the centres associated with the bhakti hymns.’17

Whatever the truth, then, about the existence of a Chola administrative bureaucracy, it is clear that for Rajaraja, and probably for other contemporary dynasts, there were alternative means of asserting royal authority and integrating a vast kingdom. The conspicuous generosity which such patronage demanded did, however, necessitate access to substantial revenue; and although taxation undoubtedly provided some of it, the rich pickings of predatory warfare were essential. For economic as well as ideological reasons, a successful digvijaya was a requisite for any new king. When, therefore, Rajendra I succeeded Rajaraja and assumed the reins of power in 1014, his priority was obvious. Sri Lanka was promptly reinvaded and more treasures and priceless regalia seized; prising open even relic chambers, says a Sri Lankan chronicle, ‘like bloodsucking yakkhas they took all the treasures of Lanka for themselves’. Next the Chera and Pandya kingdoms witnessed another triumphal progress; then the born-again Western Chalukyas were re-engaged following their unwelcome intervention in the affairs of their Eastern namesakes.

In c1020, while completing this campaign in Vengi (Andhra), Rajendra’s general is thought to have pushed north into Kalinga (Orissa) against the Eastern Ganga dynasty of Bhuvaneshwar, who may have been helping the enemy. There he received instructions to continue north, allegedly to obtain water from the Ganga river with which to sanctify the Chola land. Thus, somewhat incidentally, was launched Rajendra’s great northern escapade. The name of the general is not known, nor is his route very clear, although it seems to have followed the east coast. He certainly crossed a lot of rivers, his elephants being lined up to breast their currents and so form bridges for his infantry to march over. Some of the peoples he defeated have been tentatively identified. ‘Strong Mahipala’, whom he put to flight in a hotly contested battle by sounding his deep-sea conch, was almost certainly Mahipala I, who briefly revived the fortunes of the Buddhist Pala dynasty in Bengal during the early decades of the eleventh century. ‘Odda- Visaya defended by thick forests’ must be Orissa, and ‘Vangala-desa where the rain water never stopped’ sounds like a fair description of Bengal in the monsoon. From the Pala king he obtained ‘elephants of rare strength, women and treasure’. No doubt there was other booty. There was certainly no question of retaining any territory. It was as short and risky a venture as any undertaken by Mahmud, and one in which any reverses were patently ‘glozed over’, as Professor Nilakantha Sastri, the champion of the Cholas, nicely puts it.

But the main trophy, according to the inscriptions, was the water of the sacred Ganga, ‘whose flow, strewn with fragrant flowers, had splashed against the places of pilgrimage’. Brought back, presumably, in jars, it was presented to Rajendra as he waited for the return of his expedition on the banks of the Godavari river. Thence he carried it home with triumphal purpose. For, like his father, Rajendra had conceived the idea of building a royal temple and, if it would not be quite as tall as the Tanjore Rajarajeswara, he intended it to be even richer in imperial symbolism, and the focus of a new Chola capital. The water was for the ceremonial tank, a vast sheet of water five kilometres long which was duly known as the ‘Chola-ganga’. Similarly the city itself was wordily named in honour of this same great exploit as ‘Gangai-konda-chola-puram’, ‘the city of the Chola who conquered the Ganga’. Whether Rajendra was aware of the earlier Rashtrakuta ploy to relocate arya-varta in the Deccan is not known, but clearly this was another attempt to appropriate the sacred geography of the Puranas and to centre it anew around the all-conquering Cholas.

‘Well worth a visit,’ says Murray’s Handbook of Gangaikondacholapuram. But few pay heed, and the site of the Cholas’ most ambitious creation remains a forlorn reminder of the monumental lengths to which a king might go to validate his rule and integrate his kingdom. The city, if it was ever built, has vanished, the Cholas’ Ganga has been drained by recent irrigation canals, and the magnificent temple stands incongruously amidst straggling acacia and fields of padi, as if embarrassed by its own distinction.

An air of improbability haunts the exploits of the Cholas, not so much discrediting their authenticity as imputing their wisdom. For while, to the intense annoyance of generations of historians, other dynasties were content to let their eulogists award them impossible conquests, the Cholas, with a rare regard for the literal truth, seem to have determined on fulfilling such claims to the letter.

In the same spirit, and probably in search of more plunder, possibly in support of Chola trade, Rajendra lit upon his most ‘quixotic’ exploit, a naval expedition to south-east Asia. Whether the Cholas actually had a navy has been disputed. But since such a unit’s function was simply troop-carrying, any shipping would have served; and there is no doubt that Indian ships were still maintaining regular commercial contacts with the Indianised kingdoms of the East and even with China, where several Chola missions are recorded. The partial conquest of Sri Lanka had demonstrated a Chola naval capacity, and no logistical barrier prevented its deployment still further overseas. What was novel about Rajendra’s expedition was his willingness to champion such an exploit, and its obviously warlike intent in a theatre where the use of Indian troops had not previously been recorded. It is, in fact, another of those rare examples of Indian aggression beyond the frontiers of the subcontinent.

The evidence for the expedition comes almost entirely from an inscription on the west wall of Rajaraja’s Tanjore temple. Presumably it was recorded there because Rajendra’s new temple at Gangaikondacholapuram was not ready for inscriptions. The precise date is disputed: it may have been before the Ganga expedition, but was probably in c1025; alternatively there may have been more than one expedition. The inscription consists mainly of a longish list of ‘taken’ places, and on their identification great theories about south-east Asian polities have been constructed. ‘Six [of the places tentatively identified] are located on the Malay peninsula or in Tenasserim while four are located on Sumatra, and “Nakkavaram” certainly represents the Nicobar islands.’18 But the first listed, and seemingly the most important, was ‘Kadaram’, or Kedah, the once Thai, then Malay and now Malaysian state north of Penang; and the second, the name on which historians invariably pounce, was ‘Srivijaya’, the maritime power which supposedly controlled the Malacca Straits and had been well known to the Chinese since Buddhist pilgrims en route to India had received instruction there in the seventh century.

One theory has it that the Cholas were endeavouring to break Srivijaya’s control of the straits. This is disputed, but commercial considerations may well have played their part. In the wake of the Cholas’ conquests in India and Sri Lanka, there had spread and prospered an organisation usually known in inscriptions as the ‘Five Hundred Swamis of Ayyavole’. More a robust trading league than a simple guild, the ‘Ayyavole Five Hundred’, or ‘Aihole Five Hundred’ (from which place it had originated), seems to have specialised in the organisation and protection of long-distance transport and exchange. It managed fortified trading depots and employed its own troops. There is no reason to suppose that, like the Hanseatic League, it pursued its own policies. Yet, as a substantial contributor to the welfare and defence of the realm, it was clearly influential. It would therefore be interesting to know more of the part it played in Rajendra’s south-east Asian exploit, particularly since later in the century the Ayyavole swamis are found to have had an outpost at Barus on the west coast of Sumatra.

Religion may also have figured. Rajaraja is known to have provided for a Buddhist vihara to be built by the ruler of ‘Kadaram’ at Tanjore’s port of Negapatnam. Presumably it was for the convenience of Kadaram Buddhists visiting India. But it seems reasonable to suppose that subsequent relations with the Buddhists of Kadaram may well have been soured by Rajendra’s ‘bloodsucking’ of Sri Lanka’s monasteries and his worsting of the Buddhist Palas in Bengal. With both of these kingdoms the Srivijayan world was in close contact. Retaliatory measures against Chola traders at the Srivijayan ports could well have followed, and so have provoked Rajendra’s raid.

Yet if one returns to the Tanjore inscription, there is mention of neither pious nor commercial gains, only of military matters, of formidable defences overcome and of desirable booty secured. The ‘jewelled gates’ of Srivijaya and the ‘heaped treasures’ of Kadaram were what mattered. Plunder once again proves to be the constant factor behind Chola expansion.

Rajendra’s reign lasted thirty-three years, during which time, we are told, he ‘raised the Chola empire to the position of the most extensive and most respected Hindu state of his time’.19 The fact that his most ambitious conquests were hurried forays in search of booty and prestige, that he failed to subdue his immediate neighbours in the Deccan, and that even Sri Lanka would have to be evacuated by his successors in no way discredits this statement. On such doubtful foundations lay most other claims to extensive empire and dynastic regard in pre-Islamic India.

FISH-RICH WATERS

The Cholas’ supremacy in the south would last until the early thirteenth century. Territorially their sway was much reduced with the loss of Sri Lanka in c1070, the gradual reassertion of Pandyan sovereignty from about the same time, and the ebb and flow of fortune in the almost continuous hostilities with the Later Western Chalukyas and other Deccan powers. But the Cholas’ international prestige remained intact. A seventy-two-man Chola mission reached China in 1077. In 1090 the Chola king received another deputation from Kadaram in connection with the affairs of the Buddhist establishment at Negapatnam, and in subsequent years diplomatic exchanges are recorded with both of south-east Asia’s master-building dynasties, the Khmers of Angkor and the Burmans of Pagan.

The Cholas themselves continued to build, although the sites were fewer and the pace slackened as resources diminished. The classic example is the Nataraja temple of Chidambaram. Nothing if not transitional, its construction spanned several reigns from c1150 to 1250. Its profile marries ‘a compendium of the entire Chola style’ with cardinal features of later south Indian architecture, most obviously the colossal gopuras or gateways. In that the Chidambaram temple seems to have replaced those of Tanjore and Gangaikondacholapuram as the dynasty’s symbolic focus, its varied iconography and extremely confused layout (‘it is still impossible, for example, to determine its original orientation’20) may be taken as an apt commentary on the uncertain aspirations of the later Cholas.

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The Rise and Fall of the Cholas of Tanjpre

But they did at least survive; and any continuity in a period of such dismal confusion is welcome. The historian who looks for a classic example of matsyanyaya, that ‘big-fish-eats-little-fish’ state of anarchy so dreaded in the Puranas, need look no further than India in the eleventh to twelfth centuries. Dharma’s cosmic order appeared utterly confounded and the geometry of the mandala hopelessly subverted. Lesser feudatories nibbled at greater feudatories, kingdoms swallowed kingdoms, and dynasties devoured dynasties, all with a voracious abandon that woefully disregarded the shark-like presence lurking in the Panjab.

Even there the Muslim descendants of Mahmud, though they clung to their patrimony with a rare constancy, seemed to be succumbing to the spirit of a senseless age. Seldom did a Sultan succeed without a major succession crisis and a horrific bloodbath. Since two of Mahmud’s sons had been born on the same day but of separate mothers, this was initially understandable. But thereafter it became a habit, and the Ghaznavids’ Panjab kingdom was rent with internal dissension. Externally, sporadic raids into neighbouring Indian territories produced more treasure but few political gains. The reign of Masud, Mahmud’s immediate successor, is said to ‘mark a phase of total strategic confusion, as far as his relations with India go’.21 They went not far, nor for long; Masud was overthrown and killed in a palace revolution. Meanwhile, beyond the Hindu Kush, the Ghaznavids’ once-extensive territories were subject to steady encroachment by the Seljuq Turks and others. The loss of Khorasan in c1040 had the effect of shifting the focus of the shrinking empire from Afghanistan to India. Lahore virtually replaced Ghazni as the capital, which latter city, once the pride of the dynasty, was now held on sufferance and, after several devastating raids, irrevocably lost in c1157. A few years later it changed hands yet again. No longer an epicentre of empire, its principal charm was now as a strategic gateway to the Muslim kingdoms in Sind and the Panjab.

The new lords of this much-diminished Ghazni were complete outsiders from the remote region of Ghor in central Afghanistan. Warlords of possibly Persian extraction, they would nevertheless continue their presumptuous encroachment. After several incursions across the north-west frontier, in 1186 they would overthrow the last of Mahmud’s successors. Lahore thus fell to the Ghorids; and their leader Muizzudin Muhammad bin Sam saw no reason to stop there. Determined to succeed where both Alexander and Mahmud had failed, this ‘Muhammad of Ghor’ would press on, east and south, to cruise with devastating effect in the fish-rich waters of the Indian matsya-nyaya.

It was not just a case of India being hopelessly fragmented. A discouraging prospect for the political historian, the eleventh to twelfth centuries have won yet more disgusted comment from social and economic historians.

Never before was land donated to secular and religious beneficiaries on such a large scale; never before were agrarian and communal rights undermined by land grants so widely; never before was the peasantry subjected to so many taxes and so much sub-infeudation; never before were services, high and low, rewarded by land grants in such numbers as now; and finally never before were revenues from trade and industry converted into so many grants.22


It reads like a prescription, if not for revolution, then certainly for a reformation. According to this diagnosis, economic collapse, social oppression and caste discrimination went hand in hand with political fragmentation. India was bracing itself for a renewal of the Islamic challenge by squandering the resources, oppressing the people and pulverising the authority on which any effective resistance must depend. Indeed the triumph of an alternative dispensation which, like that of Islam, promised social justice, the equality of the individual and firm government would seem to be assured. Instead of warring for centuries to win minority acceptance, Islam should have won spontaneous adoption.

That it did not suggests that the situation was not that dire. Economic activity may have declined, but evidence of social protest is lacking. Instead there are many examples of contemporary rulers who enjoyed great repute in their lifetimes and have been the subjects of popular romance ever since. Even from the murky mêlée of competing dynasts in north and central India a few figures of striking stature emerge, none more revered than the great ‘philosopher-king’ Bhoj of Dhar.

Not to be confused with the ninth-century Pratihara King Bhoj (or Bhoja) of Kanauj, this eleventh-century Bhoj belonged to a clan of the Paramaras who had once been feudatories of the Rashtrakutas in Gujarat. Claiming ksatriya (or rajput) status like so many of their contemporaries, the Paramaras had asserted their independent rule in Malwa in the mid-tenth century when both the Rashtrakutas and the Pratiharas were slipping into terminal decline.

As their capital they chose Dhar, now a small town between Ujjain and Mandu in Madhya Pradesh. Ujjain, beside the Sipra river, was the ancient centre of Malwa where Ashoka had allegedly misspent much of his youth, while Mandu, now a heavily fortified but eerily deserted headland high above the Narmada, would become the redoubt of Malwa’s next rulers. Such a scatter of regional centres within a small radius is not unusual. In the progression from hallowed but indefensible Ujjain to upland Dhar to near impregnable Mandu one may detect a response to changing times.

Bhoj succeeded to the throne of Dhar in or about the year 1010 and seems to have reigned for nearly fifty years. He was therefore an exact contemporary of the Chola, Rajendra I. From his uncle and his father, both bellicose digvijayins, he inherited suzerain claims over a host of rival kings and sub-kings scattered throughout Rajasthan, central India and the Deccan. They certainly did not include the ‘Keralas and the Cholas’, whose bejewelled diadems are nevertheless said, in a by-now threadbare cliché, to have coloured his uncle’s lotus feet. But amongst the many to whom these claims were unacceptable were just about every other contemporary dynasty including the Chandelas of Khajuraho, their formidable Chedi and Kalachuri neighbours, the reborn Western Chalukyas of the Deccan, the Solankis of Gujarat, and numerous other incipient rajput kingdoms plus assorted minor potentates in Maharashtra and on the Konkan coast.

Lumbered with such a contentious inheritance, the youthful Bhoj felt obliged to take the field on his own digvijaya. The results were mixed, his successes being much contradicted and his failures quickly reversed. Generally speaking, in Gujarat and Rajasthan he seems to have held his own but in the Deccan he made little progress. This was despite an anti-Chalukyan alliance with the Cholas and a legacy of exceptional bitterness left by his uncle, who had been captured, caged and executed by the Chalukyas. ‘His head was then fixed on a stake in the courtyard of the royal palace and, by keeping it continually covered with thick sour cream, [the Chalukya] gratified his anger.’23 Such an outrage rankled deeply with the Paramaras, and may explain Bhoj’s obsession with chastising the Chalukyas.

In this he not only failed but, at one point, was surprised by a Chalukyan raid and had to flee from his beloved Dhar. The capital, though said to have been devastated, must have been speedily regained and then restored, for it is as ‘Dharesvara’, the intellectual magnate and ‘lord of Dhar’, that Bhoj is principally remembered. Compared to the Cholas or the Pratiharas, claims as to his military prowess ring somewhat hollow. But if military success was an essential attribute of kingship, so too was scholastic attainment and patronage. In this respect Bhoj outshines even Harsha’s intellectual genius as portrayed in Bana’s Harsa-carita; for whilst to Harsha have been attributed works which he certainly did not write, ‘we have no real knowledge to disprove Bhoj’s claim to polymathy exhibited in a large variety of works.’24

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Avanti/Malwa: The Incarnations of a Proto-State

These range over subjects as various as philosophy, poetics, veterinary science, phonetics, archery, yoga and medicine. ‘To study Bhoj is to study the entire culture of the period.’ Dhar seems to have been transformed into a veritable Oxford, with its palaces serving as common rooms of intellectual discourse and its temples as colleges of higher education. Other kings, contemporary and subsequent, could hardly contain their admiration. ‘Bhoj was such a versatile personality and left such a deep impression … that even the pro- Chalukya chronicle, the Prabandhacintamani, felt constrained to conclude its account of Bhoj with the words: “Among poets, gallant lovers, enjoyers of life, generous donors, benefactors of the virtuous, archers, and those who regard dharma as their wealth, there is none on the earth who can equal Bhoj.”’ Other rajput kings would achieve greater popular celebrity as heroes of the martial ethos which their ksatriya status enjoined. Bhoj’s legacy was no less substantial. As his own eulogy succinctly puts it, ‘he accomplished, constructed, gave, and knew what none else did. What other praise can be given to the poet-king Bhoj?’25
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Re: India A History, by John Keay

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Chapter 11: The Triumph of the Sultans
c1180–1320

FRIENDS, RAJPUTS AND CONQUERORS


THE WORD ‘RAJPUT’ (raja-putera) simply means ‘son of a raja’. Although it therefore implied ksatriya status and eventually came to mean just that, someone of ksatriya caste, it originally had no particular ethnic or regional connotations. To those ex-feudatories of the Gurjara-Pratihara kings of Kanauj to whom the term is so freely applied, and to other Indian opponents of Islam to whom it was occasionally extended, it was probably meaningless other than as one of many hackneyed, and usually much more grandiloquent, honorifics. Not until the Mughal period did the word come to be used of a particular class or tribe and, given the prejudices of Aurangzeb’s reign, its connotation soon became decidedly pejorative: ‘Rashboots’, as they sometimes appeared in English translation, were freebooters and trouble-makers, ‘a sort of Highway men, or Tories’ according to a seventeenth-century travelogue by the German Albert de Mandelson.1 Always ‘gentiles’ (the contemporary designation for Hindus), they were encountered mainly in Gujarat and Rajasthan and were usually under arms, soldiering being their hereditary profession.

Colonel James Tod, who as the first British official to visit Rajasthan spent most of the 1820s exploring its political potential, formed a very different idea of the ‘Rashboots’. Not only was it his boast that ‘in a Rajpoot I always recognise a friend,’ but seemingly in a friend he always recognised a rajput. Their hospitality to one who was offering acknowledgement of their sovereignty plus protection from the then devastating attentions of the Marathas was overwhelming. Tod found rajputs all over Rajasthan; and the whole region thenceforth became, for the British, ‘Rajputana’. The word even achieved a retrospective authenticity when, in an 1829 translation of Ferishta’s history of early Islamic India, John Briggs discarded the phrase ‘Indian princes’, as rendered in Dow’s earlier version, and substituted ‘Rajpoot princes’. As Briggs freely admitted, he was ‘much indebted for the unreserved communications on all points connected with the history of Rajpootana … to my good friend Colonel Tod’.2

Nor, according to Tod, were these ubiquitous ‘Rajpoots’ outlaws – or even Tories. They were sovereign chiefs and princes, scions of a noble race amongst whom, opined Tod, ‘we may search for the germs of the constitutions of European states’. Although perjured and persecuted during centuries of Islamic supremacy, they were in fact the native aristocracy of India, an indomitable people whose ethnic origins could be traced back to a common ancestry with the earliest tribes of Europe and whose genealogies as recorded in the Puranas reached back to the epics and the Vedas.

