The Anarchy:The East India Co. Corporate Violence, & Pillage

That's French for "the ancient system," as in the ancient system of feudal privileges and the exercise of autocratic power over the peasants. The ancien regime never goes away, like vampires and dinosaur bones they are always hidden in the earth, exercising a mysterious influence. It is not paranoia to believe that the elites scheme against the common man. Inform yourself about their schemes here.

Re: The Anarchy:The East India Co. Corporate Violence, & Pil

Postby admin » Sat Apr 19, 2025 12:59 am

Part 1 of 2

8. The Impeachment of Warren Hastings

[x]

At noon on 13 February 1788, while Ghulam Qadir was preparing for his assault on Delhi, in London huge crowds had gathered outside Parliament to witness the members of the House of Lords process into Westminster Hall to impeach Warren Hastings.

Tickets for the few seats reserved for spectators changed hands for as much as £50,* and even then so many people wished to attend that, as one of the managers of the impeachment noted, the audience ‘will have to mob it at the door till nine, when the doors open, and then there will be a rush as there is at the pit of the Playhouse when Garrick plays King Lear … The ladies are dressed and in the Palace Yard by six [in the morning], and they sit from nine to twelve, before the business begins … Some people, and I believe, even ladies, have slept at the coffeehouses adjoining Westminster Hall, that they may be sure of getting in the door in time.’1

In addition to the 170 lords, there were bewigged and ermined judges, black-robed lawyers for both sides, and 200 members of the House of Commons. The Queen, ‘dressed in fawn-coloured satin, her head dress plain, with a very slender sprinkling of diamonds’, took her place in the Royal Box, along with her son and two of her daughters, the Duchess of Gloucester, and other attendants, among them the Dukes of Cumberland, Gloucester and York. The Prince of Wales was there with Charles James Fox. Among those who queued for admission were the great society actress and courtesan Sarah Siddons, the painter Joshua Reynolds, the diarist Fanny Burney and the historian Edward Gibbon.

For all the theatre of the occasion – indeed one of the prosecutors was the playwright Richard Brinsley Sheridan – this was not just the greatest political spectacle in the age of George III, it was the nearest the British ever got to putting the Company’s Indian Empire on trial. They did so with one of their greatest orators at the helm – the Anglo-Irish Whig statesman and political theorist Edmund Burke, supported by his no less eloquent and much more radical rival, Charles James Fox.

Warren Hastings stood accused of nothing less than the rape of India – or as Burke put it in his opening speech, ‘with injustice and treachery against the faith of nations’:

With various instances of extortion and other deeds of maladministration … With impoverishing and depopulating the whole country … with a wanton, and unjust, and pernicious, exercise of his powers … in overturning the ancient establishments of the country … With cruelties unheard of and devastations almost without name … Crimes which have their rise in the wicked dispositions of men – in avarice, rapacity, pride, cruelty, malignity, haughtiness, insolence, ferocity, treachery, cruelty, malignity of temper – in short, nothing that does not argue a total extinction of all moral principle, that does not manifest an inveterate blackness of heart, a heart blackened to the very blackest, a heart corrupted, gangrened to the core … We have brought before you the head, the Captain General of Iniquity – one in whom all the frauds, all the peculations, all the violence, all the tyranny in India are embodied.2


Hastings, Burke explained, was, quite simply, a criminal: ‘He is a robber. He steals, he filches, he plunders, he oppresses, he extorts.’ He was ‘a professor, a doctor upon the subject’ of crime.3 Worse was to come. Hastings, said Burke, was also ‘a rat’, ‘a weasel’, ‘a keeper of a pig stye, wallowing in corruption’. ‘Like a wild beast, he groans in corners over the dead and dying.’4

Every bit as bad as the man was the institution he represented. Because it was a Company, a corporation, that was governing Bengal, there were, believed Burke, none of the usual checks and balances which could make national government just and legitimate: ‘The East India Company in India is not the British nation,’ he declaimed. ‘When the Tartars entered China and into Hindoostan, when all the Goths and Vandals entered Europe, when the Normans came into England, they did so as a Nation.’

The Company in India does not exist as a Nation. Nobody can go there that does not go in its service … They are a Nation of Placemen. They are a Republic, a Commonwealth, without a people … The consequence of which is that there are no people to control, to watch, to balance against the power of office …

Out of this has issued a species of abuse, at the head of which Mr Hastings has put himself against the authority of the East India Company at home and every authority in the Country … He has corrupted his hands and sullied his government with bribes. He has used oppression and tyranny in place of legal government; and instead of endeavouring to find honest, honourable and adequate rewards for the persons who served the public, he has left them to prey upon it without the slightest degree of control.5


Burke then paused for effect, before launching into his thunderous climax:

I impeach, therefore, Warren Hastings, Esquire, of High Crimes and Misdemeanours. I impeach him in the name of the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled, whose Parliamentary trust he has betrayed. I impeach him in the name of the Commons of Great Britain, whose national character he has dishonoured. I impeach him in the name of the people of India, whose laws, rights and liberties he has subverted, whose properties he has destroyed, whose country he has laid waste. I impeach him in the name and by virtue of those eternal laws of justice which he has violated. I impeach him in the name of human nature itself, which he has cruelly outraged, injured and oppressed, in both sexes, in every age, rank, situation and condition of life.6


Burke’s opening speech alone took four days. In it he alleged widespread use of torture by the Company in its ruthless search for plunder, and he accused Hastings of ‘geographical morality … as if when you have crossed the equatorial line all the virtues die’. Natural law, he said, meant that justice and human rights were universal: ‘the laws of morality,’ he declared, ‘are the same everywhere, and there is no action which would pass for an act of extortion, of peculation, of bribery, and oppression in England which would not be an act of extortion, of peculation, of bribery, and oppression in Europe, Asia, Africa and the world over.’7

Company rule, he continued, had done nothing for India, except to assetstrip it: ‘Every rupee of profit made by an Englishman is lost to India for ever. Every other conqueror … has left some monument behind him. Were we to be driven out of India this day, nothing would remain to tell that it had been possessed, during the inglorious period of our domination, by anything better than an ouran-outang or the tiger … [The Company appears] more like an army going to pillage the people under the pretence of commerce than anything else … [Their business is] more like robbery than trade.’8 Now, he argued, it was the duty of those gathered in judgement to ensure that corporations, like individuals, must be held accountable to Parliament.

When Burke began to describe the violation of Bengali virgins and their mothers by the Company’s tax collectors – ‘they were dragged out, naked and exposed to the public view, and scourged before all the people … they put the nipples of the women into the sharp edges of split bamboos and tore them from their bodies’ – several women in the audience fainted. According to Macaulay, ‘the ladies in the galleries, unaccustomed to such displays of eloquence, were in a state of uncontrollable emotion. Handkerchiefs were pulled out; smelling bottles were handed around; hysterical sobs and screams were heard; and Mrs Sheridan was carried out in a fit.’9

Sheridan himself then took over, further outlining the prosecution case and holding forth for four more days. He too took a prolonged tilt at Hastings’ alleged moral darkness which he compared to ‘the writhing obliquity of the serpent … shuffling, ambiguous, dark, insidious’. As for his employers, the Company, they combined ‘the meanness of a pedlar and the profligacy of pirates … wielding a truncheon in one hand, and picking a pocket with the other’.10

His speech was widely regarded as one of the greatest feats of oratory of his day. Even the Speaker was rendered speechless. At the end of his impassioned performance, Sheridan whispered, ‘My lords, I have done’, and swooned backwards, landing in Burke’s arms. ‘The whole house – the members, peers, strangers – involuntarily joined in a tumult of applause … There were few dry eyes in the assembly.’11 Gibbon, alarmed at his friend’s condition, went around the following day to check if Sheridan was all right: ‘He is perfectly well,’ he noted in his diary. ‘A good actor.’12

Some of the Prosecution’s charges and insights – such as the idea of universal human or ‘natural’ rights – were important, even profound.13 Much of the rest was terrifically entertaining and scandalous. The only problem was that, thanks to the machinations of the ever-vindictive Philip Francis, Parliament had impeached the wrong man.

Earlier in his career, Burke had defended Robert Clive against parliamentary enquiry, and so helped exonerate someone who genuinely was a ruthlessly unprincipled plunderer. Now he directed his skills of oratory against Warren Hastings, a man who, by virtue of his position, was certainly the symbol of an entire system of mercantile oppression in India, but who had personally done much to begin the process of regulating and reforming the Company, and who had probably done more than any other Company official to rein in the worst excesses of its rule.

The impeachment had been Philip Francis’s final revenge on the man who had shot him during their duel and whom he had continued to hate with an obsessional passion. As soon as he recovered from his duelling wound in October 1780, Francis had given in his resignation and caught ship to London. There he used his new Indian wealth to buy a parliamentary seat and begin lobbying to bring Hastings down.

In February 1782, he found a sympathetic ear in Edmund Burke, then a rising Whig star. Burke had never been to India, but part of his family had been ruined by unwise speculation in East India stock. Together Burke and Francis worked on a series of Select Committee reports exposing the Company’s misdeeds in India. Before he met Francis, Burke had described himself as ‘a great admirer’ of Hastings’ talents.14 Francis quickly worked his dark magic to change that. By April 1782, he had drawn up a portentous list of twenty-two charges against Hastings which Burke then brought to the House.15 In May 1787, after five years of obsessive campaigning to blacken Hastings’ name and reputation, Burke and Francis persuaded Parliament that there was enough evidence to impeach him. On the 21st, the recently returned Hastings was taken into custody by the Serjeant-at-Arms, who passed him on to Black Rod. He was then made to kneel at the bar of the Lords, bow his head and hear the charges against him.

Hastings was certainly no angel; and the EIC under his rule was as extractive as ever. After Francis’s departure, Hastings began to take a more old-fashioned, pseudo-monarchical and even despotic idea of his powers, something Burke particularly disliked.16 Moreover, during the military crisis of the early 1780s, in the aftermath of victories by the armies of Tipu and the Marathas, when it looked as if the Company might easily be driven out of India, Hastings had been forced to raise money quickly to fight the war and to save Madras and Calcutta. He chose to raise it by pressuring the Company’s princely allies to contribute, and he used some extremely dubious means to gather the sums he needed. These included bullying the Nawab of Lucknow, Asaf ud-Daula, forcefully to strip the wealth of his purdah-bound aunts, the Begums of Avadh. He also personally used strong-arm tactics on Chait Singh, the Raja of Benares, an intervention that caused a local uprising and nearly cost Hastings his life. There were other dubious decisions, too. In particular, Hastings had failed to intervene with a pardon to save the life of Nandakumar, a former Diwan of the Nawab of Bengal, who had faked evidence of Hastings’ corruption which he handed to Philip Francis. Nandakumar had then been sentenced to death for forgery by Hastings’ old Westminster schoolfriend, the Calcutta Chief Justice, Sir Elijah Impey. This opened Hastings up to charges of failing to prevent what Burke and Francis viewed as the convenient ‘judicial murder’ of a whistleblower.

All of these were potentially grave charges. But Hastings was nevertheless by far the most responsible and sympathetic of all the officials the Company had yet sent to India. From his early twenties, his letters had been full of outrage at the unprincipled way Company officials were exploiting India and mistreating Indians. He had many close Indian friends and regarded himself as an honourable champion of justice for the people of Bengal. He had railed and campaigned against those who were plundering the country and wrecking the Bengali economy and he did his best to set it on a more prosperous and sustainable path. He took concrete measures to make sure there was no repetition of the terrible famine of 1770, including building the great Gola in Patna, which survives to this day. His successor said that in Bengal he was by far the most popular of all the British officials in India, ‘positively beloved of the people’.17

Nor did he even look the part: far from being an ostentatious and loudmouthed new-rich ‘Nabob’, Hastings was a dignified, intellectual and somewhat austere figure. Standing gaunt at the bar in his plain black frock coat, white stockings and grey hair, he looked more Puritan minister about to give a sermon than some paunchy plunderer: nearly six feet tall, he weighed less than eight stone: ‘of spare habit, very bald, with a countenance placid and thoughtful, but when animated, full of intelligence.’

As a result of Francis’s influence, the Articles of Impeachment were full of demonstrable fantasies and distortions, which traded on the ignorance of the audience about the issues and personalities involved. They were also badly drafted and lacked the necessary legal detail. Many of the more entertaining speeches were little better than ad hominem rants, mixing falsified history and unproved innuendo. Hastings did not begin his career as ‘as a fraudulent bullock contractor’. Chait Singh of Benares was not, as alleged, ‘a sovereign prince’. Hastings had not been the one declaring war on the Marathas. He had never given orders ‘to extirpate the Rohillas’. The Begum of Avadh’s eunuchs were never scourged.18 It took Hastings’ defence many weeks even to begin correcting the multiple errors of basic facts which the prosecution had laid out.

If anything, the Impeachment demonstrated above all the sheer ignorance of the British about the subcontinent they had been looting so comprehensively, and profitably, for thirty years. Indeed, some of the charges were almost comically confused: the illiterate and piratical Rohilla Afghan warlord Hafiz Rehmat Khan, for example, was conflated by Burke with the fourteenth-century mystical Persian love poet Hafez, who had been dead in his grave for 400 years by the time of the Impeachment.19

Few were surprised when, after seven years, on 23 April 1795, Hastings was ultimately cleared of all charges. But it scarred the final decades of his life, leading to what he described as ‘years of depression & persecution … Besides crimes of the most atrocious lies which were alleged against me, I was loaded by all the managers in succession, through the whole course of their pleadings in the trial, with language of the foulest abuse, aggravated by coarse and vulgar epithets, of which there had never been any examples in the jurisprudence of this or any other country.’20

The trial, however misconceived and misdirected, did have one useful outcome: to demonstrate that the Company’s many misdeeds were answerable to Parliament, and it helped publicise the corruption, violence and venality of the EIC, so setting the stage for further governmental oversight, regulation and control. This was a process which had already begun with the 1773 Regulating Act and had been further enhanced by Pitt’s India Act of 1784, which made the Company’s political and military transactions subject to government supervision. It eventually culminated in the outright nationalisation of the Company seventy years later in 1858, but by 1784 the writing was already on the wall. In that year Alexander Dalrymple, the Company’s now retired hydrographer, put it with utmost clarity and confidence: ‘The East India Company must be considered in two lights’, he wrote, ‘as commercial and political; but the two are inseparable: and if the politics are not made subservient to the commerce, the destruction of the Company must ensue.’21

Amid all the spectacle of Hastings’ trial, it made sense that the man sent out to replace him was chosen by Parliament specifically for his incorruptibility. General Lord Charles Cornwallis had recently surrendered the thirteen American Colonies of the British Empire over to George Washington, who had immediately declared it a free and independent nation.

Cornwallis’s mission was now to make sure that the same never happened in India.

[x]

On arrival in Calcutta in August 1786, Cornwallis inherited a far more flourishing Bengal than the famine-wrecked dustbowl which had greeted Hastings fourteen years earlier.

This was at least partly the result of the reforms Hastings had brought in. Calcutta itself had turned into a boomtown with a population of around 400,000, more than double that at the time of Plassey. Now known as the City of Palaces or the St Petersburg of the East to its British inhabitants, and the Paradise of Nations, Zannat-al-Bilad to the old Mughal aristocracy, the Company’s bridgehead in Bengal was unquestionably the richest, largest and most elegant colonial city in the East: ‘Imagine everything that is glorious in nature combined with everything that is beautiful in architecture,’ wrote the newly arrived William Hunter, ‘and you can faintly picture to yourself what Calcutta is.’22

The city was prosperous and fast growing. All it lacked was proper planning regulations: ‘It is not without astonishment and some irritation that a stranger looks at the city of Calcutta,’ wrote the Comte de Modave. ‘It would have been so easy to turn it into one of the most beautiful cities in the world, by just following a regular planned layout; one cannot fathom why the English failed to take advantage of such a fine location, allowing everyone the freedom to build in the most bizarre taste, with the most outlandish planning. With the exception of two or three properly aligned streets, the rest is a labyrinth of winding narrow lanes. An effect, it is said, of British liberty, as if such liberty were incompatible with good order and symmetry.’23

Nor was it just the British who did well out of this new boom or who lived extravagantly: Bengali merchant and money-lending dynasties also flourished. The Mullick family, for example, had rambling baroque palaces strewn around the city and used to travel around Calcutta in an ornate carriage drawn by two zebras. But the boom reached down to benefit more humble Bengali labourers, too: by the end of the 1780s, their wages had risen by around 50 per cent in a decade.24

The finances of Bengal were in fact in a healthier state than they had been since the time of the Aliverdi Khan in the 1740s and 1750s: by the end of the decade, Cornwallis was able to report back to London that revenues exceeded expenditure by £2 million. After meeting deficits elsewhere, this left £1.3 million for the ‘investment’ to purchase export goods, which Cornwallis estimated would sell in London for £2.4 million.*25 After a period on the edge, the Company was now back in business and making a healthy profit. Part of these profits came from the successful introduction of new cash crops like sugar, opium and indigo, but much was simply due to the natural fecundity of Bengal, which always produced large surpluses of rice each year. The same Bengali agricultural revenues which had once sustained the Mughal Empire now sustained the Company Raj.26

It was not just agriculture and land revenues which had turned around. Trade was flourishing, too. Since the low point of the Company’s near bankruptcy in 1772, exports from Bengal had grown fivefold and now exceeded Rs15 million, or around £5 million. There was every sign that this looked likely to continue.27 Fine Bengali textiles – especially cotton piece goods, muslins and fine silks – were selling well, to the tune of Rs28 million* annually, as was Malwa opium and Gujarati cotton; but the biggest success story was tea from China.28 By 1795, tea sales had doubled in less than a decade to 20 million pounds (9,000 tons); one former director of the EIC wrote that it was as if tea had become ‘the food of the whole people of Great Britain’.29 The only thing holding back further growth was the question of supply: ‘the demand for Bengal goods exceed double the quantity that can be procured,’ Cornwallis reported back to London.

As a result, the shortages of bullion which had paralysed the Bengal economy in the 1770s were now long forgotten: the Calcutta mint was now striking Rs2.5 million** of coins each year.30 In every way, the Company holdings in eastern India – the Three Provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa – were now effectively the richest of all the regional post-Mughal successor states dotted around South Asia, with resources many times greater than any of their rivals.

All this meant that the Company state was able to keep building its army and apportion over £3 million annually to military expenditure, a sum no other South Asian power could possibly match.31 From 2,900 sepoys in 1757 after Plassey, the Bengal army had grown to around 50,000 men by the arrival of Cornwallis.32 The Company also had the pick of the best candidates in the military labour market since it paid its sepoys significantly more, and more regularly, than anyone else: Bengal army sepoys classed as ‘gentlemen troopers’ earned around Rs300 a year, while their equivalents in Mysore earned annually only Rs192 (four times the Rs48 Tipu paid an ordinary soldier); those in Avadh earned annually as little as Rs80.*33 As Burton Stein nicely put it: ‘The colonial conquest of India was as much bought as fought.’34

These sepoys were in turn supported by a sophisticated war machine, run out of the armouries of Fort William and the arms factories of Dumdum. When in 1787 the Hyderabadi minister Mir Alam spent several months in Calcutta he was amazed at the scale of the Company’s Calcutta military establishments. He was particularly impressed by the arsenals he saw in Fort William: ‘Three hundred thousand muskets hung up in good order and easy to collect, ammunitions factories hard at work, and two to three thousand cannons in place with five to six thousand more in reserve and ready for use.’35 Forty years earlier, in 1750, the Company had been a trading corporation with a small security force and a few crumbling forts; by 1790 it had effectively transformed its Indian holdings into a tightly run fiscal-military state guarded by the most powerful army in Asia.


So when, in 1791, war once again loomed with Tipu Sultan of Mysore, Cornwallis’s armies could now draw on unprecedented manpower, weaponry and military materiel. There was good reason for the Company generals to be confident: if war with Tipu was unavoidable they would now have a good opportunity of avenging their abject defeat at Pollilur twelve years earlier.

[x]

In 1783, Haidar Ali of Mysore had died of a suppurating tumour ‘the size of a dinner plate’ on his back. His son Tipu moved quickly to take over his father’s throne.

The Governor of Madras called Tipu ‘the youthful and spirited heir of Haidar, without the odium of his father’s vices or his tyranny’.36 According to one British observer, Tipu, now thirty-three, was ‘about 5ft 7ins in height, uncommonly well-made, except in the neck, which was short, his leg, ankle and foot beautifully proportioned, his arms large and muscular, with the appearance of great strength, but his hands rather too fine and delicate for a soldier … He was remarkably fair for a Mussulman in India, thin, delicately made, with an interesting, mild countenance, of which large animated black eyes were the most conspicuous feature.’37

On his deathbed, Haidar had written to Tipu with advice to his son on the art of good government. He warned him that the Company would attempt to exploit any weakness in the succession: ‘The greatest obstacle you have to conquer is the jealousy of the Europeans,’ he wrote. ‘The English are today all-powerful in India. It is necessary to weaken them by war.’

He suggested that Tipu’s best chance of doing this lay in dividing and ruling: ‘The resources of Hindustan do not suffice to expel the English from the lands they have invaded. Put the nations of Europe one against the other. It is by the aid of the French that you could conquer the British armies, which are better trained than those of India. The Europeans have surer tactics; always use against them their own weapons.’

He then bade his son farewell and good luck: ‘If God had allowed me a longer career, you need only have enjoyed the success of my enterprises.’

But I leave you for achieving them rich provinces, a population of twelve million souls, troops, treasures and immense resources. I need not awaken your courage. I have seen you often fight by my side, and you shall be the inheritor of my glory. Remember above all that valour can elevate us to the throne, but it does not suffice to keep it. While we may seize a crown owing to the timidity of the people, it can escape us if we do not make haste to entrust it to their love.38


Tipu was already one of the most feared and admired military commanders in India: able and brave, methodical and hard-working, he was above all innovative, determined to acquire the arsenal of European skills and knowledge, and to find ways to use them against his enemies. Tipu had already proved his capacity to do this on the battlefield, defeating the Company not only at Pollilur but also twice more since then: in 1782, he had annihilated another British army under Colonel John Braithwaite just outside Tanjore and then, a year later, immediately before his accession, ambushed and destroyed a third Company column on the banks of the Coleroon River. The surprise was that within a few years Tipu showed that he was just as imaginative in peace as he had been in war.

Tipu began to import industrial technology through French engineers and experimented with harnessing water power to drive his machinery. He sent envoys to southern China to bring back silkworm eggs and established sericulture in Mysore, something that still enriches the region today. He introduced irrigation and built dams so that even his British enemies had to admit that his kingdom was ‘well cultivated, populous with industrious inhabitants, cities [including Bangalore] newly founded and commerce extended’.

More remarkably still, he created what amounted to a state trading company with its own ships and factories. Regulations issued to Tipu’s ‘commercial department’ survive, providing details of a state trade in valuable commodities such as sandalwood, silk, spices, coconut, rice, sulphur, and elephants imported into and exported from Srirangapatnam. Trade centres were established in thirty places in Mysore and other places on the western coast as far north as Kutch, as well as in Pondicherry and Hyderabad. Officials were encouraged to recruit suitably trained assistants to run such markets, and each was to be placed under oath according to their religion. Capital for trade was to be provided from the revenue collected by state officials and provision was made for accepting deposits of private persons as investments in the state trade with fixed returns. Other factories were established at Muscat and dotted across the Persian Gulf. Tipu even asked his ambassadors to Ottoman Istanbul to secure for him the ijara – farm – of Basra so that, like the Europeans, he could establish an overseas settlement which would be a base for his vessels.39

Keeping in mind his father’s advice to win the love of his subjects, Tipu went out of his way to woo and protect the Hindus of his own dominions. From the beginning of his reign he had loaded the temples of his realm with presents, honours and land. Few of his chancery records survive, but from the temple archives of the region we know, for example, that in 1784 he gave a land grant to one Venkatachala Sastri and a group of Brahmins, begging them ‘to pray for the length of his life and prosperity’. A year later he sent the temple complex of Melkote twelve elephants and a kettledrum, while also sending a Sanskrit verse recording his grant of lands ‘to the temples and Brahmins on the banks of the Tungabhadra’. So it continued at the rate of at least three or four major endowments or gifts of money, bells, pensions, villages, jewels or ‘padshah lingams’ per year, for the rest of his reign, mostly in return for requests for prayers, pujas ‘for the success of the King’s armies’ or temple processions.40

But it was the great temple of Sringeri that always received his most generous patronage, as a stash of correspondence discovered within the temple in the 1950s bears witness. Tipu put on record his horror at the damage done to the temple by a Maratha Pindari raiding party during a Maratha invasion of Mysore: ‘People who have sinned against such a holy place are sure to suffer the consequences of their misdeeds,’ wrote Tipu. ‘Those who commit evil deeds smiling, will reap the consequences weeping. Treachery to gurus will undoubtedly result in the destruction of the line of descent.’41

Sending a large sum of cash and a consignment of grain ‘for the consecration of the goddess Sarada’, and to ‘feed one thousand Brahmins’, Tipu asked the Swami ‘please to pray for the increase of our prosperity and the destruction of our enemies’. Shortly after this, he sent another note, along with a present of an elephant, writing that ‘wrong-doers to gurus and our country will soon perish by the grace of God! Those who took away elephants, horses, palanquins and other things from your monastery will surely be punished by God. Cloth for the Goddess has been sent. Please consecrate the Goddess, and pray for our welfare and the destruction of our foes.’42

This was not just a matter of statecraft. Tipu, despite being a devout Muslim and viewing himself as a champion of Islam, thoroughly embraced the syncretic culture of his time and believed strongly in the power of Hindu gods. In his dreams, which he diligently recorded every morning in a dream book, Tipu encountered not only long-dead Sufi saints, but also Hindu gods and goddesses: in one dream sequence, there are references to him finding himself in a ruined temple with idols whose eyes moved: one talked to him and as a result Tipu ordered the temple rebuilt.43 It is recorded that Tipu made all his troops, Hindu and Muslim, take ritual baths in holy rivers ‘by the advice of his [Brahmin] augurs’ in order to wash away cowardice and make them superior in battle to the Marathas. Tipu also strongly believed in the supernatural powers of holy men, both Hindu and Muslim. As he wrote in 1793 to the Swami of Sringeri: ‘You are the Jagatguru, the preceptor of the world … in whatever country holy personages like you may reside, that country will prosper with good showers and crops.’44

The British consistently portrayed Tipu as a savage and fanatical barbarian, but he was in truth a connoisseur and an intellectual, with a library containing some 2,000 volumes in several languages, mainly on law, theology and the secular sciences, as well as amassing a large collection of modern scientific instruments including thermometers and barometers.45 When in the course of a raid on the outskirts of Madras, Tipu’s troops captured some scholarly volumes on Indian botany, Tipu had the books rebound and added to his library. The culture of innovation Tipu fostered in Mysore stands record to a man very different from that imagined by Calcutta: a modernising technocrat who, as Christopher Bayly nicely put it, attempted to fight ‘European mercantilist power with its own weapons: state monopoly and an aggressive ideology of expansion’. His imported French military technology was if anything more advanced than that of the Company; he failed only because the resources of the Company were now larger, and expanding significantly faster, than those of Mysore.
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Re: The Anarchy:The East India Co. Corporate Violence, & Pil

Postby admin » Sat Apr 19, 2025 1:00 am

Part 2 of 2

Tipu did, however, have some severe flaws which left him vulnerable to his enemies. For Tipu was prone, even by the standards of the time, to use unnecessary violence against his adversaries and those he defeated, creating many embittered enemies where conciliation would have been equally possible and much wiser. Rebels had their arms, legs, ears and noses cut off before being hanged. He routinely circumcised and brutally converted to Islam captive enemy combatants and internal rebels, both Hindu and Christians, Indian and British. More often than not he destroyed the temples and churches of those he conquered. He did this on a particularly horrific scale on his various campaigns in Malabar, Mangalore and Coorg. Huge numbers of people were forced to migrate from their homes: 60,000 Christians from the southern Carnatic to Mysore in one year alone.46 Christian Portuguese missionaries wrote that ‘he tied naked Christians and Hindus to the legs of elephants and made the elephants move around till the bodies of the helpless victims were torn to pieces’.

Allied to this often counter-productive aggression and megalomania was a fatal lack of diplomatic skills. When Cornwallis reached Calcutta in September 1786, Tipu was already at war with both the Maratha Peshwa and the Nizam of Hyderabad, both of whom had been allies of his father. Unlike Haidar, who joined the Triple Alliance coalition against the British, Tipu’s aggressive attacks on his neighbours so alarmed both Marathas and Hyderabadis that, when courted by Cornwallis, they agreed to form a new Triple Alliance. This time the alliance would be with the Company, and it was aimed against Tipu’s Mysore.

As if he had not made enough enemies, Tipu then decided to break off relations with Shah Alam, so becoming the first Indian ruler formally to disown even a nominal sovereignty to the Mughal Emperor. He ordered that the Friday sermon, the khutbah, should be read in his own name not that of the Emperor, observing that ‘as to those idiots who introduce the name of Shah Alam into the khutbah, they act through ignorance, since the real condition of the so-called Emperor is this: that he is actually enslaved and a mere cypher, being the servant of Scindia at the monthly wages of Rs15,000.* Such being the case, to pronounce the name of a dependant of the infidels while reciting the sacred khutbah is a manifest sin.’47

Then, in December 1789, Tipu opened a new front. He had already conquered northern Malabar as far as Cochin; now he decided to bring to obedience the Raja of Travancore to its south. The Raja had protected himself with some remarkable fortifications known as the Travancore Lines: a forty-mile rampart flanked by a sixteen-foot ditch and topped by an impenetrable bamboo hedge. He had also signed a mutual defence pact with the Company.

So when, at daybreak on 29 December 1789, Tipu brought up his heavy artillery and blew a wide gap in the Travancore defences, sending in his crack Tiger Sepoys to massacre the unsuspecting Raja’s troops, he suddenly found himself at war not only with the Marathas, the Hyderabadis and the people of Travancore – but also, yet again, with his oldest and bitterest enemy, the East India Company.

[x]

The Third Anglo-Mysore War began, as had the previous two, with Tipu marching with unprecedented speed and violence into the Carnatic. He reached Trichinopoly in early December 1790, where he effortlessly outmanoeuvred a lumbering Company army. He then fell on the coast between Madras and Pondicherry, where his cavalry burned and devastated the undefended towns and villages. The great temple town of Tiruvannamalai was bloodily sacked in mid-January.


The Company had no ability to match the speed of Tipu’s marches. One officer, Major James Rennell, recorded that the Mysore troops used to ‘make three marches for one of ours … The rapidity of Tippoo’s marches was such that no army appointed like ours could ever bring it to action in the open country.’48 This was partly because every Company officer travelled with at least six servants, a complete set of camp furniture, ‘his stock of linens (at least 24 suits); some dozens of wine, brandy and gin; tea, sugar and biscuits; a hamper of live poultry and his milch goat’.49 Tipu’s troops had few such encumbrances.