Thanks to the rajputs’ naturally generous disposition and to the assistance of
their royal archivists and bards, Tod had been privileged to attempt a reconstruction of their history; and what a glorious tale it was. In his majestic Annals and Antiquities of Rajast’han, published in 1829, he regaled his readers with examples of a chivalry to shame Camelot and of a resolve worthy of Canute. Frequent references to the rajputs’ clan organisation and aristocratic sense of noblesse oblige went down especially well with an audience steeped in British history; and in the feudal structure of rajput society Tod thought he saw an exact equivalent of that which had pertained nearer to home in Anglo-Norman times. For ‘the martial system peculiar to these Rajpoot states’ invariably and specifically made vassalage and land grants contingent on military service and the provision of fighting men.

Admittedly, for the rajput knights themselves feudalism seemed less about tenurial feus and more about the interminable feuds to which they often gave rise. Rivalry between the various rajput houses was intense and disastrous.

The closest attention to their history proves beyond contradiction that they were never capable of uniting, even for their own preservation: a breath, a scurrilous stanza of a bard, has severed their closest confederacies. No national head exists amongst them … and each chief being master of his own house and followers, they are individually too weak to cause us [i.e. the British] any alarm.3


They had, nevertheless, shown a bold front in the face of Muslim aggression. And for whatever that defiance had lacked in the way of coherence, they had amply compensated with a stalwart perseverance unequalled in the annals of mankind.

ADDUCED: To bring forward, present, or offer; advance; cite; name or instance as authority or evidence for what one advances.

Synonyms: Adduce, Allege, Assign, Advance, Offer, Cite. Offer and assign are the least forcible of these words. To offer is simply to present for acceptance. We may offer a plea, an apology, or an excuse, but it may not be accepted. We may assign a reason, but it may not be the real or only reason which might be given by us. We may advance an opinion or a theory, and may cite authorities in support of it. Allege is the most positive of all these words. To allege is to make an unsupported statement regarding something; to adduce, on the other hand, is to bring forward proofs or evidence in support of some statement or proposition already made: as, he alleged that he had been robbed by A. B., but adduced no proof in support of his allegation.

-- Adduce, by The Century Dictionary



In support of this contention Tod adduced a litany of patriotic heroes and tales of martial romance from the twelfth to eighteenth centuries. The earliest was ‘the heroic history of Pirthi-raj by Chund’, a particularly instructive saga to which he devoted considerable space. For ‘Pirthi-raj’ was otherwise Prithviraj III of the Chahamana (Chauhan) dynasty, who ruled an extensive kingdom in northern Rajasthan and the eastern Panjab from c1177. It was he therefore whose territory marched with that of the Ghaznavids at Lahore and, when that city fell to Muhammad of Ghor in 1186, it was he who stood between the Ghorid kingdom and the rest of India. Tod was wrong in imagining that the bard ‘Chund’ was a contemporary eye-witness, let alone ‘his [i.e. Prithviraj’s] friend, his herald, his ambassador’. He was therefore mistaken in taking Chand’s ‘poetical histories’ as reliable evidence But in rehabilitating Prithviraj, as also the ksatriya dynasties of Rajasthan whom he had so determinedly designated as ‘Rajpoots’, Tod did both history [???] and Indian nationalism a useful service. [???]

The Chahamanas, like the Pratiharas and Bhoj’s Paramaras, claimed (or would eventually claim) to have acquired their ksatriya status from the great fire-sacrifice once held on Mount Abu.

History: The ancient name of Mount Abu is Arbuda. In the Puranas, the region has been referred to as Arbudaranya ("forest of Arbuda") and 'Abu' is a diminutive of this ancient name. It is believed that sage Vashistha retired to the southern spur at Mount Abu following his differences with sage Vishvamitra. There is another history story according to which a serpent named "Arbuda" saved the life of Nandi (Lord Shiva's bull). The incident happened on the mountain that is currently known as Mount Abu and so the mountain is named "Arbudaranya" after that incident which gradually became Abu.

According to a legend, the sage Vashistha performed a yajna at the peak of Mount Abu, to seek from the gods a provision for the defense of righteousness on earth. In answer to his prayer, a youth arose from the Agnikunda (fire-altar) — the first Agnivansha. Achalgarh Fort is one of more attractive place which was built by Parmar kings. The Dilwara Jain Temple is a pilgrimage centre for the Jain religion among the lush green hills of Aravali. The Dilwara Jain Temple is located at a distance of 2.5 km from Mount Abu. Vastupala designed the temple. Vimal Shah built it between the 11th century and the 13th century. The complex is sculpted on white marble in every corner of the temple....

The Arbuda Mountains region is said to be original abode of the famous gurus like Atri and Vashishtha. The association of the Gurus with the mountain is noticed in many inscriptions and epigraphs including Tilakamanjari of Dhanpala. According to one theory, this Gurdhara or land of the gurus got corrupted with time and became Gurjara.

-- Mount Abu, by Wikipedia


The Gurjar (or Gujjar, Gujar, Gurjara) are an agricultural ethnic community, residing mainly in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, divided internally into various clan groups. They were traditionally involved in agriculture, pastoral and nomadic activities and formed a large heterogeneous group. The historical role of Gurjars has been quite diverse in society: at one end they have been founders of several kingdoms and dynasties and, at the other end, some are still nomads with no land of their own.

The pivotal point in the history of Gurjar identity is often traced back to the emergence of a Gurjara kingdom in present-day Rajasthan and Gujarat during the Middle Ages (around 570 CE). It is believed that the Gurjars migrated to different parts of the Indian Subcontinent from the Gurjaratra.

The Gurjaras started fading from the forefront of history after the 10th century CE. Thereafter, history records several Gurjar chieftains and upstart warriors, who were rather petty rulers in contrast to their predecessors. Gujar or Gujjar were quite common during the Mughal era, and documents dating from the period mention Gujars as a 'turbulent' people.

The Indian states of Gujarat and Rajasthan were known as Gurjaradesa and Gurjaratra for centuries prior to the arrival of the British. The Gujrat and Gujranwala districts of Pakistani Punjab have also been associated with Gurjars from as early as the 8th century CE, when there existed a Gurjara kingdom in the same area. The Saharanpur district of Uttar Pradesh was also known as Gurjargadh previously, due to the presence of many Gurjar zamindars in the area.

Gurjars are linguistically and religiously diverse. Although they are able to speak the language of the region and country where they live, Gurjars have their own language, known as Gujari. They variously follow Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism.

The Hindu Gurjars are mostly found in Indian states of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab Plains and Maharashtra. Muslim Gurjars are mostly found in Pakistani province of Punjab, mainly concentrated in Lahore and northern cities of Gujranwala, Gujrat, Gujar Khan and Jhelum; Indian Himalayan regions such as Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, and Garhwal and Kumaon divisions of Uttarakhand; and Afghanistan....

Origin: Historians and anthropologists differ on the issue of Gurjar origin. According to one view, circa 1 CE, the ancient ancestors of the Gurjars came in multiple waves of migration and were initially accorded status as high-caste warriors in the Hindu fold in the North-Western regions (modern Rajasthan and Gujarat). Aydogdy Kurbanov states that some Gurjars, along with people from northwestern India, merged with the Hephthalites to become the Rajput clan.

Previously, it was believed that the Gurjars had migrated earlier on from Central Asia as well, however, this view is generally considered to be speculative.

According to B. D. Chattopadhyaya, historical references speak of Gurjara warriors and commoners in North India in the 7th century CE, and mention several Gurjara kingdoms and dynasties. However, according to Tanuja Kothiyal, the historical image of Gurjars is that of "ignorant" herders, though historical claims of Gurjar past also associate them with Gurjara-Pratiharas. She cites a myth that any Rajput claim Gurjars may have comes through a Rajput marrying a Brahmin woman, and not through an older Kshatriya clan. She says that the historical process suggests the opposite: that Rajputs emerged from other communities, such as Gurjars, Jats, Raikas etc.

The oldest known reference to the word Gurjara is found in the book called Harshacharita (Harsha's Deeds), a biography of king Harshavardhana written around 630 CE. Banabhatta, the author of Harshacharita, mentions that Harsha's father Prabhakravardhana (560-580 CE) was "a constant threat to the sleep of Gurjara"—apparently a reference to the Gurjara king or kingdom. Inscriptions from a collateral branch of Gurjaras, known as Gurjaras of Lata, claim that their family was ruling Bharakucha (Bharuch) as early as 450 CE from their capital at Nandipuri.

According to scholars such as Baij Nath Puri, the Mount Abu (ancient Arbuda Mountain) region of present-day Rajasthan had been an abode of the Gurjars during the medieval period. These Gurjars migrated from the Abu mountain region and as early as in the 6th century CE, they set up one or more principalities in Rajasthan and Gujarat. The whole or a larger part of Rajasthan and Gujarat had been long known as Gurjaratra (country ruled or protected by the Gurjars) or Gurjarabhumi (land of the Gurjars) for centuries prior to the Mughal period.

In Sanskrit texts, the ethnonym has sometimes been interpreted as "destroyer of the enemy": gur meaning "enemy" and ujjar meaning "destroyer").

Medieval period: Babur, in the context of revolt, wrote that Jats and Gujjars poured down from hills in vast numbers in order to carry off oxen and buffaloes and that they were guilty of the severest oppression in the country. Many Gurjars were converted to Islam at various times, dating back to Mahmud of Ghazni's raid in Gujarat in 1026. Gurjars of Awadh and Meerut date their conversion to Tamerlane, when he sacked Delhi and forcibly converted them. By 1525, when Babur invaded India, he saw that the Gurjars of northern Punjab were already Muslims. Until the 1700s, conversions continued under Aurangzeb, who converted the Gurjars of Himachal Pradesh by force. Pathans and Balochis drove Gurjar converts out of their land, forcing them into vagrancy.

-- Gurjar, by Wikipedia


Vishvamitra (Sanskrit: विश्वामित्र, IAST: Viśvāmitra) is one of the most venerated rishis or sages of ancient India. Vishvamitra is one of the seven Brahmarshi. According to Hindu tradition, he is stated to have written most of the Mandala 3 of the Rigveda, including the Gayatri Mantra (3.62.10). The Puranas mention that only 24 rishis since antiquity have understood the whole meaning of —and thus wielded the whole power of — the Gayatri Mantra. Vishvamitra is supposed to have been the first, and Yajnavalkya the last...

In post-Rigvedic literature Viśvāmitra becomes a mythical sage.


Most of the stories related to Vishvamitra's life is narrated in the Valmiki Ramayana.[9] Vishvamitra was a king in ancient India ...

His story also appears in various Puranas; however, with variations from Ramayana....

-- Vishvamitra, by Wikipedia


More prosaically they look to have been a desert tribe from the region around lake Sambhar, west of modern Jaipur, who over the centuries, like countless other peoples in out-of-the-way places, had undergone a long process of ‘Aryanisation’. Hemachandra Ray’s Dynastic History of Northern India lists no fewer than eight Chahamana families of princely standing, one of which, the Sakambhari (i.e. Sambhar) branch, remained on home ground in the vicinity of lakes Sambhar and Pushkar. Inducted into the Gurjara-Pratihara empire by marriage, they had eventually broken away and, early in the twelfth century, one King Ajaya-raja established a new capital. He called it ‘Ajaya-meru’, or Ajmer.

In the mid-twelfth century Vigraha-raja, one of Ajaya-raja’s successors, greatly extended the dynasty’s sway by pushing northwards into what is now Haryana and what remained outside Ghaznavid rule of the eastern Panjab. Delhi, too, fell to Vigraha-raja, and to record this brilliant campaign he added his own inscriptions to those of Ashoka on one of the latter’s still-standing pillars. By a strange coincidence the pillar he chose was the one, then located higher up the Jamuna, which two centuries later would be so laboriously shipped downriver for re-erection in Delhi. There, fortuitously relocated in the heart of the city to which he had laid claim, it records Vigraha-raja’s conquest of the whole region up to the Himalayas and also mentions frequent exterminations of the mlechhas, presumably a reference to conflicts with the declining Ghaznavids. Another inscription speaks of his having thereby made arya-varta ‘once more the abode of the arya’.

Vigraha-raja died c1165. The Chahamana succession then became convoluted until Prithviraj III ascended the throne of Ajmer twelve years later. Evidently a minor at the time, he seems to have celebrated his coming of age by eloping with the daughter of the king of Kanauj. This much-loved romance is told in some detail by the unreliable Chand. On the other hand the young Lochinvar’s ambitious digvijaya of c1182 is shrouded in uncertainty. It seems to have brought him into conflict with, amongst others, the Chandelas and their allies and also the Solanki rajputs of Gujarat. In all such encounters he is said to have fared well and, according to another popular narrative of the period, he waxed strong enough to vow next to extirpate his mlechha neighbours in the Panjab.

In this he was emboldened by the decline of the Ghaznavids and the rather unimpressive showing so far made by Muhammad of Ghor. From Ghazni the Ghorid had first turned his attentions to Sind, routing the restored Ismaili ruler of Multan and eventually pushing down the Indus to Mansurah and Debal. He had thence attempted to attack the Solankis of Gujarat by crossing the Thar desert in imitation of Mahmud’s raid on Somnath. He even invited the young Prithviraj to support him in this venture. Prithviraj declined and briefly considered joining his Solanki rival to eject the Turuskas. But in the event this proved unnecessary, for the Ghorids were roundly defeated in Gujarat. Muhammad thereupon abandoned the idea of a trans-Thar invasion and directed his attention north-east to Lahore. Having secured that place in 1186–7, he was ready to meet Prithviraj’s challenge. Along a Panjabi frontier not dissimilar to today’s Indo–Pakistan border, ‘the Ghorid and the Chahamana now stood face to face. The Muslim knew that the wealth of the rich cities and temples in the Jamuna-Ganga valley and beyond could only be secured by the destruction of the Hindu power which held the key to the Delhi gate.’4

Twentieth-century parallels with a situation in which Sind and Gujarat lay divided from one another by religion, and the Panjab in effect partitioned between Muslim and Hindu rulers, are hard to overlook. Pakistanis may take comfort from the fact that this division had already subsisted for nearly two hundred years in the case of the Panjab and for over four hundred in the case of Sind/Gujarat. Indians, on the other hand, take little note of the chronology and more of the outcome.

It should, though, be emphasised that during this long political stand-off there were contacts of an informal nature. Apart from commercial links, which continued much as under the Balhara’s even-handed patronage, Muslim immigrants and missionaries seem to have enjoyed the freedom of north India much as Hindus did that of Sind and the Panjab. Writing of the Varanasi region, Ibn Asir, a contemporary scholar, insists that ‘there were Mussalmans in that country since the days of Mahmud bin Sabuktigin [i.e. Mahmud of Ghazni], who continued faithful to the law of Islam, and constant in prayer and good work.’5 Numerous other examples of pre-Ghorid Muslim communities in India have been noticed;6 and so has the existence of a Turuska tax. This could have been a levy to meet tribute demands from the Ghaznavids, but seems more probably to have been a poll-tax on Muslims resident in India and so a Hindu equivalent of the Muslim jizya. But perhaps the most striking evidence of pre-Ghorid Muslim communities comes from Ajmer itself. There, if later tradition is to be believed, Shaikh Muin-ud-din Chishti founded the most famous of India’s Sufi movements in the months immediately preceding Muhammad of Ghor’s assault, and so under the very nose of Prithviraj III.

To what extent religion was uppermost in the mind of either Prithviraj or Muhammad of Ghor when first they met is therefore debatable. In 1191 Muhammad took the offensive by storming a fort in the Panjab which is thought to have been either that of Sirhind near Patiala or of Bhatinda near the current Indo–Pakistan frontier. The fort was taken; but Prithviraj hastened to its rescue and, at a place called Tarain near Thanesar (about 150 kilometres north of Delhi), he was intercepted by the main Ghorid army.

The ensuing battle is described as having been decided by a personal contest between Muhammad of Ghor and Govinda-raja of Delhi, who was Prithviraj’s vassal. Govinda lost his front teeth to the Ghorid’s lance but then took fearful revenge with a spear that struck the latter’s upper arm. Barely able to keep his seat, Muhammad was saved by ‘a lion-hearted warrior, a Khalji stripling’ who leapt up behind him in the saddle and piloted him from the battlefield. Seeing this, many of Muhammad’s troops feared the worst; they believed their leader to be dead and so broke off the encounter. Had the Chahamana forces taken advantage of the situation, it might have become a rout. But Prithviraj, fresh from the ritualistic manoeuvres of a conventional digvijaya, mistook retreat for an admission of defeat. Ignorant of the advice once given by ‘Bhimpal’, it was as though he rejoiced over the capture of a hill and bothered not with the rest of the range. The Muslim forces were allowed to withdraw in good order. Prithvi-raj then ordered his army forward to a laborious siege of the Sirhind/Bhatinda fort.

Muhammad withdrew to Ghazni to convalesce and assemble more troops. The Ghorid forces included Afghans, Persians and Arabs, but the most numerous and effective contingents were of Turkic stock.
Meanwhile those who had fled the field at Tarain were obliged to don their horses’ nosebags and tread the thoroughfares of Ghazni munching on grain. By mid-1192 Muhammad was back in the Panjab at the head of 120,000 horse and with an uncompromising ultimatum for the king of Ajmer: apostasise or fight. Prithviraj returned ‘a haughty answer’: he would not capitulate nor would he embrace Islam but, if Muhammad was having second thoughts, he was willing to consider a truce.

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Chahamana Defeat and Muhammad of Ghor's Conquests 1192-1200

Endearingly susceptible to the perquisites of power, Prithviraj is said to have been enjoying himself since his earlier victory. He was still in his mid-twenties and, returning now to the fortunate field of Tarain at the head of an army said to have comprised 300,000 horse, he was in an even better position to dispose of the Ghorid challenge. If Ferishta was right about his 150 royal vassals – and translator Briggs about their being ‘Rajpoot princes’ – he headed the most formidable rajput confederacy on record. Tod, despite his insistence on the rajputs’ chronic disunity, seems to agree: ‘Pirthi-raj’ was now ‘the ruler of Rajasthan’; and amongst those ‘Rajpoot princes’ who supposedly flocked to his standard was Tod’s particular hero, the Guhila ruler of distant Mewar (later capital Udaipur) in southern Rajasthan.

From Ferishta’s much later and, it must be said, suspiciously detailed account there also comes evidence of trickery. Muhammad allegedly responded to Prithviraj’s suggestion of a truce with a letter couched in terms sufficiently ambiguous to give the Indians cause for celebration. ‘The letter produced the intended effect; for the enemy, conceiving that Muhammad was intimidated, spent the night in riot and revelry, while he was preparing to surprise them.’ when they awoke, late and in urgent need of ablutions, they found the Ghorid forces already entering their lines. The battle thus began amidst some confusion. Only Muhammad had a plan: like the great Mahmud he would launch wave after wave of mounted archers, but not try to force the Indian position, and in fact withdraw as the Indians’ elephant-phalanx advanced. Prithviraj, happy with this apparent success, duly advanced. But the buffeting assaults of the Turkish horse took their toll of the all-night revellers; sore rajput heads began to droop, and the scent of morning victory soured as the day wore on. By sunset Muhammad was ready to strike back.