But Cornwallis had no intention of allowing Tipu to run rings around him. He was also determined to redeem his military reputation, tarnished by his surrender to George Washington at Yorktown five years earlier. So he decided to lead the counter-attack in person: ‘We have lost time and our adversary has gained reputation, which are the two most valuable things in war,’ wrote Cornwallis. ‘I have no other part to take but to go myself … and see whether I can do better.’50

In early February 1791, the portly figure of Marquess Cornwallis could be seen mounting his charger and trotting out of Madras at the head of an army of 19,000 sepoys. By 21 March he had climbed the Eastern Ghats and reached the plateau beyond without encountering opposition. He then seized by assault Tipu’s second-largest city, Bangalore. Here he was joined by his Hyderabadi ally, Mir Alam, who brought with him 18,000 Mughal cavalry.

By May the combined force was ready and began the advance deep into Tipu’s territory; but it was here that their problems began. Tipu had laid waste to the fields and villages on Cornwallis’s line of march, so supplies of food were low and by the time they neared Tipu’s island capital, Srirangapatnam, 10,000 Company transport bullocks had died; those that remained were so close to starvation they could hardly pull their loads. The dearth of carriage bullocks meant rank-and-file Europeans, sepoys and camp followers had to carry heavy ordnance for the artillery train on their backs. To add to Cornwallis’s problems, sickness had broken out in the army and the monsoon arrived early, spoiling a large proportion of his rice rations and soaking his ailing troops. Low-caste followers were forced to survive on the decaying flesh of dead bullocks. Before long, smallpox was raging throughout the Company lines.51 On 24 May, after a brief skirmish with Tipu, Cornwallis ordered his battering train and heavy guns to be destroyed and a muddy withdrawal to Bangalore to begin.

The retreating army had only marched for half a day when, near the temple town of Melkote, a troop of horses 2,000-strong appeared on the road in front of them. The alarm was raised and the first shots had been fired before it was realised that the cavalry were not Tipu’s, but belonged to the Company’s new Maratha allies. A much larger force came up soon after and was found to be carrying ample supplies for both Cornwallis’s bullocks and his men.

After weeks of growing austerity and deprivation, the Company soldiers could hardly believe the profusion of goods available in the Maratha bazaar: ‘English broadcloths, Birmingham pen-knives, the richest Kashmiri shawls, rare and costly jewellery together with oxen, sheep, poultry and all that the most flourishing towns could furnish.’52 Famished sepoys and camp followers hurried into the Maratha camp to buy food at inflated prices. British officers bought up all the carriage bullocks they could and pressed them into service.53 Together, the three allied armies marched back to Bangalore to sit out the rains and make preparations for a fresh attack when the monsoon subsided and the rivers had ebbed.

After two months of resting, feasting and military parades with their Maratha and Hyderabadi allies, Cornwallis sent his men off to begin besieging Tipu’s mountain fortresses that guarded the remaining passes through the ghats. They started with those commanding the Nandi Hills, overlooking Bangalore, and the fearsome fort of Savandurga, perched on a near-vertical peak and believed to be one of the most impregnable fortresses in the Deccan. By New Year, Cornwallis had secured the safety of his supply routes and made sure that there would be no repetition of May’s logistical failures.

Finally, on 26 January 1792, the three armies marched out of Bangalore for a second attempt to corner the Tiger of Mysore in his lair. Cornwallis now had 22,000 sepoys, plus 12,000 Marathas and a slightly larger number of Hyderabadis.54

Tipu had a larger army than this – more than 50,000 sepoys and cavalry troopers – but he was too careful a general to risk open battle against such a formidable force. Instead he stayed within the magnificent fortifications of Srirangapatnam which had been designed for him by French engineers on the latest scientific principles, following Sébastian de Vauban’s research into artillery-resistant fortification designs, as adapted by the Marquis de Montalembert in his book La Fortification Perpendiculaire. These provided the most up-to-date defences that the eighteenth century could offer, and took into account the newly increased firepower of cannon, bombs and mines, as well as the latest developments in tactics for storming and laying siege to forts.55 Penetrating these defences was the challenge now facing Cornwallis’s army.

Late on 5 February 1792, the three armies arrived in front of the formidable walls of Srirangapatnam island for the second time. Without waiting for Tipu to make the first move, and without telling his allies of his plans, Cornwallis launched an immediate attack, taking advantage of the moonless night. He concentrated his initial fire on Tipu’s fortified encampment on the high ground opposite the island which overlooked and guarded the bridges and fords over the Kaveri. Tipu, who had thought Cornwallis would wait until his entire force had assembled, was taken completely by surprise. He led a brave resistance for two hours, but by midnight had retreated onto the island and into the walls of his citadel.

Once Tipu had abandoned the encampment, and the fords were left unguarded, Cornwallis unleashed a second column towards the fortress at the eastern end of the island. By daybreak, the beautiful Lal Bagh, the Red Garden, was in Cornwallis’s hands. James Kirkpatrick, who was in the second column, had gazed across the river and seen Tipu’s magnificent Mughal-style garden palace, ‘Lall Baug, in all its glory’, the day before: ‘Alas!’ he wrote to his father, ‘it fell sacrifice to the emergencies of war.’ The palace was made a hospital for the wounded and the beautiful garden ‘toppled to supply materials for the siege. Whole avenues of tall and majestic cypresses were in an instant laid low, nor was the orange, apple, sandal tree or even the fragrant bowers of rose and jasmine spared in this indiscriminate ruin. You might have seen in our batteries fascines of rose bushes, bound with jasmine and picketed with pickets of sandal wood. The very pioneers themselves became scented …’56

Even the ‘alarming mortality’ among the European troops and the ‘infectious exhalations from millions of putrid carcases that cover the whole surface of the earth for twenty miles around the capital’, he wrote, could not blind him to the astonishing loveliness of the city he was engaged in besieging: ‘The palaces and gardens both upon the island and without the city as far exceed the palace and gardens at Bangalore in extent, taste and magnificence, as they are said to fall short of the principal ones within the city.’57

The following day, Tipu made a series of ineffectual counter-attacks, but, as the hopelessness of his position became apparent, more and more of his troops deserted and he was forced to send a message to Cornwallis, through some captured Company officers, suggesting peace negotiations. Cornwallis accepted, but his terms were severe: Tipu must surrender half his kingdom, and pay an indemnity of 30 million rupees,* release all his prisoners of war, and give his two eldest sons as hostages to guarantee full payment. The borderlands next to the Marathas were to be handed over to the Peshwa; those next to Hyderabad to the Nizam; and the Company was to receive his territories in the Eastern Ghats as well as those in Coorg and spice-rich Malabar.

The treaty was finally signed, and the two young princes – Abdul Khaliq, who was eight, and Muizuddin, aged five – handed over to Cornwallis on 18 March 1792. The boys were taken off by elephant to Madras, which they appeared in general to like, though they clearly did not enjoy being made to sit through entire performances of Handel’s Messiah and Judas Maccabaeus.58 Having created a sensation in Madras society with their dignity, intelligence and politeness, they were sent back two years later when Tipu delivered the final tranche of his indemnity payment.

All this was a crushing blow to Tipu. Over the course of the war he had already lost 70 forts and 800 guns, and sustained 49,340 casualties. Now he stood to lose one entire half of the kingdom he had inherited from his father. But even as negotiations over the peace treaty were wrangling on, it was clear that Tipu was unbowed even by his defeat.

Around this time he reached out to Nizam Ali Khan of Hyderabad: ‘Know you not the custom of the English?’ he wrote. ‘Wherever they fix their talons they contrive little by little to work themselves into the whole management of affairs.’ One night just before the treaty was signed, according to Maratha sources, Tipu appeared secretly in the Maratha camp, and asked to be taken to the tent of the ‘lordly old Brahmin’ general, Haripant Phadke: ‘You must realise I am not at all your enemy,’ he said. ‘Your real enemy is the Englishman, and it is he of whom you must beware.’59

[x]

In many ways 1792 was the major turning point for the East India Company in India: before this, the Company was often on the defensive and always insecure. After this year, the Company appeared increasingly dominant. Up to this point, too, the EIC was still, in terms of land, a relatively small Indian power, controlling only 388,500 out of 4.17 million square kilometres – about 9.3 per cent of the Indian land mass, almost all in the north and east.60 But with the great chunks of land it had just seized from Tipu in the south, the Company Raj was now on its way to becoming a major territorial, as well as a military and economic, power.

The reforms Cornwallis initiated on his return to Calcutta further consolidated this position. In America, Britain had lost its colonies not to Native Americans, but to the descendants of European settlers. Cornwallis was determined to make sure that a settled colonial class never emerged in India to undermine British rule as it had done, to his own humiliation, in America. By this period one in three British men in India were cohabiting with Indian women, and there were believed to be more than 11,000 Anglo- Indians in the three Presidency towns.61 Now Cornwallis brought in a whole raft of unembarrassedly racist legislation aimed at excluding the children of British men who had Indian wives, or bibis, from employment by the Company.

In 1786 an order had already been passed banning the Anglo-Indian orphans of British soldiers from qualifying for service in the Company army. In 1791 the door was slammed shut when an order was issued that no one with an Indian parent could be employed by the Civil, Military or Marine branches of the Company. A year later, this was extended to ‘officers of the Company ships’. In 1795, further legislation was issued, again explicitly disqualifying anyone not descended from European parents on both sides from serving in the Company’s armies except as ‘pipers, drummers, bandsmen and farriers’. Yet, like their British fathers, the Anglo-Indians were also banned from owning land. Thus excluded from all the most obvious sources of lucrative employment, the Anglo-Indians quickly found themselves at the beginning of a long slide down the social scale. This would continue until, a century later, the Anglo-Indians had been reduced to a community of minor clerks, postmen and train drivers.62

It was under Cornwallis, too, that many Indians – the last survivors of the old Murshidabad Mughal administrative service – were removed from senior positions in government, on the entirely spurious grounds that centuries of tyranny had bred ‘corruption’ in them.63 Increasingly, all non-Europeans began to be treated with disdain by the exclusively white officials at the Company headquarters of Fort William. Around this time, Warren Hastings’ Military Secretary, Major William Palmer, who was married to a Mughal princess, wrote expressing his dismay at the new etiquette regarding Indian dignitaries introduced to Calcutta by Cornwallis: ‘They are received,’ he wrote, ‘in the most cold and disgusting style, and I can assure you that they observe and feel it, and no doubt they will resent it whenever they can.’64

Cornwallis then set about making a series of land and taxation reforms guaranteeing a steady flow of revenue, particularly in time of war, as well as reinforcing the Company’s control of the land it had conquered. The Permanent Settlement, introduced in 1793, gave absolute rights to land to zamindar landowners, on the condition that they paid a sum of land tax which Company officials now fixed in perpetuity. So long as zamindars paid their revenues punctually, they had security over the land from which the revenue came. If they failed to pay up, the land would be sold to someone else.65

These reforms quickly produced a revolution in landholding in Company Bengal: many large old estates were split up, with former servants flocking to sale rooms to buy up their ex-masters’ holdings. In the ensuing decades, draconian tax assessments led to nearly 50 per cent of estates changing hands. Many old Mughal landowning families were ruined and forced to sell, a highly unequal agrarian society was produced and the peasant farmers found their lives harder than ever. But from the point of view of the Company, Cornwallis’s reforms were a huge success. Income from land revenues was both stabilised and enormously increased; taxes now arrived punctually and in full. Moreover, those who had bought land from the old zamindars were in many ways throwing in their lot with the new Company order. In this way, a new class of largely Hindu pro-British Bengali bankers and traders began to emerge as moneyed landowners to whom the Company could devolve local responsibility.

So even as the old Mughal aristocracy was losing high office, a new Hindu service gentry came to replace them at the top of the social ladder in Company-ruled Bengal. This group of emergent Bengali bhadralok (uppermiddle classes) represented by families such as the Tagores, the Debs and the Mullicks, tightened their grip on mid-level public office in Calcutta, as well as their control of agrarian peasant production and the trade of the bazaars. They participated in the new cash crop trades to Calcutta – Dwarkanath Tagore, for example, making a fortune at this time in indigo – while continuing to lend the Company money, often for as much as 10–12 per cent interest. It was loans from this class which helped finance colonial armies and bought the muskets, cannon, horses, elephants, bullocks and paid the military salaries which allowed Company armies to wage and win their wars against other Indian states. The Company’s ever-growing Indian empire could not have been achieved without the political and economic support of regional power groups and local communities. The edifice of the East India Company was sustained by the delicate balance that the Company was able to maintain with merchants and mercenaries, its allied nawabs and rajas, and above all, its tame bankers.66

In the end it was this access to unlimited reserves of credit, partly through stable flows of land revenues, and partly through the collaboration of Indian moneylenders and financiers, that in this period finally gave the Company its edge over their Indian rivals. It was no longer superior European military technology, nor powers of administration that made the difference. It was the ability to mobilise and transfer massive financial resources that enabled the Company to put the largest and best-trained army in the eastern world into the field. The biggest firms of the period – the houses of Lala Kashmiri Mal, Ramchand-Gopalchand Shahu and Gopaldas-Manohardas – many of them based in Patna and Benares, handled the largest military remittances, taking charge of drawing bills of exchange in Bombay or Surat or Mysore, as well as making large cash loans, all of which made possible the regular payment, maintenance, arming and provisioning of the Company’s troops. The Company in turn duly rewarded these invaluable services in 1782 when they announced that the house of Gopaldas would henceforth be the government’s banker in the place of the Jagat Seths. Support from the Company then enabled the house to break into western India from where they had previously been absent.67

As Rajat Kanta Ray put it, ‘With regard to the indigenous systems of commercial credit, the Company was better placed than the Indian powers by virtue of its reputation as an international capitalist corporation with a developed sense of the importance of paying its debts. It was known, moreover, to have the biggest revenue surplus available in the country to offer as collateral for large contract loans obtained from sahukaras [moneylenders].’68 The Company was perceived as the natural ally of Indian traders and financiers; the British, wrote Hari Charan Das, did not ‘interfere with the wealth of any rich men, bankers and merchants, and other people who reside in their cities, but on the contrary they are kind to those who are wealthy.’69

As the Jagat Seths had discovered forty years earlier, the East India Company spoke a language Indian financiers understood, and offered a higher degree of security to Indian capital than its rivals.70 In the end, it all came down to money. By the end of the century, Bengal was annually yielding a steady revenue surplus of Rs25 million at a time when Scindia struggled to net Rs1.2 million* from his territories in Malwa.71 No wonder that Scindia reflected anxiously that ‘without money it was impossible to assemble an army or prosecute a war’.72

Ultimately it was the East India Company, not the Marathas or the Sultans of Mysore, that the financiers across India decided to back.73 Moreover, for all the rapacity of the Company, it was an increasingly easy decision for them to make. By 1792, there was little credible opposition. Tipu had just been defeated and had lost half his kingdom. For all his valour and determination, it would take a miracle for him ever again to muster sufficient resources to defeat the Company as he once did at Pollilur.

Meanwhile, the great Maratha Confederacy, the power which controlled the most land and fielded the largest and most formidable armies, was slowly beginning to unravel. On 1 June 1793, at the Battle of Lakheri, after many years of open rivalry and increasingly strained relations, Tukoji Holkar was comprehensively defeated by Mahadji Scindia. When the result of the battle was reported to the blind Shah Alam in Delhi, he chuckled and commented, ‘the power of the Marathas will soon be destroyed’.74 He was right. In the next round of internecine bloodshed that followed, ‘the Maratha princes bore less resemblance to a confederacy than to a bag of ferrets’.75

It was no longer difficult to predict the future. By the 1790s the Comte de Modave, for one, had no doubt what lay in store for India. ‘I am convinced that the English will establish themselves in the Mughal empire only precariously and with much uncertainty,’ he wrote, ‘and they will no doubt, eventually, in due course of time, lose it.’

But they will certainly control it for long enough to extract prodigious amounts of money from it, which will enable them to maintain the role they have arrogated to themselves of being the principal, or rather the one and only, power, exclusive of all others, among the trading nations of Europe.

Who can stop them? In Hindustan, anarchy smothers the hope of anything good germinating or sprouting: the people live in want and misery, even though they have so many possibilities of living well. The English in Bengal are watching this curious situation attentively, hoping to profit by it, for their lust for gain is as voracious as their mania for conquest.

I have no doubt that these ever-recurring disturbances, which pin down all the armed forces of this empire, are welcomed by the English as a sure means of taking over the empire itself, bit by bit. It strikes me that their behaviour corresponds exactly to this long-term strategy as they carefully stoke the fires of civil discord, which they then offer to resolve, backing up such mediation with a show of military strength as soon as they well can.

This pattern of behaviour, from which they have not deviated for several years, has allowed them to seize control of many areas beyond the limits of Bengal, so much so that they will soon be masters of the Ganges from Allahabad to the Ocean. They play the game of advancing without ever being seen to make any step forward … In brief, they assiduously practise that old maxim followed by the Romans in their politics, that is, in the words of Tacitus, everywhere to keep in place [local hereditary] rulers, in order to use them as instruments to reduce the people to slavery.

The English Company stands alone, today, on this vast stage, preparing secretly and silently to extend immeasurably the major role they are playing here. All their schemes, their plans, their initiatives, all tend to this one great object. One by one, all the powers of India are being reduced by terror, intrigues, flattery, promises or threats. Every day the English Company takes a step closer to that goal. I have no doubt at all that, for some years now, the plan of invading Hindustan and taking over the trade of all the East Indies has been the object of their speculations and calculations, a profitable compensation for what they have lost in America. If you also consider the power of the English navy, the strength of their military establishments on the coast of India, you will realise that, given the means already in their hands, they need make only a small effort to achieve this grand and magnificent project.

When the moment comes to act, their plan, however vast and complex, will be fully formed, down to its last details, with all necessary preliminary information ready gathered: then their operations will be carried out with a rapidity and success which will astonish the whole of Europe.76


The Company, he believed, now looked unassailable. But he was overlooking one thing. There was in fact one force which could still stop the Company in its tracks. Modave’s own homeland, now in the grip of revolution and led by a heavily accented Corsican colonel named Napoleon Bonaparte, had just declared war against Britain on 1 February 1793. Four years later, in December 1797, Tipu despatched an embassy seeking Napoleon’s help against the Company. What the Sultan of Mysore did not know was that the army he needed was already being prepared in Toulon. By the time Tipu’s embassy arrived in Paris, in April 1798, Napoleon was waiting for an opportunity to sail his 194 ships, carrying 19,000 of his best men, out of Toulon, and across the Mediterranean to Egypt. Napoleon was quite clear as to his plans.

In a book about Turkish warfare he had scribbled in the margin before 1788 the words, ‘Through Egypt we shall invade India, we shall re-establish the old route through Suez and cause the route by the Cape of Good Hope to be abandoned.’ Nor did he anticipate many problems: ‘The touch of a French sword is all that is needed for the framework of mercantile grandeur to collapse.’77 From Cairo in 1798 he sent a letter to Tipu, answering the latter’s pleas for help and outlining his grand strategy:

You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, full of the desire of releasing and relieving you from the iron yoke of England. I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the desire I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation. I wish you could send some sort of intelligent person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I may confer. May the Almighty increase your power, and destroy your enemies!

Yours &c &c

Bonaparte9


_______________

Notes:

* £5,250 today.

* The modern equivalences of these sums are: £2 million = £210 million; £1.3 million = £136 million; £2.4 million = £252 million.

* The modern equivalences of these sums are: £5 million = £525 million today; Rs28 million = £364 million.

** Rs2.5 million = £32.5 million today.

* £3 million = £315 million; Rs300 = £3,900; Rs192 = £2,496; Rs48 = £624; Rs80 = £1,040.

* £195,500 today.

* £390 million today.

* The modern equivalences of these sums are: Rs25 million = £325 million; Rs1.2 million = £15.6 million.
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Re: The Anarchy:The East India Co. Corporate Violence, & Pil

Postby admin » Tue Apr 22, 2025 11:01 pm

Part 1 of 3

9. The Corpse of India

[x]

On 17 May 1798, two days before Napoleon’s fleet slipped out of Toulon and sailed swiftly across the Mediterranean towards Alexandria, a single tall-masted ship, this time a sleek East Indiaman, was tacking into the River Hooghly after seven months at sea. On board was a man who would change the history of India as much as Napoleon would change that of France; indeed, though his name is largely forgotten today, in the next seven years he would conquer more territory in India, and more quickly, than Napoleon conquered in Europe.

When Robert Clive had turned into the same river in December 1756, noting in his letters the point where the waters of the Bay of Bengal took on the distinctive colour of Ganges silt, the only Company men left in Bengal had been the beaten and malaria-stricken refugees from Calcutta, dying in droves amid the Sunderban mangrove swamps at Fulta. Calcutta itself was a ruin. Now, only forty-two years later, Calcutta was one of the largest cities in Asia, the Company completely dominated eastern and southern India and had successfully encircled the entire peninsula. As the passenger looked out from his berth in the roundhouse, he was conscious that he was being sent east specifically to bring this work of corporate conquest and consolidation to its climax.

This was his first glimpse of Bengal and he was excited by what he saw: ‘Nothing could equal the magnificence of my approach,’ he wrote to his wife on his arrival. ‘For nearly three miles the river, which is as large as the Thames at London, is bordered by lovely, well-built country houses with porticoes and colonnades. The town is a mass of superb palaces in the same style, with the finest fortress in the world. The green of the lawns surpasses anything you have ever seen … an extraordinary effect in so hot a country. The trees are more beautiful, their foliage more luxuriant, than in any European country … Arthur met us a few miles from the town, and on arrival at the fort I was saluted with a salvo of artillery.’1

The passenger was the new Governor General, Richard, Marquess Wellesley;2 ‘Arthur’ was his younger brother, who had also recently been posted to India, and who would, in time, eclipse Richard and be ennobled as the Duke of Wellington. Between them, the two would transform both India and Europe.

There was nothing inevitable about this. The brothers were neither great noblemen nor distinguished politicians and they possessed no great fortune. They came from minor, provincial Anglo-Irish Protestant stock; their main assets were their steely self-confidence, quick brains and extraordinary chutzpah. Like Clive before them, they were both aggressive and autocratic pragmatists who believed that offence was the best form of defence; like him they seemed to lack self-doubt and managed to remain undaunted by odds which would terrify more anxious, or sensitive, men.

At this stage in their lives, it was Richard, not Arthur, who was the star of the family. He had entered the House of Commons at twenty-four, was soon made a Lord of the Treasury and became close friends with the Prime Minister, William Pitt. Now, at the age of thirty-seven, when he stepped ashore at Calcutta to succeed Lord Cornwallis as Governor General of the Company’s possessions in India, Richard Wellesley was an unusually self-possessed young man with a high forehead, thick, dark eyebrows and a prominent Roman nose. He had deep-set, compelling blue eyes and a firm chin, the prominence of which was emphasised by his three-quarter-length sideburns. There was a purposeful set to his small mouth and an owlish gleam in his expression that hinted at his brilliance, and perhaps also at his ruthlessness. But there was also a look of suspicion, and even a paranoia there, too, apparent in all his portraits. It was a flaw that he increasingly came to disguise with a mask of extreme arrogance.

Where Wellesley differed quite markedly from his predecessors as Governor General was in his attitude to the Company he was expected to serve. For just as Calcutta was now quite different from the small, battered town familiar to Clive, so the Company was a very different beast from that which Clive had served. In India it might be immeasurably more powerful, with an army now roughly twenty times the size of that commanded by Clive; but in London, Parliament had been steadily chiselling away at its powers and independence, first with Lord North’s Regulating Act of 1773 and then with Pitt’s India Act of 1784. Between them, the two bills had done much to take control of political and military affairs of British India out of the hands of the Company directors in Leadenhall Street and into those of the Board of Control, the government body set up in 1784 to oversee the Company, across town in Whitehall.

Wellesley was, unrepentantly, a government man, and unlike his predecessors made no secret of his ‘utter contempt’ for the opinions of ‘the most loathsome den of the India House’.3 Though he would win the directors a vast empire, he came within a whisker of bankrupting their Company to do so, and it was clear from the beginning that he had set his sights on far more ambitious goals than maintaining the profit margins of the Company he was supposed to serve, but whose mercantile spirit he actually abhorred.

Unknown to the Company’s directors, Wellesley had come out east with two very clear goals in his mind. He was determined to secure India for British rule and was equally determined to oust the French from their last footholds on the subcontinent. In this he was following the bidding of Henry Dundas, the Board of Control’s president, whose Francophobia was transmitted to a receptive Wellesley at a series of lengthy briefings before the new Governor General embarked for India.

In particular Dundas had instructed Wellesley to ‘cleanse’ those pockets of Indian princely power that had been ‘contaminated’ by French influence – namely the courts of Tipu Sultan of Mysore, Nizam Ali Khan of Hyderabad and those of that network of rival chiefs that ruled the great Maratha Confederacy – all of whom had raised sepoy armies trained by French mercenaries and renegades, and all of which could, potentially, be used against the British and in favour of the French. At a time of national crisis, when Britain was at war not only with France but also with Holland and Spain; when its last ally – Austria – had just laid down her arms; when a naval mutiny had broken out in the Channel Fleet; and when Napoleon was drawing up plans for seaborne invasions of both Ireland, then on the verge of rebellion, and the English south coast, this was not something the British government was prepared to tolerate.4

Wellesley’s ideas about the renewed French threat to the Company in India came into much closer focus when, halfway through his outward voyage, his ship docked on the Cape to refit. There, at the end of January 1798, he had met a senior Company diplomat who was taking the waters at the Cape mineral baths to treat his gout and attempt to recover his shattered health. Major William Kirkpatrick was as much a Francophobe as Wellesley, but unlike the new Governor General knew India intimately, having spent all his adult life there, latterly serving as Company Resident in both Delhi and Hyderabad. There he had come into direct contact with the French mercenaries Wellesley was determined to defeat and expel.

Wellesley had initially asked Major Kirkpatrick to provide written answers to a range of questions about the French troops employed by the Nizam of Hyderabad, notably a battalion ‘commanded by a Frenchman by the name of Raymond’ and officered by ‘Frenchmen of the most virulent and notorious principles of Jacobinism … an armed French party of great zeal, diligence and activity … The basis of a permanent French faction in India.’5 The answers he received so impressed him, that he not only forwarded them, unedited, to Dundas, he also begged Kirkpatrick to abandon the plans he had been making to return to England, and to take up a job at his side in Calcutta, as his Military Secretary.

Over the course of Wellesley’s days in the Cape, the two remained cloistered as Kirkpatrick briefed his new boss on his perceptions of the French threat, and what steps the new Governor General could take to contain it. He told him of the well-equipped French-commanded Maratha sepoy battalions which had been trained up for Scindia by the brilliant Savoyard general Benoît de Boigne. De Boigne had now retired to Europe and handed over his battalions to a far less formidable commander named General Pierre Perron, but Kirkpatrick had witnessed the skills of the army he had created, and particularly its ruthlessly efficient artillery divisions. Three years earlier, in March 1795, he had been present when the Nizam of Hyderabad’s army had disintegrated under their fire at the Battle of Khardla. Kirkpatrick was under no illusions about the formidable nature of Scindia’s new army, which was now almost indistinguishable from that of the Company in uniform, drill, weaponry and even in its sepoys’ ethnic and caste backgrounds.

Wellesley was especially alarmed to hear about the degree to which the army of Tipu Sultan, the Company’s most implacable and relentless enemy, had fallen into the hands of a body of 500 Revolutionary French mercenaries, advisers, technicians and officers. Kirkpatrick told him how, in May 1797, Tipu’s French troops had gone as far as establishing a Revolutionary Jacobin club in Srirangapatnam: ‘The National Flag [the Tricolour] was hoisted to the sound of artillery and musketry of the camp’, while symbols of the pre- Revolutionary Bourbon monarchy were burned. Republican hymns were sung during the subsequent planting of ‘the Liberty Tree’ – a sort of Jacobin maypole – and while the tree was crowned with a ‘Cap of Equality’, the assembly ‘swore hatred of all Kings, except Tipoo Sultan, the Victorious, the Ally of the Republic of France, to make war on tyrants and to love towards the motherland as well as the land of Citizen Prince Tipoo’. Finally, they took a solemn oath to support the Republican constitution, ‘or die at arms … to live free or die!’6

At the end of the ceremony, the French corps marched to the Srirangapatnam parade ground, where the Citizen Prince awaited them. As they approached, Tipu ordered a salute from 2,300 cannon, 500 rockets and all the musketry his troops could muster. ‘Behold,’ announced Citizen Tipu, ‘my acknowledgement of the Standard of your country, which is dear to me and to which I am allied; it shall always be carried aloft in my country, as it has been in our sister Republic! Go, conclude your festival!’7

Wellesley’s greatest fear was that the different French mercenary units could unite to challenge the Company if war broke out again with Tipu. He wrote to London how

in the present weak state of the Nizam of Hyderabad’s Government, the French corps in his service would openly join with Tipu Sultan, and by a sudden blow, endeavour to seize the Nizam’s territories, and to secure them to the dominion of France, under an alliance with Tipu Sultan. The interest and inclination of Scindia, who also entertains a large army in his service under the command of a French officer, would lead him to engage with Tipu Sultan and the French. The junction which might thus be effected between the French officers, with their several corps in the respective services of the Nizam, Scindia and Tipu, might establish the power of France upon the ruin of the states of Pune and of the Deccan.8


As soon as he arrived in Calcutta, Wellesley began drawing up plans to send troops south to take on this threat. But his plans greatly accelerated when, on 8 June, he read in a Calcutta newspaper of a declaration, issued in Mauritius by the island’s French Governor General, M. Malartic. This publicised the intention of Tipu to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the French and ‘that he only waits for the moment when the French shall come to his assistance to declare war on the English, whom he ardently wishes to expel from India’.9

From that moment, Tipu’s fate was sealed. Wellesley’s priority was now to eradicate all traces of French influence before any French military expedition could arrive. In June he wrote to General Harris, the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, who was a veteran of Cornwallis’s campaign against Tipu, announcing his decision to ‘call upon our allies without delay and assemble the army on the coast with all possible expedition’, with a view to ‘striking a sudden blow against Tippoo before he can receive foreign aid’.10

By early August, Wellesley had completed his war plan. This he transmitted to Dundas in London, outlining ‘measures … most advisable for the purpose of frustrating the united efforts of Tippoo Sultan and of France’.11 As far he was concerned, Tipu was now a proven enemy and predator and must be immediately crushed: ‘The evidence of meditated hostility is complete,’ he wrote. ‘While professing the most amicable disposition, bound by subsisting treaties of peace and friendship, and unprovoked by an offence on our part, Tipu Sultan has manifested a design to effect our total destruction.’12

First, however, Wellesley decided to deal with Raymond’s French Revolutionary force in Hyderabad.

[x]

Although many of Wellesley’s writings at this period have an air of Francophobe paranoia to them, the new Governor General was in fact quite correct about the potential threat posed to the Company by Raymond. As a recently discovered cache of papers has shown, Raymond was indeed in correspondence both with the French officers of de Boigne’s corps in Scindia’s service and those working for Tipu at Srirangapatnam, where Raymond had himself been employed before entering the Nizam’s service.