Thinking he had sufficiently worn out the enemy and deluded them with a hope of victory, he put himself at the head of twelve thousand of his best horse, whose riders were covered with steel armour, and making one desperate charge, carried death and destruction through the Hindu ranks. The disorder increased everywhere until at length the panic became general. The Muslims, as if they only now began to be in earnest, committed such havoc that this [Prithviraj’s] prodigious army, once shaken, like a great building tottered to its fall and was lost in its ruins.7


Govinda-raja of Delhi, the hero of the first battle at Tarain, was slain; his body was recognised by its missing teeth. Slain too was the Guhila king Samatasimha, Tod’s ‘Ulysses of the Rajpoot host’. In all 100,000 are said to have been sent to their death. Prithviraj was taken prisoner and would soon join them.

The 1192 rout of the rajputs at Tarain is arguably the most decisive battle in the history of India. Prithviraj had succeeded in uniting at least some of the rajput princes and in cordoning off the Islamised Panjab. The blood-and-plunder raids had been stopped. But this interdiction had served only to increase the pressure for a more decisive encounter. The Ghorids rose to the challenge because for them, as for their Indian contemporaries, plunder was a necessity.

Prithviraj had upped the stakes, and he paid the price. When the Chahamana army succumbed, it became painfully clear that his earlier successes had only made his eventual failure all the more catastrophic. The ‘key to the Delhi gate’, indeed to the whole of arya-varta, now belonged to Muhammad of Ghor and his victorious Turks.


Scenes of devastation, plunder, and massacre commenced, which lasted through the ages; during which nearly all that was sacred in religion or celebrated in art was destroyed by these ruthless and barbarous invaders.


Colonel Tod could have been writing of the fall of the Roman empire. Fresh from the study of Edward Gibbon’s epic, he relished another apocalypse and saw the decline and fall of Hindu empire as a history which was there for the telling. Not beset by niggling scruples about impartiality, he conjured up the heroes of his choice in a language rich in the exaggeration typical of their bardic traditions. His verdict on the years that followed, like his estimate of the ‘Rajpoots’ themselves, would enjoy a long if controversial currency.

The noble Rajpoot, with a spirit of constancy and enduring courage, seized every opportunity to turn upon his oppressor. By his perseverance and valour he wore out entire dynasties of foes, alternately yielding to his fate or restricting the circle of conquest. Every road in Rajast’han was moistened with torrents of blood of the spoiled and the spoiler. But all to no avail; fresh supplies were ever pouring in, and dynasty succeeded dynasty, heir to the same remorseless feeling which sanctified murder, legalised spoliation, and deified destruction. In these desperate conflicts entire tribes were swept away, whose names are the only memento of their former existence and celebrity. What nation on earth could have maintained the semblance of civilisation, the spirit or the customs of their forefathers, during so many centuries of overwhelming oppression, but one of such singular character as the Rajpoot?8


THE SLAVE KINGS

Within a year of the victory at Tarain, Muhammad of Ghor’s forces had taken Delhi, plus Meerut, Kol (Aligarh) and Baran (Bulandshahr), commanding the upper Ganga-Jamuna Doab. Ajmer was also under Ghorid control, and within another three years much of arya-varta shared its fate. Of the three great natural fortresses screening Rajasthan and the routes south, Ranthambhor had been won, Gwalior assailed and Narwar targeted. To the east, after another decisive battle, Kanauj, Asni and Varanasi on the Ganga had also been overrun; and in the south-west, following victory at Mount Abu over a western rajput combination, the Gujarati capital of Anhilwara (Patan) had been sacked. The thirteenth century opened with even more sensational conquests as Muslim forces pushed further east into Bihar, Bengal and Assam; others moved into the Chandela country south of the Ganga and captured, amongst many, the stronghold of Kalinjar. On paper the Ghorid empire in India already exceeded that of Harsha.

Given, however, their predatory imperative, many of these conquests were temporary. Ajmer and Ranthambhor, for instance, changed hands several times; Gwalior and Kalinjar were lost shortly after they were won; Anhilwara was evacuated as soon as it was sacked. In some cases existing rulers were reinstated but then renounced their submission once the Turuskas had departed or further support had been recruited. In other instances, most notably in Bengal, the victorious Turuska generals would soon themselves renounce their allegiance to Delhi. It would be a characteristic of the Muslim advance that most major cities and forts were taken and then retaken, sometimes four or five times, before their fate was finally decided.


Nor can many of these early successes be attributed to Muhammad of Ghor himself. Soon after the second battle of Tarain he returned to Ghazni and, although he paid subsequent visits to India, it was the more pressing affairs of central Asia which commanded his attention. There, at the instigation of the Baghdad caliph, the Ghorids had by 1201 won another empire. Like that of the Ghaznavids it reached west to the Caspian, and as before, the wide-open spaces of Khorasan were soon proving harder to hold than to win. Within a matter of months the Ghorids had been ejected by the Turkic rulers of Khwarasm, or Khiva (on the lower Oxus), who were themselves soon to be ejected by an even more formidable horde, alien and infidel to boot, under Ghenghiz Khan.

Reeling from the heftiest of defeats in north-west Afghanistan, Muhammad found Ghor itself in danger and his lines of communication from Ghazni to Lahore under threat from a Panjabi hill-tribe known as the Ghakkars. By 1206 he had suppressed this revolt, but during a dark and sultry night a party of vengeful Ghakkars somehow penetrated his camp on the banks of the Jhelum and ‘sheathed their daggers in the King’s body’. ‘Thus fell Sultan Moyiz-ood-Deen Muhammad Ghori after a reign of thirty-two years,’ notes Ferishta.

Rarely the work of Muhammad himself, his conquests in India had been principally achieved by his Turkish commanders
, amongst whom the most successful was Qutb-ud-din Aybak (Aibak, Eibek). Aybak was also the most trusted and, since Muhammad had no sons, he looked to be his likeliest successor. Not without the bloody elimination of rivals which accompanied almost every succession of a Delhi sultan, Aybak eventually secured his position in India and would no doubt have made as great a sovereign as he had a viceroy. But in 1210, after just four years on the throne, he fell while playing polo, and his pony fell on top of him ‘so that the pommel of the saddle entered his chest and killed him’. He is remembered as the founder of what is sometimes called the ‘Slave Dynasty’ of Delhi, and as the creator of that city’s earliest surviving Islamic monuments, the so-called Qutb mosque and minar.

Like the nearly contemporary slave, or Mameluke, rulers of Egypt, the ‘Slave Kings’ of Delhi were anything but servile. The term simply indicates that, as one-time captives, they had once been slaves. In fact they may even have found this station to their advantage. In a court awash with intrigue and opportunity, India’s Turkish conquistadors regarded a slave’s loyalty as more dependable than that of their own kin. Purchased, rapidly promoted, eventually freed, and still highly trusted, the erstwhile slave of a royal patron was ideally placed to act as either power-broker or pretender.
Aybak would be succeeded, after a brief interlude of confusion, by Shams-ud-din Iltumish, another ex-slave of Turkic extraction. That no stigma attached to either of them is clear from Aybak’s recognition as sultan by his titular superior in Ghazni, and from Iltumish’s yet grander recognition by the caliph himself.

Their elevated status is equally proclaimed by their monuments. The Qutb mosque in Delhi boasts a tower of victory which doubles as India’s, and perhaps Islam’s, most massive minar(et). Five balconied tiers tall, many of them fluted and the whole thing heavily tapered, it rears above the now outrageously-priced housing of south Delhi, its red sandstone reminding irreverent neighbours of a brick-built smokestack awaiting demolition. No doubt it made a braver showing until its topmost cupola was toppled by an earthquake in 1803. Down below, the mosque is properly that of Quwwattu’l Islam, the ‘Might of Islam’. Such triumphalism is well substantiated by its construction from the reassembled components – pillars, capitals, lintels – of what had previously been twenty-seven Hindu and Jain temples. Evidently the first sultans were more anxious to see their mosque open for worship than to gratify architectural purists. It stands, where the temples probably had, in what was Rai Pithaura, the Chahamana citadel named after Prithviraj. Renamed Lalkot, this ‘red fort’ area (not to be confused with the Shah Jahan’s ‘Red Fort’ in the Mughal city now known as Old Delhi) was also graced with a ‘white palace’ whence Iltumish and his successors reigned. The palace has gone, but the ruins of Iltumish’s tomb (Aybak was buried in Lahore) stand beside the Qutb mosque, the first in a long and sublime succession of Indo-Islamic mausolea. As if by way of a nod to the later glories of Humayun’s tomb and the Taj Mahal, white marble makes its Delhi debut in the interior of Iltumish’s resting place.

At Varanasi, according to Ferishta, Muhammad of Ghor and Qutb-ud-din Aybak demolished the idols in a thousand temples and then rededicated these shrines ‘to the worship of the true God’. They also carted away treasure by the camel-load -– fourteen hundred camel-loads according to one estimate. Then, as indeed now, most of the Varanasi temples may have been small and airless cells unsuited to the Muslim ideal of the whole community worshipping in unison. Temples were designed for a more intimate kind of communion and did not readily lend themselves to congregational assemblies. If piety and plunder necessitated the destruction of idols, temples may more commonly have been dismantled for their already dressed stones. At Ajmer, where Qutb-ud-din Aybak caused another great mosque to be built, the requisite height for the prayer chamber was obtained by sticking as many as three squat temple pillars on top of one another.

The iconoclasm of the early sultans was not always so thorough. In the southwest, despite victory at Mount Abu and the destruction of nearby Anhilwara, the Muslim forces left untouched the magnificently decorated Jain temple of Adinatha at Dilwara on Mount Abu itself. Here white marble, and little else, has been fretted into a lacy membrane of intricate sculpture which, womb-like, lines the entire interior. The temple dates from 1032 and so belongs to that defiant period of construction immediately after Mahmud of Ghazni’s raids. It was commissioned by a minister of the Solanki rajput dynasty of Gujarat but is so unobtrusively sited and of such inconspicuous profile that it may simply have been overlooked by the invaders.



Just how disastrous the Muslim conquest was for India’s heritage, how heavily Muslim rule bore on the Hindu population, and how determinedly it was resisted are contentious subjects. ‘An analysis of the military operations of the period reveals the fact that never once were the Turkish armies called upon to deal with a hostile population,’ insists an eminent Muslim historian; ‘we do not come across a single revolt of the Hindu masses as such.’9

FN9: Nizami, Khaliq Ahmed, Some Aspects etc., p.91:

The opinion that the Turkish government was military in character or that it rested exclusively on the force of Turkish arms is equally unwarranted. No political structure could be built up and no government could be carried on for decades, nay for centuries, without its active acquiescence by the people. The frequency of military operations during the period should not be construed to mean that the state was military in character. It was military only so far as all medieval Empires had to be. Beyond that it was not, and, could not be so. The Rajput privileged classes—Thakurs, Ranas and Rawats —who were deprived of their pre-eminent position in the social and political life of the country — no doubt chafed under foreign domination and rebelled whenever an opportunity was available, but we do not come across a single revolt of the Hindu masses as such. In fact the people in general had accepted the new government as it had guaranteed complete freedom in their peaceful pursuits. A Hindu inscription dated 1337 of the Vikrama era (1280-1 A.D.) describes Balban as he ‘throughout whose contented realm, under his great and good government, from Gaur to Ghaznah, from the Dravida country and Rameshwaram, everywhere the Earth bears the bounty of sylvan spring.” His armies "ensure the peace and security enjoyed by all." So great was the Sultan’s care for his people that "Vishnu himself has retired from the care of the world and gone to sleep on the ocean of milk 1 [Epigraphia Indo Moslemica, 1913-1914, pp. 35-45.].” There may be an element of poetic exaggeration in it, but it is, nevertheless, characterized by feelings of sincere appreciation.

The circumstances under which the Sultans had to work were exacting. On one side the displaced governing class was eager to reassert its authority and win back its lost prestige and on the other side the Mongols were hammering at the gates of India. A vigilant and well-organized army alone could guarantee peaceful conditions both for the individual and the society. An analysis of the military operations of the period reveals the fact that never for once were the Turkish armies called upon to deal with a hostile population. Their operations were directed either against the Mongols or against the recalcitrant Ranas and Rawats. Mr. K. M. Munshi’s observation that “the conquests so exultantly referred to by the court chronicles of the Sultanate had an Indian side of the picture. It was of ceaseless resistance offered with relentless heroism; of men, from boys in teens to men with one foot in the grave, flinging away their lives for freedom; of warriors defying the invaders from fortresses for months, sometimes for years, in one case, with intermission, for a century; of women in thousands courting fire to save their honour; of children whose bodies were flung into the wells by their parents so that they might escape slavery; of fresh heroes springing up to take the place of the dead and to break the volume and momentum of the onrushing tide of invasion"1 [The Struggle for Empire, Preface] is not borne out by historical facts and may be dismissed as an attempt to misread medieval history in terms of modern national sentiments. Had this been the popular reaction to Turkish occupation of the country, the Turkish government would have been thrown out in no time.

A scientific evaluation of the nature of any organization cannot be attempted without an analysis of (a) the atmosphere in which the organization developed, (b) the leitmotif of the persons who developed it and (c) the organization itself. Studied in this light the Sultanate appears to be essentially a secular institution which was accepted by the medieval Indian people on grounds of merit.


-- Some aspects of religion and politics in India during the 13th century, by Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, 1961


Yet, following Tod’s lead, a no less eminent Hindu authority writes of ‘ceaseless resistance offered with relentless heroism’ as warriors, ‘boys in their teens’, ‘men with one foot in the grave’ and ‘women in thousands’ fought and died ‘to break the volume and momentum of the onrushing tide of invasion’.10

FN 10: Munshi, K.M., in HCIP, vol. 5, The Struggle for Empire, p. xv

About the middle of the twelfth century, the Turks, then in occupation of parts of Central Asia, were forced first westwards and then eastwards by the pressure of their enemies. In A.D. 1175, the Turkish chief, Mu‘izz ud din Muhammad, the nephew of the ferocious ‘World-Burner’ of Ghur, invaded India. The impact of the invasion was borne by three powerful princes; Prithiviraja Chahamana of Ajmer, Jayachandra Gahadavala of Kanauj, and Mularaja II, Chaulukya of Gujarat. Each one of them was powerful enough to defeat the invader singly; Mularaja drove him back in 1178; Prithviraja, in A.D. 1191; but no two of them would combine. When the brave Prithviraja lost the second Battle of Tarain in 1192, the turning point of history came. When Jayachandra Gahadavala, next to be vanquished, died fighting, the Turkish cavalry swept over the plains of the Ganga.

In A.D. 1206, Qutb-ud din Aibak, who succeeded Mu'izz ud-din Muhammad, established the Turkish Sultanate of India at Lahore [NW India/E Pakistan]. It was transferred later to Delhi. The Sultanate was foreign in personnel and outlook [mleccha]] , for “The Forty” as the leading Turkish chiefs, originally the slaves of Mu'izz-ud din, were called, owned it in fee. Its principal concern was loot and conquest; and the slogan of jehad [striving in the path of God.], supported by the 'Ulama [the guardians, transmitters, and interpreters of religious knowledge in Islam.], came in useful to maintain the fanatic zeal of the army. To these invaders nothing was sacred. The description given by Padmanabha in Khanadade Prabandha (c. A.D. 1456) of what the armies of ‘Ala-ud-din Khalji [1296–1316] did, would equally apply to the campaigns of the Turks:

“The conquering army burnt villages; devastated the land, plundered people’s wealth, took Brahmanas, children and women of all castes captive, and flogged them with thongs and raw hide, carried a moving prison with it, and converted the prisoners into obsequious Turks.”


In the days of Mahmud of Ghazni [2 November 971 – 30 April 1030], in the words of ‘Utbi, “the blood of the infidels flowed copiously and apostasy was often the only way of survival.”

Abu al-Qasim Mahmud ibn Sabuktigin (Persian: ابوالقاسم محمود بن سبکتگین, romanized: Abu al-Qāṣim Maḥmūd ibn Sabuktigīn; 2 November 971 – 30 April 1030), usually known as Mahmud of Ghazni or Mahmud Ghaznavi (محمود غزنوی), was Sultan of the Ghaznavid Empire, ruling from 998 to 1030. During his reign and in medieval sources, he is usually known by his honorific title Yamin al-Dawla (یمین‌ الدوله, lit. 'Right Hand of the State')....

Highly Persianized, Mahmud continued the bureaucratic, political, and cultural customs of his predecessors, the Samanids. He established the ground for a future Persianate state in Punjab, particularly centered on Lahore, a city he conquered. His capital of Ghazni evolved into a significant cultural, commercial, and intellectual centre in the Islamic world, almost rivalling the important city of Baghdad. The capital appealed to many prominent figures, such as al-Biruni and Ferdowsi....

He was the first ruler to hold the title Sultan ("authority"), signifying the extent of his power while at the same time preserving an ideological link to the suzerainty of the Abbasid Caliphs. During his rule, he invaded and plundered the richest cities and temple towns, such as Mathura and Somnath in medieval India seventeen times, and used the booty to build his capital in Ghazni.

Mahmud was born in the town of Ghazni in the region of Zabulistan (in present-day Afghanistan) on 2 November 971. His father, Sabuktigin, was a Turkic slave commander who laid foundations to the Ghaznavid dynasty in Ghazni in 977, which he ruled as a subordinate of the Samanids, who ruled Khorasan and Transoxiana. Mahmud's mother was a local woman of possible Iranian descent from a landowning aristocrat family in the region of Zabulistan, and he is therefore known in some sources as Mahmud-i Zavuli ("Mahmud from Zabulistan")....

Mahmud initiated the first of numerous invasions of North India. On 28 November 1001, his army fought and defeated the army of Raja Jayapala of the Kabul Shahis at the Battle of Peshawar. In 1002 Mahmud invaded Sistan and dethroned Khalaf ibn Ahmad, ending the Saffarid dynasty. From there he decided to focus on Hindustan to the southeast, particularly the highly fertile lands of the Punjab region....

Following the defeat of the Indian Confederacy, after deciding to retaliate for their combined resistance, Mahmud then set out on regular expeditions against them, leaving the conquered kingdoms in the hands of Hindu vassals and annexing only the Punjab region. He also vowed to raid and loot the wealthy region of northwestern India every year.

In 1001 Mahmud of Ghazni first invaded modern day Pakistan and then parts of India. Mahmud defeated, captured, and later released the Hindu Shahi ruler Jayapala, who had moved his capital to Peshawar (modern Pakistan). Jayapala killed himself and was succeeded by his son Anandapala. In 1005 Mahmud of Ghazni invaded Bhatia (probably Bhera), and in 1006 he invaded Multan, at which time Anandapala's army attacked him. The following year Mahmud of Ghazni attacked and crushed Sukhapala, ruler of Bathinda (who had become ruler by rebelling against the Shahi kingdom). In 1008–1009, Mahmud defeated the Hindu Shahis in the Battle of Chach. In 1013, during Mahmud's eighth expedition into eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Shahi kingdom (which was then under Trilochanapala, son of Anandapala) was overthrown.

In 1014 Mahmud led an expedition to Thanesar. The next year he unsuccessfully attacked Kashmir. The ruler of Kashmir Sangramaraja had been an ally of the Hindu Shahis against the Ghaznavids, and Mahmud wanted retribution. Antagonized by Sangramaraja's having helped Trilochanapala, Mahmud invaded Kashmir. He advanced along the Tohi river valley, planning to enter Kashmir through the Tosamaidan pass. However, his advanced was checked by the strong fort of Loharkot. After having besieged the fort for a month, Mahmud abandoned the siege and retreated, losing many of his troops on his way and almost losing his own life as well. In 1021, Mahmud again attempted to invade Kashmir, but was again not able to advance beyond the Loharkot fort. After the two failed invasion attempts, he did not attempt to invade Kashmir again.

In 1018 Mahmud attacked Mathura and defeated a coalition of rulers there while also killing a ruler called Chandrapala. The city of Mathura was "ruthlessly sacked, ravaged, desecrated and destroyed". In particular, Al-utbi mentioned in his work Tarikh-e-yamini, that Mahmud Ghaznavi destroyed a "great and magnificent temple" in Mathura. According to Firishta, writing a "History of Hindustan" in the 16th-17th century, the city of Mathura was the richest in India, and was consecrated to Vāsudeva-Krishna. When it was attacked by Mahmud of Ghazni, "all the idols" were burnt and destroyed during a period of twenty days, gold and silver was smelted for booty, and the city was burnt down. The Art of Mathura fell into decline thereafter.