Raymond’s ambitions are revealed in the series of passionately patriotic letters he wrote in the early 1790s to the French headquarters at Pondicherry, pledging his loyalty to France and the Revolution: ‘I am ready to sacrifice all,’ he wrote to the Governor of Pondicherry, ‘if I am so fortunate that circumstances may ever put it in my power to prove the zeal for my country which animates me.’ To the Governor of Mauritius, he was even more explicit about his intentions: ‘I shall always follow as my first duty whatever [orders] you wish to give me … If ever I can be useful to France I am ready to pour my blood once more for her. I labour only to discharge this duty and gain your good opinion.’13

James Achilles Kirkpatrick, the new British Resident in Hyderabad, upon whom the job of ousting the French corps devolved, was the younger brother of Wellesley’s new Military Secretary. His task was far from easy. Raymond’s personal income was vast – his estates on their own yielded Rs500,000 a year[a] – and in the early months of 1798 Raymond had persuaded the Nizam again to increase the size of his force, this time to over 14,000 men, with their own bespoke gun foundry and a complete train of artillery, drawn by a force of 5,000 of its own bullocks. The corps manufactured its own swords, muskets and pistols, besides its excellent artillery; there was even a small cavalry group numbering 600. To make matters worse Raymond was personally very popular with the Hyderabad court. The heir apparent, Sikander Jah, was so taken with the Frenchman that he went as far as swearing ‘by the head of Raymond’.14

Then, on the morning of 25 March 1798, Raymond was found dead, aged only forty-three; there was gossip that the cause may have been poison, possibly administered by the pro-Company faction in the durbar. Whatever the truth, the sudden death of Raymond gave Kirkpatrick his chance. It helped that one of the Nizam’s ministers, Mir Alam, had recently visited Calcutta and been astonished by the size and scale of the Company’s barracks and arms factories, and that other senior officials in the Hyderabad durbar were equally convinced that the Company was the rising power in India. They argued that an alliance was essential for the safety of Hyderabad, surrounded as it was by two much more powerful neighbours, Tipu’s Mysore to the south and the Marathas in Pune, immediately to the west.

Six months later, after weeks of hard negotiation, a secret treaty was signed, bringing Hyderabad and the Company into a close military alliance: 6,000 Company troops were to be resident in Hyderabad and available for the Nizam’s protection. In return the Nizam was to pay the Company an annual subsidy of £41,710,b and to dismiss the French corps. Exactly how or when this was to be done, however, was not made clear in the Treaty.

Following the signing, an uneasy month passed as the new Company force of four battalions, along with a train of artillery, made its way slowly up the 150 miles from the coast near Guntur. This was the nearest Company-controlled town, where Wellesley had ordered them to collect two months earlier, in readiness to march on Hyderabad.15

Before first light on 22 October, the EIC troops quietly encircled the French cantonments, arranging their guns on the ridge above the French lines, not far from where a classical Greek temple and obelisk had just been raised as a memorial for Raymond. They achieved complete surprise. When dawn broke, the French corps woke up to find itself surrounded. At nine o’clock Kirkpatrick offered the mutineers payment of all salaries owing if they would surrender. They had ‘one quarter of an hour to stack their arms and march off to a protection flag, which was pitched about half a mile to the right of the camp. If they did not comply, they were immediately to be attacked.’16

For thirty minutes the French corps remained undecided. Two thousand Company cavalry massed on the right flank of the French camp; 500 more waited on the right. In the centre were 4,000 East India Company infantry. There was complete silence. Then, just after 9.30 a.m., to Kirkpatrick’s great relief, the sepoys finally sent out word that they accepted the terms.

The Company cavalry rode in and quickly took possession of the French magazine, store houses, powder mills, gun foundries and cannon, while the French sepoys fled to the flag under which they were to surrender themselves: ‘at once a glorious and piteous sight’, thought Kirkpatrick.17 Within a few hours, the largest French corps in India, more than 14,000- strong, was disarmed by a force of less than a third that number. Not a single shot had been fired, not a single life lost.

Kirkpatrick watched the soldiers laying down their arms all afternoon from the roof of the British Residency. That evening, in a state of mixed exhaustion and elation, he wrote to his brother William that the ‘turning adrift of thousands of Raymond’s troops, all of which I saw this evening from the roof of my house with my spy glasses as plain as if it had been on the spot, was the finest sight I ever saw in my life.’

In a postscript written two hours later, there came even better news: had William heard yet the news, which had just arrived post-haste from Bombay, ‘of Admiral Nelson’s glorious naval action’? In the Battle of the Nile on 1 August, Nelson had sunk almost the entire French fleet in Aboukir Bay, wrecking Napoleon’s hopes of using Egypt as a secure base from which to attack India. It was an amazing turn of events. Ever since news had arrived of Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt, it had looked quite possible that India would be next and might even become a French colony. Now that threat was greatly diminished.18

The operation had been carried out with great skill and Wellesley was delighted. ‘You will enjoy my gentle conquest of an army of 14,000 men under the command of French officers in the service of the Nizam,’ he wrote to Dundas later that month. ‘My despatches do not mention a curious fact, that the standard of this army was the Tricolour flag: the first of that description erected on the Continent of India. This standard has fallen into my hands; and I shall send it home as the best comment upon the whole policy of making an effort to crush the French influence in India.’19

Now with Hyderabad secured, Wellesley was ready to move directly against his principal adversary, Tipu Sultan.

[x]

On 4 November 1798, Wellesley wrote a sarcastic letter to Tipu, telling him of the cataclysmic defeat of his French allies at the Battle of the Nile: ‘Confident that from the union and attachment subsisting between us that this intelligence will afford you sincere satisfaction, I could not deny myself the pleasure of communicating it.’20 Tipu replied in kind, penning an apparently friendly but equally disingenuous letter back, telling Lord Wellesley: ‘I am resident at home, at times taking the air, and at times amusing myself with hunting at a spot which is used as a pleasure ground.’21

When Wellesley next wrote, the Company’s alliance with Hyderabad had been secured and the French corps rounded up, and the Governor General was now much more confident of the strength of his position. This time his tone was very different: ‘It is impossible that you should suppose me ignorant of the intercourse between you and the French, whom you know to be inveterate enemies of the Company,’ he wrote. ‘Nor does it appear necessary or proper that I should any longer conceal from you the surprise and concern with which I perceived you disposed to involve yourself in all the ruinous consequences of a connection which threatens to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the Company, and to introduce into your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion and … to destroy the religion which you revere.’22 But Tipu refused to be drawn: ‘Being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt,’ he wrote back, ‘I am accordingly proceeding on another hunting expedition … Always continue to gratify me by friendly letters, notifying your welfare.’23

Wellesley was now busy putting the final touches to his invasion plans. The finances to fight the war were now secure and, having won the support of the Marwari bankers of Bengal, Wellesley sent to Bombay and Madras the vast sum of Rs10 million (£1 million, £130 million today), which he had managed to raise on the Calcutta money market.24 More money came in a timely injection of treasure from Europe.25

He wrote to the Resident in Pune, William Palmer, that he must at all costs get the Marathas to break off relations with Mysore and join the war against Tipu, in accordance with the Triple Alliance signed by Cornwallis. In due course a reluctant Peshwa promised Palmer that the Marathas would honour their commitments and send the Company 25,000 troops – though after much foot-dragging in Pune, these failed to arrive in time for action.26 A message was also sent to the Nizam to call up his troops to assist his new British allies, as had been agreed in the Treaty he and Kirkpatrick had signed five months earlier.

In a process of vilification familiar from more recent Western confrontations with assertive Muslim leaders, Wellesley now stepped up his propaganda against Tipu, who he depicted as ‘a cruel and relentless enemy’, ‘a beast of the jungle’, an ‘intolerant bigot’ with ‘a rooted hatred of Europeans’ who had ‘perpetually on his tongue the projects of Jihad’. This tyrant was also deemed to be an ‘oppressive and unjust ruler … [a]; sanguinary tyrant, a perfidious negociator’, and, above all, a ‘furious fanatic’.27

At the same time he wrote to reassure the Court of Directors that he was not engaged in some vainglorious adventure at their expense: ‘Although I have deemed it my duty to call your armies into the field in every part of India,’ he wrote, ‘my views and expectations are all directed to the preservation of the peace, which in the present crisis cannot otherwise be secured than by a state of forward preparations for war.’28

This letter was as insincere as anything he had ever written to Tipu. For Wellesley had, in reality, absolutely no intention whatsoever of keeping the peace. Instead, he was hugely enjoying the prospect of using the directors’ private army to wage his entirely avoidable war against the French-led forces in India.

[x]

On Christmas Day, 25 December 1798, Lord Wellesley embarked from Calcutta for Madras, so that he could better control affairs from his southern base. He arrived on the last day of 1798, to be greeted by the new Governor of Madras. This was Edward, Lord Clive, the slightly slow-witted son of Robert Clive, whose victory at Plassey thirty-five years earlier had begun the East India Company’s transformation from a trading company to a privately owned imperial power with a standing army and territorial possessions far larger than that of its parent country. After their first meeting, Wellesley wrote that the younger Clive was ‘a worthy, zealous, obedient & gentlemanlike man of excellent temper; but neither of talents, knowledge, habits of business, or firmness equal to his present situation. How the devil did he get here?’29 Henceforth Wellesley more or less ignored his host and busied himself with managing the detail of his onslaught against Tipu without involving Edward Clive in any way.

By this stage, General Harris’s heavy siege train, with its battering rams and mining gear, had already reached Vellore, the last British-held fort before the Mysore frontier. There 20,000 East India Company sepoys, 1,400 elite British grenadiers under Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington, and a battalion of kilted Scottish Highlanders engaged in training exercises, while Harris waited for his orders to advance.30

Tipu had an extremely efficient network of spies and knew exactly what was happening beyond his borders: ‘It has lately come to my ears from report,’ he wrote, ‘that, in consequence of the talk of interested persons, military preparations are on foot.’31 While Lord Wellesley finessed his military plans, Tipu tried, with equal energy, to raise support from the last indigenous armies capable of taking on the Company, warning them that whatever differences they may have had in the past, this was their chance to unite and defeat the British.

On 8 January, James Kirkpatrick reported from Hyderabad that Tipu had written to the Nizam begging forgiveness if he had infringed any treaty and asking for an alliance, claiming that the English ‘intended extirpating all Mussulmans and establishing hat-wearers in their place’.32 Two days later, on 10 January, despatches from Pune reached Wellesley announcing the intelligence that a delegation of Tipu’s ambassadors had also presented themselves at the Maratha court, seeking military assistance.33

Wellesley’s spies reported that Tipu Sultan had even written to Ahmad Shah Durrani’s grandson, Zaman Shah, the ruler of Afghanistan. ‘It ought to be the duty of faithful chiefs to extirpate the infidels by uniting together,’ wrote Tipu, before proposing that, ‘after deposing the pathetic King [Shah Alam,] who has reduced the faith to such a state of feebleness’, they should divide India between them.34 But it was all too late.

Wellesley was now ready and there would be no time for Tipu to create the alliances he needed to protect himself.35 When he was dying, Tipu’s father, Haidar Ali, had advised his son always to make sure he took on the Company in alliance with other Indian rulers; only that way could he be sure of victory. Ambitious and self-confident, Tipu had ignored that advice. Now, when he most needed that assistance, he would fight alone.

Tipu must have known how slim the odds now were of success: his dream book records one about the last-minute arrival of a rescue force ‘of 10,000 Franks [Frenchmen]’, while on 20 December the Sultan was awoken by a nightmare of a vast army of regiments of English Christians with the heads of pigs marching on his capital.36 But he had no intention of backing down. As he is alleged to have said when he heard the news that Wellesley’s invasion of his kingdom had begun, ‘I would rather live a day as a lion than a lifetime as a sheep … Better to die like a soldier, than to live a miserable dependant on the infidels, in their list of pensioned rajas and nabobs.’37

[x]

On 3 February 1799, General Harris was ordered to mobilise his troops and ‘with as little delay as possible … enter the territory of Mysore and proceed to the siege of Seringapatam’. The Governor General sent characteristically detailed instructions on how to proceed and ordered that, whatever the circumstances, there were to be no negotiations until the army was standing in front of the walls of Srirangapatnam.38

On 19 February, the four East India Company battalions in Hyderabad under Colonel James Dalrymple, along with the four further battalions of Hyderabadi sepoys and more than 10,000 Hyderabadi cavalry, joined up with General Harris’s Company army. On 5 March, with some 30,000 sheep, huge stocks of grain and 100,000 carriage bullocks trailing behind them, the two armies crossed the frontier into Mysore.39 There followed at least 100,000 camp followers, who outnumbered the combatants by at least four to one. Wellesley believed his army to be ‘the finest which ever took the field in India’; but it was a huge and unwieldy force, and it trundled towards Srirangapatnam at the agonisingly slow place of five miles a day, stripping the country bare ‘of every article of subsistence the country can afford’ like some vast cloud of locusts.40

Having surrendered half his kingdom in 1792, Tipu’s resources were much more limited than they had been during Cornwallis’s campaign, and he realised that his best chance of success lay in concentrating all his troops on his island fortress-capital. He made only two brief sorties, one against a small British force from Bombay as it passed through the mountains from Coorg, and another against Harris’s main force near Bangalore, where Tipu personally led a spirited cavalry charge. Then he retired behind the great walls of Srirangapatnam to begin strengthening the defences and preparing for the siege.

With only 37,000 troops, he was slightly outnumbered by the allies, but remained a formidable opponent. No one forgot that, in the three previous Anglo-Mysore Wars, Tipu’s forces had frequently defeated the Company. Indeed, two of the most prominent Company commanders in the campaign, Sir David Baird and his cousin James Dalrymple, had both been prisoners of Tipu, having been captured and imprisoned for forty-four long months after the disastrous British defeat at Pollilur in 1780, ‘the most grievous disaster which has yet befallen British arms in India’.41

By 14 March, Harris’s force had passed Bangalore and taken several key forts in the surrounding hills. Three weeks later, on 5 April, the army finally came within sight of Srirangapatnam. On 6 April, Arthur Wellesley led a failed night attack on some of the outer defences; a party of thirteen Company sepoys was captured by Tipu’s forces and then tortured to death. On the 7th, the siege began.42

With his characteristic ingenuity and tenacity, Tipu showed every sign of resisting. As one British soldier wrote, he ‘gave us gun for gun … [and nighttime skirmishes were] made with desperate exertion … Soon the scenes became tremendously grand; shells and rockets of uncommon weight were incessantly poured upon us from the SW side, and fourteen pounders and grape from the North face of the Fort continued their havoc in the trenches; while the blaze of our batteries, which frequently caught fire … was the signal for the Tiger sepoys [Tipu’s elite forces dressed in tiger-striped uniforms] to advance, and pour in galling vollies of musketry.’ In all, around 120 Frenchmen were taken prisoner, including twenty officers.43

The small French corps, around 450-strong, all wearing Republican cockades and sprigs of laurel, also ‘behaved with great spirit’, sallying out on 22 April to the British positions on the north bank of the island: ‘some of them fell within the entrenchment upon our bayonets, and others were killed close to it.’44

Tipu put up a brave and skilful defence and for some time it appeared that the Company troops were making little headway: ‘the enemy continued during the night to repair their dismantled parapets,’ wrote one officer, ‘and in the morning surprised us with the production of several guns in a new work, embracing the N.W cavalier … Something akin to despondence was now beginning to steal upon the mind; and unless this aspect of affairs soon changed our calculations went to determine that this truly formidable place, manfully defended as it was, would not change masters without extensive blood-shedding.’45

But Wellesley’s army was equipped with unprecedented quantities of heavy artillery, and deployed forty 18-pounders for breaching the walls and seven 8-inch and 5.5-inch howitzers for plunging fire inside the fort’s walls. In addition, there were fifty-seven 6-pounders for fire support for the besieging army against Tipu’s infantry.46 By the end of April, most of Tipu’s guns on the northern and western end of the island had been disabled. By 3 May, the artillery of the Hyderabad contingent felt secure enough to move forward to within 350 yards of the weakest corner of the walls, and by evening a substantial breach was made. Harris set the following day for the assault.47

That morning, after inspecting the breach and bathing, Tipu consulted his Brahmin astrologers. They warned the Sultan of particularly bad omens. Tipu gave them ‘three elephants, two buffaloes, a bullock and a she-goat’, as well as an iron pot full of oil, used for divination, asking them to ‘pray for the prosperity of the Empire’. He now suspected himself doomed.48

At 1 p.m., in the heat of the day, most of Tipu’s sepoys went off to rest for the afternoon. In the Company trenches, David Baird roused himself and gave his troops ‘a cheering dram and a biscuit, and drew his sword saying, “Men are you ready?” “Yes,” was the reply. “Then forward my lads!”’49 He then jumped out of the trench and led a storming party 4,000-strong into the River Kaveri and across the shallows into the breach. His two columns scrambled over the glacis and into the city, swinging right and left along the ramparts, amid fierce hand-to-hand fighting.

When he heard the news that the assault had finally been launched, Tipu left his lunch in the palace and rode straight to the breach, accompanied by a bodyguard from his elite Lion of God battalion. But by the time he arrived, the Company troops were already well within the walls. There was nothing for him to do but to climb on the battlements and fight for his life. Outnumbered, bravely taking on the overwhelming incoming rush of Company sepoys, he quickly received two bayonet wounds and a glancing musket shot in the left shoulder. His attendants called on him to surrender, but he replied, ‘Are you mad? Be silent.’

Here, between the water gate and the inner ramparts of the fort, Tipu stood to make what even his most hostile British opponents acknowledged was ‘his gallant last stand’.50 A party of redcoats had forced their way between the gates, and one grenadier, seeing a gold buckle sparkling on the waist of the wounded man, tried to grab at it, and received a last fatal sword slash from the Sultan in return. Seconds later, one of his companions shot Tipu at pointblank range, through the temple. After four wars against the Company, over a period of thirty-two years, the Tiger of Mysore finally fell, sword in hand, among the heaps of dead and dying men.51

Within a few hours, the city was in Company hands. That evening, after sunset, Baird was taken to Tipu’s body by one of his courtiers, Raja Khan. ‘The scene was altogether shocking,’ wrote an eyewitness. ‘The numbers of bodies so great, and the place so dark, that it was impossible to distinguish one person from another.’ They had to roll the bodies off the pile, one at a time, checking each face by the flickering light of a lamp. Eventually Baird found Tipu; as chance would have it, his body was only 300 yards from the gate of the prison where Baird had spent his captivity.52

The Sultan’s body lay at the bottom of a heap of dead and wounded, stripped of its jewels. Tipu’s eyes were open and the body was so warm that for a few moments, in the lamplight, Baird wondered whether the Sultan was still alive; but feeling his pulse, he declared him dead: ‘His countenance was in no ways distorted, but had an expression of stern composure,’ wrote Baird.53 ‘His dress consisted of jackets of fine white linen,’ remembered another eyewitness. Below, he wore ‘loose drawers of flowered silk, with a crimson cloth of silk and cotton round his waist; a handsome pouch with a red and green silk belt hung over his shoulder; his head was uncovered, his turban being lost in the confusion of the fall; he had an amulet on his arm, but no ornament whatsoever.’c The corpse was placed in a palanquin and taken to the palace. There its identity was confirmed by Tipu’s captured family.54

Already, the Mysore casualties hugely outnumbered those of the allies: some 10,000 of Tipu’s troops were dead as opposed to around 350 of the Company and Hyderabadi sepoys: ‘It would be scarcely possible,’ wrote one British observer, ‘to describe, in adequate terms, the objects of horror, the ghastly spectacle, presented to the senses by the bodies of the slain, in every attitude, and in every direction; lying in the verandas and along the principal street.’55 But the horrors had barely begun.

That night the city of Srirangapatnam, home to 100,000 people, was given over to an unrestrained orgy of rape, looting and killing. Arthur Wellesley told his mother, ‘Scarcely a house in the town was left unplundered, and I understand that in camp jewels of the greatest value, bars of gold etc etc have been offered for sale in the bazaars of the army by our soldiers, sepoys and followers. I came in to take command of the army of the morning of the 5th and with the greatest exertion, by hanging, flogging etc etc, in the course of that day I restored order …’56

At 4.30 that afternoon, the Sultan’s funeral procession wound its way slowly and silently through crowds of weeping survivors. People lined the streets, ‘many of whom prostrated themselves before the body, and expressed their grief by loud lamentations’.57 Eventually the cortège reached the white, onion-domed tomb of Haidar Ali in the Lal Bagh garden.

Here Tipu was laid to rest next to his father, ‘immediately consecrated by his Mahomedan followers as a Shahid, or Martyr of the Faith … with the full military honours due to his exalted rank’.58 The British, all of whom had during the campaign been force-fed on Wellesley’s propaganda that Tipu was a brutal tyrant, were surprised to discover how much his people, both Hindu and Muslim, clearly loved him, just as they had been surprised to see how prosperous his kingdom was – ‘well-cultivated, populous with industrious inhabitants, cities newly founded and commerce extending’ – and how popular he was with his personal staff: ‘numbers of his confidential Hindoo servants who during the war fell into our hands, acknowledged him to be a lenient and indulgent master.’59

Meanwhile, the Prize Committee, whose job it was to distribute the booty, began to amass what was left of Tipu’s possessions and the contents of his treasury. They were astonished by what they found: ‘The wealth of the palace, which was sufficiently dazzling to the eyes of many who were much more habituated to the sight of hoarded treasure than we were, seemed, at that moment, in specie, and jewels, and bullion, and bales of costly stuff, to surpass all estimate.’60

In all, around £2 million [d] of gold plate, jewellery, palanquins, arms and armour, silks and shawls were accumulated: ‘everything that power could command, or money could purchase.’61 The most magnificent object of all was Tipu’s gold throne, inlaid with precious stones and with bejewelled tiger head finials ‘superbly decorated … [It took the form of a] howdah supported on the back of a Tyger, the solid parts made of black wood, and entirely covered by a sheet of purest gold, about as thick as a guinea, fastened on with silver nails, and wrought in tiger stripes, curiously indented, and most beautifully and highly polished.’62

Unable to decide who to award it to, the Prize Agents cut it up into small pieces, so destroying one of the great wonders of eighteenth-century India. Arthur Wellesley was the first to lament its loss, writing to the directors that ‘it would have given me pleasure to have been able to send the whole throne entire to England but the indiscreet zeal of the prize agents of the army had broken that proud monument of the Sultan’s arrogance into fragments before I had been appraised even of the existence of such a trophy.’63

Such was the notoriety of the bloody looting of Srirangapatnam that it later inspired Wilkie Collins’ pioneering detective novel, The Moonstone. This opens at the fall of the city when the narrator’s cousin, John Herncastle, seizes ‘the Yellow Diamond … a famous gem in the native annals of India [once] set in the forehead of the four-handed Indian God who typifies the Moon’. To do this Herncastle, ‘a torch in one hand, and a dagger dripping with blood in the other’, murders the Moonstone’s three guardians, the last of whom tells him as he dies that the diamond’s curse will follow Herncastle to his grave: ‘The Moonstone will have its vengeance yet on you and yours!’ In the course of the novel, the diamond brings death and bad luck to almost everyone who comes into contact with the gem, before being seized back by the stone’s mysterious Hindu guardians – something that has yet to happen with the real loot of Srirangapatnam.64

For the cream of Tipu’s treasures were later collected by Clive’s daughterin- law, Henrietta, Countess of Powis, when she made a pleasure trip through southern India the following year. She was bored by the company of her husband, Edward Clive, the dim new Governor of Madras, and she left him to his new job at Governors House while she toured Tipu’s former lands of Mysore. Whenever she came to a Company cantonment, she found herself surrounded by infantrymen longing to swap their share of the jewelled loot of Srirangapatnam for cash. She was happy to oblige. In this way, with very little outlay, she casually accumulated one of Europe’s most impressive collections of Indo-Islamic art. In due course it made its way back to the Clive seat of Powis, where it was put on display beside the loot collected, forty years earlier, from the Murshidabad palace of Siraj ud-Daula. There it remains.

In the political settlement that followed, Tipu’s sons were despatched to exile in the fort of Vellore and most of the best lands of the state of Mysore were divided between the Company and the Nizam of Hyderabad. The rump was returned to the Hindu Wadyar dynasty whose throne Haidar and Tipu had usurped. A five-year-old child from the dynasty was found living ‘in a state of misery … in kind of stable with sheds attached to it’.65 The boy was informed he was now Raja, and, after a brief ceremony, was given charge of a reduced Mysore state, carefully watched over by a British Resident. The Wadyars in due course moved their capital back to Mysore and Srirangapatnam was left a ruin. It never recovered.

Today a small village squats beside the foundations of Tipu’s former palace, and goats graze in his once magnificent pleasure grounds. Other than the majestic French-designed fortifications, the best-preserved building in Tipu’s former capital is, ironically, the ancient Hindu Sri Ranganatha temple, after which Tipu’s capital was named, and which was not just protected by Tipu but loaded with the valuable gifts which are still on display today, as are all its beautiful Vijayanagara-era images. Not one of these has suffered from the iconoclast’s chisel, despite standing in the middle of the capital of a ruler denounced by his British enemies as a fanatical ‘intolerant bigot’.

Today most of Tipu’s capital is grazing land, and very little remains as witness of the former splendour of the kingdom of the Tiger of Mysore, the single Indian ruler who did more than any other to resist the onslaught of the Company.

[x]

‘Ladies and gentlemen,’ said Lord Wellesley, raising a glass, when the news of Tipu’s death was brought to him, ‘I drink to the corpse of India.’66

In less than two years, Wellesley had managed to disarm the largest French force in India, and to defeat and destroy the second largest. Now only the French-commanded corps of the Marathas stood between him and complete mastery of peninsular India. Further conflict was, sooner or later, inevitable.

The Marathas still controlled great swathes of western, central and southern India – very much more of the country than was then held by the Company. Had they been able to form a united front they could yet have reemerged as the pre-eminent power in India; but their forces were now more hopelessly divided than ever, and this was something Wellesley took the greatest pleasure in exploiting.

The final act of the great Maratha Confederacy opened with the death, on 13 March 1800, of its veteran Prime Minister, the brilliant Nana Phadnavis, who had controlled Maratha diplomacy and administration for a quarter of a century.67 Nana, ‘the Maratha Machiavelli’, had been one of the first to realise the existential threat posed by the Company to all independent Indian rulers and it was he who in the 1780s had stitched together the first Triple Alliance with a view to expelling the Company from India.

He had worked equally hard to keep the different parts of the Confederacy together. Tragically for the Marathas, he was the last of the talented generation that came to prominence after the catastrophic Maratha defeat at the Battle of Panipat in 1761, and his death came at the end of a five-year period, 1795–1800, which had also seen the loss of the Peshwa and the senior members of the houses of Scindia and Holkar. ‘With the death of the great Minister Nana Phadnavis,’ wrote the British Resident at Pune, General Palmer, ‘all the wisdom and moderation of the Maratha government departed.’68 Wellesley needed to do very little: he could just sit back in Calcutta and watch as the great Confederacy fell apart.
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Re: The Anarchy:The East India Co. Corporate Violence, & Pil

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Part 2 of 3

In Nana’s absence, the three ambitious but quarrelsome and inexperienced teenagers who had between them inherited the leadership of Confederacy – the new Peshwa, Baji Rao II; the new head of the house of Scindia, Daulat Rao; and the new chief of the house of Holkar, Jaswant Rao – were now free to conspire and intrigue against each other unchecked. Just as Wellesley was beginning to move the troops of the increasingly well-armed, well-financed and aggressively militaristic Company with great subtlety around the subcontinental chessboard, the Marathas found themselves hopelessly stuck deep in a swamp of internal conflict. They could only hope to win against the Company if they stood united. With every passing day, however, that unity was becoming more and more elusive.69

The politics of north India had long been dominated by the old, hereditary feud between the Scindia and Holkar dynasties; now it passed down a generation, growing in bitterness and violence as it did so. When Mahadji Scindia had died in 1794, his successor, Daulat Rao, was only fifteen. The boy inherited the magnificent army that Benoît de Boigne had trained up for his predecessor, but he showed little vision or talent in its deployment. General Palmer, who was the Company’s most experienced observer of Maratha politics, had greatly admired Mahadji Scindia; but he was not impressed by his successor. He described him as a ‘profligate young man … weak [and] totally destitute of decency or principle’.

His revenues have declined rapidly, while his army has been unnecessarily augmented & he is now more than a crore [10 million rupees, £130 million today] in arrears to his troops, though he has received five crores by the most shameless oppression and robbery since he came to the musnud [throne]. The fidelity of his European officers & their corps have so far prevented his deposal, but they cannot save him much longer … He is totally ignorant of his own affairs & incapable of understanding his own true interests, has not the smallest regard to honour or character, nor the least benevolence of mind. His servants take every advantage of these defects, and his government is a scene of confusion, fraud & rapine.70


It did not help that the new Peshwa, Baji Rao II, was equally young and inexperienced: his character, thought Palmer, ‘is not better than Scindia’s, but he wants the power to do as much mischief. In his private demeanour, however, he is decent while Scindia is quite abandoned. I have had a very troublesome and mortifying part to act here [in Pune] with two young men who neither understand their own good, nor the rights of others.’71

Baji Rao, a slight, timid, unconfident-looking boy of twenty-one with a weak chin and a downy upper lip, quickly showed himself comprehensively unequal to the challenge of holding together the different factions that made up his power base. Moreover, both he and Scindia were on irreconcilably hostile terms with the third principal Maratha power broker, Jaswant Rao Holkar, the one-eyed ‘Bastard of Indore’.

The Peshwa’s traditional role was to act as mediator between the different Maratha warlords and to bring them together. But in April 1802, Baji Rao managed instead, quite unnecessarily, to initiate a new blood feud with the Holkars. When Jaswant Rao’s elder brother Vitoji was unexpectedly captured by the Peshwa’s troops, the gleeful Baji Rao hung him in chains and sentenced him to suffer a flogging of 200 strokes, followed by a lingering death, tied to the foot of an elephant. In this manner, Vitoji was dragged screaming around the palace, while Baji Rao looked on, giggling, from a palace terrace.72 Shortly afterwards Baji Rao invited Nana Phadnavis’s former allies and supporters to the palace and there charged them with conspiracy and had them all arrested.73

As the epithet suggests, Jaswant Rao was the illegitimate son of Tukoji Holkar by a concubine. On the accession of his legitimate half-brother, Jaswant Rao had become a fugitive and set off into the jungle with a band of similarly desperate armed outlaws, living hard and moving fast in the badlands surrounding Indore. Following Vitoji’s murder, having invoked the assistance of the family deity at Jejuri, and buoyed by his reputation as a courageous and resourceful leader, with the help of a tribe of 200 loyal Bhil warriors, Jaswant marched on his brother’s fortress of Maheshwar, and had himself crowned as his successor.

There, on 31 May, Jaswant Rao Holkar vowed vengeance on those he held responsible for his brother’s murderers. He first turned his attention to Scindia, setting off almost immediately to raid his enemy’s territory and plunder and burn down his palaces. The two rivals spent much of 1801 fighting each other to a standstill across the hills and battlefields of central India as their armies marched and counter-marched between Ujjain and Burhanpur, haemorrhaging men with every inconclusive engagement. According to the chronicler Munna Lal, ‘The other commanders of the Deccan, who could see things as they really were, strove to make peace with Jaswant Rao, saying that mutual hatred between us Marathas is a disgrace: prosperity arises from unity, while discord will bring about our ruin. But as the times were not favourable, their good advice made no impact. Day by day, the flames of discord burned ever more violently.’74

Finally, Jaswant Rao crossed the Godavari, marched south and headed for Pune with his army. The Peshwa, desperate for allies, turned to the only force still in play after the death of Tipu. He summoned the British Resident and asked for an alliance.

This was Wellesley’s chance further to divide the Maratha Confederacy and to paralyse its war machine. He offered Baji Rao the same terms he had just offered the Nizam: a defensive alliance and a permanent garrison of Company sepoys to be stationed for his protection in Pune, in return for a large annual cash payment. The Peshwa accepted the terms; but before any Company troops could arrive to protect him, he and Scindia had to face Holkar’s army, which was now rapidly advancing on Pune.

On Sunday 25 October 1802, the feast of Diwali, the two armies faced each other across a wide wooded valley at Hadaspur, a few miles from the Maratha capital. The battle began at half past nine in the morning with a prolonged artillery duel. It continued indecisively until, soon after one o’clock, Jaswant Rao personally led a massed cavalry charge on Scindia’s guns, ‘like a tiger on a herd of deer’. He was seriously wounded in the charge, but won a decisive victory.75 Long before the battle was finally lost, and 5,000 of his men were killed, the frightened and bewildered Baji Rao had fled.

For a month, the young Peshwa moved with his bodyguard from one hillfort to another, avoiding Jaswant Rao’s patrols. For a while he hid in the fortress of Sinhagarh, south of Pune, before making his way to the spectacular and craggily inaccessible hilltop fort of Raigad, where the first great Maratha, Shivaji, had been crowned and from where he had defied the Mughal armies of Aurangzeb. All the while, Baji Rao kept in close touch with his new Company allies, who soon put into action a rescue operation.

From Raigad, the Peshwa was instructed to make his way towards the sea coast, where he took shelter in the old pirate stronghold of Suvarnadurg. Shortly afterwards, he was picked up by the HMS Herculean, commanded by Wellesley’s emissary, Captain Kennedy. Baji Rao and his men were fed and entertained, and two lakh rupeese in gold provided for their personal use. A fortnight later, on 16 December, the sloop docked, to artillery salutes, at Bassein – modern Vassai – the former Portuguese trading post a little to the north of Bombay: an extraordinary crumbling city full of decaying Jesuit churches and overgrown Dominican convents, all slowly beginning to return to the jungle, with mighty banyan trees corkscrewing through the broken baroque pediments and collapsing cloisters.

Here Baji Rao signed a treaty of alliance with the Company, which he now acknowledged to be the Marathas’ overlord. A large British garrison would be installed in a new barracks to overlook the Peshwa’s palace in Pune, where British arms would now reinstall him.

The document, known as the Treaty of Bassein, was ratified on the last day of the year, 31 December 1802. When Holkar learned the details of the terms, he declared, simply: ‘Baji Rao has destroyed the Maratha state. Now the British will deal the same blow to it that they did to Tipu Sultan.’76

With the Treaty of Bassein, Wellesley believed he had succeeded, bloodlessly, in turning the Marathas into dependants of the Company, just as he had the Nizam. Other more experienced observers were less sure. As soon as he heard the details of the treaty, the Resident in Hyderabad, James Kirkpatrick, wrote an official despatch from Hyderabad warning that not one of the Maratha warlords – the real powers in the Peshwa’s dominions – would sit back and allow the English to control Baji Rao as their puppet. He predicted that Wellesley’s actions, instead of bringing peace, would succeed in uniting the Marathas where Baji Rao himself had failed, and that together the Maratha armies would now mass in a ‘hostile confederacy’ to fight the Company.

Wellesley was predictably furious at what he regarded as Kirkpatrick’s impertinence. He wrote an intemperate reply to Hyderabad, saying that any sort of united Maratha resistance was now ‘categorically impossible’ and that the Resident was guilty of ‘ignorance, folly, and treachery’ in suggesting otherwise. But Kirkpatrick held his ground, replying that his sources of intelligence indicated that ‘such a confederacy was highly probable’, that Holkar was even now on his way to occupy Pune, and that another of the leading Maratha chieftains, Raghuji Bhosle, the Raja of Berar, was planning to join him there.

Kirkpatrick was correct. Within months, the Company would once again be at war, and this time against the largest, best armed and most tightly trained forces they had ever faced.

[x]

The last survivor of the older generation of rulers was the Emperor Shah Alam. Now seventy-five, the old, blind king still sat on the gilt replica of the Peacock Throne amid his ruined palace, the sightless ruler of a largely illusory empire.

The Emperor had outlived all his enemies – Nader Shah, Imad ul-Mulk, Clive, Carnac, Shuja ud-Daula, Ghulam Qadir – but this was really his only victory. In old age, he was at least realistic about his failures, telling his heir apparent, Akbar Shah, that from the day that he arrived back in Delhi he was a ruler in name only. He was merely a high-class prisoner, he said, and his sons should not consider themselves more than that.77

Mahadji Scindia, who had at least showed an intermittent interest in the welfare of the Emperor, had died in 1794 and his successor, Daulat Rao, was completely indifferent to his nominal position as Mughal Vakil-i-Mutlaq, or Vizier. He had still less interest in maintaining the Mughal court which lay in the far north of his dominions, and which he never visited after ascending the musnud. So while the Emperor remained under nominal Maratha protection, with a Maratha garrison resident within the Red Fort, the imperial family lived in poverty, neglected by their keepers.

These were a group of French officers led by Louis Guillaume François Drugeon, a Savoyard aristocrat who was given charge of the Emperor’s person and command of the Emperor’s bodyguard, and Louis Bourquien, a French mercenary of humble origins, who one historian of the Marathas has described as a ‘pastry cook, pyrotechnic and poltroon’. Overall command lay with Scindia’s Commander-in-Chief, General Pierre Perron, the son of a Provençal weaver, who lived with his troops a hundred miles to the southeast in the great fortress of Aligarh.78

Several volumes of the palace diary from the period, the Roznamcha-i- Shah Alam, survive in the British Library and they reveal as no other source the degree to which Mughal court life had been diminished by sheer lack of resources. We hear how one prince was caught stripping out pieces of marble and inlaid semi-precious stones from the floor of the Asad Burj tower ‘for the purpose of sale. He was summoned by His Majesty and warned against committing such malicious activities.’ A princess got into a dispute with the king over the interest on some jewels she had been forced to mortgage. A concubine was accused of stealing the ornaments of Nawab Mubarak Mahal. The royal children complained their salaries had not been paid; the more distant royal cousins made a bid to escape from the Salatin Cage, claiming they were not receiving adequate food and were near starvation. The king replied that ‘due to the infirm state of the Empire, it was necessary for the Princes to be contented with whatever the Masters of Pune [the Marathas] provide for expenditure’.

On one especially telling occasion, the blind king had to reprimand the royal servants when a visiting Maratha chief threw a handful of coins on the floor of the audience hall, and all the attendants, abandoning court decorum, scrambled to grab them, some even breaking into fist fights within the Diwan-i-Am. Meanwhile, petitioners from the city complained about raids by Gujjars within the walls, and by the Sikhs on the outer suburbs.79

Shah Alam was also alarmed by the reports he heard of the violence and instability generated by the Maratha civil war, and blamed Daulat Rao: ‘His Majesty expressed deep regret at these developments,’ reported his biographer, Munna Lal, ‘saying “this ill-omened one now strives to sow disunity among his companions. With such ugly and inappropriate behaviour, he saws off the branch he’s sitting on. It will all end in scandal and disaster.”’80

Frustrated by the ways of this world, the Emperor looked more and more to the world of the spirit. When a celebrated dervish arrived from Lahore, the imperial princes were sent out to the gates of the city to welcome him. On one occasion, it was reported that a concubine ‘saw in a dream that if His Majesty paid a visit to Qadam Sharif and ordered a red cow to be released to wander free, the situation in the Empire would improve’. The Emperor gave orders that both should be done.81

Shah Alam’s one remaining pleasure was his literary work. He spent much of his free time in his seventies editing his lifetime’s poetic composition, from which he produced a single volume of his favourite verses, and the Nadirat-i-Shahi, Diwan-i-Aftab. He also dictated what scholars hold to be the first full-length novel in Delhi Urdu, a massive and ambitious 4,000-page work called the Ajaib ul-Qasas. This dastan (story) is a meditation on kingship and tells the story of a prince and princess tossed back and forth by powers beyond their control, from India to Constantinople via various magical islands and fairy and demonic realms. While the prince’s sense of helplessness in the hands of fate reflects Shah Alam’s experience, the lavish courtly settings of the dastan contrast with the impoverished reality of Shah Alam’s daily life under the neglectful regime of the younger Scindia.

Daulat Rao may not have realised the value of controlling the elderly Mughal Emperor, but Lord Wellesley certainly did. He understood the vital distinction that, while Shah Alam may not have commanded any significant military power, he still held substantial symbolic authority, and that his decisions instantly conferred legality. ‘Notwithstanding His Majesty’s total deprivation of real power, dominion, and authority,’ he wrote, ‘almost every state and every class of people in India continue to acknowledge his nominal sovereignty. The current coin of every established power is struck in the name of Shah Alam …’82

As it became clear by the end of June 1803 that Scindia was not going to accept the Treaty of Bassein, and that war was now unavoidable, Wellesley began drawing up detailed plans to invade Hindustan and seize both its ancient Mughal capital and its emperor. Having brought about ‘the destruction of M. Perron’s force’, he would, he wrote, ‘invade Scindia’s possessions and make alliances with the Rajputs’.83 ‘I will seize Agra and Delhi,’ he told his brother Arthur, and thus ‘take the person of the Mogul into British protection … at the earliest practical moment.’84 This would be the moment when the Company finally, both symbolically and in substance, came to replace the Mughals and the Marathas as the paramount rulers of India.

The British had long used Shah Alam’s confidant, Sayyid Reza Khan, as a discreet channel of communication with the Emperor, and now Wellesley decided to send a secret letter to Shah Alam, offering him asylum and opening negotiations to take the Mughals back under Company care for the first time since the Emperor had left Allahabad thirty years earlier, in 1772: ‘Your Majesty is fully apprised of the sentiments of respect and attachment which the British Government has invariably entertained towards your Royal Person and Family,’ he began in his usual style, mixing flattery, sarcasm and half-truths. ‘The injuries and indignities to which your Majesty and your illustrious family have been exposed since the time when your Majesty unhappily transferred the Protection of your person to the Power of the Maratha State, have been a subject of unceasing concern to the Honourable Company.’

I have deeply regretted that the Circumstances of the times have hitherto not been conducive to the interposition of British Power for the purpose of affording your Majesty effectual relief from injustice, rapacity and inhumanity. In the present Crisis of Affairs, it is probable that your Majesty may have the opportunity of again placing yourself under the Protection of the British Government, and I shall avail myself of any event which may enable me to obey the Dictates of my Sincere respect and Attachment to your Royal House.85


Wellesley’s Commander-in-Chief, Lord Lake, was instructed to ‘show His Majesty every demonstration of reverence, respect and attention and every degree of regard for the comfort of His Majesty and the Royal Family’, and to assure him ‘that adequate Provision will be made for the support of your Majesty and of your family and Household’. It sounded generous, although the following paragraph hinted at Wellesley’s actual intentions, when he suggested that the Emperor might prefer to leave the Red Fort and reside closer to Calcutta, at the modestly provincial fort of Monghyr near Patna.86 But the chivalrous Lord Lake, misunderstanding Wellesley’s meaning, went beyond his superior’s intentions and assumed the tone of a subject rather than that of a friendly protector: ‘I am cordially disposed to render your Majesty every demonstration of my loyalty and attachment,’ he wrote, ‘and I consider it to be a distinguished honour, as it is a peculiar privilege, to execute your Majesty’s commands.’

The subtle difference in tone was not lost on the Emperor.

[x]

Two Company armies, one in the north, the other in the south, were now actively preparing for the coming conflict. In the north, Lake was drilling his men at his forward post, ‘the vast ruins of the ancient city of Kannauj’. This lay close to the Company’s western border with the Marathas, ‘amidst lofty grass, covering the remains of splendid edifices and the tombs of princes, concealing a variety of game, such as wolves, jackals and tigers’.87

At the age of only seventeen, Lake had served close to Frederick the Great, and from him had learned the effectiveness of fast, light, horse-drawn artillery, or, as he called them, ‘galloper guns’. Now he brought this military novelty to India: ‘Two of these guns, six-pounders, were attached to each regiment of horse,’ wrote Major William Thorn, ‘and nothing could exceed the speed and exactness of the manoeuvres made with them at full speed by this large body of cavalry, whose combined movements were conducted with the most perfect order’, something which would soon provoke ‘terror among the Maratha horse’.88 Lake worked his troops hard, but also charmed his army with his lavish evening hospitality. Once war broke out, he would soon need all these reserves of trust and popularity to persuade his troops to face down the magnificent Maratha artillery.

In the south, Lord Wellesley’s younger brother, the newly promoted Major General Arthur Wellesley, was also deep in preparations for the forthcoming war: busy gathering in troops, rice and other provisions at Tipu’s old capital of Srirangapatnam. Here he had earlier absorbed some of Tipu’s troops, artillery and, most important of all, his vast transport machine – 32,000 bullocks and 250,000 strong white Mysore cattle – into his army.89 Like Lake, he put his men through a rigorous training programme, practising crossing fast-flowing rivers with coracles, while in the hills round about he ‘manoeuvred his future army, and taught us that uniformity of movement, which afterwards would enable him to conquer foes twenty times as numerous’.90

In early March 1803 Arthur Wellesley set off to march Peshwa Baji Rao II back into Pune and return him to his throne, now under British protection and the Wellesleys’ own firm control. This he achieved in early April, without firing a shot, as Holkar cautiously withdrew his army north-east, across the Deccan to Aurangabad. Baji Rao resumed his palace life, now less as a Maratha leader than a British puppet, but apparently ‘happy with his routine of baths and prayers, eating, drinking and making merry, having no bother of any outside concern … Sumptuous dinners with profuse decorations for plates are arranged daily. Hot discussion takes place on the selection of dishes …’91

The ease with which Arthur Wellesley achieved this success later led him to underestimate the bravery and skill of the Marathas, laughing at the former Resident, Lieutenant Colonel John Ulrich Collins, who warned him that ‘their infantry and guns will astonish you’. This was a serious mistake; it would not be long before the Maratha armies proved themselves by far the most formidable enemy ever tackled by the Company. One of the major general’s officers, who later remembered Collins’ warning, wrote in his memoirs how ‘riding home afterwards we amused ourselves, the General among the rest, in cutting jokes at the expense of “little King Collins.” We little thought how true his words would soon prove.’92

[x]

While his generals were busy with drilling and training their troops, the Governor General himself was in Calcutta, engaged in finalising the financial and diplomatic support for his forthcoming war.

The Company’s army had expanded very quickly under Wellesley’s rule and within a few years its muster roll had gone up by nearly half from 115,000 to 155,000 men; in the next decade its numbers would rise again to 195,000, making it one of the largest standing European-style armies in the world, and around twice the size of the British army. It had also belatedly recruited an impressive new cavalry arm, mounted on strong European and South African horses. Their job it was to protect the slow-moving and cumbersome infantry and artillery columns from flanking attacks by irregular Indian light horse, as had happened with fatal consequences at Talegaon and Pollilur. This was a form of warfare in which the Marathas were especially skilled.93

Unlike the perennially cash-strapped Warren Hastings, Wellesley had no problem paying for this vastly increased military establishment. After the rural upheavals of Cornwallis’s land reforms had settled down, the Company in Bengal found it had a considerable annual revenue surplus of Rs25 million. In contrast, Scindia was able to realise only Rs1.2 million [f] from his poorly irrigated home base in Malwa. This dependable surplus in turn allowed the Company easy access to credit from the Bengal money market, so much so that under Wellesley, between 1798 and 1806, the Company’s debt in India more than tripled.

The Company was also able efficiently to redistribute these financial resources around India. The bankers of Benares and the west coast house of Gopaldas-Manohardas, both of whom were given the protection of the Company’s army, now began to send representatives to travel with it, supplying cash as required both to the troops themselves and their army paymasters. Indeed, bankers from across India began to compete among themselves to supply the Company army with finance. Two Benares banking houses, Mannu Lal and Beniparshad, went as far as asking for assurances that the Company ‘would honour them with a preference on being permitted to furnish supplies of cash that may be required for the use of the army’.94

Ultimately the East India Company succeeded in war precisely because it had found a way to provide a secure financial base for its powerful mercenary army, and always found it easier than any of its rivals to persuade Indian seths, sahukaras and shroffs quickly to realise the cash needed to pay the army’s salaries and feed its hungry troops. In contrast, as the young Arthur Wellesley noted, ‘there is not a Maratha in the whole country, from the Peshwa down to lowest horseman, who has a shilling’. This was hardly surprising as, by 1801, Arthur had noted that after the devastations of the Maratha civil war, there was ‘not a tree or an ear of corn standing for 150 miles around Pune’.95

Things were just as bad at the Mughal court where a Maratha envoy reported that ‘money is nowhere to be seen’.96 As a result Scindia and Holkar, both enormously in arrears to their troops and with their sahukaras often refusing further loans, found themselves in the same position as an earlier Maratha Peshwa who described himself as having ‘fallen into that hell of being beset by creditors … I am falling at their feet till I have rubbed the skin from my forehead.’97

But Richard Wellesley was far too cunning and ruthless an adversary to rely merely on brute military force or indeed the power of the Company’s money alone. His greatest pleasure always lay in moving his pieces on the chessboard in such a way as to frustrate or hopelessly entrap his enemies.

Messages were sent out to seduce, corrupt and buy the frequently unpaid mercenaries in Maratha service; the Commander-in-Chief of Scindia’s northern forces, General Pierre Perron, who had already invested his life savings of £280,000g in Company stock, was one of the first to show an interest in coming to a mutually beneficial financial arrangement.98 Lake was given authority ‘to conclude any arrangement with M. Perron for the security of his personal interests and property accompanied by any reasonable renumeration which shall induce him to deliver up the whole of his military resources and power into your hands’.99

The gnarled old warrior ascetic Anupgiri Gossain, now known as Himmat Bahadur, was also persuaded to come to terms with his former adversaries and ally his Bundelkhand-based Naga warriors with the Company. This happened despite warnings from one of Wellesley’s intelligence men that ‘Himmat Bahadur is not to be trusted … A native speaking of him said he was like a man who in crossing a river kept a foot in two boats, ready to abandon the one that was sinking.’100

Wellesley also worked hard to keep the warring Maratha armies from patching up their differences. In particular, adopting the old Roman maxim divide et impera, divide and rule, Wellesley did all he could to keep Scindia and Holkar from reconciling. In this he was especially successful.

By the end of June 1803, Holkar had gathered his entire army near Aurangabad but still equivocated about joining the coalition with his brother’s murderers to fight the Company. Here Wellesley’s masterstroke was to send Holkar a captured letter from Scindia in which the latter plotted with Peshwa Baji Rao to overthrow Holkar after the war was over: ‘Let us make a show of satisfying his demands,’ wrote Daulat Rao. ‘After the war is over, we shall both wreak our full vengeance upon him.’101

After receiving this, Holkar, who had just made the first two days’ march towards Scindia, turned back, and firmly declined to join the coalition. Shortly afterwards, he recrossed the Narmada and set off back towards his central Indian base at Maheshwar.102 This allowed Wellesley first to pick off Scindia and his ally Raghuji Bhosle, Raja of Berar, and only later to move his forces against Holkar. This, perhaps more than any other factor, gave the Company its most overwhelming advantage against its still militarily powerful but politically fractured Maratha adversaries.

Behind all these manoeuvres, Wellesley was developing an aggressive new conception of British Empire in India, not as a corporate but as a state enterprise; and it was a vision that was markedly more nationalist and nakedly expansionist than anything his Company predecessors could have dreamed of. On 8 July Sir George Barlow first articulated it in an official memorandum: ‘It is absolutely necessary,’ he wrote, ‘that no Native State should be left to exist in India which is not upheld by the British power, or the political conduct of which is not under its absolute control.’103 It was from this idea of total British government control over the entire Indian peninsula that would grow the British Raj – and with it a future in which Mughal, Maratha and finally even the Company itself would all, in time, give way to the control of the British Crown.

As usual, Wellesley neglected to tell his nominal employers, the Company directors, what he was planning. Already there was growing nervousness in Leadenhall Street about Wellesley’s grandiose style of ruling. When the traveller Lord Valentia arrived in Calcutta he applauded Wellesley’s imperial style, writing that it was better that ‘India be ruled from a palace than a counting house’; but it was Wellesley’s increasingly wasteful and spendthrift use of Company funds that was steadily eroding his support among the directors, and provoking the first discussions about his eventual recall.104 Already the directors were sending shots across Wellesley’s bow, making it quite clear that ‘It by no means appears to us essential to the well-being of our Government in India that pomp, magnificence and ostentation of the Native Governments should be adopted by the former; the expense that such a system would naturally lead must prove highly injurious to our commercial interests.’105

In his usual spirit of dissimulation to his employers, well into 1803 Lord Wellesley was still promising the directors a ‘speedy and hasty conclusion of the late arrangements with His Highness the Peshwa, and of the amicable adjustment of the differences existing among the Maratha chieftains, through the mediation and influence of the British power’.106 Maybe that spring Wellesley really did still hope that Scindia could be intimidated into recognising the Treaty of Bassein, and, like the Nizam and the Peshwa Baji Rao before him, be bullied into accepting the protection of the Company. But as spring gave way to the summer of 1803, such dreams quickly faded, as the increasingly gloomy despatches from his envoy Colonel John Collins confirmed. In July, Wellesley sent Scindia an ultimatum to withdraw north of the Narmada or to face the consequences.

In the end, Daulat Rao Scindia did not back down; instead, like Tipu, he began making preparations for hostilities. On 1 August 1803, he gave Collins a formal declaration of war and dismissed him from his camp.

It took a week for express couriers to carry the news to Calcutta; but only a few hours for Lord Wellesley to give the order for his carefully laid war plans to be immediately put into action on no less than four fronts – with minor thrusts along the coasts of Orissa and Gujarat as well as the two main assaults which were designed to take control of the entire Deccan and all of Hindustan.107

To Scindia and Bhosle, the Governor General wrote a brief note: ‘While we have no desire to open war against you, you two chiefs have given a clear indication of your intention to attack us, since you have collected large forces on the Nizam’s frontiers and you have refused to move away from your positions. You have rejected the hand of friendship I have offered you, and I am now starting hostilities without further parleys. The responsibility is entirely yours.’108

[x]

Major General Arthur Wellesley heard the news of Scindia’s declaration of war on 4 August. On the 6th he broke camp and with 40,000 troops headed off north towards the mighty fortress of Ahmadnagar which he captured on the 11th after a brief bombardment and the payment of a large bribe to the French and Arab mercenaries holding the fort for Scindia. Inside was found large amounts of gunpowder, part of Scindia’s remaining treasure and ample food supplies. Arthur Wellesley garrisoned the fort as his base while he sent scouts out to search for the main Maratha army.

Scindia and Bhosle, meanwhile, had succeeded in bringing their forces together; they then marched their confederated army south to plunder the Nizam’s territories around Aurangabad and draw Wellesley out of the safety of his fortifications. In this they succeeded. Leaving a large garrison behind to guard Ahmadnagar, Wellesley moved eastwards to defend his allies’ territory and stop the Maratha advance. The two armies finally came within sight of one another in the dusty alluvial plain to the north of the Ajanta Pass, in the early morning of 23 September, after Wellesley’s troops had just marched eighteen miles through the night.

The major general had broken his force in two the day before to avoid the delay that would have taken place in sending his whole army through the narrow Ajanta defile; half he had sent off to the west under his deputy, Colonel Stevenson. He therefore had less than 5,000 men – half of them Madrasi sepoys, the other half kilted Highlanders – when he heard from his scouts that Scindia’s camp was only five miles away and that the Marathas were about to move off. His small army was exhausted from their night march. But, worried that his quarry might escape if he waited, Wellesley made an immediate decision to head straight into the attack, without giving his troops time to rest or waiting for the other half of his force.

Reaching the crest of a low hill, the major general saw the two Maratha armies spread out before him, next to the fortified village of Assaye. Their tents and qanats (tented enclosures) extended for as much as six miles along the banks of the shallow Khelna River to near where it reached a confluence with another smaller stream, the Juah. He calculated that there were around 10,000 infantry and around five times that number of irregular cavalry. They were clearly not expecting an attack and their artillery bullocks were out grazing along the riverbank.

Leaving his baggage and stores behind him under guard, Wellesley marched straight forward, as if to make an immediate frontal attack over the river. Then at the last moment he turned eastwards to cross the meandering Khelna at an unguarded ford whose position he had guessed at due to the proximity of two small villages just before it. His guess was a lucky one: the water was between knee and waist high, and Wellesley just managed to get all his troops across without them getting their powder wet. Even so, his artillery had trouble crossing, and several guns got stuck in the mud, leaving his infantry to form up and face the opening salvos of the Maratha bombardment without the protection of artillery cover.

Arthur Wellesley had hoped that the speed and surprise of his movement would leave the Marathas in disarray and allow him to attack their unguarded right flank; but to his surprise he found that Scindia’s troops had managed not only to get themselves into full battle formation but had also skilfully wheeled around to the left in order to face his new direction of attack, all the while maintaining perfect order. This was a difficult manoeuvre that he presumed they would be incapable of, but which they instantly effected with parade-ground precision.

This was only the first in a whole series of surprises in a battle that Arthur Wellesley would later remember as one of the hardest he had ever fought, and altogether tougher than his later confrontation with Napoleon at Waterloo. ‘Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India, excepting our own,’ he wrote afterwards to his friend John Malcolm. ‘I assure you that their fire was so heavy that I doubted at one time if I should be able to induce our troops to advance. All agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably; the sepoys astonished me.’109 A particular shock was Scindia’s heavy field guns which proved just as deadly as Collins had warned: ‘The fire of the enemy’s artillery became most dreadful,’ remembered Major John Blakiston. ‘In the space of less than a mile, 100 guns worked with skill and rapidity, vomited forth death into our feeble ranks. It cannot then be a matter of surprise if our sepoys should have taken advantage of any irregularities in the ground to shelter themselves from the deadly shower, or that even, in some few instances, not all the endeavours of the officers could persuade them to move forward.’110 Major Thorn concurred: ‘It was acknowledged by all the officers present, who had witnessed the power of the French artillery in the wars of Europe, that the enemy’s guns at the Battle of Assaye were equally well-served.’111

The major general himself had two horses shot under him and had several of his immediate staff killed around him by the clouds of grape the Maratha gunners sent in his direction. One large round shot just missed Wellesley as he was crossing the Khelna but decapitated his dragoon orderly as he paused midstream. The horrifying sight of the headless horseman features in many accounts of the battle, ‘the body being kept in its seat by the valise, holsters, and other appendages of a cavalry saddle, and it was some time before the terrified horse could rid himself of the ghastly burden’.112

The Madras infantry sepoys in the centre and the Highlanders on the right wing of Wellesley’s front line were targeted with particular violence, as the Maratha gunners tried to blow away the core of Wellesley’s formation with large canisters of anti-personnel chain and grapeshot, fired at short range and at close quarters: whirring through the air with a terrifying screeching noise, ‘it knocked down men, horses and bullocks, every shot’.113

Nevertheless, Wellesley’s infantry continued to advance at a steady pace, through the smoke. They fired a single volley, then charged the Maratha guns with bayonets, killing the gunners as they stood at the gun muzzles ‘and none quitted their posts until the bayonets were at their breasts … nothing could surpass the skill or bravery displayed by their golumdauze [gunners]’.114

A final surprise awaited the British as they marched forward to drive Scindia’s men from their fallback position. Once the British infantry lines had safely passed by, many of the Maratha ‘dead’ around the cannons ‘suddenly arose, seized the cannon which had been left behind by the army, and began to reopen a fierce fire upon the rear of our troops, who, inattentive to what they were doing, were eagerly bent upon the pursuit of the flying enemy before them’. The British lines were raked with yet more canister shot until the major general personally led a desperate cavalry charge ‘against the resuscitated foe’, during which he had his second horse shot beneath him.115

Two hours later, after a final stand in the village fort, Scindia’s Marathas were driven from the field and back over the Juah, leaving ninety-eight of their guns in British hands; but the casualties on both sides were appalling. The Marathas lost around 6,000 men. Wellesley lost fewer, but as the smoke cleared the major general found he had just left fully one-third of his army dead on the battlefield: 1,584 out of 4,500 of his troops were later burned or buried on the plains of Assaye.116 Indeed, so battered were his forces that Wellesley declared pursuit of Scindia and his fleeing men impossible, writing to his elder brother, ‘Scindia’s French[-trained] infantry were far better than Tipu’s, his artillery excellent, and his ordnance so good, and so well equipped, that it answers for our service. We never could use Tipu’s. Our loss is great, but the action, I believe, was the most severe that ever was fought in this country.’117 As one of Wellesley’s senior officers wrote to the major general soon afterwards: ‘I hope you will not have occasion to purchase any more victories at such a high price.’118

Because of Arthur Wellesley’s later celebrity after Waterloo, Assaye has long come to be regarded as the crucial victory of the Maratha War; but at the time, most eyes were actually on the north, where, long before Assaye, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Lake, was already advancing rapidly on the Mughal capital, in what was seen at the time as the final chapter of the Company’s conquest of what had once been the Mughal Empire.

As Richard Wellesley wrote unequivocally to Lake: ‘The defeat of Perron is certainly the first object of the campaign.’ Lake, he stressed, must understand the crucial ‘importance of securing the person and nominal authority of the Mogul against the designs of France, and the increase in reputation to the British name which would result from offering an honourable asylum to the person and family of that injured and unfortunate monarch’.119

[x]

Lord Lake, who liked to claim descent from the Arthurian hero Lancelot of the Lake, was not a man who admired diplomacy or who liked being told what to do: ‘Damn your writing,’ he is alleged to have cried at an army bookkeeper. ‘Mind your fighting!’ The phrase became his maxim. Although sixty years old, and a veteran of the Seven Years War and, more recently, the American War of Independence, where he fought against Washington at Yorktown, he was still famous for his boyish charm and immense energy, often rising at 2 a.m. to be ready to lead the march, blue eyes flashing.120

Determined to take the offensive, Lake left Kanpur on 7 August, a day after he heard about the declaration of war, even though it was in the middle of the monsoon and the roads were awash with mud. He headed due west towards Perron’s fortress at Aligarh. Intent on fighting a fast-moving campaign, Lake brought with him a small but highly trained Grand Army of 10,000 men, including a cavalry division armed with his light galloper guns; but he deliberately brought little heavy artillery and no siege equipment.