In 1021 Mahmud supported the Kannauj king against Chandela Ganda, who was defeated. That same year Shahi Trilochanapala was killed at Rahib and his son Bhimapala succeeded him. Lahore (modern Pakistan) was annexed by Mahmud. Mahmud besieged Gwalior, in 1023, where he was given tribute. Mahmud attacked Somnath in 1025, and its ruler Bhima I fled. The next year, he captured Somnath and marched to Kachch against Bhima I. That same year Mahmud also attacked the Jats [a traditionally agricultural community in Northern India and Pakistan. Originally pastoralists in the lower Indus river-valley of Sindh, many Jats migrated north into the Punjab region in late medieval times, and subsequently into the Delhi Territory, northeastern Rajputana, and the western Gangetic Plain in the 17th and 18th centuries] of Jud and defeated them. Mahmud's desecration of the Somnath temple in Gujarat in 1024 CE motivated Rajput king Bhoja to lead an army against him, however after Somnath raid, Mahmud Gazhnavi chose a more dangerous route via Sindh, to avoid facing the invading powerful armies of Bhoja, he passed through a desert, where the scarcity of food and water killed a large number of his soldiers and animals, Kitabh Zainu'l Akhbar (c. 1048 CE) by 'Abd al-Hayy Gardizi, Tabaqat-i-Akbari by Nizamuddin Ahmad and Firishta's writings also mention this incident.

Christoph Baumer notes that in 1026 CE, Jats "inflicted heavy losses" on the army of Mahmud while it was on its way from Somnath to Multan. Later in 1027 CE, he avenged the attack by the Jats, who had been resisting "forced Islamisation" for the past 300 years, by ravaging their fleet in the Indus river. Even though the Jats had a bigger fleet than Mahmud, he is said to have had around 20 archers on each of his 1400 boats, stocked with "special projectiles" carrying naphtha, which he used to burn the Jats' fleet.

The Indian kingdoms of Nagarkot, Thanesar, Kannauj, and Gwalior were all conquered and left in the hands of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist kings as vassal states and he was pragmatic enough not to neglect making alliances and enlisting local peoples into his armies at all ranks. Since Mahmud never kept a permanent presence in the northwestern subcontinent, he engaged in a policy of destroying Hindu temples and monuments to crush any move by the Hindus to attack the Empire; Nagarkot, Thanesar, Mathura, Kannauj, Kalinjar (1023) and Somnath all submitted or were raided. It is estimated Mahmud's invasions killed over 2 million people.

In 1025 Mahmud raided Gujarat, plundering the Somnath temple and breaking its jyotirlinga. He took away booty of 2 million dinars. The conquest of Somnath was followed by a punitive invasion of Anhilwara. Some historians claim that there are records of pilgrimages to the temple in 1038 that do not mention damage to the temple. However, powerful legends with intricate detail had developed regarding Mahmud's raid in the Turko-Persian literature, which "electrified" the Muslim world according to scholar Meenakshi Jain.

-- Mahmud of Ghazni, by Wikipedia


Abu'l-Husain Abd-Allah ibn Ahmad Utbi was an Iranian statesman from the Utbi family, who served as the vizier of the Samanid ruler Nuh II from 977 to 982.

Nothing is known about the early life of Utbi. He was a relative of Abu Ja'far Utbi, who had served as vizier of the Samanid Empire from 956 to 959. When the young Samanid prince Nuh II ascended the Samanid throne in 976, Utbi was one year later appointed as his vizier. Utbi, along with Nuh's mother, helped him in controlling the Samanid state. Sometime around Nuh's ascension, the Karakhanids invaded and captured the upper Zarafshan Valley, where the Samanid silver mines were located. In 980 they struck again, seizing Isfijab. Utbi, however was focused on removing Abu'l-Hasan Simjuri, the Samanid governor of Khorasan. Utbi considered Abu'l-Hasan Simjuri to be too powerful; he managed to remove him from the post in 982. He replaced him with one of his own partisans, a Turkic general called Tash. Abu'l-Hasan Simjuri fled to his appendage in Quhistan, to the south of Herat.

An expedition against the Buyids was mobilized in Khorasan, also in 982; it was initially successful, but the Samanid forces were subsequently crushed. A Buyid invasion of the Samanid state was prevented only by the death of 'Adud al-Daula. Utbi attempted to regroup the army, but was assassinated by representatives of Abu'l-Hasan Simjuri and Fa'iq. His death was mourned by many Samanid officers, and even sparked a revolt in the Samanid capital of Bukhara. Utbi was considered by his relatives and medieval historians, including the author of the Tarikh Yamini, Abu Nasr Muhammad Utbi, as the last great Samanid vizier.

-- Abu'l-Husain Utbi, by Wikipedia


On the testimony of so liberal a Muslim of this Age as Amir Khusrav, “the land had been saturated with the water of the sword and the vapours of infidelity (i.e. Hindus) had been dispersed.” Will Durant, in his Story of Civilization, aptly says: “The Mohammedan conquest of India is probably the bloodiest story in history. It is a discouraging tale, for its evident moral is that civilization is a precarious thing, whose delicate complex of order and liberty, culture and peace may at any time be overthrown by barbarians invading from without or multiplying within”. And neither the ferocity nor the persistence of the invader could lead the Indians to develop the military organisation or the ruthlessness needed to match the opposing savagery.

The conquests so exultantly referred to by the court chroniclers of the Sultanate had an Indian side of the picture. It was one of ceaseless resistance offered with relentless heroism; of men, from boys in teens to men with one foot in the grave, flinging away their lives for freedom; of warriors defying the invaders from fortresses for months, sometimes for years, in one case, with intermission, for a century; of women in thousands courting fire to save their honour; of children whose bodies were flung into the wells by their parents so that they might escape slavery; of fresh heroes springing up to take the place of the dead and to break the volume and momentum of the onrushing tide of invasion.

About the middle of the thirteenth century, the Mongols had already established themselves in Afghanistan. In A.D. 1254, they had taken Lahore; in A.D. 1255 they had entered Sindh. With his retreat to the original homeland thus cut off, the Turk, compelled to look to India as his permanent home, clung to the precariously held kingdom of Delhi with tenacity. However, in spite of military operations conducted for a century, the core of the Sultanate only comprised the central military base of Delhi and the surrounding districts within a radius of about 250 miles of it. The frontier districts were no better than garrison outposts from which the Turkish satraps carried on raids against the Indian chiefs, who hold the rural areas. But even when the resistance was overcome, the satraps had to administer the conquered areas with the aid of hereditary Indian chiefs and officers, who were always on the look out for an opportunity to revolt. Some of the Indian chiefs carried their expeditions to the walls of Delhi and even across the Yamuna into the Doab. From the Indian point of view, therefore, the territory of the Sultanate in the thirteenth century was only an arena of resistance which neither wavered nor tired.

-- The Struggle for Empire, by K.M. Munshi, Vol. 5, 1957
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Curiously neither makes mention of what sounds like a devastating revolt in Awadh (or ‘Oudh’ in Uttar Pradesh) of c1220 during which, according to a contemporary, ‘120,000 Muslims received martyrdom at the hands and sword of the accursed Bartuh’.11 It is clear that ‘Bartuh’ was a Hindu but his identity is otherwise uncertain. As with other mysterious ‘heroes of the resistance’, like the Ghakkars of the Panjab or the Mhers and Mewatis of Rajasthan, it would seem that some of the most determined opposition came from tribal, or at least non-rajput, peoples, about whose existence the Hindu dynastic records, and Tod, are silent.

Given that the Muslim conquest of India took several centuries, all generalisations must be suspect. The well-authenticated oppression of Muhammad bin Tughluq in the mid-fourteenth century cannot simply be presumed of his predecessors or his successors. Similarly a Hindu inscription of c1280 which lauds the security and bounty enjoyed under the rule of Sultan Balban should not be taken as a blanket endorsement of firm Islamic government. Not all temples were destroyed, although many were. The jizya tax on non-Muslims was not levied on brahmans until the reign of Feroz Shah Tughluq (1351–88),12 and may never have been very effectively collected. Idolatry was condemned yet Hindus were not prevented from practising their religion. And since the records often make no clear distinction between military and civilian casualties, it is hard to assess the extent of gratuitous violence.

Many would argue that the sultans, like other Indian dynasts, were more interested in power and plunder than in religion. Muslim chroniclers chose to portray the occupation of northern India as a religious offensive and to paint its principals as religious heroes; ‘but such a view cannot stand the test of historical scrutiny’.13 The more informative chroniclers in fact say surprisingly little about Muslim–Hindu relations. They are much more revealing about the power struggles amongst the conquistadors themselves; indeed these feuds, together with the chaos induced by the Mongol invasions, look to have slowed the pace of conquest quite as much as any resurgence of Hindu resistance. According to one authority the entire history of the ruling Turkish elite ‘can be summed up in these words; they united to destroy their enemies and disunited to destroy themselves’.14

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Eastern India c1200

During the twenty-six years of his reign Iltumish was almost continuously in the field, yet beyond raids into Malwa he brought little new territory within the Muslim ambit and was as often engaged against fellow Muslims as against Indian ‘idolaters’. In the west, Sind and the Panjab were in constant turmoil as Ghenghiz Khan neared and then crossed the Indus in 1222. The turmoil was caused not just by the Mongols themselves but by the tide of armies, princes, scholars and artisans from all over Turkestan, Khorasan and Afghanistan whom the Mongol invaders rolled before them. Figures are not available but it seems probable that far more Muslims entered India as refugees from the Mongol invasions than as warriors in the Ghaznavid and Ghorid armies combined.

East of Delhi Iltumish had to reconquer much of what is now Uttar Pradesh and then face Muslim rivals in Bihar and Bengal. These were the Khaljis or Khiljis, originally tribal neighbours of the Ghorids in central Afghanistan, who had followed Muhammad of Ghor to India. Muhammad Bakhtiyar, the founder of Khalji rule, had been denied lucrative office in both Ghazni and Delhi before eventually securing what was then a frontier fief (iqta) near Varanasi. Thence he organised freelance raids into Bihar, one of which was rewarded with the unexpectedly easy capture of what the Khaljis thought was a fortified city. Here the inhabitants, all of whom seemed to have shaven heads, were indeed put to death and great plunder was made. Amongst the spoils were whole libraries of books but, since all the people had been killed, no one could tell what the books were about. Further investigation, however, clarified the situation. According to Minhaju-s Siraj, a distinguished scholar who after being flushed out of Afghanistan by the Mongols spent two years with the Khaljis, ‘it was then discovered that the whole fort and city was a place of study’;15 it was in fact the famous Buddhist monastery-cum-university of Odantapuri.

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Odantipuri


Such fearless feats of arms won the applause of Qutb-ud-din Aybak and brought followers flocking to the Khalji standard. Bakhtiyar had then ventured through south Bihar and, in another daring escapade, captured Nadia, the capital of the Senas, which dynasty had succeeded that of the Buddhist Palas as the most important in Bengal. With just eighteen followers Bakhtiyar is supposed to have gained entrance to the Sena palace and surprised King Lakshmanasena in the middle of lunch. The Senas’ other capital of Lakhnauti, otherwise Gaur on what is now the Indo–Bangladesh frontier, was also taken. With Lakhnauti as his headquarters, Bakhtiyar continued east into Assam and then ‘Tibet’ –- which was probably not the country now so designated but perhaps Bhutan. Howsoever, the Himalayas were certainly too physically challenging for the Khalji forces, most of whom perished in a swollen river. Bakhtiyar made it back to the plains but, a broken man, he either died or was killed soon after.

This was in 1205, and from then onwards the governorship of Bengal and Bihar had been bitterly contested by various Khaljis who acknowledged Delhi’s supremacy only on the rare occasions when the sultan’s support was deemed personally advantageous. Iltumish endeavoured to rectify the situation by invading Bengal in 1225. Its incumbent Khalji was obliged ‘to place the yoke of servitude on the neck of submission’ and yield a hefty tribute; then he reverted to his bad old ways. A year later the sultan sent his son Nasir-ud-din to repeat the treatment. This time the Khaljis were routed, their ruler killed and their capital occupied; the problem looked to be solved. But such calculations took no account of Bengal’s notorious climate. Nasir-ud-din suddenly sickened and died. Again Bengal, that ‘hell full of good things’ as the Mughals would call ppopit, slipped the leash and again (in 1229) Iltumish had to invade. His settlement barely lasted until his death, whereupon Bengal, Bihar and sometimes Awadh became again effectively independent. Although over the succeeding century this situation was occasionally threatened and briefly reversed, ‘between 1338 and 1538, for long two hundred years, Bengal remained independent without interruption.’16

Delhi’s chances of reasserting its authority there or anywhere else declined sharply after Iltumish. Before dying of natural causes, a feat which even contemporary writers found worthy of special note, Iltumish had wavered between nominating as his successor a remaining but ineffectual son and an inspirational but gender-handicapped daughter. The son, though liked, had his own handicaps, including a vindictive and detested mother and a predilection to ‘licentiousness and debauchery’. Mother and son duly indulged their respective passions during a seven-month period. It barely qualified as a reign, and they were both then toppled by the daughter, the redoubtable Raziya.

Sultan Raziya was a great monarch. She was wise, just and generous, a benefactor to her kingdom, a dispenser of justice, the protector of her subjects, and the leader of her armies. She was endowed with all the qualities befitting a king, but she was not born of the right sex, and so in the estimation of men all these virtues were worthless. (May God have mercy on her!)17


Nevertheless, continued Minhaju-s Siraj, ‘the country under Sultan Raziya enjoyed peace and the power of the state was manifest’; even Bengal made a grudging submission. This was short-lived, and the calm merely presaged a storm. Raziya’s reign lasted barely four years (1236–40). Perhaps her decision to dispense with the veil and, in mannish garb of coat and cap, to ‘show herself amongst the people’ was unnecessarily provocative to Muslim sensitivities. So too may have been the appointment as ‘personal attendant to her majesty’ of Jamal-ud-din Yakut, an ‘Abyssinian’ who was probably once a slave and very definitely an African. A liaison so conspicuous duly brought unfavourable comment from the historian Isami. Declaring that a woman’s place was ‘at her spinning wheel [charkha]’ and that high office would only derange her, he insisted that Raziya should have made ‘cotton her companion and grief her winecup’.

These lines, written in 1350, are of additional interest in that, according to Irfan Habib, India’s most distinguished economic historian, they contain ‘the earliest reference to the spinning wheel so far traced in India’. Since the device is known in Iran from a prior period, ‘the inference is almost inescapable that the spinning wheel came to India with the Muslims’.18 So did the paper on which Isami penned his patronising lines, palm leaves having previously served as a somewhat friable writing surface. Both introductions were of incalculable value. Governance and taxation would be expedited, and literature, scholarship and the graphic arts revolutionised by the availability of a uniform writing material which could be readily filed and bound. In fact it became so common that by the mid-fifteenth century Delhi’s confectioners were already wrapping their sticky halwa in recycled writing paper, a practice which would continue until the triumph of the polythene bag and then revive after polythene’s environmental disgrace.


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The Delhi Sultanates (1) The 'Slave Dynasty" 1206-90

Likewise, the charkha greatly boosted the production of yarn and no doubt provided employment for many more weavers. High-quality cotton textiles had long been an important export; but thanks to the spinning wheel and other innovations, India’s cottage-based cotton industry would in time become a barometer of national self-esteem. In adopting the charkha as the symbol of Indian independence, Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party were not, however, courting Muslim votes. The irony of predominantly Hindu India sporting a national icon of Islamic provenance went unnoticed.

Raziya was elbowed aside by a junta of Turkish, and of course male, chauvinists. While bravely dashing across the Panjab in high summer to douse a revolt at Bhatinda, she was isolated by the conspirators, her Abyssinian friend was killed, and she ended a prisoner in the fort she had come to redeem. There she managed to win the backing and affection of one of the conspirators. They were married and, gathering further support, marched on Delhi. Perhaps if the conduct of their forces had been left to the experienced Raziya, they might have prevailed. But, as a wife, she deferred to her husband and they were heavily defeated. Next day, while fleeing the battlefield, the newlyweds ‘fell into the hands of Hindus and were killed’.

Known as ‘The Forty’ or ‘The Family of Forty’, the Turkish military oligarchs who now dominated Delhi affairs intrigued both against one another and against a more amorphous grouping composed of Indian converts to Islam and eminent refugees from Afghanistan and beyond. At the whim of these cutthroat godfathers young and ineffectual sultans were casually summoned and quickly despatched, usually to the hereafter.

Raziya’s demise had been followed almost immediately by another Mongol eruption. In 1241 the invaders sacked Lahore, whose ruins were then picked over by the predatory Ghakkars. Unlike Delhi, Lahore thus lost all trace of its Ghaznavid and Ghorid past and has no monuments prior to those of the Mughals. That the Mongols did not then take advantage of Delhi’s strife-torn predicament is largely thanks to Ghiyas-ud-din Balban, another Turkish slave who, while loyally dictating policy for the ineffectual Sultan Nasir-ud-din, was briefly disgraced but, eventually and allegedly, poisoned the sultan to secure his own succession.

During forty years as the effective (1246–65) and then actual (1265–87) ruler, the stern and merciless Balban held the Mongols at bay with a skilful mixture of force and diplomacy. Ghenghiz Khan was now dead, but his successors readily championed the cause of one of Sultan Nasir-ud-din’s brothers plus other claimants to the Delhi throne; they frequently intervened in the tortuous affairs of Sind; and they advanced to the Beas river in the Panjab. This necessitated the diversion of the sultanate’s best troops and most reliable commanders to patrolling the new frontier. ‘If this anxiety … as guardian and protector of Mussulmans, were removed,’ Balban is supposed to have said, ‘I would not stay one day in my capital but would lead forth my army to capture treasures and valuables, elephants and horses, and would never allow the Rais and Ranas [i.e. the rajputs and other Hindus] to repose in quiet at a distance.’19 While the Mongols threatened the very existence of the sultanate, even plundering raids into Hindu India, let alone conquests, were in abeyance.

Several Mongol incursions were indeed frustrated, but in 1260 Balban fêted an embassy from Hulagu, grandson of Ghenghiz Khan. Despite Balban’s boast that up to fifteen ex-rulers of Turkestan, Khorasan, Iran and Iraq were enjoying asylum in Delhi, some sort of working relationship seems to have been established between the two neighbours. Balban could now concentrate on shoring up the status of the sultanate and securing his existing possessions. Perhaps influenced by all those royal refugees from the north-west, he introduced into his court an elaborate system of precedence and protocol modelled on Persian practice. The sultan being ‘the shadow of God’ and his vice-regent on earth, it was fitting that he be honoured as such. With drawn swords fearsome retainers now constantly attended the royal presence. Those who would approach the throne must abase themselves, performing zaminbos (‘kissing the ground’) and paibos (‘kissing the [royal] feet’) as they advanced. Any infringement of this rigid decorum brought instant and bloody punishment.

With an equally heavy hand, Balban’s forces put down insurrections in the Ganga-Jamuna Doab and cleared the region round Delhi of both the marauding Mewatis and the scrub jungle in which they found sanctuary. A major expedition into Bengal, whose governor was again in revolt, took three years and was distinguished by more ferocious reprisals. But on the sultan’s return, his most capable son and preferred successor was killed in a skirmish with the Mongols. Balban, now said to have been in his eighties, never recovered from this blow. When not presiding, grim-faced, over his terrified courtiers, he is said to have spent his nights howling with grief for the ‘martyr-prince’. In 1287 death brought relief to the tortured sultan. Not, however, to his kingdom, which plunged into another bloodstained succession crisis.