His intention to lead a small and mobile force was, however, somewhat challenged by Indian reality. By the early nineteenth century, East India Company armies had accumulated a huge establishment of attendants and assistants and support staff. In the end, the total body heading west amounted to more than 100,000 people, including mahouts and coolies, grass-cutters and horse-keepers, tent lascars and bullock-men, Banjarrah grain-collectors and money-changers, ‘female quacks, jugglers, groups of dancing girls, and votaries of pleasure’. These numbers did not, of course, include the thousands of elephants, camels, horses, poultry and flocks of goats and sheep which followed close on their heels: ‘The march of our army had the appearance of a moving town or citadel,’ remembered Major Thorn, ‘in the form of an oblong square, whose sides were defended by ramparts of glittering swords and bayonets.’121

After three weeks of difficult marching through heavy rain, wading through mud and badly flooded roads with carefully sealed ammunition boxes carried aloft on men’s heads, on 29 August Lake’s army crossed into Maratha territory and advanced swiftly on the mighty polygonal fortress of Aligarh, with its massive French-designed walls, reinforced corner towers and deep moat.

Aligarh was regarded as one of the strongest and best-provisioned forts in Hindustan; a siege could have taken months. Throughout the march, however, Lake had been in negotiations with General Perron over what he would charge to deliver the fortress into the hands of the British.122 Through intermediaries, the two commanders had eventually come to an understanding, and when Lake’s army advanced on his headquarters, Perron obediently withdrew, along with his bodyguard, after only the briefest of skirmishes with Lake and a few salvoes from his galloper guns.

Perron told his men he was off to gather reinforcements from Agra and Delhi, and to his deputy, Colonel Pedron, ‘a stout, elderly man with a green jacket with gold lace and epaulettes’, he sent a remarkably disingenuous letter: ‘Remember you are a Frenchman,’ he wrote, ‘and let no action of yours tarnish the character of your nation. I hope in a few days to send back the English general as fast, or faster, than he came. Make yourself perfectly easy on the subject. Either the Emperor’s army or General Lake shall find a grave before Allyghur. Do your duty, and defend the fort while one stone remains upon another. Once more remember your nation. The eyes of millions are fixed upon you!’123

These brave words were belied by the last conversation he had before fleeing up the Delhi road. One of his junior cavalry officers, of mixed Scottish and Rajput blood, attempted to ride with him, but was waved away, ‘Ah, no, no! It is all over!’ Perron shouted over his shoulder, ‘in confusion and without his hat’, at the young James Skinner. ‘These fellows [the cavalry] have behaved ill: do not ruin yourself, go over to the British; it is all up with us!’124

Distrusted by the French, all the Anglo-Indians among the Maratha forces, including Skinner himself, crossed the battle lines at this point: ‘We went to General Lake and were kindly received,’ wrote Skinner later.125 Pedron and many of Perron’s French mercenary colleagues were equally happy to surrender if they were assured of a safe passage home with their lifetimes’ savings intact. But Lake had not reckoned with the honour of Scindia’s Rajput and Maratha officers, who stoutly refused all inducements to drop their weapons and quickly withdrew behind the walls to begin their defence. There they deposed and imprisoned Pedron, elected a Maratha commander of their own, and prepared to fight to the death.

For three days Lake continued to negotiate, making the men a variety of extravagant promises, but the defenders remained firm. ‘I tried every method to prevail upon these people to give up the fort,’ wrote Lake, ‘and offered a very large sum of money, but they were determined to hold out, which they did most obstinately, and, I may say, most gallantly.’126

Lake was daunted by the challenge now lying in front of him: ‘The strength of the place cannot be described,’ he wrote to Wellesley. ‘A Seventy-Four [gun ship] might sail in the ditch.’127 But ever the hyperactive sexagenarian, Lake was temperamentally incapable of conducting a patient siege, and anyway had left his siege equipment in Kanpur. So, on 4 September he opted for the only alternative: a frontal assault on the main gate of a fortress long considered impregnable. An Irish deserter from Scindia’s garrison, Lieutenant Lucan, offered to lead the storming party, under the supervision of Lake’s deputy, Colonel Monson.

Two hours before dawn, the storming party set off and shortly after that had their first stroke of luck. Had the Marathas withdrawn behind the moat and destroyed the bridge, there was very little Lake could have done. But the defenders had stationed a piquet of fifty men with a 6-pounder gun behind a breastwork in front of the fort, leaving the bridge undamaged and the wicket gate open. Lucan and his storming party edged up in the dark and found the men smoking at their post. ‘They ran at them like lions,’ wrote Skinner, and slit the throats of as many as stood their ground. The rest ‘ran away to the wicket, and got in. The assaulting party attempted to get in along with them, but were shut out.’

Instead, however, of retreating, these brave fellows stood upon the goonjus [bridge] under one of the heaviest fires of musketry and great guns I have seen … [attempting to scale the walls.] Only at sunrise did they fall back about one hundred yards … and in going back they carried with them the [abandoned] Maratha gun.128


They fired the gun twice, then a third time, but failed to blow open the heavily reinforced gate. While waiting for a new and larger cannon to be hauled up, the attackers continued their attempts to mount the walls with scaling ladders. As before, they were driven down by the Marathas on the battlements, who had long pikes waiting for them. A heavy 12-pounder cannon was finally wheeled forward to the gate, but just before it could be fired its weight broke through a mine gallery that the defenders had skilfully tunnelled under the area in front of the wicket gate, leaving the gun half in, half out of the tunnel beneath.

As Monson and Lucan tried to lever the cannon out, the attackers were raked with musketry from above and exposed to the fire from two heavy mortars filled with grape that the defenders had prepared and positioned for just this moment. To add to the chaos, the defenders then began to climb down the scaling ladders that the British troops had left propped against the walls. One of them wounded Monson in the thigh with a thrust of his pike; four of his officers were also killed.129 ‘This misfortune detained us considerably, and at this time it was that we lost so many of our officers and men. Never did I witness such a scene. The sortie became a perfect slaughter house, and it was with the greatest difficulty that we dragged the gun over our killed and wounded.’130
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Re: The Anarchy:The East India Co. Corporate Violence, & Pil

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Part 3 of 3

In the Company camp, Lake was on the verge of blowing the bugle to call off the attack. But at the last minute the cannon was righted, pressed against the wood of the gate and fired. It was a muzzle-blast containing no shot, but the pressure from the powder charge at close quarters finally buckled one of the great doors open.131 ‘I was close to Lord Lake,’ wrote Skinner, ‘and saw and heard everything that passed.’

The God of Heaven certainly looked down upon those noble fellows … for they blew open half the gate, and giving three shouts, they rushed in. The Rajputs stood their ground, like brave soldiers, and from the first to the second gate the fight was desperately maintained on both sides, and the carnage was very great … Then spurring his horse [Lake] galloped to the gate. When he saw his heroes lying thick there, tears came to his eyes. ‘It is the fate of good soldiers!’ he said; and turning round, he galloped back to the camp, and gave up the fort to plunder.132


In the hours that followed, the garrison of 2,000 was massacred. No quarter was asked for and none was given. ‘Many of the enemy were killed in attempting to escape by swimming the ditch after we got in, and I remarked an artilleryman to snap his piece at a man who at the same instance dived to save himself,’ wrote John Pester, Lake’s quartermaster. ‘The soldier coolly waited his coming up and shot him through the head.’

As the heat of the business was over, I remonstrated with him on putting them to death at that time, but the man declared he had lost some of his oldest comrades that morning, and that he wished to be revenged, reminding me also that we had received orders to spare none … Guards were disposed over the different magazines, and at each gate as soon as we had possession, and the enemy were all disposed of; scarcely a man of them escaped for those who swam the ditch were cut up by the troopers on the plain, and all we found in the place were bayonetted.133


[x]

At midnight on the night of 1 September, the Qu’tb Minar, built in the twelfth century as a symbol of the establishment of Islamic rule in India, was hit by a massive earthquake and its top storey collapsed to the ground: ‘In Delhi and all around many buildings were toppled from their foundations,’ wrote Shah Alam’s biographer, Munna Lal. ‘In several places the earth cracked wide open. Had it lasted a moment longer, it would have ushered in the Day of Resurrection. The wise interpreted it as a bad omen, signifying that disasters would appear in these times.’134

Shah Alam, always sensitive to omens and premonitions, was alarmed. He was, after all, in a difficult position. For much of his adult life he had had no option but to choose between the protection of the Marathas and that of the Company. Both had used him for their own ends, and both had, at crucial junctures in his life, let him badly down. But when the news arrived that Perron had finally surrendered himself to Lord Lake, and been given safe passage to Calcutta with his family, his diamonds and his fortune, the Emperor took the view that the Company was now clearly in the ascendant, and it was time to reopen negotiations.

Shah Alam calculated that his best chance lay in covertly reaching out to Wellesley, while appearing to obey his French and Maratha masters who still garrisoned his fort and staffed his bodyguard. Thus, while putting his seal to proclamations that he would fight against the Company which had ‘seized of the whole country and laid aside allegiance to the throne’, he authorised Sayyid Reza Khan to enter into renewed correspondence with Lake, explaining that ‘the public letter which the Emperor has written and the announcement of his taking to the field are not voluntary acts but arise from compulsion and are directly contrary to his own wishes … He says, “I shall resist it to the utmost, but as I am in their power, I am helpless.”’135

Shah Alam nevertheless could not forget the way that Hastings had unilaterally cut the promised payment of the Diwani revenue from Bengal due to him under the terms of the Treaty of Allahabad, and he asked for written assurances that his allowances would be properly paid before he committed to throwing his lot in with the Company: ‘Conceiving therefore that when the English gain possession of the Country they may prove forgetful of me, it becomes necessary for the General [Lake] to settle this point with the Governor General, that hereafter there be no want of obedience or cause of dissatisfaction to me.’136 At the same time the Emperor firmly refused to allow Scindia’s men to take his heir apparent, Akbar Shah, with them into battle.

Since Perron’s defection, military authority in the Red Fort had devolved to Lieutenant Colonel Louis Bourquien, who had once earned his living by making both fireworks and tartlets in Calcutta, ‘his craft in culinary matters being superior to his skill in military ones’.137 But wherever his true talents lay, Scindia’s troops remained loyal to him, and were determined to revenge the massacre of their brothers-in-arms in Aligarh.

When news came that Lake was advancing rapidly up from Aligarh and had decided to skirt Agra with a view to capturing Delhi and ‘liberating’ the Emperor as soon as possible, Bourquien ferried his army of 19,000 troops across the Yamuna from the ghats under the Red Fort over to Shahdara. The area was flat and, in places, marshy, but he found a low hill commanding the approach to the city and prepared an ambush near the Hindan River, at a point where two swampy lakes flanked the road. This meant that any force coming towards the city from Aligarh would have to funnel themselves into a narrow causeway between the bogs. He then hid his one hundred heavy guns in a semicircle behind tall fans of elephant grass at the base of the hill and waited for Lake to approach.

On the afternoon of 10 September, Lake had camped his men to the north of Akbar’s Tomb at Sikandra. Towards evening his spies brought news that Scindia’s army had crossed the Yamuna and were preparing to block his crossing; but they brought little specific information about the whereabouts of the army. Word quickly circulated that the final battle for the control of Mughal Delhi would be fought the following day: ‘We drank an extra bottle of claret upon this intelligence,’ wrote Quartermaster Pester, ‘and without much reflection on the fate of a battle enjoyed ourselves until after nine.’138

Lake woke his troops at 2 a.m., as was his habit, and the final march towards the Mughal capital began an hour later, at 3 a.m. At 10 a.m., after marching eighteen miles, with the sun beginning to beat down on the column, Lake ordered a halt for breakfast beside a marshy lake on the banks of the Hindan. Tents were erected, boots were removed, fires lit and the sepoys began to cook their parathas. The general sent a dram around his officers.

Quite suddenly there was a series of bright flashes and the thunder crash of heavy artillery, ‘shattering not only the tranquillity of the day but the eardrums of men closest to the guns … The accompanying pressure wave generated by the explosive muzzle-blasts, which flattened the obstructing grass, was immediately followed by other, unnatural and far more eerie auditory sensations that played upon deafened ears. Grape shot tore and chain shot scythed through the grass with a shearing sound which was followed by a metallic clatter or muffled thuds depending on whether the projectiles struck equipment or the flesh of men and horses.’139

It was a massacre. Among the many casualties was Pester, who was hit by some of the first volleys: ‘A grapeshot passed through the housing of my pistols, and shattered the stock of one of them, and I felt my horse stagger under me; another grape had grazed his side and lodged under the skin; a third went through him. It entered at his near quarter and passed out at the other. He staggered and fell onto me.’140

Chaos broke out, but the Marathas remained at their defensive position on the raised ground, failing to advance and scatter the terrified Company sepoys. This gave Lake time to rally his men. Deciding to lure Bourquien off his strong position, Lake gave the order for the infantry to fall back in a feint, and they did so, between two wings of cavalry who lay hidden behind the tall grass. The Marathas took the bait and rushed forward, only to find themselves caught in a pincer movement. The Company infantry then turned and advanced methodically forward with bayonets, supported by the galloper guns. ‘We drove them into the Yamuna,’ wrote the badly bruised Pester, ‘and hundreds of them were destroyed in endeavouring to cross it.’

The Flying Artillery was up, and the river appeared boiling by the fire of grape kept up on those of the enemy who had taken to the river. It was literally, for a time, a stream of blood, and presented such a scene as at another period would freeze a man’s very soul. When this was past, we faced about, and returned to the field of battle to collect our wounded men and officers …

There the scene was truly shocking … About thirty surgeons were absolutely covered in blood, performing operations on the unfortunate soldiers who had had their legs and arms shattered in the action, and death in every shape seemed to preside in this assembly of human misery. Their exclamations were enough to pierce the hardest heart. Numbers were fainting, and even dying under the operation; others bore the pain with as much fortitude as they could … In one corner of the tent stood a pile of legs and arms, from which the boots and clothes of many were not yet stripped off.141


That night, five French commanders gave themselves up, and Lord Lake wrote to tell Wellesley what had passed.142 He added: ‘Your Lordship will perceive that our loss has been very great … under as heavy a fire as I have ever been witness to …’143 Later he expanded on the bravery and skill shown by his Maratha opponents. ‘Their battalions are uncommonly well appointed,’ he wrote, ‘have a most numerous artillery, as well served as they possibly can be.’

All the sepoys of the enemy behaved exceedingly well, the gunners standing to their guns until killed by the bayonet … I was never in so severe a business in my life, and I pray to God I may never be in such a situation again. Their army is better appointed than ours; no expense is spared, and they have three times the number of men to a gun we have. These fellows fought like devils, or rather heroes, and had we not made a disposition for attack in a style that we should have done against the most formidable army we could have been opposed to, I verily believe, from the position they had taken, we might have failed.144


Terrible as it was, the Battle of Delhi was the last time British troops faced French officers in South Asia, ending more than a century of rivalry which had caused so much bloodshed, mostly of non-Europeans, across the subcontinent. It also brought to a close Hindustan’s unhappy century of being fought over, and plundered, by rival armies. As Khair ud-Din put it shortly afterwards, ‘the country is now flourishing and at peace. The deer lies down with the leopard, the fish with the shark, the pigeon with the hawk, and the sparrow with the eagle.’145 Khair ud-Din was, of course, writing to flatter his British patrons, but there was a measure of truth in what he wrote: in comparison with the horrors of the last century – ‘the Great Anarchy’ – the next fifty years would be remembered as ‘the Golden Calm’.

Most importantly, the Battle of Delhi decided the future fate of India. The Marathas were the last indigenous Indian power that was militarily capable of defeating the Company and driving it out of South Asia. There were other battles still to be fought against both Scindia and Holkar before they surrendered, but after Assaye and Delhi the outcome of the war was quite clear. The last power who could have ousted the Company had been humbled and was about to be conquered.

Company Bengal, Madras and Bombay were now linked up as a continuous unit, joined with the Deccan and much of Hindustan, so consolidating a land empire that controlled over half a million square miles of territory and which, fifty years later, would become the British Raj.146 Before long, the Company would conclude treaties with all the Rajput states that had been fiefs of Scindia: Jodhpur, Jaipur, Macheri, Bundi and the Jat Raja of Bharatpur. All the major regimes of peninsular India had now either been annexed or become allies of the Company through a process of conquest, collaboration and co-option. As Arthur Wellesley told his delighted brother: ‘Your policy and our power have reduced all the powers in India to the state of mere cyphers.’147

Around 600 well-trained Company civil servants, guarded by 155,000 Indian sepoys, were to administer most of peninsular India.148 Here the Company’s army was now unequivocally the dominant military force, and the Governor General who controlled it the real Emperor. Not only had Lord Wellesley gained many more subjects than Britain had lost a decade earlier in North America – around 50 million – he had also created a cadre of young men committed to his imperial project, and who would carry it forward after he had gone.149 Wellesley’s ambitious protégés were working for the establishment and spread of an Anglicised colonial state that would provide an efficiently regimented but increasingly remote and alien administrative infrastructure for this new empire. As one of them, the young Company diplomat Charles Metcalfe, wrote, ‘Sovereigns you are, and as such must act.’150

In London there was surprisingly little awareness as yet of what had been achieved. The country was still obsessed with the struggle with Napoleon, and despite the swathe of territories Lord Wellesley had conquered, there was little interest in what had taken place in India outside those organisations or people directly concerned with it. Even Wellesley’s ultimate boss, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, declared himself ‘totally unacquainted with every part of this subject’ when Lord Wellesley’s aggressively expansionist Indian policy was briefly discussed in a half-empty House of Lords.151

But within India everyone knew that a major revolution had just taken place. Many Muslims, led by the puritanical Delhi imam Shah Abdul Aziz, saw this as the moment that India had slipped out of their hands for the first time since the twelfth century: ‘From here to Calcutta, the Christians are in complete control,’ wrote Shah Abdul Aziz in an 1803 fatwa of jihad. ‘India is no longer Dar ul-Islam.’152 Company officials realised it with equal clarity: ‘We are now complete masters of India,’ wrote Thomas Munro, ‘and nothing can shake our power if we take proper measures to confirm it.’153

The sinews of British supremacy were now established. With the exception of a few months during the Great Uprising of 1857, for better or worse, India would remain in British hands for another 144 years, finally gaining its freedom only in August 1947.

[x]

Shah Alam and the royal family watched the battle anxiously from the roof of the Red Fort. Towards late afternoon they had a grandstand view of the Company lancers chasing fleeing Maratha sepoys immediately opposite their marble pavilions and ‘cutting them up on the banks of the river which runs immediately under the fort of Delhi. The Emperor had sent out instantly to congratulate the Commander-in-Chief on our victory and declared that “he waited to receive the General as his saviour in his arms.”’154

The following day, 15 September, according to the Shah Alam Nama,

General Lake proceeded to pitch his tents on the far side of the Yamuna and sent Sayyid Reza Khan, who had for a long time been the Company’s representative at the Imperial Court, to humbly request an audience at the Celestial Threshold. He also asked that boats should be provided for crossing the river. The Universal Monarch gave the order to his Commander of the River to send boats without delay. The General crossed the Yamuna and lodged in the vicinity of the old fort, Purana Qila. The next day, Sayyid Reza Khan presented the Governor General’s letter to His Majesty expressing good wishes and loyal friendship. His Majesty honoured the messenger with gifts of robes.155


On 16 September, the Crown Prince, Akbar Shah, was meant to have presented himself at Lord Lake’s camp in Purana Qila at noon, but with the usual Mughal sense of time-keeping, did not appear until 3 p.m., when the sepoys had been on parade for a full three hours. Major William Thorn was among those standing to attention, sweating in his fustian red coat in the claggy monsoon heat. ‘By the time that the usual ceremonies had been gone through,’ he wrote, ‘his Highness had remounted his elephant, and the cavalcade had formed, it was past four o’clock.’

The distance being four miles, His Excellency [Lake] did not arrive at the palace until sunset. So great, indeed, was the pressure of the crowd through which the procession had to pass, that it was with difficulty that the line could be preserved; for the population of Delhi was in a manner concentrated into a solid mass: and even the courts of the palace were filled with spectators, anxious to witness the revival of the House of Timur, which had so long been under a cloud.156


Memories of earlier Maratha sieges and lootings were not easily forgotten and Scindia’s troops had always been unpopular in Delhi; no one, it seems, was sad to see them go. As for what might be expected from the Emperor’s new protectors, the people of the Mughal capital kept, for the time being, an open but curious mind:

At length, after a slow progress, amidst this immense assemblage, all eager to behold the deliverer of their sovereign, the Commander-in-Chief reached the palace, and was ushered into an apartment where the eyes of beholders had formerly been dazzled by the splendour of oriental magnificence …

But now, such is the vanity of earthly grandeur, and the uncertainty of mortal power, the descendant of the great Akbar, and the victorious Aurangzeb, was found, an object of pity, blinded and aged, stripped of authority, and reduced to poverty, seated under a small tattered canopy, the fragment of regal state, and the mockery of human pride. Such a scene could not fail to make a deep impression on the minds of those who beheld it.157


According to the Shah Alam Nama, Lake nevertheless ‘bowed his head at the feet of the imperial throne’, then conversed with the blind Emperor through his deputy, Colonel Sir David Ochterlony. Ochterlony’s father was a Highland Scot who had settled in Massachusetts. When the American Revolution broke out, his loyalist family fled to Canada, and David entered the Company’s army in 1777. He never returned to the New World, and, having made India his home, vowed never to leave it. He had collected a variety of Indian wives, to each of whom he gave an elephant, and through whom he learned to speak fluent Urdu and Persian. This was something that impressed and surprised the chronicler Munna Lal, who noted that Da’ud Akhtar-Luni Bahadur (as he called him) ‘was unrivalled for understanding and penetration and very well-versed in Persian letters. At the Emperor’s request, he was left at Court to advise on political and financial negotiations with His Majesty.’158

Ochterlony read to Shah Alam the carefully worded letters sent for the occasion by Wellesley, in which the Governor General described himself as ‘the happy instrument of your Majesty’s restoration to a state of dignity and tranquillity, under the power of the British Crown’.159 In return, wrote Munna Lal, ‘His Majesty, in order to show his appreciation of Kampani Sahib Bahadur, bestowed on the two men rich robes and awarded the title Nawab Samsam al-Daula, Khan Dauran Khan, to General Gerard Lake. The Colonel [Ochterlony] also received a gift of suitably fine robes, and the title Nasir al-Daula, Muzaffar Jang.’160h Ochterlony, in turn, announced Wellesley’s gift of 600,000 rupees to be made available for Shah Alam’s immediate expenses, and undertook to provide 64,000 rupeesi monthly ‘for the costs of the servants of the Imperial Household, the Princes and the chief courtiers, the Pillars of the State’.161

In the days that followed, Lord Lake held a durbar in Delhi for all the nobles of the Mughal court, and some others ‘who declared themselves to be attached to the English’.162 These included the Begum Sumru, who had sent a battalion of her troops to fight with the Marathas, and was anxious that this, in addition to her husband’s role in the Patna Massacre, might mean that her estates would now be confiscated. During the dinner that followed the durbar, she however charmed Ochterlony, who would in time become a close friend.

She also introduced herself to Lord Lake. This proved more problematic. Lake was deep in his cups, and clearly surprised to be approached by a woman once celebrated as one of Delhi’s most beautiful courtesans; ‘instead of some well-bearded chief, and,’ wrote Skinner, ‘being a little elevated by the wine which had just been drunk, he gallantly advanced, and, to the utter dismay of her attendants, took her in his arms and kissed her’. This broke every rule of Mughal etiquette and a ghastly silence descended on the dinner. ‘The mistake might have been awkward, but the lady’s presence of mind put all right. Receiving courteously the proffered attention, she turned calmly round to her astonished attendants – “It is,” said she, “the salute [of forgiveness and reconciliation] of a padre to his daughter.” The Begum professed Christianity, and thus the explanation was perfectly in character, though more experienced spectators might have smiled at the appearance of the jolly red-coated clergyman, exhibited in the person of his Lordship.’163

Shortly afterwards, Lake set off to Agra to capture the fort, mop up remaining Maratha resistance and win his final great victory over Scindia at Laswari. Ochterlony, who had just been appointed the new Company Resident, took up residence in the ruins of an old Mughal building which had once been the library of the Sufi prince Dara Shukoh, eldest son of Shah Jahan, and more recently the house from which the young prince Shah Alam had escaped Imad ul-Mulk nearly fifty years earlier.164 Meanwhile, a hospital and accommodation for the cavalry and artillery were set up near the Kashmiri Gate, while Qamar al-Din’s haveli near the Ajmeri Gate became the new Custom House. Several other old mansions were taken over for official use by the new Company administration, and a twin Anglo-Mughal court system was set up.165 A new joint Anglo-Mughal administration quickly fell into place.

The Company conquest of Delhi was, by any standards, a hugely significant moment. For the sightless and powerless Shah Alam, described by the poet Azad as ‘only a chessboard king’, it represented a final resolution to the conundrum that had been haunting him all his life: how to rule the Empire of his Timurid ancestors, from where, and under whose protection.166 He was now in his seventy-seventh year. As a boy he had seen Nader Shah ride into Delhi, and leave carrying away the Peacock Throne, into which was embedded the great Koh-i-Noor diamond. He had escaped Imad ul-Mulk’s attempt to assassinate him and survived repeated battles with Clive. He had fought the Company at Patna and Buxar, awarded the Diwani to Clive at Allahabad and defied the Company with his cross-country trek back to Delhi. There, with Mirza Najaf Khan, against all the odds he had nearly succeeded in rebuilding the empire of his ancestors; only to see it vanish like a mirage after the premature death of the last great Mughal general. Finally, at his lowest point, the Emperor had been assaulted and blinded by his psychotic former favourite, Ghulam Qadir. Now under the wings of Wellesley’s protection, and with a Company pension, he could at least spend his last years on the throne of his ancestors, in his beloved Red Fort, in comfort and safety, and with some measure of dignity.

Three years later, on 1 April 1806, Ochterlony’s deputy, the newly arrived William Fraser, one of the first graduates of Lord Wellesley’s new Fort William College, wrote home to his father in Inverness about his impressions of the old Emperor and his court: ‘On one of the late Mussulman festivals,’ he wrote, ‘I accompanied the King to the Mosque, and was much struck by the dignity and humility with which the whole court offered their prayers to the Almighty.’

At this time, I was constantly by the side of the King; and could not but admire the extreme of nobility in his gait, aspect and mien. The loss of his eyes does not at all disfigure his countenance; but the history of their loss and his misfortune exalts to the highest our pity and veneration. On his death, and not till then, we may say, the Line of Timour is extinct as a Dynasty; beginning with the lame, and ending with the blind.167


It had hardly been a glorious reign, but his was, nonetheless, a life marked by kindness, decency, integrity and learning at a time when all such qualities were in short supply. Above all, Shah Alam showed an extraordinary determination through successive horrific trials. Throughout his life, he had suffered a long series of repeated reverses; but he never gave up, and only briefly – after the rape of his family and his blinding by the Rohillas – did he allow himself to give way to despair. In the most adverse circumstances imaginable, that of the Great Anarchy, he had ruled over a court of high culture, and as well as writing fine verse himself he had been a generous patron to poets, scholars and artists.

Moreover, he had guided his dynasty through its lowest moments and managed to keep the Mughal flame alive through the worst of the Great Anarchy. He also succeeded in creating a new model of Mughal rule, where the absence of real power lay well disguised beneath the aura of divinely appointed kingship and the gilt screen of high culture and courtly manners, both of which were derived from his Timurid ancestors. It was a vision that was still sufficiently inspiring, some half a century later, for the court of his grandson to become the centre of the greatest anti-colonial revolt in history. This uprising very nearly ended British rule and might well have initiated a new phase of Mughal rule.168

For the Company, too, this was an historic occasion, the final denouement of its long struggle to defeat the Marathas and seize from them control of the erstwhile Mughal Empire. At the same time, it also represented the final act in the gradual penetration by the Company of the Mughal system, in which a joint stock company from the City of London slowly appropriated the power of the mighty Mughal Empire, and to some extent, under Wellesley, also took on the trappings of Mughal grandeur.

In the end, the Company established its paramountcy by imposing itself on the Mughal Emperor as Regent, so finding a measure of legitimacy for itself in the eyes of India under the Mughal umbrella. As late as 1831, the Bengali reformer Raja Rammohan Roy dwelt ‘on the greater stability to the power of the British government attained by securing the grateful friendship of a monarch, who though without territorial possession, was still regarded by the nations of Hindustan as the only legitimate foundation of either honour or dominion’.169 The Company understood the importance of infiltrating the Mughal system rather than simply blowing it apart or abolishing it.

Wellesley would protest to the directors that he ‘recoiled from the thought of it being suspected in England’ that he wished to ‘place the East India Company, substantially or vicariously, on the throne of the Mughals’.170 But this, of course, was exactly what he had done. In less than fifty years, a multinational corporation had seized control of almost all of what had once been Mughal India. It had also, by this stage, created a sophisticated administration and civil service, built much of London’s docklands and come close to generating half of Britain’s trade. Its annual spending within Britain alone – around £8.5 millionj – equalled about a quarter of total British government annual expenditure.171 No wonder the Company now referred to itself as ‘the grandest society of merchants in the Universe’. Its armies were larger than those of almost all nation states and its power now encircled the globe; indeed, its shares were by now a kind of global reserve currency. As Burke wrote: ‘The Constitution of the Company began in commerce and ended in Empire;’ or rather, as one of its directors admitted, ‘an empire within an empire’.172

Nevertheless, for all its vast resources, to finance his six years of incessant warfare Wellesley had come close to bankrupting the Company, hugely increasing its annual deficits to around £2 millionk a year. The Company’s overall debt, which had stood at £17 million when Wellesley first arrived in India, was now rising towards £31.5 million.l Between 1800 and 1806, £3.9 million of silverm had to be shipped from London to Bengal to help begin repaying the enormous debts that Wellesley had run up.173 The news of the cost of the palatial new Government House in Calcutta, which Lord Wellesley had begun to build on a truly Mughal scale, was the final straw for the directors. Under Wellesley, the Government of India, they declared, had ‘simply been turned into a despotism’.

On 6 November 1803 the Court of Directors wrote to the government’s Board of Control listing their objections to Wellesley. They accused him of

making various inroads upon the constitution established for the governance of British India, and when they so far expressed their feelings in the hope of his effecting great promised retrenchments in the public expenditure … instead of answering their views he embarked, unnecessarily as they think, those extensive plans of foreign policy inevitably leading to wars which … have, in the opinion of the Court, been productive of many serious evils, have removed further than ever the prospect of reducing the debt and expenses of the country, and have exchanged the secure state and respected character of British power for an uncertain supremacy, and it is to be feared, the disaffection of all the states in India.174


By the end of 1803, the final decision had been taken: Wellesley, the Empire-building government cuckoo in the Company’s corporate nest, was to be recalled.

[x]

In 1803 the directors got their way, but in the end it was the British government that prevailed over the Company. Even as the Company grew daily stronger and more invincible than it had ever been in India, as the first half of the nineteenth century progressed it became ever more closely overseen and restricted by the British state; and the idea that the corporation should be running what had now become the country’s most important colony began to be seen as more and more of an anomaly.

An anonymous writer in the Edinburgh Review, probably James Mill, put it well a few months after Wellesley’s recall: ‘Among all the visionary and extravagant systems of policy that have been suggested,’ he wrote, ‘no one has been absurd enough to maintain that the most advisable way to govern an empire was by committing it to the care of a body of merchants residing at a distance of many thousands of miles.’175 In 1813, Parliament abolished the Company’s monopoly of trade with the East, allowing other, merchants and agency houses to set up shop in Bombay and Calcutta.176

By 1825 there was growing opposition in Parliament to the continuing existence of the East India Company at all. One MP remarked that the power and influence of the Company were so great that ‘were it not, indeed, that the locality of its wealth is at so remote a distance, the very existence of such a body would be dangerous, not merely to the liberty of the subject, but to the stability of the state’. Five years later another MP raged against politicians allowing ‘a gigantic power to exist in opposition to the welfare of the kingdom, and over which Parliament has a most feeble and indirect control’.177 In Parliament, James Silk Buckingham went even further: ‘The idea of consigning over to a joint stock association … the political administration of an Empire peopled with 100 million souls were so preposterous that if it were now for the first time to be proposed it would be deemed not merely an absurdity, but an insult to the meanest understanding of the realm.’178

In 1833, Parliament finally took action. They passed the East India Company Charter Bill, which removed the East India Company’s right to trade and so turned it into a sort of governing corporation. The Company, which had once presided over a vast empire of business – and which even at this stage was annually making £1 million [n] from the tea trade alone – entered its final phase devoted exclusively to the business of Empire.179

Finally, on 10 May 1857, the EIC’s own private army rose up in revolt against its employer. On crushing the rebellion, after nine uncertain months, the Company distinguished itself for a final time by hanging and murdering many tens of thousands of suspected rebels in the bazaar towns that lined the Ganges, probably the bloodiest episode in the entire history of British colonialism. In the aftermath of the Great Uprising – the Indian Mutiny as it is known in Britain, or the First War of Independence as it is called in India – Parliament finally removed the Company from power altogether.

Enough was enough. The Victorian state, alerted to the dangers posed by corporate greed and incompetence, successfully tamed history’s most voracious corporation. The Company’s navy was disbanded and its army passed to the Crown. In 1859, it was within the walls of Allahabad Fort – the same space where Clive had first turned the Company into an imperial power by signing the Diwani – that the Governor General, Lord Canning, formally announced that the Company’s Indian possessions would be nationalised and pass into the control of the British Crown. Queen Victoria, rather than the directors of the EIC, would henceforth be ruler of India.

The East India Company limped on in its amputated form for another fifteen years when its charter expired, finally quietly shutting down in 1874, ‘with less fanfare,’ noted one commentator, ‘than a regional railway bankruptcy’.

Its brand name is now owned by two brothers from Kerala who use it to sell ‘condiments and fine foods’ from a showroom in London’s West End.

_______________

Notes:

a £6.5 million today.

b £4,379,550 today.

c Some secondary sources erroneously have Tipu’s body being discovered by Arthur Wellesley. That it was Baird who found Tipu is made quite clear in the letter Baird wrote to General Harris; it can be found in Montgomery Martin (ed.), The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of Marquis Wellesley, vol. I, 1836, pp. 687–9. Arthur Wellesley’s role in the taking of Seringapatam has in general been exaggerated by some historians who have inflated his importance with the benefit of hindsight and in view of his subsequent European triumphs. Baird and Harris were the two ranking officers who at the time were credited with defeating Tipu.

d £200 million today.

e £2.6 million today.

f The modern equivalences of these sums are: Rs25 million = £325 million; Rs1.2 million = £15.6 million.

g Over £29 million today.

h The Rajasthani town of Nasirabad is, perhaps surprisingly, named after the Scottish Bostonian.

i The modern equivalences of these sums are: 600,000 rupees = almost £8 million; 64,000 rupees = £832,000.

j £890 million today.

k Say, £210 million a year in today’s currency.

l Say, £3.3 billion in today’s currency.

m Over £400 million today.

n Over £100 million today.
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Re: The Anarchy:The East India Co. Corporate Violence, & Pil

Postby admin » Wed Apr 23, 2025 7:20 pm

Epilogue

The red sandstone Mughal fort where the Diwani was extracted from Shah Alam, and where the Company was finally dispossessed of its empire – a much larger fort than those visited by tourists in Lahore, Agra or Delhi – is still a closed-off military zone. When I visited it late last year, neither the guards at the gate nor their officers knew anything of the events that had taken place there; none of the sentries had even heard of the Company whose cannons still dot the parade ground where Clive’s Diwani tent was once erected.

On the evening of my visit, I hired a small dinghy from beneath the fort’s walls and asked the boatman to row me upstream. It was an hour before sunset, that beautiful moment north Indians call godhulibela – cow-dust time – and the Yamuna glittered in the evening light as brightly as a scattering of Mughal gems. Egrets picked their way along the banks, past pilgrims taking a dip near the auspicious point of confluence, where the Yamuna meets the Ganga. Ranks of little boys with fishing lines stood among the holy men and the pilgrims, engaged in the less mystical task of trying to hook catfish. Parakeets swooped out of cavities in the battlements; mynahs called to roost.

For forty minutes we drifted slowly, the water lapping against the sides of the boat, past the mile-long succession of mighty towers and projecting bastions of the fort, each decorated with superb Mughal kiosks, lattices and finials. It seemed impossible to imagine that a single London corporation, however ruthless and aggressive, could have conquered a Mughal Empire that was so magnificently strong, so confident in its own strength and brilliance and beauty.

In both India and Britain, people still talk about the British conquering India, but, as this book has attempted to show, that phrase disguises a much more ominous and complex reality. Because it was not the British government that seized India in the middle of the eighteenth century, but a private company. India’s transition to colonialism took place through the mechanism of a for-profit corporation, which existed entirely for the purpose of enriching its investors.

The Company’s conquest of India almost certainly remains the supreme act of corporate violence in world history. For all the power wielded today by the world’s largest corporations – whether ExxonMobil, Walmart or Google – they are tame beasts compared with the ravaging territorial appetites of the militarised East India Company. Yet if history shows anything, it is that in the intimate dance between the power of the state and that of the corporation, while the latter can be regulated, the corporation will use all the resources in its power to resist.

Today we are back to a world that would be familiar to Britain’s first envoy to India, Sir Thomas Roe, where the wealth of the West has begun again to drain eastwards, in the way it did from Roman times until the birth of the East India Company. Now when a Western prime minister visits India, he no longer comes, as Clive did, to dictate terms. In fact, negotiation of any kind has passed from the agenda. Like Roe, he comes as a supplicant begging for contracts and business, and with him come the CEOs of his country’s biggest corporations.

The corporation – the idea of a single integrated business organisation stretching out across the seas – was a revolutionary European invention contemporaneous with the beginnings of European colonialism that upended the trading world of Asia and Europe, and which helped give Europe its competitive edge. It is, moreover, an idea that has continued to thrive long after the collapse of European imperialism. When historians debate the legacy of British colonialism in India, they usually mention democracy, the rule of law, railways, tea and cricket. Yet the idea of the joint stock company is arguably one of Britain’s most important exports to India, and the one that has for better or worse changed South Asia as much any other European idea. Its influence certainly outweighs that of communism and Protestant Christianity, and possibly even that of democracy.

Companies and corporations now occupy the time and energy of more Indians than any institution other than the family. This should come as no surprise: as Ira Jackson, the former director of Harvard’s Center for Business and Government, recently noted, corporations and their leaders have today ‘displaced politics and politicians as … the new high priests and oligarchs of our system’. Covertly, companies still govern the lives of a significant proportion of the human race.

The 300-year-old question of how to cope with the power and perils of large multinational corporations remains today without a clear answer: it is not obviously apparent how a nation state can adequately protect itself and its citizens from corporate excess. No contemporary corporation could get away with duplicating the violence and sheer military might of the East India Company, but many have attempted to match its success at bending state power to their own ends.

As the international subprime bubble and bank collapses of 2007–9 have so recently demonstrated, just as corporations can enrich, mould and positively shape the destiny of nations, so they can also drag down their economies. In all, US and European banks lost more than $1 trillion on toxic assets from January 2007 to September 2009. What Burke feared the East India Company would do to England in 1772 – potentially drag the government ‘down into an unfathomable abyss’ – actually happened to Iceland in 2008–11, when the systemic collapse of all three of the country’s major privately owned commercial banks brought the country to the brink of complete bankruptcy. In the twenty-first century, a powerful corporation can still overwhelm or subvert a state every bit as effectively as the East India Company did in Bengal in the eighteenth.

Corporate influence, with its fatal blend of power, money and unaccountability, is particularly potent and dangerous in frail states where corporations are insufficiently or ineffectually regulated, and where the purchasing power of a large company can outbid or overwhelm an underfunded government. This would seem to have been the case, for example, with the Congress government that ruled India from 2009 until 2014 and which was embroiled in a succession of corruption scandals that ranged from land and mineral giveaways to the corrupt sale of mobile phone spectrum at a fraction of its real value.

In September 2015, the then governor of India’s central bank, Raghuram Rajan, made a speech in Mumbai expressing his anxieties about corporate money eroding the integrity of parliament: ‘Even as our democracy and our economy have become more vibrant,’ he said, ‘an important issue in the recent election was whether we had substituted the crony socialism of the past with crony capitalism, where the rich and the influential are alleged to have received land, natural resources and spectrum in return for payoffs to venal politicians. By killing transparency and competition, crony capitalism is harmful to free enterprise, and economic growth. And by substituting special interests for the public interest, it is harmful to democratic expression.’ His anxieties were remarkably similar to those expressed by Horace Walpole and many others in Britain more than 300 years earlier, when the East India Company had become synonymous with ostentatious wealth and political corruption.

The East India Company has, thankfully, no exact modern equivalent. Walmart, which is the world’s largest corporation in revenue terms, does not number among its assets a fleet of nuclear submarines; neither Facebook nor Shell possesses regiments of infantry. Yet the East India Company – the first great multinational corporation, and the first to run amok – was the ultimate model and prototype for many of today’s joint stock corporations. The most powerful among them do not need their own armies: they can rely on governments to protect their interests and bail them out.

Today, the site of the company’s headquarters in Leadenhall Street lies underneath Richard Rogers’ glass and metal Lloyd’s building. No blue plaque marks the site of what Macaulay called ‘the greatest corporation in the world’, and certainly the only power to equal the Mughals by seizing political power across wide swathes of South Asia. But anyone seeking a monument to the company’s legacy in the City need only look around them.

This book has attempted to study the relationship between commercial and imperial power. It has looked at how corporations can impact on politics, and vice versa. It has examined how power and money can corrupt, and the way commerce and colonisation have so often walked in lock-step. For Western imperialism and corporate capitalism were born at the same time, and both were to some extent the dragons’ teeth that spawned the modern world.

Such was the disruption caused in eighteenth-century India by the advent of the East India Company that a whole new literary genre was invented to deal with it. This is the genre of moralising histories known as The Book of Admonition, or ‘Ibrat-Nâma. The admonitory purpose of these histories was put succinctly by Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, the author of the best known such volume: ‘Az farâ-dîd-i sar-guzasht-i guzashtagân, bar khud ‘ibrat pazîrad’ – By considering these past lives, take heed for your own future.1

The East India Company remains today history’s most ominous warning about the potential for the abuse of corporate power – and the insidious means by which the interests of shareholders can seemingly become those of the state. For as recent American adventures in Iraq have shown, our world is far from post-imperial, and quite probably never will be. Instead Empire is transforming itself into forms of global power that use campaign contributions and commercial lobbying, multinational finance systems and global markets, corporate influence and the predictive data harvesting of the new surveillance-capitalism rather than – or sometimes alongside – overt military conquest, occupation or direct economic domination to effect its ends.

Four hundred and twenty years after its founding, the story of the East India Company has never been more current.
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Re: The Anarchy:The East India Co. Corporate Violence, & Pil

Postby admin » Wed Apr 23, 2025 7:37 pm

Glossary

Aftab : the Sun

Akhbars : Indian court newsletters

Alam : the world. It also means a standards used by Shias as focuses for
their Muharram : venerations. Usually tear-shaped or fashioned into
the shape of a hand, they are stylised representations of the
standards carried by Imam Hussain at the Battle of Kerbala in AD
680

Amir : nobleman

Arrack : Indian absinthe

Arzee : Persian petition

Atashak : gonorrhea

Bagh : a formal Mughal garden, often a char bagh: , named after its
division into four (char: ) squares by a cross of runnels and
fountains

Banjara : nomadic trading community

Bazgasht : return or homecoming

Begum : Indian Muslim noblewoman. A title of rank and respect: ‘Madam’

Betel : nut used as a mild narcotic in India, and eaten as paan

Bhadralok : the prosperous and well-educated upper middle class of Bengal

Bhang : cannabis preparation

Bhet : an offering

Bhisti : water carrier

Bibi : an Indian wife or mistress

Bibi ghar : ‘Women’s House’ or zenana

Brahmin : the Hindu priestly caste and the top rung of the caste pyramid

Charpoy : Rope-strung bed (literally, ‘four feet’)

Chattri : a domed kiosk supported on pillars, often used as a decorative feature to top turrets and minarets (literally, ‘umbrella’)

Chaupar : a cross-shaped board game very similar to pachisi

Chhatrapati : royal title – literally, ‘Lord of the Umbrella’. Equivalent of
Emperor

Choli : short (and at this period often transparent) Indian bodice

Chowkidar : guard, gatekeeper

Coss : Mughal measurement of distance amounting to just over three
miles

Crore : 10 million (or 100 lakh)

Cuirassier : armoured cavalry officer armed with a musket

Dacoit : outlaw; a member of a robber gang

Daftar : office, or in the Nizam’s palace, chancellery

Dak : post (sometimes spelled ‘dawke’ : in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries)

Dargah : Sufi shrine, usually built over the grave of a saint

Dar ul-

Islam : the lands or house of Islam

Dastak : a pass

Dastan : story, epic or oral history

Deorhi : courtyard house or haveli

Derzi : tailor

Dharamasala : resthouse

Dharma : duty

Dhobi : laundryman

Dhoolie : covered litter

Dhoti : loincloth

Divan : book of collected poetry

Diwan : Prime Minister, or the vizier in charge of administrative finance

Dubash : an interpreter

Dupatta : shawl or scarf, usually worn with a salvar kemise : (literally, ‘two
leaves or widths’). Also known as a chunni

Durbar : court

Fakir : literally, ‘poor’. Sufi holy man, dervish or wandering Muslim
ascetic

Faujdar : fort keeper or garrison commander

Firangi : foreigner

Firman : an order of the Emperor in a written document

Gagra

Choli : Indian bodice and skirt

Ghat : steps leading to a bathing place or river

Ghazal : Urdu or Persian love lyric

Godhulibela : ‘cow-dust time’ –the golden hour before sunset

Golumdauze : artillery gunners

Gomasta : agent or manager

Goonjus : bridge

Hakim : physician

Hamam : Turkish-style steam bath

Haveli : courtyard house or traditional mansion

Harkarra : literally, ‘all-doo-er’. Runner, messenger, newswriter or spy. In
eighteenth-century sources the word is sometimes spelled

hircarrah

Havildar : a sepoy non-commissioned officer corresponding to a sergeant

Holi : the Hindu spring festival in which participants sprinkle red and
yellow powder on one another

Hookah : waterpipe or hubble-bubble

Id : the two greatest Muslim festivals: Id ul-Fitr marks the end of
Ramadan, while Id ul-Zuha commemorates the delivery of Isaac.
To celebrate the latter a ram or goat is slaughtered, as on the
original occasion recorded in both the Old Testament and Koran

Iftar : the evening meal to break the Ramadan fast

Ijara : rental contract

Jagatguru : guru of the Universe

Jagir : landed estate, granted for service rendered to the state and whose
revenues could be treated as income by the jagirdar

Jali : a latticed stone or wooden screen

Jazair : swivel gun, usually mounted on camelback

Jharoka : projecting balcony

Jizya : Islamic tax on non-believers

Kalawant : singer or chanter

Kar-khana : workshop or factory

Khanazad : palace-born princes

Khansaman : in the eighteenth century the word meant butler. Today it more
usually means cook

Kharita : sealed Mughal brocade bag used to send letters as an alternative to
an envelope

Khilat : symbolic court dress

Khutba : the sermon during which the Islamic prayer for the ruler is said at
Friday prayers

Kotla : fortress or citadel

Kotwal : the Police Chief, Chief Magistrate or City Administrator in a
Mughal town

Lakh : a hundred thousand

Langar : free distribution of food during a religious festival

Lathi : truncheon or strick

Lota : water pot

Lingam : the phallic symbol associated with Lord Shiva in his role as
Creator

Lungi : Indian-type sarong; longer version of the dhoti : (QV)

Mahal : literally, ‘palace’ but often used to refer to sleeping apartments or the zenana : wing of a palace or residence

Mahi

maratib : the Order of the Fish; a Mughal standard

Majlis : assembly (especially the gatherings during Muharram – : QV)

Mandapa : the gateway of a temple

Mansabadar : a Mughal nobleman and office holder, whose rank was decided by
the number of cavalry he would supply for battle, for example a

mansabdar : of 2,500 would be expected to provide 2,500 horsemen
when the Nizam went to war

Masnavi : Persian or Urdu love lyric

Mehfil : an evening of courtly Mughal entertainment, normally including
dancing, the recitation of poetry and the singing of ghazals : (QV)

Mihrab : the niche in a mosque pointing in the direction of Mecca

Mir : the title ‘Mir’ given before a name usually signifies that the holder
is a Sayyed (QV)

Mirza : a prince or gentleman

Mohalla : a distinct quarter of a Mughal city, i.e. a group of residential lanes,
usually entered through a single gate

Muharram : the great Shia Muslim festival commemorating the defeat and
death of Imam Hussain, the Prophet’s grandson. Celebrated with
particular gusto in Hyderabad and Lucknow.

Munshi : Indian private secretary or language teacher

Mushairas : poetic symposia


Marqanas : stalactite-type decoration over mosque or palace gateways

Musnud : the low arrangement of cushions and bolsters that forms the throne
of Indian rulers at this period

Nabob : English corruption of the Hindustani Nawab: , literally ‘deputy’,
which was the title given by the Mughal Emperors to their
regional governors and viceroys. In England it became a term of
abuse directed at returned ‘Old Indian hands’, especially after
Samuel Foote’s 1768 play The Nabob : brought the term into
general circulation and in England was soon reduced to ‘nob’

Nagara : Indian ceremonial kettledrum

Nageshwaram: long Tamil oboe-like wind instrument

Namakharam : traitor, literally ‘bad to your salt’

Naqqar

Khana : ceremonial drum house

Naubat : drum used for welcoming dignitaries and festivities

Naubat

Khana : drum house above the gateway of a fort

Nautch : an Indian dance display

Nazr/Nazar : symbolic gift given in Indian courts to a feudal superior

Nizam : title of the hereditary ruler of Hyderabad

Omrah : nobleman

Padshahnama : the history of the Emperor

Palanquin : Indian litter

Peshkash : an offering or present given by a subordinate to a superior. The
term was used more specifically by the Marathas as the money
paid to them by ‘subordinate’ powers such as the Nizam

Peshwaz : a long high-waisted gown

Pir : Sufi holy man

Pikdan : spittoon

Prasad : temple sweets given to devotees in exchange for offerings; a
tradition transferred from Hindu to Islamic practice at the Sufi
shrines of the Deccan

Puja : prayer

Pukhur : pond

Pukka : proper, correct

Purdah : literally, ‘a curtain’; used to signify the concealment of women
within the zenana

Qanat : portable shelter of canvas or tenting

Qawal : a singer of Qawalis

Qawalis : rousing hymns sung at Sufi shrines

Qiladar : fort keeper

Qizilbash : literally, ‘redheads’. Name given to Safavid soldiers (and later
traders) due to the tall red cap worn under their turbans

Raja : king

Ryott : peasant or tenant farmer

Sahukara : moneylender

Salatin : palace-born princes

Sanad : charter or warrant

Sanyasi : a Hindu ascetic

Sarir-e khas : the Privy Seat

Sarpeche : turban jewel or ornament

Sati : the practice of widow burning, or the burned widow herself

Sawaree : elephant stables (and the whole establishment and paraphernalia
related to the keeping of elephants)

Sayyed : (or f. Sayyida) a lineal descendant of the Prophet Mohammed.
Sayyeds often have the title ‘Mir’

Sepoy : Indian soldier

Seth : trader, merchant, banker or moneylender

Shadi : marriage feast or party

Shamiana : Indian marquee, or the screen formed around the perimeter of a
tented area

Shia : one of the two principal divisions of Islam, dating back to a split
immediately after the death of the Prophet, between those who
recognised the authority of the Medinian Caliphs and those who
followed the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali (Shiat Ali means ‘the Party
of Ali’ in Arabic). Though most Shiites live in Iran, there have
always been a large number in the Indian Deccan, and Hyderabad
was for much of its history a centre of Shi’ite culture

Shikar : hunting

Shroff : trader, merchant, banker or moneylender

Sirdar : nobleman

Sloka : Sanskrit couplet

Strappado : Portuguese form of torture involving dropping the victim from a
height while bound with a rope

Subadhar : governor

Takhta : wooden frame for keeping shawls

Tawaif : the cultivated and urbane dancing girls and courtesans who were
such a feature of late Mughal society and culture

Thali : tray

Ubnah : gay male sex

Ulama : Muslim clerics

Unani : Ionian (or Byzantine Greek) medicine, originally passed to the
Islamic world through Byzantine exiles in Persia and still
practiced in India today

‘Urs : festival day

Ustad : master, teacher or expert

Vakil : ambassador or representative (though in modern usage the word
means merely lawyer)

Vilayat : province, homeland

Zenana : harem, or women’s quarters

Zamindar : landholder or local ruler
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Re: The Anarchy:The East India Co. Corporate Violence, & Pil

Postby admin » Wed Apr 23, 2025 7:40 pm

Part 1 of __

Notes

ABBREVIATIONS


BL: British Library

CPC: Calendar of Persian Correspondence

IOR: India Office Records

NAI: National Archives of India

OIOC: Oriental and India Office Collections

INTRODUCTION

1 Philip Stern has shown brilliantly how much earlier than was previously understood the Company acquired real and tangible political power. See Philip J. Stern., The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty & the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India. Cambridge, 2011.

2 ‘The Muzaffarnama of Karam Ali’, in Bengal Nawabs translated into English by Jadunath Sarkar, Calcutta, 1952, p. 63.

3 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin Calcutta, 1790– 94, vol. 3, pp. 9–10.

4 Quoted by Emma Rothschild in her unpublished essay, ‘The East India Company and the American Revolution’.

5 More recent research is represented by historians like Richard Barnett’s pioneering North India Between Empires: Awadh, the Mughals and the British, 1720–1801 Berkeley, 1980 and Christopher Bayly’s Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars and Alam, who, in his The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India demonstrates economic growth in north India during the first half of the eighteenth century. There has been a considerable literature devoted to this new understanding. For collections of essays espousing these ‘revisionist’ views see Seema Alavi (ed.), The Eighteenth Century in India New Delhi, 2002; P. J. Marshall (ed.), The Eighteenth Century in Indian History. Evolution or Revolution New Delhi, 2003. See also; Stewart Gordon, Marathas, Marauders and State Formation in Eighteenth-Century India Delhi, 1998; Rajat Datta, The Making of the Eighteenth Century in India: Some Reflections on Its Political and Economic Processes . Jadunath Sarkar Memorial Lecture, Bangiya Itihas Samiti, Kolkatta, April 2019; Karen Leonard, ‘The Hyderabad Political System and Its Participants’, Journal of Asian Studies 30(3) (1971); Tilottama Mukherjee, Political Culture and Economy in Eighteenth-Century Bengal. Networks of Exchange, Consumption and Communication New Delhi, 2013; John F. Richards, The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in South Asia in Modern Asian Studies 24, 4,(1990), pp. 625-638; M. Athar Ali, The Passing of an Empire: The Mughal Case, Modern Asian Studies, Vol 9. No.13 (1975), pp. 385-396; Stewart Gordon, Legitimacy and Loyalty in some Successor States of the Eighteenth Century. In John F Richards, Kingship and Authority in South Asia [New Delhi, 1998], pp. 327-347 Madhu Trivedi, The Making of the Awadh Culture New Delhi, 2010; Stephano Pelò, ‘ Drowned in the Sea of Mercy. The Textual Identification of Hindu Persian Poets from Shi’i Lucknow in the Tazkira of Bhagwan Das ‘Hindi’ in Vasudha Dalmia and Munis D. Faruqui (eds), Religious Interactions in Mughal India New Delhi, 2014; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘ Connected Histories: Notes Towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia ’, Modern Asian Studies 31(3) (1997); J. F. Richards, ‘ Early Modern India and World History ’, Journal of World History 8(2) (1997), C. A. Bayly, ‘Indian Merchants in a ‘Traditional’ Setting. Banaras, 1780–830’, in Clive Dewey and A. J. Hopkins (eds), The Imperial Impact. Studies in the Economic History of India and Africa, London, 1978; Philip Calkins, ‘The Formation of Regionally Oriented Ruling Group in Bengal, 1700–740’, Journal of Asian Studies 29(4) (1970).

6 Fakir Khair-al Din Illahabadi, Fakir, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, OIOC, Or. 1932. f1v, Bangiya Itihas Samiti, Kolkatta, April 2019; Karen Leonard, ‘The Hyderabad Political System and Its Participants’, Journal of Asian Studies 30(3) (1971); Tilottama Mukherjee, Political Culture and Economy in Eighteenth-Century Bengal. Networks of Exchange, Consumption and Communication New Delhi, 2013; John F. Richards, The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in South Asia in Modern Asian Studies 24, 4,(1990), pp. 625-638; M. Athar Ali, The Passing of an Empire: The Mughal Case, Modern Asian Studies, Vol 9. No.13 (1975), pp. 385-396; Stewart Gordon, Legitimacy and Loyalty in some Successor States of the Eighteenth Century. In John F Richards, Kingship and Authority in South Asia [New Delhi, 1998], pp. 327-347 Madhu Trivedi, The Making of the Awadh Culture New Delhi, 2010; Stephano Pelò, ‘ Drowned in the Sea of Mercy. The Textual Identification of Hindu Persian Poets from Shi’i Lucknow in the Tazkira of Bhagwan Das ‘Hindi’ in Vasudha Dalmia and Munis D. Faruqui (eds), Religious Interactions in Mughal India New Delhi, 2014; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘ Connected Histories: Notes Towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia ’, Modern Asian Studies 31(3) (1997); J. F. Richards, ‘ Early Modern India and World History ’, Journal of World History 8(2) (1997), C. A. Bayly, ‘Indian Merchants in a ‘Traditional’ Setting. Banaras, 1780–830’, in Clive Dewey and A. J. Hopkins (eds), The Imperial Impact. Studies in the Economic History of India and Africa, London, 1978; Philip Calkins, ‘The Formation of Regionally Oriented Ruling Group in Bengal, 1700–740’, Journal of Asian Studies 29(4) (1970).

6 Fakir Khair-al Din Illahabadi, Fakir, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, OIOC, Or. 1932. f1v.

CHAPTER 1: 1599

1 James Shapiro, 1599: A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare London, 2005, pp. 303–8.

2 Henry Stevens, The Dawn of British Trade to the East Indies, as Recorded in the Court Minutes of the East India Company 1599–1603, Containing an Account of the Formation of the Company London, 1866, pp. 1–10.

3 Marguerite Eyer Wilbur, The East India Company and the British Empire in the Far East New York, 1945, pp. 18–24.

4 Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550–653 Princeton, 2003, pp. 19–23, 61–4; James Mather, Pashas: Traders and Travellers in the Islamic World London, 2009, pp. 4, 40–2.

5 Stevens, The Dawn of British Trade pp. 1–10.

6 Sir William Foster, ‘The First Home of the East India Company’, in The Home Counties Magazine ed. W. Paley Baildon, FSA, vol. XIV, 1912, pp. 25–7; Beckles Willson, Ledger and Sword: The Honourable Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies 1599– 1874 2 vols, London, 1903, vol. 1, pp. 19–23.

7 Stevens, The Dawn of British Trade pp. 5–6; P. J. Marshall, ‘The English in Asia to 1700’, in Nicholas Canny, The Oxford History of the British Empire vol. 1, The Origins of Empire Oxford, 1998, pp. 267–9.

8 A pauper in comparison to Mughal prosperity, England was not however impoverished by north European Standards, and conducted a large and growing textile trade, largely through the Netherlands.

9 Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1430–1630 Cambridge, 1984, pp. 12, 33, 256.

10 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World London, 2003, pp. 6, 7, 9; G. L. Beer, The Origins of the British Colonial System, 1578–1660 London, 1908, pp. 8–9.

11 Giles Milton, Nathaniel’s Nutmeg or, The True and Incredible Adventures of the Spice Trader Who Changed the Course of History London, 1999, pp. 15–20.

12 Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement pp. 176, 200–22, 309, 314; Ferguson, Empire p. 58.

13 National Archives of India Calendar of Persian Correspondence, intro. Muzaffar Alam & Sanjay Subrahmanyam vol. 1, New Delhi, 2014 (henceforth CPC ), p. xxxi.

14 William Foster (ed.), Early Travels in India 1583–1619 London, 1921, pp. 1–47; G. V. Scammell, The World Encompassed: The First European Maritime Empires London, 1981, p. 474.

15 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution pp. 20–1; Milton, Nathaniel’s Nutmeg pp. 7, 42–52; Holden Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600–800’, in Maritime India intro. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, New Delhi, 2004, p. 31, 343n.

16 Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient’, pp. 31–; Shapiro, 1599 p. 303; Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement p. 260.

17 K. N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company 1600–1640 London, 1965, p. 11; Mather, Pashas p. 40.

18 Willson, Ledger and Sword pp. 19–21.

19 Stevens, The Dawn of British Trade pp. 5–6.

20 Sir William Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade London, 1933, pp. 144–50.

21 Mather, Pashas p. 41.

22 Philip J. Stern, The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty & the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India Cambridge, 2011, pp. 6–9.

23 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea London, 2003, p. 26.

24 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution pp. 12–13.

25 Willson, Ledger and Sword p. 31.

26 John Keay, The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company London, 1991, p. 13; Milton, Nathaniel’s Nutmeg p. 77.