A grandson, who quickly replaced the one Balban had nominated as his successor, celebrated his succession by renouncing the austerities of the previous reign and embarking on a riot of indulgence. The young sultan, says Ferishta, ‘delighted in love and in the soft society of silver-bodied damsels with musky tresses’. Delhi welcomed the change; ‘every shade was filled with ladies of pleasure and every street rung with music and mirth.’20 But such was the young sultan’s abandon, such the heavy inebriants and the musky tresses, that within three years the handsome and affable prince was reduced to a gibbering wreck. Meanwhile Balban’s trusty lieutenants had been eliminated by the new sultan’s self-appointed keeper, an evil genius who was himself then poisoned by jealous opponents. ‘What little order had been maintained in the government was now entirely lost,’ according to Ziau-ud-din Barani, the author of an important history, who was a boy about Delhi at the time. The still young but now paralysed and imbecilic sultan was replaced by his son, a three-year-old toddler. In his name cradle-snatching rivals continued to manoeuvre and fight for office.

The dénouement of this 1290 crisis saw the remnants of the Turkish ‘Forty’ outwitted by rivals belonging to the same Khalji tribe who had earlier conquered Bihar and Bengal. Despatching two sultans in quick succession – both the paralytic father and his wretched child – the Khaljis ended the so-called ‘Slave dynasty’ and proclaimed one of their seniors, Jalal-ud-din Feroz Khalji, as the new sultan. A kicking toddler was thus replaced by a grey-bearded patriarch as the Khalji dynasty began its thirty-year tenure of the throne of Delhi.

Jalal-ud-din Feroz, sometimes called Feroz Shah I, was an unlikely instrument of revolution. A Turk, though not exactly a young one, he also displayed a clemency unheard of in the annals of the sultanate. It even won him a certain popularity. Conciliating rivals and forgiving enemies, he ‘weaned the citizens of Delhi from their attachment to the old family’, says Ferishta. Such policies melted even Mongol hearts. The trickle of defectors from the Mongol khanates who were embracing Islam and transferring their loyalties to the sultanate briefly became a flood. But such leniency also severely tested the loyalties of his Khalji supporters and offered much encouragement to potential opponents. Amongst the latter was the sultan’s nephew, who was also his son-in-law and a keen student of the earlier Khalji campaigns in Bengal.

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The Delhi Sultanates (2) The Khalji Dynasty 1290-1320[/b]

This man was Ala-ud-din Khalji, and the lesson he drew from his kinsmen’s experiences in Bengal was that plunder and conquests made at the expense of Hindu India could significantly enhance his challenge for the sultanate. After a lull of nearly a century during which the tide of ‘Muslim conquest’ in India had if anything receded, another giant surge was about to carry it deep into the peninsula.

ALADDIN’S CAVE

By now, the end of the thirteenth century, the still-Hindu Deccan and south had witnessed further dynastic change. Yet the pattern of struggle, modelled on the symmetry of the mandala and consummated in the compass-boxing digvijaya, remained the same. So too does our limited perception of it. [i]Unenlivened by the gossipy narratives beloved of Muslim writers, the contemporary history of Hindu India has still to be laboriously extrapolated from the sterile phrasing and optimistic listings favoured by royal panegyrists and fortuitously preserved in a few literary compositions and numerous stone and copper-plate inscriptions. The formality of such sources drains their content of vitality and, without the labours lavished by the likes of Tod on the rajputs, the history of the Deccan is liable to appear as arid and confusing
as its geography.

Lest this should prove to be the case, it must suffice to note that in the western Deccan the Western Chalukyas, those doughty opponents of the great Cholas of Tanjore, had succumbed, like their Rashtrakuta predecessors, to the rising power of two erstwhile feudatories, one of which now dominated Karnataka and the other Maharashtra. As Yadavas, both these new dynasties claimed descent from the Vedic Yadu lineage, once of Mathura and of Dwarka in Saurashtra. They were not ‘Rajpoots’ in the geographically-specific sense used by Tod, and not certainly even ksatriya, a caste that is practically unknown in peninsular India. Yet as befitted a lineage that could claim Lord Krishna as a Yadava, they too revered the martial ethic.
The Seuna, Sevuna, or Yadavas of Devagiri was a medieval Indian dynasty ...

-- Seuna (Yadava) dynasty, by Wikipedia

Of these two Yadava dynasties, the Hoysalas of Halebid are the more epigraphically articulate. Originally a hill-people from the Western Ghats just north of Coorg, they had carved out a small kingdom around Belur (two hundred kilometres west of modern Bangalore in southern Karnataka) in the tenth century. In the eleventh, as ‘the rod in the right hand of the Chalukya king’, Hoysala forces had served with distinction against both the Chola kings Rajaraja and Rajendra and against King Bhoj’s Paramara successor in Malwa. More territory had been acquired, more scholars and adventurers attracted to the Hoysala court and, with the establishment of a new capital at Dorasamudra (now Halebid), twelve kilometres from Belur, the usual clustering of dynastic sites was under way. ‘Striking hostile princes in a brilliant way as if they were balls in a game,’ says an eleventh-century panegyrist (who must by now have been reborn as a cricket commentator), ‘that famous [King] Vinayaditya ruled like Indra from the west as far as Talakad, until the circle of the Earth cried out “Well done, Sir!” in approval.’21

Imperial ambitions had first been entertained by the Hoysalas in the early twelfth century when the spectacularly ornate temples of Chenna Kesava at Belur and of Hoysalesvara at Dorasamudra-Halebid were designed to celebrate it. This bid for supremacy throughout Karnataka proved premature, but towards the end of the century, at about the same time as Prithviraj was succumbing to Muhammad of Ghor at Tarain, the Hoysalas successfully exploited a do-or-die struggle between the Western Chalukyas and the invading Kalachuris of Madhya Pradesh. Ballala II, the greatest of the Hoysala kings, thus added to his ancestral domains most of northern Karnataka and, by exploiting a similar conflict between the Chola and Pandya rulers in the Tamil country, also emerged with an important slice of the Kaveri plain around Srirangam (Trichy). A new chronological era was adopted by Ballala’s royal bards, and so were the usual imperial titles, plus many besides. Gloriously if briefly the Hoysalas were paramount through-out most of the Kannadaspeaking Deccan, and could pose as arbiters in the lusher lands below the Eastern Ghats.

There, in the Tamil country, their main rivals were the Pandyas of Madurai who in the 1250s under the great Sundara Pandya overthrew the Cholas and blunted the Hoysala thrust. The Pandyas also struck north deep into the Telugus-peaking Andhra country, where an important dynasty called the Kakatiyas had replaced the Eastern Chalukyas of Vengi. Thus it was the Pandyas from Madurai, the Hoysalas of Karnataka and these Kakatiyas of Warangal (their capital, near the later Hyderabad), together with their respective feudatories, who controlled most of the south when, as the thirteenth century drew to a close, Ala-ud-din Khalji began to formulate his plans.

North of the Hoysalas, and barring any access to the south via the western Deccan, there ruled those other beneficiaries of the Chalukyan decline who also claimed Yadava descent. Indeed they are often referred to as the ‘Yadavas of Devagiri’. Since Maharashtra was their homeland they are also described as Marathas, although the correct name of the dynasty is Seuna, or Sevuna. These Seunas, then, once feudatories of the Rashtrakutas and then of the Chalukyas, had taken the latter’s capital of Kalyana in c1190. Although boxed in on all sides –- by the Hoysalas to the south, the Kakatiyas to the east, the Paramara rajputs of Malwa in the north and the Solanki rajputs of Gujarat in the west –- they had yet carved out a substantial kingdom embracing most of what is now the state of Maharashtra. Very roughly, the Seuna kingdom therefore corresponded to the territory of the ancient Shatavahanas and the early Rashtrakutas.

Beset by so many aggressive neighbours, the Seunas had taken the sensible precaution of locating their capital at the base of the most impregnable citadel in western India. A fang of rock, mostly bare of vegetation, vertiginous, accessible only by a labyrinth of caves and shafts, and further strengthened by glowering fortifications plus a Stygian moat, the citadel rises three hundred metres above the plains at a place called Devagiri (Deogir), later Daulatabad, between the rock-city of Ellora and the garden-city of Aurangabad. Here the considerable fortune amassed by the Seunas from revenue, raiding and trade seemed secure. From his eyrie King Rama-chandra could survey the core of his kingdom on the upper Godavari river safe in the knowledge that, however his armies fared, his person and possessions were unlikely to be jeopardised.



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The Peninsular Incursions of Ala-ud-din and Malik Kafur, 1296-1312

In 1296 a dry-season offensive against the Hoysalas in Karnataka was being conducted by his son. Devagiri was therefore sparsely defended. But Ramachandra, nearing the end of a successful reign that had already lasted twenty-five years, was not unduly anxious. A few Muslim troops were already serving as mercenaries in the Deccan. The rigidity of Islam was familiar from centuries of contact, and the aggressive forays of the Delhi sultans north of the Narmada must long have been matter for comment. Three years previously the young Alaud-din Khalji had led a plundering expedition from his base at Kara, near Allahabad, and pushed as far south as Bhilsa, near Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh. High-value booty had been secured from this ancient capital and from the neighbouring Buddhist centre of Sanchi. But Bhilsa was not halfway from the Ganga to the Godavari; there were still over three hundred kilometres of the ruggedest country between it and Devagiri. To Rama-chandra such barely authorised escapades by some unknown nephew of the remote and unusually pacific Feroz Shah I were scarcely cause for alarm. He was therefore taken completely by surprise when in the spring of 1296 Ala-ud-din suddenly materialised on his precipitous doorstep.

In the event, Rama-chandra was not the only one surprised. Ala-ud-din’s eruption into the Deccan had been kept secret even from his uncle the sultan. In fact, surprising the latter was the higher priority; for as would soon appear, the real target was not Devagiri but Delhi. Ala-ud-din was acting without authority and with comparatively few troops. From Kara via Bhilsa he had stumbled on a secluded route to the rich kingdoms of the Deccan which avoided the stilldefiant rajputs of Rajasthan and Malwa. But he needed to complete his mission before it was discovered and countermanded. Speed of movement was therefore essential; he had avoided towns, camping in the jungle and following previously reconnoitred routes. On what was essentially a quest for wealth and prestige, all that mattered was securing a quick submission plus a monumental ransom from the luckless Rama-chandra.

The Khalji’s troops therefore sacked and plundered the town of Devagiri as soon as they reached it. Rama-chandra retired to his citadel and, to the invaders’ distress, looked capable of holding out indefinitely. But after barely a week’s defiance it was found that provisions within the citadel were already running low. With almost indecent haste the adversaries then concluded a pact which even the unexpected return of the Seuna army failed to compromise. Thus, after days rather than weeks, Ala-ud-din and Rama-chandra parted on the best of terms, the invader with a Seuna bride and treasure beyond his wildest dreams, and the invaded with his kingdom intact, his army undefeated, his beliefs uncompromised, and a powerful new Turuska ally.

As planned, news of Ala-ud-din’s remarkable achievement reached the ears of his uncle in Delhi ahead of the reports about his original disobedience. All, if not forgiven, was now beyond reprehension. Ala-ud-din had rediscovered the predatory purpose behind Turkish rule in India; he had established himself as a resourceful and fortunate general; and he had acquired sufficient treasure, plus the possibility of more where that came from, to attract powerful support. Clearly he needed careful handling. The sultan therefore extended his congratulations and, ignoring advice to ambush his ambitious nephew en route, bade him return to Delhi with his plunder. In fact Ala-ud-din headed for the safety of his own fief at Kara on the Ganga. There he eventually inveigled his uncle into paying him a visit. Only a sultan as guileless as the aged Feroz would have accepted such an invitation and have then sailed downriver to the meeting with only a few unarmed attendants and no hope of escape. Needless to say, he had barely stepped ashore when he was cut down. ‘While the head of the murdered sovereign was yet dripping with blood, the ferocious conspirators brought the royal canopy and elevated it over the head of Ala-ud-din.’22

The usurper then made his way to Delhi, gathering supporters as he went by showering the roadsides with coins fired as grapeshot from a specially-designed manjanik. His fellow conspirators were quickly disposed of; such men were obviously not to be trusted. But during a reign of twenty years (1296–1316) Alaud-din would not otherwise disappoint the high expectations he had aroused amongst the sultanate’s supporters. Although an illiterate of unremarkable physique and unendearing presence, he combined the scruple-free instincts essential to survival with a paternal and even innovative concern for the welfare of his kingdom. Ala-ud-din’s memory would transcend the eventful years of his reign and become something of a benchmark for later rulers. Much the most successful as well as the most unforgiving of the Delhi sultans, it was he who now directed the victorious progress of Turkish arms throughout India.

Conquest to any lasting purpose it was not. With the exception of Gujarat and parts of Rajasthan and Malwa, very little new territory was brought under direct Khalji rule. No pan-Indian empire under a Turkish or an Islamic dispensation resulted. Mass conversions were almost unknown. Existing rulers were mostly reinstated and, despite promptly acknowledging Delhi’s suzerainty, they rarely fulfilled their tributary obligations unless compelled to do so by the threat of further armed intervention. Ala-ud-din’s victories certainly conjured up amongst his supporters a vision of Islamic dominion throughout India. Perhaps they also reminded his Hindu subjects of those indigenous traditions of universal sovereignty associated with the concept of the cakravartin. But it would be another two hundred years before these ideals were fused into an effective reality; and the credit would then belong neither to the Turkish Khaljis nor their Afghan successors, but to the descendants of those hordes who continued to threaten the very existence of the Delhi sultanate and whom, though known to Europe as ‘Mongols’, contemporary Persian and Indian sources always called ‘Mughals’.

From 1297 to 1303 Ala-ud-din faced almost annual Mongol onslaughts. Delhi itself was twice surrounded, the Doab was ravaged and what is now Pakistan suffered continual Mongol occupations
. Whether even the stern Balban could have held the enemy at bay must be doubtful. But after a crushing victory in early 1300 and numerous other lesser triumphs, Ala-ud-din not only stemmed the tide but reversed it. Sind and the Panjab were regained and by the end of his reign Khalji forces were raiding Ghazni, Kabul and Kandahar in Afghanistan. It was by no means the end of the ‘Mughal’ threat. But Ala-ud-din’s successes served as a temporary deterrent and provided a convincing demonstration of the military effectiveness of manoeuvrable Turkish cavalry in combination with a solid Indian elephant-phalanx.

Further demonstrations of military might were witnessed in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Malwa, the Deccan and even the extreme south. Although glossed over in contemporary accounts, there were also setbacks, most notably in Bengal and initially in Andhra. It is clear, too, that Tod’s rajputs gave a good account of themselves, with the great hill-forts of Ranthambhor, Jalor and Chitor withstanding long sieges, occasioning heavy casualties, and inspiring posterity with their legendary jauhars. These hara-kiri rituals had been practised by other doughty patriots ever since Sind was first invaded in the eighth century, but the rajputs of Rajasthan now made them peculiarly their own. When all was lost, when the last scrap of food had been eaten, the last arrow fired, the last waterskin emptied, a pyre was lit and, as the womenfolk hurled themselves into the flames, the men rode out in a still brighter blaze of glory to kill until they were killed. Fanaticism was not an exclusively Islamic prerogative. The Khalji forces marvelled that principalities so agriculturally disadvantaged and forts so poorly endowed with treasure should occasion such passionate resistance.

Much less trouble and infinitely more rewarding were the conquests of Gujarat and then Malwa, from where the poet-king Bhoj’s Paramara successors were finally removed. Gujarat, besides being extremely fertile and renowned for both its textiles and its cattle, was further enriched by the maritime trade of Cambay, which had now superseded Broach as north India’s main port on the Arabian Sea. Prodigious spoils resulted from this campaign of 1298, including more gold and precious stones from the rebuilt, and now re-demolished, temple of Somnath; its replacement lingam was again hammered into fragments and reserved for trampling by the feet of the faithful, this time in Delhi. Amongst Cambay’s seized assets the most prized was a Hindu captive who would add particular lustre to the Khalji sultanate. A eunuch and a slave, he quickly espoused Islam but retained the nickname ‘Thousand-dinar Kafur’, presumably a reference to his original valuation. ‘His beauty,’ says Barani, ‘captivated Ala-uddin’ who thereafter trusted him implicitly and appointed him a Malik-naib, or senior commander.23

The king of Gujarat, meanwhile, had found sanctuary in the fortress of Devagiri where Rama-chandra’s son, if not Rama-chandra himself, had been having second thoughts about the Seuna–Khalji alliance. In 1307, with the arrears of Seuna tribute mounting, Ala-ud-din sent an army to chastise the son and reoccupy the kingdom. Commanded by none other than ‘Thousand-dinar Kafur’ it quickly routed the Seuna forces and again ransacked the capital. Sangama, the Seuna heir, fled. Rama-chandra, however, was taken to Delhi and was there much fêted by the sultan, who reinstated him on his throne and showered him with favours in an unusually creditable display of magnanimity. As a result the Seuna king ‘not only stood firm in his loyalty to the sultan but rendered valuable assistance to the officers whom he sent to subdue the Hindu kingdoms of the south’.24

Pre-eminent amongst these officers was again the inspirational Maliknaib Kafur. In 1309 he headed south for the second time and from Devagiri mounted an assault on the Kakatiyas of Andhra. About eighteen years earlier Marco Polo, while visiting Tamil Nadu by sea from China, had noted the rich diamond finds made in the Andhra country which, he reported, was then ruled by a formidable queen of Seuna birth. She had lost her Kakatiya husband and was acting as regent for her grandson. The grandson was Pratapa-rudra who, coming of age, had since succeeded to the Kakatiya throne, and now withdrew within the fortifications of Warangal as Malik Kafur approached. The siege proved lengthy but Pratapa-rudra eventually succumbed and was relieved of horses, elephants and the usual trunkloads of treasure before being reinstated on the promise of an annual tribute.

Next year Kafur was back in the Deccan, and from Devagiri he this time continued south. The Seunas, relishing the prospect of their Hoysala rivals being the next to be humbled, provided supplies, guides and covering forces. With the distant outline of the Western Ghats tracking his progress, Kafur pressed on south into the interminable Deccan horizon. Halebid, nestling amongst greener pastures, was reached and duly besieged. But Ballala III, the Hoysala king, then opted for terms under which he was to perform much the same escort service in respect of Kafur’s onward march into the Pandya country. It did not mean that Halebid escaped the customary demands for treasure and elephants, but it did mean that Kafur’s troops had traversed the entire Deccan without once having had to fight a battle.

Directed by Kafur, himself born a Hindu under rajput rule, ‘the Muslim conquest of the south’ was partaking more of the digvijaya than the jihad. Claims by Ferishta and others that Malik Kafur built a mosque in Halebid and established Islam throughout Karnataka are deemed a wishful fabrication. ‘Though he served a master who bore the name of Ala-ud-din [i.e. Aladdin] he could not have worked, without the aid of the wonderful lamp, such miracles during a brief stay of less than two weeks.’25

From Halebid the Khalji forces, aided by the Hoysalas, descended into the Tamil country through elysian vales dotted with teak trees, their fallen leaves crackling underfoot like crisp papadums. They spent only a month amongst the rice fields of Tamil Nadu. Again no battles are recorded and the time seems to have been mainly spent in a fruitless pursuit of the elusive Pandyan ruler. It did, though, suffice to strip the temple cities of Madurai, Srirangam and Chidambaram of their solid-gold idols, to empty their gold-filled temple cavities, and to yield much other portable wealth. Such being the whole point of the exercise, ‘Thousand-dinar Kafur’ turned for home heavily laden and well satisfied.