27 Keay, The Honourable Company p. 9.

28 Stern, The Company State pp. 12, 56–8.

29 Philip Stern has shown brilliantly how much earlier than was previously understood the Company acquired real and tangible political power. See stem, The Company State.

30 Stevens, The Dawn of British Trade p. 13.

31 Ibid., pp. 14–20, 42–3.

32 Ibid., pp. 30–46, 52.

33 Sir William Foster, John Company London, 1926, p. 5.

34 Milton, Nathaniel’s Nutmeg pp. 77–80.

35 Keay, The Honourable Company p. 15; Milton, Nathaniel’s Nutmeg pp. 80–2.

36 Keay, The Honourable Company p. 23.

37 Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient’, pp. 38–.

38 Marshall, The English in Asia to 1700 p. 268; Scammell, The World Encompassed pp. 480–1.

39 Cited in H. Love, Vestiges of Old Madras 2 vols, London, 1913, vol. I, p. 533, vol. II, p. 299.

40 Scammell, The World Encompassed p. 479.

41 Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient’, p. 42.

42 Ferguson, Empire p. 21.

43 CPC p. xxxi; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution p. 49; Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient’, p. 39; Marshall, The English in Asia to 1700 pp. 270–1; Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement p. 270.

44 Richard M. Eaton, India in the Persianate Age, 1000–1765 London, 2019, p. 373.

The Cambridge historian Angus Maddison shows that around 1700 India briefly overtook China as the largest economy in the world. This was due to many factors: Sher Shah Suri and the Mughals had encouraged trade by developing roads, river transport, sea routes, ports and abolishing many inland tolls and taxes. Their aesthetic obsessions also helped bring Indian textile manufacturing to a new height of beauty and brilliance. As the French traveller François Bernier wrote around 1700: ‘Gold and silver come from every quarter of the globe to Hindostan,’ words echoed by Sir Thomas Roe, who remarked that: ‘Europe bleedeth to enrich Asia.’ Maddison’s exact figures show than in 1600 Britain was creating 1.8 per cent of world GDP, while India was creating 22.5 per cent.

The figures for 1700 are 2.88 per cent vs 22.44 per cent. On the other hand, Maddison also shows that from 1600 onwards GDP per head was already higher in England than in India, which implies that the wealth in India in this period, as today, was concentrated in the ruling and business classes, and very unevenly distributed. European travellers constantly remarked on the wealth of the rulers and the bankers and the poverty of the agricultural classes. Maddison’s work does show, however, that GDP per head was higher in seventeenth-century India than in any previous period.

Shireen Moosvi, who did her dissertation under the supervision of Irfan Habib, undertook a detailed study of Ain-i-Akbari in the 1980s. Her conclusion was that the Mughal state was unusually extractive and app. ropriated 56.7 per cent of the total produce. Her research focused on five north Indian provinces: Agra, Delhi, Lahore, Allahabad and Avadh. The total population of these provinces was estimated at 36 million. She estimated the average income per peasant family to be 380 dams per annum –roughly 1 dam per day (a ‘dam’ was the standard copp. er coin in Mughal India. Roughly 40 dams made a rupee). According to W. W. Hunter, in 1882 the total revenue of Aurangzeb in 1695 was estimated at £80 million. The gross taxation levied by British India between 1869 and 1879 was £35.3 million. So the Mughal Empire under Aurangzeb (circa 1700) collected twice as much land revenue as the British Raj (circa 1880), though the economy size was about the same in both periods. See W. W. Hunter, The Indian Empire (London, 1882). With thanks to Śrīkānta Kṛṣṇamācārya for bringing this to my attention.

45 D. A. Washbrook, ‘Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History c. 1720–1860’, Modern Asian Studies vol. 22, no. 1 (1988), pp. 57–96.

46 Angus Maddison, Contours of the World Economy, 1–2030 ad: Essays in Macro-Economic History Oxford, 2007, pp. 116–20, 309–11, 379; Shashi Tharoor, Inglorious Empire: What the British Did in India New Delhi, 2016, pp. 2–3.

47 Shireen Moosvi, Economy of the Mughal Empire, c1595: A Statistical Study New Delhi, 1987, p. 376; Foster (ed.), Early Travels p. 112; Eaton India in the Persianate Age p. 371.

48 Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient’, p. 45.

49 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution Oxford, 1988, p. 135. The figure may not be correct: Parker probably gets this from Irvine, who got it from Abu’l Fazl’s Ain-i Akbari. Dirk Kolff’s Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy London, 1992, makes a compelling case that this number by Abu’l Fazl was actually an estimation of the ‘military labour market’ of the twelve subahs of the empire in the 1590s (essentially northern India) and should not be understood as the actual size of the Mughal army. See pp. 3ff (basically the whole chapter on the ‘armed peasantry’).

50 Milo Cleveland Beach and Ebba Koch (eds), King of the World – the Padshahnama: an Imperial Mughal Manuscript from the Royal Library, Windsor Castle London, 1997, pp. 56–7, 58–60, 179–80; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia: A Political and Economic History 1500–1700 New York, 1993, pp. 165–6, 201; Tirthankar Roy, The East India Company: The World’s Most Powerful Corporation New Delhi, 2012, p. 83.

51 Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient’, p. 40.


52 The best biography is Michael Strachan, Sir Thomas Roe 1581–1644 Salisbury, 1989.

53 Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge Princeton, 1996, p. 17.

54 Sir Thomas Roe and Dr John Fryer, Travels in India in the 17th Century London, 1873, pp. 26– 9, 38–9.

55 Ibid., pp. 103–4. See also Sir William Foster, The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India 1615–9, as Narrated in his Journal and correspondence New Delhi, 1990.

56 Roe wrote a wonderful love letter to Elizabeth, Lady Huntingdon, from ‘Indya’ on 30 October 1616. I would like to thank Charlotte Merton for sending me this reference. Pasadena Library, Hastings Collection, 5 Box 7 (1612 to 1618, Thomas Roe to Elizabeth, Countess of Huntingdon, HA10561).

57 Roe and Fryer, Travels in India p. 74. See William Pinch’s brilliant essay, ‘Same Difference in India and Europe’, History and Theory vol. 38, no. 3 (October 1999), pp. 389–407.

58 Strachan, Sir Thomas Roe pp. 86–7.

59 Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, Contayning a History of the World 20 vols, Glasgow, 1905, part 1, IV, pp. 334–9.

60 This is certainly the argument of Beni Prasad in his History of Jahangir Allahabad, 1962.

61 Roe and Fryer, Travels in India pp. 83–4.

62 Jahangir Preferring a Shaykh to Kings by Bichitr, c. 1615–18. Opaque watercolour and gold on paper. Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution. Purchase F1942.15. I am in debt here to Simon Schama’s brilliant and witty analysis of the painting in BBC/PBS Civilisations Episode 5. Jahangir’s dream pictures are all enigmatic and difficult to decode. In this case the painting reflects one of Jahangir’s own dreams which revealed how the pious Emperor was actually the Millennial Sovereign of Islamic thought: master of time as well as space, ushering in the new millennium in which all other kings are beneath him and of little account; instead the Emperor turns his gaze towards the inner mysteries of Sufi wisdom. See A. Azfar Moin’s brilliant The millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship & Sainthood in Islam Columbia, 2014, and Kavita Singh’s perceptive Real Birds in Imagined Gardens: Mughal Painting between Persia and Europe Los Angeles, 2017.

63 C. A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire Cambridge, 1988, p. 16.

64 CPC p. xxxiii.

65 Quoted in G. J. Bryant, The Emergence of British Power in India 1600–1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation Woodbridge, 2013, p. 4.

66 Marshall, ‘The English in Asia to 1700’, pp. 272–.

67 Eaton, India in the Persianate Age p. 373.

68 Rupali Mishra: A Business of State: Commerce, Politics and the Birth of the East India Company Harvard, 2018, p. 6.

69 Keay, The Honourable Company pp. 112–13.

70 Mather, Pashas p. 53.

71 Thomas Mun, A Discourse of Trade, from England unto the East Indes By T.M. London, 1621, quoted in Mishra, A Business of State p. 3.

72 CPC 1, p. xi; Stern, The Company State p. 19.

73 Stern, The Company State p. 19; Keay, Honourable Company p. 68; CPC 1, p. xi; Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient’, p. 71.

74 Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient’, pp. 71–.

75 Stern, Company State pp. 35–6.

76 Ibid., pp. 22–3; Keay, Honourable Company pp. 130–1; Bruce P. Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars 1688–783 New York, 2001, p. 85; Roy, East India Company p. 77.

77 Lenman Britain’s Colonial Wars pp. 86–8.

78 Sir William Foster (ed.), The English Factories in India 1618–1669 13 vols, London, 1906–27, vol. 3, p. 345.

79 Stern, Company State p. 109, for the Bombay witchcraft trials.

80 Keay, The Honourable Company pp. 136–7.

81 William Letwin, The Origin of Scientific Economics London, 1963, p. 37.

82 Richard Carnac Temple, The Diaries of Streynsham Master, 1675–1680 2 vols, London, 1911, vol. 2, p. 28; Foster, English Factories vol. 4, p. 308; John R. McLane, Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Bengal Cambridge, 1993, p. 112; Jon Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire London, 2016, p. 39.


83 Bryant, Emergence of British Power p. 3.

84 Wilson, India Conquered p. 49.

85 Ibid., p. 47.

86 Ibid., p. 53.

87 Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies 2 vols, London, 1930, vol. 1, pp. 8–9, 312–15.

88 Wilson, India Conquered p. 53; Maya Jasanoff Edge of Empire: Conquest and Collecting in the East, 1750–1850 London, 2005, p. 25.

89 François Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, 1656–68 ed. Archibald Constable, trans. Irving Brock, Oxford, 1934, pp. 437, 442; McLane, Land and Local Kingship pp. 29–30; Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630–1720 Princeton, 1985, pp. 75, 162–3.

90 Audrey Truschke, Aurangzeb: The Man and the Myth New Delhi, 2017, pp. 66, 105.

91 C. A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion Cambridge, 1983, pp. 20–1; Satish Chandra, ‘Social Background to the Rise of the Maratha Movement During the 17th Century’, Indian Economic and Social History Review x (1973), pp. 209–18.

92 Dr John Fryer, A New Account of East India & Persia 1672–81 ed. W. Crooke, Hakluyt Society, 3 vols, London, 1909–15, vol. I, p. 341; Irfan Habib, ‘The Agrarian Causes of the Fall of the Mughal Empire’, in Enquiry 2, September 1958, pp. 81–98 and Enquiry 3, 3 April 1960, pp. 68–80. See also Meena Bhargava, The Decline of the Mughal Empire New Delhi, 2014, p. 43.

93 Fryer, A New Account of East India & Persia vol. II, pp. 67–8.

94 Truschke, Aurangzeb p. 66.

95 Kaushik Roy, ‘Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c. 1740– 1849’, in Journal of Military History vol. 69, no. 3 (July 2005), pp. 651–90; V. G. Dighe and S. N. Qanungo, ‘Administrative and Military System of the Marathas’, in R. C. Majumdar and V. G. Dighe (eds), The Maratha Supremacy Mumbai, 1977, pp. 567–8. For Shivaji’s two coronation ceremonies the best source is the Sivarajyabhiṣekakalpataru ( The Venerable Wish- Fulfilling Tree of Śiva’s Royal Consecration ) dated 30 September 1596 Saka era (= 1674 AD ). See Bihani Sarkar Traveling Tantricsand Belligerent Brahmins: the Sivarajyabhiṣekakalpataru and Sivaji’s Tantric consecration for the conference on ‘Professions in motion: culture, power and the politics of mobility in 18th-century India’, St Anne’s, Oxford, 2 June 2017; available at http://Www.academica.edu ; James W. Laine, Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India Oxford, 2003.
96 Quoted in Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Textures of Time: Writing History in South India 1600–1800 New York, 2003, p. 232. Shivaji’s reputation as a warrior hero against Islam is still alive and even growing today in modern Maharashtra, especially Bombay, where the airport, the railway station and even the Prince of Wales Museum have all recently been named after him. Here the far right-wing Hindutva Shiv Sena party, Shivaji’s Army, is one of the most powerful political forces on the streets of the city and set the city ablaze in 1992 following the destruction of the Babri Masjid.

97 Truschke, Aurangzeb p. 69.

98 Syed Ghulam Hussain Khan Tabatabai, Seir Mutaqherin Calcutta, 1790–94, vol. 1, pp. 310–11. For Ghulam Hussain Khan see Iqbal Ghani Khan, ‘A Book With Two Views: Ghulam Husain’s “An Overview of Modern Times”’, in Jamal Malik, ed., Perspectives of Mutual Encounters in South Asian History, 1760–1860 Leiden, 2000, pp. 278–97, and Kumkum Chatterjee, ‘History as Self-Representation: The Recasting of a Political Tradition in Late Eighteenth Century Eastern India’, Modern Asian Studies vol. 32, no. 4 (1998), pp. 913–48.

99 Truschke, Aurangzeb p. 120.

100 Ibid., p. 65, quoting Giovanni Gemelli Careri, Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri ed. S. N. Sen, New Delhi, 1949, p. 216. Originally published as Giro del Mondo Rome, 1699.

101 Ahkam-i Alamgiri, f 61b quoted in Bhargava, The Decline of the Mughal Empire p. 43.

102 Quoted in Waldemar Hansen, The Peacock Throne New Delhi, 1986, p. 28.

103 Uday Kulkarni’s The Era of Baji Rao: An Account of the Empire of the Deccan Pune, 2017, is both popular and exhaustively researched and makes for an excellent introduction to this period of Maratha rule.

104 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932. 2v.

105 Jean-Baptiste Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan Paris, 1822, p. 76.

106 See Stewart Gordon, ‘The Slow Conquest: Administrative Integration of Malwa into the Maratha Empire, 1720–760’, in Modern Asian Studies vol. 11, no. 1 (1977), pp. 1–40. Also Andre Wink, ‘Maratha Revenue Farming’, in Modern Asian Studies vol. 17, no. 4 (1983), pp. 591–628; Stewart Gordon, Marathas, Marauders and State Formation in Eighteenth Century India Delhi, 1994.

107 Voyage en Inde du Comte de Modave, 1773–1776 ed. Jean Deloche, Pondicherry, 1971, pp. 400–1.

108 Roy, ‘Military Synthesis in South Asia’; R. C. Majumdar et al., An Advanced History of India 1978, reprint, Madras, 1991, pp. 536–46; Eaton, India in the Persianate Age 1000–1765 p. 354; Stewart Gordon, The Marathas, 1600–1818 Cambridge, 1993, pp. 127–9, 140–3.

109 Munis D. Faruqui, ‘At Empire’s End: The Nizam, Hyderabad and Eighteenth Century India’, in Modern Asian Studies 43, 1 (2009), pp. 5–43; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Un Grand Derangement: Dreaming An Indo-Persian Empire in South Asia, 1740–800’, Journal of Early Modern History 4, 3–4 (2000), pp. 337–78; Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab 1707–1748 New Delhi, 1986.

110 Salim Allah, A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal trans. Francis Gladwin, Calcutta, 1788; McLane, Land and Local Kingship p. 72. See also Tilottama Mukherjee, ‘The Coordinating State and Economy: The Nizamat in Eighteenth-Century Bengal’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 43, no. 2 (2009), pp. 389–436.

111 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 450; J. H. Little, The House of Jagat Seth Calcutta, 1956, p. 3.

112 BL, IOR, Orme Mss India, VI, f. 1455.

113 Ibid., f. 1525.

114 For the Jagat Seths the best source remains Little, The House of Jagat Seth. See also Sushil Chaudhury, ‘The banking and mercantile house of Jagat Seths of Bengal’, in Studies in People’s History 2, 1 (2015), pp. 85–95; Lakshmi Subramanian, ‘Banias and the British: the role of indigenous credit in the Process of Imperial Expansion in Western India in the second half of the Eighteenth century’, Modern Asian Studies 21, 3 (1987); Kumkum Chatterjee, ‘Collaboration and Conflict: Bankers and Early Colonial Rule in India: 1757–813’, Indian Economic and Social History Review vol. 30, 3 (1993); Thomas A. Timberg, The Marwaris: From Jagat Seth to the Birlas New Delhi, 2014, p. 22; Lokanatha Gosha, The Modern History of the Indian Chiefs, Rajas, Zamindars, & C. Calcutta, 1881. For the wider Indian economy at this time see also Rajat Datt, ‘Commercialisation, Tribute and the Transition from late Mughal to Early Colonial in India’, Medieval History Journal vol. 6, no. 2 (2003), pp. 259–91; D. A. Washbrook, ‘Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic History c. 1720–1860’, in Modern Asian Studies vol. 22, no. 1 (1988), pp. 57–96; K. N. Chaudhuri, ‘India’s International Economy in the Nineteenth Century: A Historical Survey’, in Modern Asian Studies vol. 2, no. 1 (1968), pp. 31–50.

115 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Penumbral Visions: Making Politics in Early Modern South India Michigan, 2001, p. 106; Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Writing the Mughal World New York, 2012, pp. 353–5; Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor or Mogul India, 1653–1708 trans. William Irvine, London, 1907, vol. 3, pp. 369–70.

116 CPC 1, p. xxi; Stern, The Company State p. 176; Alam and Subrahmanyam, Writing the Mughal World pp. 358–9, 394.

117 Brijen K. Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 Leiden, 1966, p. 44.

118 Stephen P. Blake, Shahjahanabad: The Sovereign City in Mughal India, 1639–1739 Cambridge, 1991, p. 162.

119 Ishrat Haque, Glimpses of Mughal Society and Culture New Delhi, 1992, p. 21.

120 William Dalrymple and Yuthika Sharma Princes and Poets in Mughal Delhi 1707–1857 Princeton, 2012, pp. 4–5; Zahir Uddin Malik, The Reign of Muhammad Shah 1719–1748 Aligarh, 1977.

121 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan pp. 123–4.

122 Subrahmanyam, Penumbral Visions pp. 15–16.

123 Sayid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Shah Walli-Allah and His Times Canberra, 1980, p. 141; Gordon, The Marathas 1600–1818 pp. 124–5; Zahir Uddin Malik, The Reign of Muhammad Shah p. 133; Michael Axworthy, The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah from Tribal Warrior to Conquering Tyrant London, 2006, p. 189; Govind Sakharam Sardesai, A New History of the Marathas 3 vols, Poona, 1946, vol. 2, p. 154; Bhargava, The Decline of the Mughal Empire p. xv; Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, 1739–54 4 vols, New Delhi, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 2, 135.

124 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 1, p. 302; Subrahmanyam, Un Grand Derangement, pp. 356–7; Malik, The Reign of Muhammad Shah p. 135; Blake, Shahjahanabad p. 150.

125 Malik, The Reign of Muhammad Shah p. 111.

126 C. A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire pp. 8–9.

127 Malik, The Reign of Muhammad Shah p. 265; Rizvi, Shah Walli-Allah and His Times p. 141; Gordon, Marathas pp. 125, 128, 129, 135; Sardesai, New History of the Marathas vol. 2, p. 159.

128 Père Louis Bazin, ‘ Memoires sur dernieres annees du regne de Thamas Kouli-Kan et sa mort tragique, contenus dans un letter du Frere Bazin ’, 1751, in Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses Ecrites des Mission Etrangeres Paris, 1780, vol. IV, pp. 277–321. This passage, pp. 314–18.

129 Willem Floor, ‘New Facts on Nadir Shah’s Indian Campaign’, in Iran and Iranian Studies: Essays in Honour of Iraj Afshar ed. Kambiz Eslami, Princeton, 1998, pp. 198–220, p. 200.

130 Anand Ram Mukhlis, ‘Tazkira’, in Sir H. M. Elliot and John Dowson, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians London, 1867, vol. VIII, pp. 82–3.

131 Subrahmanyam, Un Grand Derangement pp. 357–8.

132 Axworthy, The Sword of Persia p. 207.

133 Mukhlis, ‘Tazkira’, in Elliot and Dowson, The History of India vol. VIII, p. 85.

134 Michael Edwards, King of the World: The Life and Times of Shah Alam, Emperor of Hindustan London, 1970, p. 15.

135 Floor, ‘New Facts on Nadir Shah’s Indian Campaign’, p. 217.

136 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 1, pp. 315–17.

137 Mukhlis, ‘Tazkira’, in Elliot and Dowson, The History of India vol. VIII, p. 86.

138 Floor, ‘New Facts on Nadir Shah’s Indian Campaign’, p. 217.

139 Mukhlis, ‘Tazkira’, in Elliot and Dowson, The History of India vol. VIII, p. 87.

140 Mahdi Astarabadi, Tarikh-e Jahangosha-ye Naderi: The official history of Nader’s reign Bombay lithograph 1849/1265), p. 207.

141 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire 1739–54 vol. 1, pp. 2–3, 4, 13.

142 BL, Add 6585, Shakir Khan, Tarikh-i Shakir Khani ff. 34–6.

144 Washbrook, ‘Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History c. 1720–1860’, p. 67.

145 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, pp. 160–1.

146 Subrahmanyam, Un Grand Derangement p. 344.

147 S. P. Sen’s book, The French in India, 1763–1816 Calcutta, 1958; Arvind Sinha, The Politics of Trade: Anglo-French Commerce on the Coromandel Coast, 1763–1793 New Delhi, 2002; Ferguson, Empire pp. 30–2.

148 Jean Marie Lafont and Rehana Lafont, The French & Delhi, Agra, Aligarh and Sardhana New Delhi, 2010, pp. 41–4.

149 The introduction of infantry drill to India occurred on a small scale before Dupleix. See David Harding’s Small Arms of the East India Company 1600–1856 London, 1997, vol. 4, pp. 150– 65, and Randolf Cooper’s important essay, ‘Culture, Combat and Colonialism in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century India’, International History Review vol. 27, no. 3 (September 2005), pp. 534–49 esp. pp. 537–8.

150 Henry Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive: The Beginning of Empire London, 1920, pp. 1–9.

151 Ferguson, Empire p. 31.

152 The Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, Dubash to Joseph François Dupleix ed. J. F. Price and K. Rangachari, 12 vols, Madras, 1922, vol. 3, p. 90.

153 Ibid., p. 9; Subrahmanyam, Penumbral Visions p. 14; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution Oxford, 1988, p. 133.

154 The Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai p. 96; Subrahmanyam, Penumbral Visions p. 14; Parker, The Military Revolution p. 133; Bert S. Hall and Kelly De Vries, ‘Essay Review –The “Military Revolution” Revisited’, Technology and Culture 31 (1990), p. 502; Knud J. V. Jespersen, ‘Social Change and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe: Some Danish Evidence’, Historical Journal 26 (1983), pp. 1–2; Michael Howard, War in European History (1976, reprint), Oxford, 1977, pp. 61, 78; Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (1983, reprint), London, 1993, p. 33; Roy, ‘Military Synthesis in South Asia’.

155 Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India London, 1989, p. 19.

156 Partha Chatterjee, The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power New Delhi, 2012, p. 11.

157 Subrahmanyam, Penumbral Visions p. 19.

158 Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company p. 36.

159 Bryant, Emergence of British Power p. 9.

160 Voyage en Inde pp. 67–8. Modave’s thoughts were echoed by his old friend Voltaire: ‘Finally there remained with the French, in this part of the world, only the regret that they had spent, over the course of more than forty years, immense sums of money in the upkeep of a Company which never provided the least profit, which never paid anything from its trade profits to its shareholders and its creditors, which in its Indian administration survived only by means of secret brigandry, and which has been upheld only by the share of the farming of tobacco accorded to it by the king: a memorable and perhaps useless example of the lack of intelligence which the French nation has had up to now in the grand ruinous trade with India’, Voltaire, Précis du siècle de Louis XV p. 1507, in Oeuvres historiques ed. R. Pomeau, Paris, 1962, pp. 1297–572.

161 Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, 1754–63 New York, 2014, pp. 52–4.

162 Ibid., pp. 59–60.
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Part 2 of __

CHAPTER 2: AN OFFER HE COULD NOT REFUSE

1 NAI, Bengal Select Committee, Letters from Court 25 May 1756, vol. 23 (1756–71), 13 February 1756.

2 Ibid.

3 Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War 1754–63 New York, 2014, p. 462.

4 John Keay, The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company London, 1991, pp. 111–12.

5 K. N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company in the 17th and 18th Centuries: A Pre-Modern Multinational Organisation The Hague, 1981, p. 29.

6 Sir William Foster, The East India House: Its History and Associations London, 1924, pp. 132–3.

7 Holden Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600–800’, in Maritime India intro. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 128–9; Tirthankar Roy, East India Company: The World’s Most Powerful Corporation New Delhi, 2012, pp. 116–17.

8 Tillman W. Nechtman, Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth Century Britain Cambridge, 2010.

9 P. J. Marshall, ‘The British in Asia: Trade to Dominion, 1700–765’, in P. J. Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century Oxford, 1998, pp. 267–9; Keith Feiling, Warren Hastings London, 1954, p. 13; Burton Stein, ‘Eighteenth Century India: Another View’, Studies in History vol. 5, 1 n.s. (1989), p. 20.

10 George Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive 2 vols, London, 1918, vol. 1, pp. 232–3; Percival Spear, Master of Bengal: Clive and his India London, 1975, pp. 62–3.

11 Mark Bence-Jones, Clive of India London, 1974, p. 3; A. M. Davies, Clive of Plassey London, 1939, p. 7.

12 Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, pp. 4–5.

13 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 31.

14 Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India London, 1989, p. 29.

15 Spear, Master of Bengal p. 61.

16 Bruce Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, 1688–783 Harlow, 2001, pp. 99–100.

17 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India pp. 30–1; Baugh, The Global Seven Years War p. 67; G. J. Bryant, Emergence of British Power Power in India 1600–1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation Woodbridge, 2013, p. 59; Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, pp. 194–201; Bence-Jones, Clive of India pp. 65–7.

18 Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, p. 218.

19 Ibid., p. 233.

20 P. J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America c. 1750– 1783 Oxford, 2005, pp. 84–5.

21 Quoted in John Keay, India Discovered London, 1981, p. 21.

22 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 10.

23 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires p. 148.

24 Brijen K. Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 Leiden, 1966, p. 14. But at this stage it was still the Asians and not the Europeans who were the major importers of bullion into Bengal in the early eighteenth century. One of the responsible officials of the EIC who lived in Bengal in the 1750–60s writes that it was the Asian merchants and not the Europeans who were the major importers of bullion into Bengal and that their imports of precious metals far exceeded those of the Europeans. Another Company official, Luke Scrafton, corroborates this finding. See Sushil Chaudhury, Companies Commerce and Merchants: Bengal in the Pre-Colonial Era Oxford, 2017, pp. 389–95. According to Richard Eaton, ‘Even as late as the mid-eighteenth century, Asian traders –especially Gujaratis, Armenians, and Punjabis –played a more important role in Bengal’s commercial economy than did Europeans.’ Eaton points out that in exchange for manufactured textiles both Asian and European merchants poured into the delta substantial amounts of silver, which, minted into currency, fuelled the booming agrarian frontier by monetising the local economy. Relying on Mughal documents, Eaton has done excellent work on the Bengal delta, the long-term expanding agrarian frontier and the changing courses of rivers in the eighteenth century which allowed the Mughal rulers to extend a rich and fertile agrarian base of rice cultivation –a process which was disrupted with the Company’s intervention in Bengal by the late eighteenth century. See Richard M. Eaton, Essays on Islam and Indian History Oxford, 2000, p. 263.

25 Mrs Jemima Kindersley, Letters from the East Indies London, 1777, p. 17. Also very good for Calcutta at this period is Farhat Hasan, ‘Calcutta in the Early Eighteenth Century’, in J. S. Grewal, Calcutta: Foundation and Development of a Colonial Metropolis New Delhi, 1991, and Rajat Datta, ‘From Medieval to Colonial: Markets, Territoriality and the Transition in Eighteenth-Century Bengal’, in Medieval History Journal vol. 2, no. 1 (1999).

26 K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660–1760 Cambridge, 1978, p. 253.

27 Kaushik Roy, ‘Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c. 1740– 1849’, in Journal of Military History vol. 69, no. 3 (July 2005), pp. 651–90; V. G. Dighe and S. N. Qanungo, ‘Administrative and Military System of the Marathas’, in R. C. Majumdar and V. G. Dighe (eds), The Maratha Supremacy Mumbai, 1977, pp. 567–8; Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, 1789–1803 4 vols, 1950; reprint, New Delhi, 1992, p. 85. The English factory records graphically described the anarchy: ‘The Marathas are plundering Birbhum (1742) which has put a stop to all businesses, the merchants and weavers flying whenever they can.’ Some of their reports are quoted in Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 43.

28 Quoted in Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 44.

29 Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Textures of Time: Writing History in South India 1600–1800 New York, 2003, pp. 236–7.

30 John R. McLane, Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Bengal Cambridge, 1993, pp. 163–5; The Maharahtra Purana : An Eighteenth Century Bengali Historical Text trans. and ed. Edward C. Dimock Jr and Pratul Chandra Gupta, Honolulu, 1965, pp. 28–32. There are many other accounts that corroborate Ganga Ram’s account. The historians Salimullah and Ghulam Husain Salim, for example, also endorse these accounts. They write, ‘The Bargis cut off the ears, noses and hands of multitudes of people, or killed them with many kinds of torture and suffering – by gagging their mouths with bags of dust and destroying them’ (i.e. outraged their women); see Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 44. Sarkar provides a long narrative of Vidyalankar’s account. The letters from the French factory at Chandernagar and the English settlement of Calcutta narrate the same story of opp. ression and destruction.

31 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 8.

32 Francis Gladwin, trans., The Memoirs of Khojeh Abdulkurreem Calcutta, 1788, pp. 147–8.

33 Roy, East India Company p. 165.

34 Ibid., pp. 25, 141–2, 165–7.

35 C. A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire Cambridge, 1988, p. 49.

36 Roy, East India Company p. 23. The problem with seeing Calcutta as a kind of shelter or tax haven for Indian merchants is that these merchants were not only operating in Calcutta, but instead depended on far-flung networks of merchants and suppliers throughout eastern and northern India. Calcutta’s status as a flourishing port, and the Company’s deep pockets, made it a magnet, but it’s also true that the city could only flourish in symbiosis with large sectors of the late Mughal economy. Calcutta was not the only city with a ‘legal system’, and it is possible Roy may have overestimated the distinctiveness of the Company in this regard.

37 Abdul Latif Shushtari, Kitab Tuhfat al-’Alam written Hyderabad 1802 and lithographed Bombay 1847, p. 427.

38 Ibid., p. 434.

39 P. J. Marshall, East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century Oxford, 1976, pp. 218–19.

40 See Andrew Ward, Our Bones Are Scattered London, 1996, p. 8.

41 Marshall, East India Fortunes p. 159.

42 Scottish Records Office, Hamilton-Dalrymple Mss, bundle 56, GD 110, folios 1021,1021. Stair Dalrymple to Sir Hew Dalrymple, 3 Jan 1754; Marshall, East India Fortunes pp. 159, 215.