Barani, who witnessed his ecstatic reception in Delhi, puts the campaign’s haul at 612 elephants, twenty thousand horses, ninety-six thousand man of gold and countless boxes of jewels and pearls. Although modern equivalencies are notoriously difficult to work out, ninety-six thousand man is said to correspond to 241 tonnes.26 ‘The old inhabitants of Delhi remarked that so much gold had never before been brought into Delhi. No one could remember anything like it, nor was there anything like it recorded in history.’27


Yet in a thoughtful retrospect of Ala-ud-din’s reign, Ziau-ud-din Barani would place ‘constant succession of victories’ no higher than second in his list of the sultan’s most notable achievements. ‘Rolling back the Mughals’ came third, ‘repairing mosques’ eighth, while ‘rooting out idolatry’ or ‘spreading the true religion’ are not mentioned at all. The sultan was no Islamic bigot: ‘there is no instance to show that Ala-ud-din oppressed some people simply because they were Hindus and favoured others just because they were Muslims.’28 Indeed, if one may judge by his reported interest in founding a new religion centred on his own illustrious person, his faith was decidedly unorthodox. He did extend Aybak’s Quwwat-ul-Islam mosque in Delhi, adding the great Alai Darwaza (Alaud-din’s Gateway). He also planned a prodigious minaret which, if completed, would have dwarfed that of the Qutb. In fact it never rose much above its current stump height, and should be seen as the aberration of a sultan occasionally deluded by his own success. Like his assumption of the title ‘The Second Alexander’ on his coinage, it was a case of the megalomaniac getting the better of the Muslim.

In Barani’s listing, the first and greatest of Ala-ud-din’s achievements was, somewhat surprisingly, ‘cheapness of grain, clothes and the necessaries of life’. Writing in an old age embittered by extreme poverty, Barani paid particular attention to such matters. His narrative, though coloured by an old-timer’s recollection of palmier days, thus provides the first detailed account of the management of an Indian economy. From it we learn of Ala-ud-din’s cancellation of all land grants and revenue assignments made by his predecessors and of his prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol. These measures affected mainly Muslim courtiers and were designed to cow dissent and quell conspiracy. The more draconian ordinances which followed – and which were designed to finance the vast armies required for his Mongol and Deccan campaigns, to eliminate profiteering and reduce the grievances of the Delhi populace – affected Hindus more directly. It is doubtful whether they were ever applied beyond the city of Delhi and its immediate environs. On the other hand, by concentrating on such a manageable entity, they could be enforced to dramatic effect.

Reasoning, apparently, that despite the expected yield of his ‘Aladdin’s cave’ in the south, new troops could not be as handsomely paid nor as well equipped as rising costs and unflinching loyalty demanded, the sultan had hit on the idea of lowering prices. That meant, first and foremost, controlling the grain market. All food-grains were listed, their prices duly fixed, and markets carefully and ruthlessly supervised. To guard against fluctuations in supply, the yield of the royal lands (khalsa) was stockpiled in city granaries, all transport was so heavily regulated as to be effectively nationalised, and provincial officials were bound to strict procurement targets. For the middleman the avoidance of penalties, invariably of the most barbaric nature, now replaced the accumulation of profits as his main incentive. Hoarding, even by the cultivator, kept a network of spies and torturers busy. Although a policy on paper, it became a purge in practice. Yet the results, according to Barani, were truly amazing. Grain prices plummeted, and stayed both cheap and unchanged even in years of drought. ‘This was indeed the wonder of the age, and something which no other monarch was able to effect.’29

The success of this price-fixing policy resulted in its extension to just about every other commodity known to the Delhi bazaars. Textiles, groceries, slaves, whores, cattle, in fact everything ‘from caps to shoes and from combs to needles’ had its fixed price and its market regulators.
It was not just one of the first recorded examples of planned economic management but also one of the most ambitious. And therein partly lay its undoing. ‘A camel could be had for a dang [a farthing],’ says Barani, ‘but wherefrom the dang?’ Purchasing power seemed to decline just as fast as prices; and urban sufficiency brought only chronic rural depression. There was no incentive to increase yields. Nor was there any chance of so ambitious a system surviving the heavy-handed authority which alone had made its imposition possible.

When Ala-ud-din succumbed to sickness and then death, both markets and prices simply reverted to the usual free-for-all. Most of his reforms, like most of his conquests, were temporary expedients and anything but proof against the internecine succession crises which now again overtook the sultanate. In the space of four years two of his sons, plus a Hindu convert, occupied the throne and quickly paid the price – a price which, though not fixed, was invariably lethal. So did ‘Thousand-dinar Kafur’, who briefly acted as king-maker; half a dozen other pretenders were either blinded or murdered. Mubarak, the son of Ala-ud-din who occupied the throne for longest, turned out to be what Ferishta calls ‘a monster in the shape of a man’. Most of his indecencies were too gross to mention although not, strangely, his practice of ‘leading a gang of abominable prostitutes, stark naked, along the terraces of the royal palaces, and obliging them to make water upon the nobles as they entered the court’.30

The Khaljis thus ended much as had the Slave kings. In 1320 Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq, the son of one of Balban’s slaves, emerged as the founder of a new dynasty. Briefly the Tughluqs would revive, and then fatally destroy, the fortunes of the sultanate, thereby surrendering Delhi’s presumed hegemony to a host of powerful new rivals. Far from uniting India, early Islam’s historic role would be to develop and entrench the subcontinent’s so-called ‘regional’ identities.
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Re: India A History, by John Keay

Postby admin » Mon Dec 16, 2024 12:31 am

Part 1 of 2

12. Other Indias: 1320–1525
THE TUGHLUQS


EAST OF THE QUTB MINAR, where the suburban sprawl of south Delhi picks its way into scrub, lie six square kilometres of monumental desolation. This wilderness of cyclopean ramparts and dungeons is Tughluqabad (Tughlakabad), the most far-flung of the dozen-odd citadels which, originally some sultan’s new Delhi, then his successors’ old Delhi, are now decidedly dead Delhis; the howling jackals by night, and by day the mewing kites, could be ghouls at large.

Built by Sultan Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq (Tughlak) in the early 1320s, Tughluqabad’s parapeted walls and bastions march uncompromisingly along a low ridge which overlooks a wasteland of goat-grazed acacia and wind-borne litter. Jets scream low on a flightpath into the airport; in the distance isolated outcrops of many-storeyed housing rise from the ground-haze like the islands of an archipelago. Today’s Delhi is still heading south, colonising the scrub with random developments and upgrading the goat tracks to feeder roads. The modern metropolis may yet reclaim Tughluqabad just as it already has the mosque of Qutb-ud-din Aybak, Iltumish’s Lalkot and the Siri fort of the Khaljis.

Below the walls of his Tughluqabad, Sultan Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq lies buried in a tomb of quite spectacular foreboding. Battlemented like the citadel, its steeply inward-sloping walls reminded James Fergusson, the nineteenthcentury dilettante who first subjected India’s architecture to systematic study, of an Egyptian pyramid; he much admired the structure’s solidity, and memorably dubbed it ‘an unrivalled model of a warrior’s tomb’. But unlike the great grey citadel whose gigantic rough-cut stones fit so pleasingly in place, the squatly domed tomb is built with dressed precision from a rusty sandstone banded with off-white marble, both of them streaked and blackened by countless monsoons. The whole composition sits in a dusty bowl, sometimes a bog, which was once an artificial lake. It is reached across a causeway of many arches where a portcullis would not go amiss. ‘Tughluq’s Tomb’ looks more like a place of detention than of repose.

Shaikh Nizam-ud-din Auliya, the Sufi saint and mystic after whom another bit of Delhi is named, must have rejoiced at the ghost of the first Tughluq sultan being committed to such secure confinement. Taking exception to what he saw as Ghiyas-ud-din’s laxity in matters of religious observance, he had famously laid upon Tughluqabad the curse which still holds good:Ya base Gujar, ya rahe ujar (‘Let it either belong to the Gujar [i.e. the herdsman], or let it remain in desolation’). He it was, too, who when warned to seek safety as the sultan drew near to the city at the end of a long campaign, still more famously gave the cryptic response ‘Delhi is yet far off.’ This proved to be an accurate forecast: the sultan never did reach Delhi. To Shaikh Nizam-ud-din’s followers his premonition was proof of his exceptional powers. But such was the animosity between saint and sultan that more suspicious minds saw the prophecy as evidence of complicity. It all depended on whether the sultan’s arrival was forestalled by accident or by design; and on this historians are still bitterly divided.

In 1320, emerging victorious from the five-year power struggle that followed Ala-ud-din Khalji’s death, Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq had skilfully combined the conciliation of rivals with the usual generosity towards supporters and kin. Prominent amongst the latter was his eldest son and designated heir, the future Muhammad bin Tughluq, who was despatched to the Deccan to deal with the ever-rebellious Kakatiya king, Pratapa-rudra of Warangal. Successful at his second attempt in taking Warangal, Muhammad had been recalled to Delhi in 1323 to act as viceroy while Ghiyas-ud-din himself ventured east. Affairs in Bengal had unexpectedly offered an opportunity for reasserting the sultanate’s authority there, while recalcitrant Hindus in the Tirhut district of northern Bihar also required attention. Both these situations were addressed with remarkably little bloodshed during the course of 1324–5. It was only when nearing Delhi at the end of this highly successful campaign that Sultan Ghiyas-ud-din ran into trouble.

To prepare for his ceremonial entry into his new citadel of Tughluqabad, he had ordered his son Muhammad to construct a timbered pavilion by way of temporary accommodation at a place called Afghanpur, which was evidently nearby on the banks of the Jamuna. This was done, and there father and son were duly reunited. Barani says simply that they dined together and that when Muhammad and other notables had retired to wash their hands at the end of the meal ‘a thunderbolt from the sky descended upon the earth, and the roof under which the sultan was seated fell down, crushing him and five or six other persons so that they died.’1 It seems to have been July, a season of storms, and the pavilion was no doubt a conspicuous lightning conductor. But Barani is not usually so economical on affairs of magnitude. Perhaps, not having witnessed the disaster, he simply gave the official version; or perhaps the memory of those who stood by that version was not something he chose to ignore.

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Muslim Conquest to Mughal Empire: The Dynasties of the Delhi Sultanate

A very different account, though, was given by other writers, including Ibn Batuta, a distinguished Muslim scholar from Morocco whose twenty-eight years of adventure in three continents would make him not just ‘the traveller of the age’ but of most subsequent ages. Ibn Batuta began his long sojourn in India eight years after the Afghanpur tragedy, but his Travels would not be written until he was back in the safety of his native Fez, where neither fear nor favour can possibly have influenced him. Moreover, his version of the affair came from one who was actually present, in fact from another distinguished Delhi Sufi. Like Nizam-ud-din Auliya, this man had no love for the Tughluqs and may therefore have been happy to discredit them. On the other hand he offered a much more plausible account, insisting that the Afghanpur pavilion was meant to fall down, that Muhammad ordered up the ground-stamping elephants to make sure that it did fall down, that its collapse was carefully timed for the hour of prayer when the rest of the company would have moved outside, and that by design the shovels and pickaxes required to sift the rubble in the search for survivors did not arrive until too late. Additionally he thought it was no coincidence that amongst the other casualties was Mahmud, another of the sultan’s sons and in fact his favourite.

None of this would normally trouble historians. After all, premature death was an occupational hazard for any contemporary ruler and parricide a fairly common cause; even when a ruler died in his bed, poison was invariably suspected. The debate over Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq’s untimely demise still rumbles on solely because of the light it supposedly throws on the character of the man who now automatically succeeded to the throne.

This was Muhammad bin Tughluq, the most complex and controversial figure ever to rule India. ‘Muhammad Khuni’ he is sometimes called, ‘Muhammad the Bloody’, Delhi’s own Nero, India’s Ivan the Terrible, the most autocratic, coldblooded, power-crazed, and catastrophic of sultans who was yet also the most able, cultivated, philanthropic and even endearing. ‘Was he a genius or a lunatic? An idealist or a visionary? A blood-thirsty tyrant or a benevolent king? A heretic or a devout Muslim?’2 India’s historians being divided by religious as well as ideological allegiances, he remains an enigma. Those of Hindu sympathies find Muhammad’s excesses impossible to forgive and tend to accept Ibn Batuta’s version of his accession. Those of Islamic sympathies favour the Barani version and regard Muhammad as an ill-starred and misunderstood philosopher-king whose gravest error was to antagonise and controvert the Muslim religioacademic establishment, or ulema.

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The Delhi Sultanates (3) The Tughluq Dynasty 1320-1413

To this influential class Ibn Batuta belonged. Muhammad would appoint him chief justice of Delhi and then one of his ambassadors. In between, the sultan also disgraced him and gave him cause to fear for his life. Yet throughout, Ibn Batuta remained fascinated by his master’s personality, unable to decide between reverence and revulsion, seduced by the royal benevolence and appalled by the royal callousness. For Muhammad, he says, was pre-eminent for two things: ‘giving presents and shedding blood’.

At his gate there may always be seen some poor person becoming rich or some living one condemned to death. His generous and brave actions, and his cruel and violent deeds, have obtained notoriety amongst the people. In spite of this, he is the most humble of men, and the one who exhibits the greatest equity.3


For a tyrant Muhammad’s lifestyle was simple, his libido restrained. Unusually amongst the conscience-ridden sultans he neither succumbed to inebriants nor vigorously proscribed them. He was exceptionally well-educated and of formidable intelligence, outwitting advisers so easily that he soon dispensed with them. He composed verses of outstanding merit; he was an authority on both medicine and mathematics; his penmanship was the envy of Islam’s finest calligraphers; and as a patron of the arts he had no rival until the Great Mughals. ‘But his distinguishing characteristic,’ according to Ibn Batuta, ‘was … a liberality so marvellous that the like has never been reported of any predecessor.’

For this liberality, as for his excessive severity, there would be ample scope although, since the order of events during his reign is uncertain, it is not always easy to trace their logic. The sultan was a relentless campaigner and seems initially to have enjoyed some success in consolidating Muslim rule in areas, like the Deccan, which had previously merely accepted Delhi’s suzerainty. Arguably the sultanate more nearly approached the status of an Indian empire during the early years of his reign than it ever had under the Khaljis. This, however, only encouraged Muhammad to look further afield. A grandiose scheme to reverse Alexander the Great’s march by conquering all Khorasan (including Afghanistan, Iran and what is now Uzbekistan) plus Iraq had to be abandoned in the face of mounting costs. Barani says vast sums were spent on buying up support in these countries and that a cavalry of 370,000 was raised and then maintained for a whole year before the project was dropped.

Another scheme, supposedly designed to afford flanking support for the Khorasan venture, went ahead. This time, explains Barani, the object was to ‘bring under the dominion of Islam the mountain[s] which lie between the territories of Hind [India] and those of China’. An expedition of at least sixty thousand duly headed off into the western Himalayas. It probably got no further than the outer ranges in Kulu or Kumaon and was there heavily defeated by ‘Hindus who closed the passes and cut off its retreat’. ‘Only ten horsemen returned to Delhi to spread the news of its discomfiture.’4

Meanwhile revolts within India itself seem to have been more or less continuous but to have increased in both frequency and scale as Muhammad’s policies took disastrous effect. Suppressing dissent, whether amongst Muslims or Hindus, he regarded as one of the main tasks of any sultan. It demanded energy and involved considerable expense but, since preserving the integrity of the state was deemed the only way of preventing civil war, he embraced the challenge with stern impartiality plus that awesome sense of duty which characterised all his actions. Justice demanded that rebels must die, and the more disagreeable their death the greater its deterrent effect. One of the first malcontents to fall into his hands was flayed alive; his skin was then stuffed and put on exhibition while its contents were minced, cooked with rice, and served up to the deceased’s family. ‘This revolting cruelty gave a foretaste,’ says one of Muhammad’s sterner critics, ‘of the barbarous, if not fiendish, spirit which characterised the sultan, and it was not long before he displayed it on a massive scale.’5 Muslims suffered quite as much as Hindus, innocent participants as much as guilty instigators. The sultan made no exceptions. Increasingly, though, he saw dissent less as a political challenge and more as a personal affront. A note of puzzlement is detectable in his dialogues with Barani. He dismissed the notion that the severity of his actions might actually engender disaffection, yet was genuinely wounded by what he took to be the obstinacy and ingratitude of so many of the beneficiaries of his rule.

As with Ala-ud-din, the high level of military spending also necessitated draconian fiscal measures. Additional taxes on the cultivators of the Ganga- Jamuna Doab are said to have driven the rich into rebellion and the poor into the jungles. Ferocious reprisals only made matters worse. The land went uncultivated and, when the rains failed, a catastrophic famine beset the whole of upper India, including Delhi. ‘It continued for some years, and thousands upon thousands of people perished of want.’6

Following Barani, Muhammad’s critics place the blame squarely on the sultan. Others see his additional taxes as negligible and certainly no worse than Ala-ud-din’s exactions. The famine they attribute to drought; and the sultan’s efforts to alleviate it become the most notable aspect of the disaster. Both Barani and Ibn Batuta acknowledge the depth of royal concern and note the measures taken to relieve distress by distributing existing grain stocks and arranging imports from further afield. Subsequently vast sums were disbursed to agents who undertook to bring wasteland into cultivation in an attempt to pre-empt future famines. This admirable initiative failed utterly. As Muhammad’s reign degenerated into chaos, the agents simply pocketed the cash advances. His successor would be obliged to write them off.

Like Ala-ud-din, Muhammad bin Tughluq was attracted by more radical economic solutions. He did not resurrect the idea of managing the market, but instead conceived the yet more innovative expedient of bypassing the currency. The problem seems to have arisen not from the treasury’s depletion but from a shortage of silver. Gold, thanks to hoards like those from the ‘Aladdin’s cave’ in the south, was plentiful; but when it was released into circulation it strained the fixed monetary ratio between gold and silver. With a coinage that was ‘more efficiently controlled than any Middle Eastern or European currency of the period’,7 the sultan was obliged to introduce gold coins of new weights plus heavily adulterated silver ones. Apparently influenced by reports of China’s paper currency, he further introduced a token coinage of brass and copper to augment the silver coinage. ‘The scheme was on the whole quite good and statesmanlike.’8 It might even have worked had he been able to regulate the supply of these tokens and had the sultanate been reckoned credit-worthy. In the event the sultan’s excesses, rather than the state of his treasury, undermined confidence, while smiths and metalworkers found the new coins absurdly easy to forge. Within two years the sultan was obliged to withdraw the lot, buying back both the real and the counterfeit at great expense until mountains of coins had accumulated within the walls of Tughluqabad.

This disastrous experiment seems to have been undertaken in the early years of his reign and to have been quickly followed by another: the removal of the capital from Delhi. In its stead Muhammad decreed that Devagiri, the city in Maharashtra from whose fang-like fortress the Seuna king Rama-chandra had so dismally failed to defy Ala-ud-din, should henceforth be the hub of his realm. He knew the place well from having made it his headquarters while fighting against the Kakatiya king of Warangal during his father’s reign. Now renamed Daulatabad, it was well sited for controlling the rich but troublesome provinces of Gujarat and Malwa and for making the sultanate’s rule more effective in the peninsular kingdoms which had been overrun, but far from pacified, by Ala-uddin, Malik Kafur and others.

But Devagiri/Daulatabad was all of fourteen hundred kilometres from Delhi, whose pampered citizens were disinclined to desert what Ibn Batuta judged ‘one of the greatest cities in the universe’. They evinced no gratitude for the generous compensation given for their Delhi properties, nor for the elaborate arrangements made for their journey, nor for the comfortable reception being organised for them in Daulatabad. Once again the sultan was obliged to resort to force.

As well as sound strategic reasons for relocating his capital – like Daulatabad’s greater security from Mongol attack – Ibn Batuta suggests that Muhammad had other reasons for evacuating Delhi. Its vulnerability to famine might have been one of them, but there was also a personal motive. In dealing severely even with Muslim miscreants, in refusing to heed the advice of established counsellors, and in promoting newcomers and Indian Muslims of low-caste origin, Muhammad had already alienated the city’s Islamic intellectual elite of Turks, Persians and Afghans. A stream of anonymous poison-pen letters now confirmed his suspicions of the ulema, whose hostility may also account for the adverse criticism of chroniclers like Barani. Removal from Delhi was a convenient way of disrupting this opposition and, when the move was resisted, of punishing it.

Tales of the city being demolished and burnt, of a nonagenarian being turfed out of his deathbed, of a blind man being ordered onto the road tied to a horse’s tail (‘only one of his legs reached Daulatabad’9), and of a cripple being fired south by manjanik (catapult), sound like exaggerations. So may be the ‘many who perished on the road’. But that Delhi was indeed deserted is attested by all. It may have been speedily repopulated. Ibn Batuta writes of other provinces being ordered to send people to reoccupy it. Moreover the whole scheme was soon abandoned, so that many of those who had reached Daulatabad, or were strung out along the road, were soon trailing back. Certainly Delhi had made something of a recovery by 1333 when Ibn Batuta first saw it. He found it magnificently appointed, although still somewhat thinly inhabited for a city of its size. Despite this renaissance, the disruption would not easily be forgotten, let alone forgiven. With his second monumental miscalculation, Muhammad had forfeited the trust of even loyal supporters. The swell of disaffection now exhibited itself in a crescendo of often simultaneous revolts.

Despite this overwhelming evidence of his unpopularity Muhammad remained on the throne until 1351, a reign of twenty-six years. Bengal had been virtually written off; the rajput princes of Rajasthan were reasserting their autonomy; in both Andhra and the Tamil country Muslim commanders established independent dynasties. Elsewhere lesser officers, mostly of Mongol and Afghan origin, repeatedly mutinied; Malwa and Gujarat heaved with dissent; the southern Deccan was experiencing a Hindu revival; something similar was underway in coastal Andhra; Sind revolted; civil war continued to flare up in the Ganga-Jamuna Doab – in all, Barani lists some twenty-two major rebellions. If in the early years of his reign Muhammad had won the sultanate’s best chance of an Indian empire, in the latter years he lost it irrevocably.


Yet in Delhi his authority seems never to have been seriously challenged, and of the plots which dogged the reigns of other sultans little is heard. Far from incompetent, let alone insane, Muhammad bin Tughluq deserves credit less for his long-remembered experiments and more for his unquestioned ascendancy during a period of appalling turmoil, not all of it of his own making. An able commander who was rarely worsted in the field, and an effective administrator whose minor reforms and directives had genuine merit, he was also comparatively free of religious and ethnic bigotry. Perhaps he more than any of the sultans glimpsed the potential of an Indo– Islamic accommodation. Even his draconian severity seems to have had its desired effect. He died while pursuing rebels into the wastes of Sind. Although poison would later be suspected, from the contemporary accounts it seems certain that his labours were indeed crowned with that rare royal accolade of a natural death.

No less remarkable was the comparatively smooth succession which followed. Although a child, said to be his son, was briefly promoted as his successor, it was generally agreed that Muhammad bin Tughluq had no sons. The impostor was quickly retired to the nursery and Feroz Shah, Muhammad’s cousin and designated heir, quietly succeeded. Already into his forties, Feroz yet managed to occupy the throne for thirty-seven years (1351–88). No less quietly, and with all the caution of advancing years, he endeavoured to preserve and pacify what remained of the sultanate’s authority, proving to be a conservative in matters of religion and a consolidator in affairs of state. Although he received an exceptionally favourable press thanks to his deference to the ulema, even his eulogists fail to disguise the fact that he made no attempt to re-establish the sultanate’s authority in the Deccan or the south, that two expeditions into Bengal were largely fruitless, and a six-year campaign in Gujarat and Sind nearly disastrous.

Only his leisurely excursion into Orissa in 1361, supposedly in search of elephants, can be claimed a success. Hitherto largely ignored, what Feroz’s chronicler calls this ‘happy and prosperous country’10 received a rude awakening as the temple-building Ganga dynasty was routed and the great shrine of Lord Jagannath at Puri desecrated. Infidels received no favours from the orthodox Feroz, and there may be truth in the massacres allegedly inflicted on the local population. Yet in the end the country, now less happy, less prosperous, and less seventy-three elephants, was duly returned to its Hindu rulers. They, like others, soon neglected any tributary obligations to the Delhi invader.

Military manoeuvres apart, Feroz’s record bears gentle scrutiny. He forswore the cruel excesses of his predecessor, showed a genuine regard for the welfare of his people and won wide support. Land revenue in those areas still administered by the sultanate was set at what seems to have been an equable rate and the jizya tax was extended to all non-Muslims, including the hitherto-exempt brahmans. Budgetary strains were further eased by abolishing the cash payment of the military and reverting to the system of remuneration by revenue grants. Since these grants often became hereditary, instant popularity was being bought at the price of eventual disarray. Large numbers of slaves, on the other hand, most of whom were Hindu captives, were rescued from penury and either enrolled as bodyguards or given productive work in the cities’ kharkhanas (workshops). Thirty-six of these establishments, some with a workforce of thousands, were maintained by Feroz, mainly to supply the court with high-quality weapons, gems, robes and perfumes and to serve the sultan’s ambitious building programmes.

Under the city-based dispensation of Islam, the buildings inevitably included another new Delhi. Erected several kilometres to the north of Tughluqabad, Feroz Shah’s city and kotla (citadel) has long since been engulfed by more recent Delhis; below its ramparts, where once refreshingly flowed the Jamuna, heavy traffic now eddies in a sluggish fog of exhaust. Yet on its skyline there still protrudes one of the two Ashoka pillars which on Feroz’s orders were so laboriously shipped downriver. Curious about their inscriptions, Feroz asked local brahmans for a translation; they expressed themselves mystified.

The sultan’s tomb, ‘an austere, plain block of grey sandstone’,11 stands in the urban oasis of Hauz Khas where, beside a reservoir built by Ala-ud-din Khalji, Feroz constructed gardens and one of many important madrasseh (colleges). Further afield he won acclaim for undertaking the first major irrigation projects with the construction of canals from both the Jamuna and the Sutlej. He also founded provincial cities, many of them called Ferozabad, including that which he later changed to Jaunpur. Jauna was the birth name of Muhammad bin Tughluq; Feroz, at least, continued to hold his predecessor in high regard.

Jaunpur, and the Awadh region of eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar which it commanded, was conferred on Malik Sowar, a eunuch-slave redeemed by Feroz and who, proving exceptionally able, was given the title of Sultan-ush Sharq. Taking advantage of the chaos which followed Feroz’s death, it was this man who founded the Sharqi kingdom of Jaunpur and whose successors – necessarily adopted and apparently of African origin – would soon defy and briefly eclipse the Delhi sultanate in the Gangetic plain.

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Delhi -- Old and New

Numerous other powers would wax brightly as the later Tughluqs presided over the contraction of the Delhi sultanate. In 1388 Feroz’s long-awaited demise produced another long and bloody succession crisis which overturned Delhi’s remaining authority. Ten years later, in 1398, the city itself was overturned when Mongol forces under Timur the Lame (Tamberlane), fresh from the conquests of Persia and Baghdad and now firm adherents of Islam, crossed the Jamuna just below Feroz’s kotla.

With little difficulty the Mongols defeated the incumbent sultan and then for three days indulged in an orgy of rapine and killing. According to Timur’s personal record, the gold, silver, jewels and precious brocades defied accounting. Exclusively Muslim quarters of the city were spared; everywhere else was sacked, and the entire Hindu population was either massacred or enslaved. ‘Although I was desirous of sparing them,’ wrote Timur in his unconvincing memoir, ‘I could not succeed, for it was the will of God that this calamity should befall the city.’12
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Re: India A History, by John Keay

Postby admin » Mon Dec 16, 2024 12:31 am

Part 2 of 2

KAFTAN AND LOINCLOTH

It was not the end of the sultanate or of Delhi. Timur soon withdrew; the Tughluq sultan duly returned to his devastated capital; and two subsequent dynasties, the Saiyyids from 1414 and the Lodis from 1451, both Afghan in origin, continued to rule amidst the ruins throughout the fifteenth century. But under the Saiyyids an authority which had once embraced most of the subcontinent was so reduced that it barely extended beyond the village of Palam, the site Delhi’s first international airport. The Lodis scarcely restored that authority, although they did restore some respectability by overcoming Jaunpur and overhauling the administration. Powerless to control erstwhile provinces and frequently under threat of invasion from them, Delhi was now just one of many, often more innovative and illustrious, power centres. If in pre-Islamic times the division of the subcontinent into strong independent states based on ancient identities of lineage, language, dynastic tradition and economic interest was the norm, then India was simply reverting to type.

Despite two centuries of dominance in most of northern and western India, the sultanate had failed to establish a pan-Indian supremacy, and had not even attempted an Indo–Islamic accommodation. True, in the cities the Hindu population had come to terms with their Muslim overlords: some enterprises, like the royal mints, remained exclusively in Hindu hands; many Muslims took Hindu wives; Indian captives often converted to Islam; and some converts had achieved high office. Yet in Delhi, as in the sultanate’s provincial capitals, the court remained largely a preserve of the Turkish, Persian and Afghan elites. The same was true of membership of the ulema, of senior posts in the administration, and of much of the military. Ethnic as much as religious exclusivity made the Delhi regime totally alien to most of India’s peoples.

Arriving at Multan, then the frontier city of Muhammad bin Tughluq’s kingdom, in 1333, Ibn Batuta had observed how other new arrivals from west and central Asia all sought recruitment into the sultan’s service. Most were mounted and, as sowars (troopers), they had to perform some equestrian manoeuvres before being enrolled in the armed forces. Others sought royal patronage as artisans, scholars, merchants or administrators. Very few looked beyond such patronage. Most trade, most industry and all financial services remained in Hindu hands. But as the English ‘nabobs’ of the eighteenth century would discover, this could be mutually advantageous. Ibn Batuta noted how Hindu banking houses in Multan grew wealthy by advancing to penniless hopefuls from central Asia such gifts as were suitable for presentation to the sultan –horses, slaves, brocades, jewels. The sultan invariably returned a far more valuable present from which the newcomer could repay with interest the Delhi agents of his Multani backer. It was official policy to encourage a stream of immigration; and such were the opportunities offered by India and such the turmoil elsewhere in Asia that the flood of adventurers from all over the Islamic world rarely dried up.

Ibn Batuta found that in Delhi most newcomers expected ‘to gain riches and then return to their countries’13 – again just like the eighteenth-century English ‘nabobs’. As Delhi’s authority declined, aggressive new sultanates on India’s Islamic frontier in Bengal, Gujarat, Malwa and the Deccan boosted the market for military personnel and offered even better prospects for plunder, promotion and remunerative revenue assignments. In fact these independent sultanates had by the fifteenth century become the real lands of opportunity. Scholars, jurists and artisans gravitated towards the more generous patronage on offer. Merchants readily took to supplying and servicing the lucrative Arabian Sea trade from the peninsula’s west coast ports. It was by way of sailings from the Red Sea that Gujarat acquired a large community of African Muslims. Meanwhile the influx of Persians and Afghans into the Deccan would give to the Bahmanid sultanate and its successors a strongly Persian and Shi’ite flavour. This would survive into the twentieth century in the case of Hyderabad, one of these successor states.

If, as Ibn Batuta says of Delhi in the fourteenth century, many Muslim fortune-seekers looked forward to a rich retirement in their original homelands, of elsewhere in the fifteenth century this seems not to have been the case. Most stayed, prospered, married and settled. With the substantial addition of Mongol recruits and Indian converts, the Muslim community was not only growing but constantly renewing itself; as with horses so with men – a steady stream of central Asian imports was seemingly vital to the virility of Muslim rule.

The Muslim elite demanded of India’s idolatrous natives no more than occasional collaboration and no less than total submission. Islamic jurists argued not over whether Hindus should be obliged to pay the jizya (the tax on non- Muslims), but whether they should be allowed to pay it. Death was the only penalty prescribed for idolaters by most Islamic schools of law; only the daringly indulgent adherents of the Hanafi school argued that the jizya was an acceptable alternative. Otherwise Hindus, although occasionally serviceable and often diverting, were beneath contempt. Like the white sahibs of European colonialism, the true believers of the sultanate saw India simply as a source of wealth, a scene of adventure, and a subject for moral indignation spiked with prurient fantasy. They too, indeed, were colonialists. Compromise with the natives was as unthinkable as it was preposterous.

For the tag of ‘the greatest medieval traveller’ Ibn Batuta’s only rival was Marco Polo. Arriving at India’s opposite extremity when he called at one of the Tamil ports en route from China in c1290, Marco Polo tells of trying to have a coat made. To his surprise he found that in peninsular India there were no tailors or seamstresses. In fact there was very little clothing at all, and what there was was neither cut nor sewn. A single length of cloth was simply tied or wrapped about the person, a custom which still survives in the wearing of the sari, the shawl, the lunghi and the dhoti. Bespoke apparel may not have been a Muslim innovation, but it came late and from the colder north. Indeed, in many parts of India tailoring remains a Muslim preserve.

Sailing on to Quilon in Kerala, a port which Ibn Batuta likened to Alexandria as one of the busiest in the world, Polo noted how Hindu kings were as scantily dressed as their poorest subjects; even soldiers, when riding into battle, wore next to nothing. ‘Men and women, they are all black, and go naked, all save a fine cloth worn about the middle.’ Even to one coming from the East, so many bared chests and unbodiced breasts were a novelty. Like the international set who in the 1930s would be so charmed by the topless fashions still prevailing in Bali, the last outpost of Hindu society in south-east Asia, Marco Polo drew his own questionable conclusion: ‘They look not on any sin of the flesh as a sin.’14

That Hindu society continued to challenge the austere morality of both Islam and Christendom well into the fifteenth century is clear from the account of a Russian merchant. Athanasius Nikitin, a native of Tver (Kalinin) on the Volga, reached India in c1470, so barely thirty years ahead of Vasco da Gama. He too arrived by sea, but from the Persian Gulf rather than round Africa, and like other Gulf traders he brought horses. According to Polo, the Pandyan ruler of Madurai imported two thousand horses a year ‘and so do his four brothers’. They needed so many because of fatalities caused by the climate and unsuitable feeding; even if they bred, they produced ‘nothing but wretched wry-legged weeds’. By land to the north and by sea to the south, the import of bloodstock was India’s main extravagance.

Nikitin came ashore at the port of Chaul, about fifty kilometres south of modern Bombay (Mumbai). ‘This is an Indian country,’ he announces in his scatty but endearing memoir.

People go about naked, with their heads uncovered and their breasts bare, the hair tressed into one tail, and thick bellies. They bring forth children every year and the children are many … When I go out many people follow me and stare at the white man. Women who know you willingly concede their favours for they like white men.15


Abdu-r Razzak, another fifteenth-century visitor to the Deccan, noted that only Muslims wore trousers and kaftans (long coats). Heading an embassy from Shah Rukh of Samarkand, who was Timur’s son and successor, Abdu-r Razzak found royal audiences in India a severe trial. The Zamorin of Calicut, another major port in Kerala, or the king of Vijayanagar would be coolly seated wearing little but pearls and a dazzling ensemble of gold jewellery while he, ‘in consequence of the heat and the great number of robes in which he was dressed, drowned in perspiration’.16 Whether admiring the intricate sculpture of the great Hoysala temple at Belur or ogling the courtesans of Vijayanagar, ambassador Razzak showed unusually catholic tastes. Such descriptions, though, merely point up the chasm of convention which separated Muslim and Hindu.

It was not just a question of ethnic or doctrinal differences. Two diametrically opposed codes of social behaviour had collided: one universal, inflexible, authoritarian and obligatory which upheld the equality of individual believers and theoretically promoted a strong sense of community; the other Indiaspecific, sectional, discriminatory and hierarchical which denied equality and revelled in diversity. The social and cultural differences were as fundamental as they were obvious. To the Hindu the stiff brocade kaftan and the ankle-tight trouser must have seemed like some kind of confinement; to the Muslim the cotton loincloth – as finely woven, according to Polo, ‘as a spider’s web’ – was disgustingly indecent. The veil and the zenana concealed Islam’s womenfolk; the copious jewellery and the waist-level lunghi merely advertised Hindu femininity.

When that grim ‘warrior tomb’ of the Tughluqs was under construction below the ramparts of Tughluqabad in Delhi, a thousand kilometres away on the shore of the Bay of Bengal at Konarak the Ganga kings of Orissa had just completed one of the most elaborate and ambitious temples ever conceived. Dedicated to the sun-god Surya, it incorporated the idea, also associated with Apollo, of the sun being drawn by a chariot. Colossal stone wheels, each intricately carved, were positioned along its flanks and a team of massive draught horses, also stone-cut, reared seawards, apparently scuffing and snorting under the strain. Even in its partially reconstructed state, the conceptual scale of this temple is overwhelming, and so too the rich variety of its sculptural ornamentation which, as usual, includes many mithuna (intertwined couples) busy making ingenious love. To Muslims, for whom any representational art is anathema, it would have been the abomination of abominations. But then to Hindus the plain profile of the Tughluq tomb with its sloping sides and martial pretensions must have seemed pathetically primitive. Their aesthetics appeared irreconcilable. Mutual incomprehension seemingly precluded accommodation, let alone acculturation.

Nonetheless a gradual acceptance, which would eventually lead to a glorious synthesis, was underway. The process was not articulated. Muslim writers continued to tell of idolaters massacred and temples destroyed, Hindu eulogists of mleccha enemies humbled and arya heroes exalted. The evidence is often inferential, fragmentary and widely scattered. It is to be sought less amongst the literate elites – the largely foreign ulema and the staunchly orthodox brahmans – and more amongst artisans, cultivators and the commercial and secretarial classes, be they Indian Muslims or lesser-caste Hindus. At this level, wherever Hindu and Muslim lived and worked in close professional proximity, social exchange is evident. Hindus adopted a modified version of the Muslim purdah (‘curtain’, i.e. the veil) to screen their women; Muslims adopted something approaching Hindu caste distinctions. Elements of ritual and popular devotion were also shared. Muslim shaikhs and pirs (Sufi saints) attracted Hindu followers; Hindu ascetics, dancers, musicians and craftsmen attracted Muslim patronage. In the arts and particularly architecture the results would soon be apparent.

But here again the evidence is diffuse and to be found not so much amongst the ruins of Delhi and in the chronicles of its sultans as in the records and remains of a dozen other capitals scattered across the subcontinent. From these places – Jaunpur, Ahmadabad, Mandu, Gulbarga, Chitor, Vijayanagar, Gaur – ruled the numerous sultans and kings who had succeeded in asserting their authority over particular regions – Awadh, Bengal, Gujarat, Malwa, the Deccan, Rajasthan, etc. – in the aftermath of the Tughluq decline and Timur’s invasion.

The regions themselves encouraged a social consolidation which transcended religious allegiance. Based on core territories, each with a long dynastic pedigree, an economically important hinterland and a now distinct language, they were ready-made for statehood, whether under Muslim rule or Hindu. Location and circumstance also conspired to favour local integration. Here Muslim rulers, mostly far removed from the Islamic world, often at war with the sultan of Delhi or other co-religionists, and always dependent on the loyalty of a largely non-Muslim population, had perforce to compromise. Likewise their Hindu counterparts, isolated on the margins of an increasingly Islamic India, yet obliged to co-operate with Muslim allies, and eager to recruit Muslim troops, could ill afford to indulge ideas of a dharma-led defiance or a Hindu renaissance.

STILLBORN STATES

The number of states which emerged from the collapse of the Delhi sultanate, not to mention the complexity of their mutual relations, could warrant a long narrational stride onto the terra firma of Mughal India. But it would be wrong to diminish the political importance of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. In Europe the period witnessed the emergence of those strong, centralised and mostly monarchical states which would become the basic units of European history. Something very similar appeared to be underway in India: Bengal, Gujarat, Kashmir, Orissa, the south and various parts of central India began to forge the territorial, political and cultural identities associated with the concept of a nation-state. But whereas not even the most committed European federationist would dismiss Scotland or the Netherlands, let alone France or Spain, as ‘regional’ aberrations, such has been India’s subsequent experience of subcontinental hegemonies, and such today is Delhi’s and Islamabad’s paranoia about secessionist movements, that ‘regions’ is how these entities are designated. The recollection of their independent status is not much promoted. The nationstate in pre-colonial India would indeed be stillborn; yet the fact of its being born at all is significant.

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The Stillborn States: India in the 15th Century

In the Deccan the Bahmanid kingdom and, further south, that of Vijayanagar, both emerged from the remains of the Khalji conquests in the peninsula. Vijayanagar was founded in the late 1330s, the Bahmanid kingdom about ten years later. The kings of Vijayanagar were Hindus and are often credited with spearheading Hindu resistance to the Islamisation of the peninsula. The Bahmanids, on the other hand, were Muslim sultans and their frequent wars with Vijayanagar are commonly seen as a continuation of the Islamising process begun by the Delhi sultanate. This, however, is certainly not the full story, and it may be no more than a gloss imparted by zealous writers, mostly of a later date.

Suspicions are aroused by legends which credit both states with highly ambiguous origins. The future founders of Vijayanagar, two brothers called Harihara and Bukka, were once feudatories of either the Hoysala king or the Kakatiya. In c1327 these brothers were supposedly captured by Muslim forces and taken to Delhi. There, legend has it, they adopted Islam before being allowed to return south as feudatories of Muhammad bin Tughluq. Only later, when a Hindu sage of high repute miraculously recognised them as embodiments of the god Virupaksha, was the sin of their apostasy cancelled and their right to erect a kingdom founded on dharma accepted. Whether this is true or not, the status of Vijayanagar’s founders was obviously such that only elaborate mythologising and divine intervention could validate it.

Likewise, according to Ferishta, the Bahmanid sultans of the Deccan sprang from an unlikely alliance in Delhi. Hasan, who as Bahman Shah would become the first Bahmanid sultan, was once apparently the servant of a Delhi brahman called Gungu. By chance, while ploughing his patch of land, Hasan unearthed a cache of gold coins whereupon Gungu, in his capacity as an astrologer, predicted a great future for him. He also made him promise not to forget his one-time master. Encouraged by such predictions and by his evident good fortune, Hasan headed for the land of opportunity in the Deccan. There he rose rapidly in the service of Muhammad bin Tughluq; and when, at the end of the latter’s reign, both Gujarat and the Deccan defied Delhi’s authority, Hasan emerged from the subsequent confusion as the choice of his fellow commanders to assume the sultanate of the breakaway Deccani kingdom. Enthroned at Daulatabad, and now known as Bahman Shah, he remembered his promise to his brahman patron and duly summoned Gungu south to become finance minster of the new kingdom.

To be fair, Ferishta seems painfully aware of the implausibility of this story. It is thought that Hasan was of Afghan birth, and it seems most unlikely that a Muslim Afghan would ever have served a brahman. Ferishta was also surely wrong in suggesting that ‘Gungu was the first brahman who accepted office in the service of a Muhammadan prince.’17 Yet he adds that, in honour of the brahman, Hasan adopted the name Gungu as one of his titles, and that it was then used ‘on all public documents and remained engraven on the royal seal of that dynasty until its extinction’. He further claims that the name ‘Bahman’ was of similar provenance, being an approximate rendering of ‘brahman’. Others insist that the name derived from the ancient Persian King Bahman from whom the Bahmanids pretended descent. Howsoever, the willingness of a distinguished Muslim historian, who was writing within a century of the Bahmanids’ demise, to credit such accounts is significant. In the eyes of the Delhi ulema the orthodoxy of the house of Hasan, alias Gungu Bahman Shah, was clearly compromised.

Ferishta’s account of the Bahmanids is initially one of almost continuous conflict with their Hindu neighbours, most notably various rulers in what is now Andhra Pradesh plus the kings of Vijayanagar. Major wars with Vijayanagar’s Bukka, who succeeded his brother Harihara, and then with Bukka’s successors, Harihara II and Deva Raya I and II, are seen as triumphs for the Bahmanid sultans who repeatedly threatened the city of Vijayanagar itself. They also carried off hoards of treasure and massacred wholly incredible numbers of idolaters; as a noted authority on the Bahmanids has calculated, ‘if we were to add together the casualties inflicted on the Hindus by the Muslims as given by our Indo-Persian chronicles, there would not have been a Hindu left alive in the Deccan.’18 Rather fewer Muslim warriors ‘drank the sherbet of martyrdom’, as Ferishta puts it, but ‘without an influx from overseas it was the Muslims’, according to Professor Sherwani, ‘who were in danger of dying out.’ Mass conversions are not mentioned until the very end of Bahmanid rule, no doubt because Bahman Shah had rejected any idea of imposing the jizya on his Hindu subjects.

Significantly the great city of Vijayanagar (at Hampi in Karnataka), although repeatedly threatened, was never actually captured. No doubt its defences were as formidable as visitors reported and as its magnificent remains testify. Yet, according to Ferishta, it was in these wars of the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries that artillery was first deployed in India. The guns were operated by both Muslim and Christian mercenaries, the latter of whom also here make their Indian debut. Although this decidedly early instance of the new gunpowder technology might be attributed to peninsular India’s maritime links with the Middle East and the Mediterranean, the casting of cannon would have presented no difficulty to India’s highly skilled metalworkers.

If such firepower was indeed available, the destruction of Vijayanagar would have been possible. Annihilation, it seems, was not the object of the exercise. Nor, despite occasional mention of far-ranging ambitions, did either state entertain realistic expectations of bringing the other permanently under its sway. As with other warring neighbours of the period – Gujarat and Malwa, Malwa and the Bahmanids, Malwa and the rajputs of Chitor – victory invariably stopped short of conquest. Royal captives were released, defeated kings reinstated, and the victor’s spoils regarded more as a one-off indemnity than as an annual tribute.

Conflict amongst the ‘regional’ kingdoms of the fifteenth century looks to have been not about sovereignty, only partly about plunder, and mostly about frontier demarcation. At issue between the Bahmanids and Vijayanagar was a rich tract of land between the Kistna and Tunghabhadra rivers known as the Raichur Doab. To command this tract the Bahmanids, like the Rashtrakutas many centuries earlier, soon moved their capital from Daulatabad (near the Rashtrakutas’ Ellora) to Gulbarga and then Bidar (near the Rashtrakutas’ Manyakheta). It was the perfect base from which to create a tran-speninsular kingdom and, as the Bahmanids duly expanded their domains to reach the west coast between Bombay and Goa and then the east coast between the Godavari and Madras, the importance of holding the Raichur Doab became immense. As if in recognition of such purely strategic imperatives, Ferishta reports that, despite the injunctions of religion, the two protagonists agreed to end the mindless slaughter of non-combatants and captives. And when in the late 1440s the issue of the Raichur Doab was settled by agreement, direct hostilities between the two neighbours ceased. Conflicting claims to the west coast ports, including Goa, continued, but elsewhere the protagonists avoided attacking one another and on one occasion actually collaborated against a common foe.

Territorial definition is fundamental to the formulation of a nation-state. A similar but shorter conflict between the Bahmanids and their northern rivals of the new sultanate of Malwa also revolved around a disputed frontier tract. When it was settled, this time not to the Bahmanids’ advantage, the two neighbours resumed friendly relations. Parallel instances of the scimitar being readily sheathed once an outstanding territorial grievance had been resolved abound amongst the other powers of the period. When in the 1490s the Bahmanid kingdom suddenly plummeted from power as result of factional in-fighting, Vjayanagar would take advantage of the situation, and war over the status of the Raichur Doab would revive. But although Vijayanagar was left as much the most powerful of the Deccan states, it would soon find that a strong and territorially secure Muslim neighbour was infinitely preferable to the smaller, weaker but territorially ambitious sultanates into which the Bahmanid kingdom dissolved. The glorious heyday of Vijayanagar’s supremacy would prove to be short-lived.

Thanks to the Russian Nikitin, who spent some months in Bidar and Gulbarga in 1470, a dazzling picture of Bahmanid power at its greatest has been preserved. Nikitin’s military estimates, amounting to close on a million cavalry and infantry, must be wild guesswork but his first-hand evidence of both ‘long muskets’ and ‘heavy guns’ cannot be gainsaid. Nor can the almost unimaginable display of opulence. Sultan Shams-ud-din Muhammad, ‘a little man, twenty years old, and in the power of the Khorasani [i.e. Afghano-Persian] nobles’, rode forth to celebrate Bairam ‘on a golden saddle, wearing a habit embroidered with sapphires and on his pointed head-dress a large diamond; he also carried a suit of gold armour inlaid with sapphires and three swords mounted in gold’. Ahead of him walked a huge elephant dressed in silk and brandishing from its trunk a heavy chain with which it cleared a path through the crowds. Behind followed the sultan’s brother on a bed of gold, covered with velvet set with precious stones and carried by twenty men. Then came Mahmud Gawan, the able chief minister and mentor of successive sultans; he too reclined on a bed of solid gold which in this case was drawn by four horses in gilded harness. Hordes of riders in full armour followed, together with several hundred female singers and dancers. Some were practically naked but all were armed with shield and sabre, sword, lance or bow. Three hundred elephants ‘clad in damask steel armour’ completed the procession. Each elephant bore a ‘citadel’ which held six ‘warriors with guns’, and each had massive swords attached to its tusks plus ‘large iron weights hanging from its trunk’. In Nikitin’s mind there was no doubt that he was attending a potentate who, ranking above all others like a latter-day ‘Balhara’, was ‘the Muhammadan sultan of India’.19

SWINGING IN THE WIND

Such Bahmanid pre-eminence would not have been conceded by the sultans of Gujarat and Malwa. A latecomer compared with Vijayanagar or the Bahmanids, Gujarat became independent when its governor, the son of a rajput convert to Islam, assumed sovereignty after Timur’s invasion in the early years of the fifteenth century. At about the same time Malwa followed suit under its erstwhile governor Dilawar Khan Ghori. Dilawar Khan was presumably a Turco-Afghan Ghorid but he quickly signified a more conciliatory attitude to idolaters by encouraging rajput settlement and creating what was in effect a Muslim–rajput condominium. Gujarat’s sultans too, although more orthodox and credited with imposing the jizya and demolishing Hindu temples, habitually married rajput princesses, patronised Indian artists and Sanskrit scholars, and employed Hindus in the highest offices of state. Also prominent in both sultanates, and especially in their respective revenue departments, were Jains, whose survival in western India belied their near-extinction in the rest of the subcontinent.

Both Dilawar Khan of Malwa (or Amid Shah Daud, as he had become) and Ahmad Shah of Gujarat (who succeeded as sultan in 1411) signified their new status by establishing new capitals. Islam had provided a powerful stimulus to urbanisation. Muslims in India, as an elite minority largely dependent on royal patronage and united by the communal duties of prayer and mosque-attendance, were naturally drawn to city life. From Allahabad and Faizabad to Hyderabad and Aurangabad the map of India still betrays hundreds of Islamic urban foundations. In Gujarat Ahmad Shah’s choice fell on a site beside the Sabarmati river. There he founded and heavily fortified the city of Ahmadabad which, rapidly populated by Gujarat’s skilled craftsmen and commercially favoured by its location close to the Gulf of Cambay, had by the end of the sixteenth century become one of the largest and wealthiest cities in India, indeed in the world according to European visitors. It is still the capital of Gujarat, and in the midst of chaotic inner-city overcrowding there remain the many mosques, tombs and gateways of the Gujarati sultans and their usually rajput queens.

Were any proof needed of the eclectic Gujarati milieu, it is self-evident in the distinctive architectural style. Here elements and motifs from both Jain and Hindu tradition are incorporated not, as in the Delhi Quwwat-ul-Islam mosque, because dismembered temples were reassembled as mosques, but by gloriously intentional design. Gujarat’s strong tradition of temple-building, together with its skilled masons, simply transferred to the Islamic architectural canon and thereby transformed mihrab and minaret into splendidly ornate features. Clichés of the Mughal style like the perforated screen (jali) and the cupolaed pavilion (chattri) are anticipated. The Jami masjid of Ahmad Shah himself has been hailed as ‘perhaps the most aesthetically satisfying [mosque] in the whole of India.’20

Very different was the new capital of Malwa. As if to challenge the lushlysited and commercially-favoured city of Gujarat’s sultans, Dilawar Khan and his successors of Malwa lit upon the rugged heights of Mandu. From nearby Dhar, the one-time capital of the good King Bhoj, a prodigious effort was directed to encircling with fortifications the already nigh-impregnable heights above the Narmada valley. At the same time they smothered the upland meadows not merely with the mosques and tombs of Islam but also with the airy palaces, the echoing courtyards and the lotus lakes so beloved of the rajputs and later of the Mughals. If one may judge by what neglect has so obligingly preserved, it was here at Mandu, and in the contemporary Man Singh palace at Gwalior, that India’s secular architecture began to stake its claim as a serious rival to the religious tradition of temple, tomb and mosque.

No metropolis has succeeded to the site of Mandu. Deserted in the seventeenth century, it has remained so ever since, one of India’s – or anywhere’s – most wildly romantic sites. Malwa being landlocked with no very certain frontiers and a host of covetous neighbours, its sultans had frequent cause to congratulate themselves on the effort expended on their capital. Although repeatedly besieged by the Gujarati army and occasionally by expeditions from the Bahmanid sultanate and the rajputs of Mewar, Mandu stood firm throughout the fifteenth century. Under Sultan Mahmud Khalji (reigned 1431–69) Malwa took the offensive, with its forces penetrating deep into Gujarat, the Deccan and Rajasthan and briefly marching on Delhi. Mandu consequently basked in the splendours of lavish patronage. According to Ferishta, Mahmud’s successor was able to assemble a harem of ten thousand maidens. To accommodate them, a self-contained ‘city of women’ was constituted whose inmates formed their own administration and militia, ran their own markets and set up their own manufactures.

What became of this feminist republic is not known. But in the early sixteenth century the Muslim–rajput balance on which the foundations of the Malwa state rested was overthrown. To offset the preponderance achieved by the rajputs, the incumbent sultan called in the forces of Gujarat, while the rajputs looked to their co-religionists in Mewar. In 1518 and then again in 1531 the Gujarati army would indeed take Mandu by storm, and its fall would presage that of the sultanate itself.

But if Malwa proved to be something of a failure in state-formation, Gujarat continued from strength to strength. In Mahmud Shah it enjoyed the services of an exceptionally able and long-reigning sultan (1459–1511) who completed the consolidation of the kingdom. Mercifully, given the innumerable other Mahmuds and Muhammads, he is usually remembered as Mahmud ‘Begarha’, a nickname which is variously explained. It may refer to his whiskers: according to European accounts his beard reached to below his waist, while his moustaches, long and grey like the horns of a buffalo (begara), were swept back to cross in a tie on the crown of his head. Alternatively it may refer to his capture of two vital fortresses (garh). One was Champaner near Baroda in eastern Gujarat, which became a subsidiary capital; the other was Girnar in Saurashtra, the great massif where Ashoka had left that famous rock inscription and where Rudradaman the satrap had once championed both irrigation and Sanskrit. ‘Mahmud Two-Forts’ in effect united mainland Gujarat with the Saurashtra peninsula to create a powerful maritime state enjoying a monopoly of those west coast ports which served upper India. It would prosper well into the seventeenth century and be finally overwhelmed only by a combination of Mughal might on land and Portuguese firepower at sea.

In the absence of obvious frontiers, fortifications were also the key to territorial aggrandisement in Rajasthan. The great plateau of Chitor, Mewar’s equivalent of the heights of Mandu, had been refortified by the Sesodia rajputs following its partial destruction by Ala-ud-din Khalji. Under Rana, or Maharana (variants of Raja and Maharaja) Kumbha, who reigned from 1433 to 1468, another towering stronghold was ringed with battlemented walls at Kumbhalgarh. From these twin eyries the Sesodias extended their sway over the lesser rajput houses of Rajasthan and adventured deep into Gujarat and Malwa. ‘Mewar was now in the middle path of her glory, and enjoying the legitimate triumph of seeing the foes of her religion captives on the rock of her power,’ pronounces Colonel Tod.

At the other extremity of Rajasthan, Raja Jodha (reigned 1438–89), a rajput of the Rathor clan who had been instrumental in securing Rana Kumbha’s throne, established his own hilltop stronghold at what became Jodhpur. ‘Never capable of uniting, even for their own preservation,’ as Colonel Tod put it, the rajputs scarcely constituted a state. They were, though, again about to give a good account of themselves. Famously if fortuitously it would be the boast of the Sesodias of Mewar that they alone never succumbed to the might of the Mughals.

In Orissa, Bengal and Awadh the same process of territorial definition and political consolidation might be traced. In Awadh (Oudh) the sultans of Jaunpur built Tughluq-esque mosques and fought with the Delhi sultans; in Orissa the Suryavamsha rajas built temples and warred with the rajas of Andhra and Vijayanagar. The success and liberality of the ruler, and the culture and language of the locality, created bonds which often transcended those of religion. In Bengal in 1418 a Hindu actually became sultan. This was too much for the Bengali ulema, who sought assistance from Jaunpur. Sultan Raja Ganesh was duly toppled, but only in favour of his son who, adopting Islam, changed his name from Jadusen to Jalal-ud-din and ruled under his father’s direction until 1431. A successor, Ala-ud-din Husain Shah (reigned 1493–1519), is revered as an outstanding patron of Bengali scholarship and, though a Muslim, indeed an Arab, is said to have honoured Chaitanya, the leader of the Vaishnavite bhakti movement in Bengal. In return the Hindus ‘went so far as to honour [the sultan] as an incarnation of Lord Krishna’.21

Husain’s tolerance had its limitations. Like the sultans of Gujarat and Malwa he stands accused of destroying temples in time of war, most notably during an attack on Orissa. But temples were seldom exclusively places of worship. They were also depositories of treasure, political statements which embodied the ambitions of their royal patrons and, on occasion, even military strongholds. Desecration was not necessarily prompted by bigotry.

In Kashmir, where Muslim immigration and conversion had resulted in the installation of a Muslim dynasty in 1339, the normally cordial pattern of Hindu– Muslim relations was interrupted in the early fifteenth century. The great Sun temple of Martand was destroyed and heavy penalties imposed on the mainly brahman Hindus. But the persecution proved short-lived. In a fifty-year reign (1420–70) Sultan Zayn-ul-Abidin reversed such discriminatory policies and, fostering both scholarship and a variety of new crafts, transformed his Himalayan kingdom into a stable and thriving state. Canals and irrigation works were also undertaken and, with a reassertion of its authority over Ladakh and Baltistan, Kashmir aspired to the sovereign status which its distinct history had long promised and which the finest natural frontiers in India seemingly guaranteed.

It was a different story in the neighbouring Panjab. Here evidence of nationstate-building is notably lacking. Timur’s Mongol descendants continued to nurse claims to the lands which he had traversed and conquered en route to Delhi in 1398. Meanwhile Afghan adventurers continued to migrate to and through the Panjab in large numbers. By the late fifteenth century the Afghan Lodis exercised desultory control from Delhi. But so heavily engaged was the Lodi sultan with rivals elsewhere that his governor in the Panjab enjoyed near independence. No obdurate dynasty like the Shahis stood between the undefended north-west frontier and the temptations of India. No champion like the later Ranjit Singh rose to rally Panjabi loyalty. The gates of Hind were swinging in the wind.
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