43 Causes of the Loss of Calcutta 1756 David Renny, August 1756, OIOC, BL, O.V. 19, pp. 147– 61; OIOC, HM vol. 66, pp. 821–4.

44 Jean Law de Lauriston, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 trans. G. S. Cheema, New Delhi, 2014, p. 59.

45 OIOC, Bengal Correspondence, Court of Directors to the Fort William Council, 16 January 1752; Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 p. 37.

46 Watts to Drake and the Fort William Council, BL, OIOC, Bengal Public Consultations, 15 August 1755; Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 p. 38.

47 Philip B. Calkins, ‘The Role of Murshidabad as a Regional and Subregional Centre in Bengal’, in Richard L. Park, Urban Bengal East Lansing, 1969, pp. 25–6.

48 J. P. Losty, ‘Murshidabad Painting 1750–820’, in Neeta Das and Rosie Llewellyn Jones, Murshidabad: Forgotten Capital of Bengal Mumbai, 2013, pp. 82–105; J. P. Losty, ‘Towards a New Naturalism: Portraiture in Murshidabad and Avadh, 1750–0’, in Barbara Schmitz (ed.), After the Great Mughals: Painting in Delhi and the Regional Courts in the 18th and 19th Centuries Mumbai, 2002; J. P. Losty, ‘Eighteenth-century Mughal Paintings from the Swinton Collection’, in The Burlington Magazine CLIX, October 2017, pp. 789–99; Tilottama Mukherjee, ‘The Coordinating State and the Economy: the Nizamat in Eighteenth Century Bengal’, in Modern Asian Studies 43, 2 (2009), p. 421.

49 The miniature shows the Delhi exile Natthu Khan heading the band on his great rabab, the beautiful young Muhammad Khan with his astonishing blue eyes singing, while his elders Chajju Khan and Dindar Khan accompany him, one on either side, on the tambura, with Taj Khan strumming the been and Sita Ram on the pakhawaj; 1755 is the date of Shahamat Jang’s death. See also ‘Eighteenth-century Mughal Paintings from the Swinton Collection’, in The Burlington Magazine, CLIX, October 2017, pp. 789–99, fig. 29. Thanks to Katherine Butler Schofield for explaining this image for me.

50 Syed Ghulam Hussain Khan Tabatabai, Seir Mutaqherin Calcutta, 1790–4, vol. 2, pp. 156–62; Mukherjee, ‘The Coordinating State and the Economy: The Nizamat in Eighteenth Century Bengal’, p. 412.

51 Sir Jadunath Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal vol. II, The Muslim Period 1200 A.D.–1757 A.D., New Delhi, 1948, p. 448.

52 NAI, Home Dept, Public Branch, vol. 1, 9 January 1749, p. 73; Mukherjee, ‘The Coordinating State and the Economy: The Nizamat in Eighteenth Century Bengal’, pp. 389–36.

53 Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 p. 45.

54 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 164. Another good account of this period is Waqa-i-Mahabat Jang [The Full History of Aliverdi Khan] or Ahwal-i-Mahabat Jang of Yusuf Ali English translation by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, published by Asiatic Society of Bengal as Nawabs of Bengal Calcutta, 1952.

55 Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth Century India: The British in Bengal Cambridge, 2007, p. 3; McLane, Land and Local Kingship p. 6; Marshall, East India Fortunes p. 34.

56 BL, OIOC, IOR, Bengal Public Consultations, 10 June 1753, Range 1, vol. 26, f. 169. Despite the overwhelming evidence from contemporary sources of Siraj behaving rather like Uday Hussain in pre-9/11 Baghdad, there have been several spirited post-Colonial attempts to resuscitate his reputation, for example see Sushil Chaudhury, who argues that Sira ud-Daula’s villainous character is a misrepresentation. See Sushil Chaudhury, The Prelude to Empire: Plassey Revolution of 1757 New Delhi, 2000, pp. 29–36.

57 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 pp. 65–6.

58 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 122, 183–4, 188.

59 J. H. Little, The House of Jagat Seth Calcutta, 1956, p. 165.

60 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 225. See also the excellent discussion in Lakshmi Subramanian and Rajat K. Ray, ‘Merchants and Politics: From the Great Mughals to the East India Company’, in Dwijendra Tripathi, Business and Politics in India: A Historical Perspective New Delhi, 1991, pp. 19–45.

61 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 95.

62 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 52.

63 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 163.

64 Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 pp. 39, 51; S. C. Hill, Indian Records Series, Bengal in 1756–7 3 vols, London, 1905, vol. 1, p. 147.

65 ‘The Muzaffarnama of Karam Ali’, in Bengal Nawabs trans. Jadunath Sarkar, Calcutta, 1952, p. 58.

66 Ibid., p. 63.

67 Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 p. 54.

68 Narrative of the Capture of Calcutta from April 10 1756 to November 10 1756 William Tooke, BL, OIOC, O.V. 19, Bengal 1756, pp. 5–46; Rajat Kanta Ray, The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism New Delhi, 2003, p. 233.

69 Narrative of the Capture of Calcutta from April 10 1756 to November 10 1756 pp. 5–46.

70 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 21.

71 Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 pp. 14, 53; Hill, Bengal in 1756–7 vol. 1, p. 3.

72 Voyage en Inde du Comte de Modave, 1773–1776 ed. Jean Deloche, Pondicherry, 1971, pp. 67– 8.

73 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 pp. 218–19.

74 CPC ii, no. 1101; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 2, pp. 315, 328.

75 Ghulam Ali Khan alias Bhikhari Khan, Shah Alam Nama BL, Add 24080, f. 21.

76 Khurshidul Islam and Ralph Russell, Three Mughal Poets: Mir, Sauda, Mir Hasan New Delhi, 1991, pp. 30, 59.

77 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 222.

78 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 126.

79 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, p. 334.

80 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 126; Manna Kai, ‘Imad ul-Mulk’, in The Encyclopedia of Islam – Three ed. Kate Fleet and Gudrun Krämer, Brill, 2018, pp. 110–13.

81 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 125.

82 Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Writing the Mughal World: Studies on Culture and Politics New York, 2012, pp. 434–4.

83 This section derives from a remarkable essay by Katherine Schofield and David Lunn, ‘Delight, Devotion and the Music of the Monsoon at the Court of Emperor Shah Alam II’, in Margit Pernau, Imke Rajamani and Katherine Schofield, Monsoon Feelings New Delhi, 2018, pp. 185– 218.

84 Ibid. It may be a little reductive to draw too strong a contrast between Shah Alam as a ‘Sufi’ and his father, who had many Sufi connections, as a ‘puritan’. There was a distinction, but Nile Green’s work has convincingly argued that Mughal Sufism should be seen less as a distinct branch of ‘mystical Islam’ than as a many-headed and multi-faceted group of scholarly and sacred lineages which had in fact become over the early modern period the Muslim ‘establishment’. Nile Green, Sufism: A Global History London, 2012.

85 Ghulam Ali Khan alias Bhikhari Khan, Shah Alam Nama BL, Add 24080, f. 18.

86 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 17v–18r.

87 Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani BL Mss Or. 1749, f. 166 verso.

88 Ibid., f. 167 recto.

89 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 17v–18r. I have added several details from the related and slightly earlier account of the same event in the Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani BL Mss Or. 1749, f. 166 verso.

90 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, pp. 365–8.

91 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 254.

92 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 17v–18r. I have added a line of dialogue here from Ghulam Hussain Khan’s closely related account of the same event.

93 Ghulam Ali Khan alias Bhikhari Khan, Shah Alam Nama BL, Add 24080, f. 30.

94 K. K. Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company Calcutta, 1965, pp. 1–2.

95 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 286–9, vol. 3, pp. 189–90; Ray, The Felt Community p. 333.

CHAPTER 2: AN OFFER HE COULD NOT REFUSE

1 NAI, Bengal Select Committee, Letters from Court 25 May 1756, vol. 23 (1756–71), 13 February 1756.

2 Ibid.

3 Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War 1754–63 New York, 2014, p. 462.

4 John Keay, The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company London, 1991, pp. 111–12.

5 K. N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company in the 17th and 18th Centuries: A Pre-Modern Multinational Organisation The Hague, 1981, p. 29.

6 Sir William Foster, The East India House: Its History and Associations London, 1924, pp. 132–3.

7 Holden Furber, ‘Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600–800’, in Maritime India intro. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 128–9; Tirthankar Roy, East India Company: The World’s Most Powerful Corporation New Delhi, 2012, pp. 116–17.

8 Tillman W. Nechtman, Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth Century Britain Cambridge, 2010.

9 P. J. Marshall, ‘The British in Asia: Trade to Dominion, 1700–765’, in P. J. Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century Oxford, 1998, pp. 267–9; Keith Feiling, Warren Hastings London, 1954, p. 13; Burton Stein, ‘Eighteenth Century India: Another View’, Studies in History vol. 5, 1 n.s. (1989), p. 20.

10 George Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive 2 vols, London, 1918, vol. 1, pp. 232–3; Percival Spear, Master of Bengal: Clive and his India London, 1975, pp. 62–3.

11 Mark Bence-Jones, Clive of India London, 1974, p. 3; A. M. Davies, Clive of Plassey London, 1939, p. 7.

12 Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, pp. 4–5.

13 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 31.

14 Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India London, 1989, p. 29.

15 Spear, Master of Bengal p. 61.

16 Bruce Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, 1688–783 Harlow, 2001, pp. 99–100.

17 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India pp. 30–1; Baugh, The Global Seven Years War p. 67; G. J. Bryant, Emergence of British Power Power in India 1600–1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation Woodbridge, 2013, p. 59; Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, pp. 194–201; Bence-Jones, Clive of India pp. 65–7.

18 Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, p. 218.

19 Ibid., p. 233.

20 P. J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America c. 1750– 1783 Oxford, 2005, pp. 84–5.

21 Quoted in John Keay, India Discovered London, 1981, p. 21.

22 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 10.

23 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires p. 148.

24 Brijen K. Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 Leiden, 1966, p. 14. But at this stage it was still the Asians and not the Europeans who were the major importers of bullion into Bengal in the early eighteenth century. One of the responsible officials of the EIC who lived in Bengal in the 1750–60s writes that it was the Asian merchants and not the Europeans who were the major importers of bullion into Bengal and that their imports of precious metals far exceeded those of the Europeans. Another Company official, Luke Scrafton, corroborates this finding. See Sushil Chaudhury, Companies Commerce and Merchants: Bengal in the Pre-Colonial Era Oxford, 2017, pp. 389–95. According to Richard Eaton, ‘Even as late as the mid-eighteenth century, Asian traders –especially Gujaratis, Armenians, and Punjabis –played a more important role in Bengal’s commercial economy than did Europeans.’ Eaton points out that in exchange for manufactured textiles both Asian and European merchants poured into the delta substantial amounts of silver, which, minted into currency, fuelled the booming agrarian frontier by monetising the local economy. Relying on Mughal documents, Eaton has done excellent work on the Bengal delta, the long-term expanding agrarian frontier and the changing courses of rivers in the eighteenth century which allowed the Mughal rulers to extend a rich and fertile agrarian base of rice cultivation –a process which was disrupted with the Company’s intervention in Bengal by the late eighteenth century. See Richard M. Eaton, Essays on Islam and Indian History Oxford, 2000, p. 263.

25 Mrs Jemima Kindersley, Letters from the East Indies London, 1777, p. 17. Also very good for Calcutta at this period is Farhat Hasan, ‘Calcutta in the Early Eighteenth Century’, in J. S. Grewal, Calcutta: Foundation and Development of a Colonial Metropolis New Delhi, 1991, and Rajat Datta, ‘From Medieval to Colonial: Markets, Territoriality and the Transition in Eighteenth-Century Bengal’, in Medieval History Journal vol. 2, no. 1 (1999).

26 K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660–1760 Cambridge, 1978, p. 253.

27 Kaushik Roy, ‘Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c. 1740– 1849’, in Journal of Military History vol. 69, no. 3 (July 2005), pp. 651–90; V. G. Dighe and S. N. Qanungo, ‘Administrative and Military System of the Marathas’, in R. C. Majumdar and V. G. Dighe (eds), The Maratha Supremacy Mumbai, 1977, pp. 567–8; Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, 1789–1803 4 vols, 1950; reprint, New Delhi, 1992, p. 85. The English factory records graphically described the anarchy: ‘The Marathas are plundering Birbhum (1742) which has put a stop to all businesses, the merchants and weavers flying whenever they can.’ Some of their reports are quoted in Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 43.

28 Quoted in Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 44.

29 Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Textures of Time: Writing History in South India 1600–1800 New York, 2003, pp. 236–7.

30 John R. McLane, Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Bengal Cambridge, 1993, pp. 163–5; The Maharahtra Purana : An Eighteenth Century Bengali Historical Text trans. and ed. Edward C. Dimock Jr and Pratul Chandra Gupta, Honolulu, 1965, pp. 28–32. There are many other accounts that corroborate Ganga Ram’s account. The historians Salimullah and Ghulam Husain Salim, for example, also endorse these accounts. They write, ‘The Bargis cut off the ears, noses and hands of multitudes of people, or killed them with many kinds of torture and suffering – by gagging their mouths with bags of dust and destroying them’ (i.e. outraged their women); see Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 44. Sarkar provides a long narrative of Vidyalankar’s account. The letters from the French factory at Chandernagar and the English settlement of Calcutta narrate the same story of opp. ression and destruction.

31 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 8.

32 Francis Gladwin, trans., The Memoirs of Khojeh Abdulkurreem Calcutta, 1788, pp. 147–8.

33 Roy, East India Company p. 165.

34 Ibid., pp. 25, 141–2, 165–7.

35 C. A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire Cambridge, 1988, p. 49.

36 Roy, East India Company p. 23. The problem with seeing Calcutta as a kind of shelter or tax haven for Indian merchants is that these merchants were not only operating in Calcutta, but instead depended on far-flung networks of merchants and suppliers throughout eastern and northern India. Calcutta’s status as a flourishing port, and the Company’s deep pockets, made it a magnet, but it’s also true that the city could only flourish in symbiosis with large sectors of the late Mughal economy. Calcutta was not the only city with a ‘legal system’, and it is possible Roy may have overestimated the distinctiveness of the Company in this regard.

37 Abdul Latif Shushtari, Kitab Tuhfat al-’Alam written Hyderabad 1802 and lithographed Bombay 1847, p. 427.

38 Ibid., p. 434.

39 P. J. Marshall, East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century Oxford, 1976, pp. 218–19.

40 See Andrew Ward, Our Bones Are Scattered London, 1996, p. 8.

41 Marshall, East India Fortunes p. 159.

42 Scottish Records Office, Hamilton-Dalrymple Mss, bundle 56, GD 110, folios 1021,1021. Stair Dalrymple to Sir Hew Dalrymple, 3 Jan 1754; Marshall, East India Fortunes pp. 159, 215.

43 Causes of the Loss of Calcutta 1756 David Renny, August 1756, OIOC, BL, O.V. 19, pp. 147– 61; OIOC, HM vol. 66, pp. 821–4.

44 Jean Law de Lauriston, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 trans. G. S. Cheema, New Delhi, 2014, p. 59.

45 OIOC, Bengal Correspondence, Court of Directors to the Fort William Council, 16 January 1752; Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 p. 37.

46 Watts to Drake and the Fort William Council, BL, OIOC, Bengal Public Consultations, 15 August 1755; Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 p. 38.

47 Philip B. Calkins, ‘The Role of Murshidabad as a Regional and Subregional Centre in Bengal’, in Richard L. Park, Urban Bengal East Lansing, 1969, pp. 25–6.

48 J. P. Losty, ‘Murshidabad Painting 1750–820’, in Neeta Das and Rosie Llewellyn Jones, Murshidabad: Forgotten Capital of Bengal Mumbai, 2013, pp. 82–105; J. P. Losty, ‘Towards a New Naturalism: Portraiture in Murshidabad and Avadh, 1750–0’, in Barbara Schmitz (ed.), After the Great Mughals: Painting in Delhi and the Regional Courts in the 18th and 19th Centuries Mumbai, 2002; J. P. Losty, ‘Eighteenth-century Mughal Paintings from the Swinton Collection’, in The Burlington Magazine CLIX, October 2017, pp. 789–99; Tilottama Mukherjee, ‘The Coordinating State and the Economy: the Nizamat in Eighteenth Century Bengal’, in Modern Asian Studies 43, 2 (2009), p. 421.

49 The miniature shows the Delhi exile Natthu Khan heading the band on his great rabab, the beautiful young Muhammad Khan with his astonishing blue eyes singing, while his elders Chajju Khan and Dindar Khan accompany him, one on either side, on the tambura, with Taj Khan strumming the been and Sita Ram on the pakhawaj; 1755 is the date of Shahamat Jang’s death. See also ‘Eighteenth-century Mughal Paintings from the Swinton Collection’, in The Burlington Magazine, CLIX, October 2017, pp. 789–99, fig. 29. Thanks to Katherine Butler Schofield for explaining this image for me.

50 Syed Ghulam Hussain Khan Tabatabai, Seir Mutaqherin Calcutta, 1790–4, vol. 2, pp. 156–62; Mukherjee, ‘The Coordinating State and the Economy: The Nizamat in Eighteenth Century Bengal’, p. 412.

51 Sir Jadunath Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal vol. II, The Muslim Period 1200 A.D.–1757 A.D., New Delhi, 1948, p. 448.

52 NAI, Home Dept, Public Branch, vol. 1, 9 January 1749, p. 73; Mukherjee, ‘The Coordinating State and the Economy: The Nizamat in Eighteenth Century Bengal’, pp. 389–36.

53 Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 p. 45.

54 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 164. Another good account of this period is Waqa-i-Mahabat Jang [The Full History of Aliverdi Khan] or Ahwal-i-Mahabat Jang of Yusuf Ali English translation by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, published by Asiatic Society of Bengal as Nawabs of Bengal Calcutta, 1952.

55 Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth Century India: The British in Bengal Cambridge, 2007, p. 3; McLane, Land and Local Kingship p. 6; Marshall, East India Fortunes p. 34.

56 BL, OIOC, IOR, Bengal Public Consultations, 10 June 1753, Range 1, vol. 26, f. 169. Despite the overwhelming evidence from contemporary sources of Siraj behaving rather like Uday Hussain in pre-9/11 Baghdad, there have been several spirited post-Colonial attempts to resuscitate his reputation, for example see Sushil Chaudhury, who argues that Sira ud-Daula’s villainous character is a misrepresentation. See Sushil Chaudhury, The Prelude to Empire: Plassey Revolution of 1757 New Delhi, 2000, pp. 29–36.

57 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 pp. 65–6.

58 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 122, 183–4, 188.

59 J. H. Little, The House of Jagat Seth Calcutta, 1956, p. 165.

60 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 225. See also the excellent discussion in Lakshmi Subramanian and Rajat K. Ray, ‘Merchants and Politics: From the Great Mughals to the East India Company’, in Dwijendra Tripathi, Business and Politics in India: A Historical Perspective New Delhi, 1991, pp. 19–45.

61 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 95.

62 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 52.

63 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 163.

64 Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 pp. 39, 51; S. C. Hill, Indian Records Series, Bengal in 1756–7 3 vols, London, 1905, vol. 1, p. 147.

65 ‘The Muzaffarnama of Karam Ali’, in Bengal Nawabs trans. Jadunath Sarkar, Calcutta, 1952, p. 58.

66 Ibid., p. 63.

67 Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 p. 54.

68 Narrative of the Capture of Calcutta from April 10 1756 to November 10 1756 William Tooke, BL, OIOC, O.V. 19, Bengal 1756, pp. 5–46; Rajat Kanta Ray, The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism New Delhi, 2003, p. 233.

69 Narrative of the Capture of Calcutta from April 10 1756 to November 10 1756 pp. 5–46.

70 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 21.

71 Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7 pp. 14, 53; Hill, Bengal in 1756–7 vol. 1, p. 3.

72 Voyage en Inde du Comte de Modave, 1773–1776 ed. Jean Deloche, Pondicherry, 1971, pp. 67– 8.

73 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 pp. 218–19.

74 CPC ii, no. 1101; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 2, pp. 315, 328.

75 Ghulam Ali Khan alias Bhikhari Khan, Shah Alam Nama BL, Add 24080, f. 21.

76 Khurshidul Islam and Ralph Russell, Three Mughal Poets: Mir, Sauda, Mir Hasan New Delhi, 1991, pp. 30, 59.

77 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 1, p. 222.

78 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 126.

79 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, p. 334.

80 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 126; Manna Kai, ‘Imad ul-Mulk’, in The Encyclopedia of Islam – Three ed. Kate Fleet and Gudrun Krämer, Brill, 2018, pp. 110–13.

81 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 125.

82 Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Writing the Mughal World: Studies on Culture and Politics New York, 2012, pp. 434–4.

83 This section derives from a remarkable essay by Katherine Schofield and David Lunn, ‘Delight, Devotion and the Music of the Monsoon at the Court of Emperor Shah Alam II’, in Margit Pernau, Imke Rajamani and Katherine Schofield, Monsoon Feelings New Delhi, 2018, pp. 185– 218.

84 Ibid. It may be a little reductive to draw too strong a contrast between Shah Alam as a ‘Sufi’ and his father, who had many Sufi connections, as a ‘puritan’. There was a distinction, but Nile Green’s work has convincingly argued that Mughal Sufism should be seen less as a distinct branch of ‘mystical Islam’ than as a many-headed and multi-faceted group of scholarly and sacred lineages which had in fact become over the early modern period the Muslim ‘establishment’. Nile Green, Sufism: A Global History London, 2012.

85 Ghulam Ali Khan alias Bhikhari Khan, Shah Alam Nama BL, Add 24080, f. 18.


86 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 17v–18r.

87 Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani BL Mss Or. 1749, f. 166 verso.

88 Ibid., f. 167 recto.

89 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 17v–18r. I have added several details from the related and slightly earlier account of the same event in the Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani BL Mss Or. 1749, f. 166 verso.

90 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, pp. 365–8.

91 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 254.

92 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 17v–18r. I have added a line of dialogue here from Ghulam Hussain Khan’s closely related account of the same event.

93 Ghulam Ali Khan alias Bhikhari Khan, Shah Alam Nama BL, Add 24080, f. 30.

94 K. K. Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company Calcutta, 1965, pp. 1–2.

95 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 286–9, vol. 3, pp. 189–90; Ray, The Felt Community p. 333.

CHAPTER 3: SWEEPING WITH THE BROOM OF PLUNDER

1 William Tooke Narrative of the Capture of Calcutta from April 10, 1756 to November 10, 1756 BL, OIOC, O.V. 19, Bengal 1756, pp. 5–46.

2 John Zephaniah Holwell, quoted in John Keay, The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company London, 1991, p. 301.

3 William Watts and John Campbell, Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal, Anno. Dom. 1757 p. 14.

4 John Zephaniah Holwell, quoted in Bruce P. Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars 1688–783 New York, 2001, p. 106.

5 An Account Of The Capture Of Calcutta By Captain Grant BM Add Mss 29200, f. 38.

6 Ibid.

7 Concerning the Loss of Calcutta BL, OIOC, HM vol. 66, pp. 821–4.

8 An Account Of The Capture Of Calcutta By Captain Grant BM Add Mss 29200, f. 39.

9 Ibid.

10 Account of the loss of Calcutta by David Renny BL, OIOC, HM vol. 66, pp. 821–4.

11 Cooke’s Evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, in W. K. Firminger (ed.), Great Britain, House of Commons, Report on East India Affairs, Fifth report from the Select Committee vol. III, p. 299.

12 Quoted in Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India London, 1989, p. 42.

13 Syed Ghulam Hussain Khan Tabatabai, Seir Mutaqherin Calcutta, 1790–4, vol. 2, p. 190.

14 Concerning the Loss of Calcutta BL, OIOC, HM vol. 66, pp. 821–4.

15 Narrative of the loss of Calcutta, with the Black Hole by Captain Mills, who was in it, and sundry other particulars, being Captain Mills pocket book, which he gave me BL, OIOC, O.V.

19, pp. 77–92.

16 Ibid.

17 Account of the loss of Calcutta by John Cooke Esq. who was in the Black Hole, June 1756 in Cooke’s Evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in W. K. Firminger (ed.), Great Britain, House of Commons, Report on East India Affairs, Fifth report from the Select Committee vol III, p. 299.

18 Ghulam Husain Salim, Riyazu-s-salatin: A History of Bengal, Translated from the original Persian by Maulvi Abdus Salam Calcutta, 1902, p. 366.

19 S. C. Hill, Indian Records Series, Bengal in 1756–7 3 vols, Calcutta, 1905, vol. 1, p. 51, French letter from Chandernagar.

20 Account of the loss of Calcutta by John Cooke Esq. who was in the Black Hole, June 1756 in Cooke’s Evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, in W. K. Firminger (ed.), Great Britain, House of Commons, Report on East India Affairs, Fifth report from the Select Committee vol. III, p. 299.

21 Yusuf Ali Khan, Tarikh-i-Bangala-i-Mahabatjangi trans. Abdus Subhan, Calcutta, 1982, pp. 120–2.

22 John Zephaniah Holwell, A Genuine Narrative of the Deplorable Deaths of the English Gentlemen, and others, who were suffocated in the Black Hole in Fort William, in Calcutta, in the Kingdom of Bengal; in the Night Succeeding the 20 th June 1756 London, 1758.

23 There is a large literature on the Black Hole. The best forensic examination of the primary evidence is to be found in Brijen K. Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, 1756– 7 Leiden, 1966, pp. 70–81. There are also good discussions in Partha Chatterjee, The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power Ranikhet, 2012, p. 255; Jan Dalley, The Black Hole: Money, Myth and Empire London, 2006; Rajat Kanta Ray, The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism New Delhi, 2003, pp. 235–7; Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600–1850 London, 2002; Ian Barrow, ‘The many meanings of the Black Hole of Calcutta’, in Tall Tales and True: India, Historiography and British Imperial Imaginings ed. Kate Brittlebank, Clayton, Vic., 2008, pp. 7–18. Betty Joseph has argued that the Black Hole helped the Company avoid much public and political scrutiny of the crucial shift that had taken place in its role in India, and as a result, the Company moved from being a commercial power to a territorial power and began the conquest of India without criticism. Betty Joseph, Reading the East India Company New Delhi, 2006, pp. 70–1.

24 Concerning the Loss of Calcutta BL, OIOC, HM vol. 66, pp. 821–4.

25 Causes of the Loss of Calcutta 1756 David Renny, August 1756, BL, OIOC, O.V. 19, pp. 147– 61.

26 G. J. Bryant, Emergence of British Power in India 1600–1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation Woodbridge, 2013, pp. 118–21.

27 Hill, Indian Records Series, Bengal in 1756–7 vol. 1, p. 233, Extract of a letter from Colonel Clive to the Secret Committee, London, dated Fort St George, 11 October, 1756.

28 George Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive 2 vols, London, 1918, vol. 1, p. 278.

29 Mark Bence-Jones, Clive of India London, 1974, p. 94.

30 Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War 1754–63 New York, 2014, p. 286.

31 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 220.

32 Bence-Jones, Clive of India p. 98; Keith Feiling, Warren Hastings London, 1954, p. 23.

33 Captain Edward Maskelyne, Journal of the Proceedings of the Troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Clive on the expedition to Bengal BL, OIOC, Mss Eur Orme, vol. 20, p. 19.

34 Edward Ives, A Voyage From England to India in the Year 1754 London, 1733, quoted in Keay, The Honourable Company p. 307.

35 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 221.

36 Ives, A Voyage From England to India in the Year 1754 p. 102.

37 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 23.

38 Ghulam Husain Salim, Riyazu-s-salatin pp. 369–70.

39 Captain Edward Maskelyne, Journal of the Proceedings of the Troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Clive on the expedition to Bengal BL, OIOC, Mss Eur Orme, vol. 20, pp. 23–4; Watts and Campbell, Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal Anno. Dom. 1757 p. 18.

40 Watts and Campbell, Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal Anno. Dom. 1757 p. 20.

41 Clive’s Evidence –First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons; Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, pp. 354–5.

42 Captain Edward Maskelyne, Journal of the Proceedings of the Troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Clive on the expedition to Bengal BL, OIOC, Mss Eur Orme, vol. 20, pp. 28–30.

43 Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, pp. 359–60.

44 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 222.

45 P. J. Marshall (ed.), The Eighteenth Century in Indian History. Evolution or Revolution New Delhi, 2003, p. 362.

46 Ray, The Felt Community p. 244.

47 The three British players in this story – the Crown, the Company and Parliament – rarely worked as a unified force. For a good analysis of the tensions between them see Lucy Sutherland’s classic, The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics Oxford, 1952.

48 Baugh, The Global Seven Years War p. 291. Cuba was a Spanish colony, only involved in the war at the very end, when Spain joined in.

49 Hill, Indian Records Series, Bengal in 1756–7 vol. 1, pp. 180–1, Letter to M Demontorcin, Chandernagar, August 1, 1756.

50 Jean Law de Lauriston, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 trans. G. S. Cheema, New Delhi, 2014, p. 87.

51 Keay, The Honourable Company p. 314.

52 Quoted by Sir Jadunath Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal vol. II, The Muslim Period 1200 A.D.–1757 A.D., New Delhi, 1948, pp. 484–5.

53 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 98.

54 Ghulam Husain Salim, Riyazu-s-salatin pp. 373–4; BL, OIOC, HM 193, p. 88.

55 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 193.

56 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 66.

57 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 211, 213.

58 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 pp. 82–3.

59 Hill, Indian Records Series, Bengal in 1756–7 vol. 2, pp. 368–9, Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr Pigot, dated 30 April 1757.

60 This is why the eminent Indian scholar K. M. Pannikar famously called the Battle of Plassey a ‘transaction, not a battle, a transaction by which the compradors of Bengal, led by Jagat Seth, sold the Nawab to the East India Company’, K. M. Pannikar, Asia and Western Dominance New York, 1954, p. 100. See also Sushil Chaudhury, Companies, Commerce and Merchants: Bengal in the Pre-Colonial Era New Delhi, 2015, pp. 336–52.

61 Fort William Select Committee Proceedings of May 1, 1757, in Hill, Indian Records Series, Bengal in 1756–7 vol. 2, p. 370.

62 In an effort to declutter an already complicated narrative, I have omitted the important role in the conspiracy of another banker, this time a Punjabi, named Amir Chand, known to the Company as Omichand. He played a major role in the Plassey conspiracy. Clive made full use of Omichand as a negotiator and he also accompanied Watts to Murshidabad following the conclusion of the February treaty. Omichand wanted his share in the spoils of Plassey and demanded 5 per cent on all the Nawab’s treasure, threatening to reveal the conspiracy to Siraj. However, when the Select Committee met on 17 May Clive deviously persuaded it to draw up a double treaty to be signed by Mir Jafar and the British, in one the article in favour of Omichand’s ‘cut’ being inserted and in the other left out. See Sushil Chaudhury, The Prelude to Empire: Plassey Revolution of 1757 p. 127 and passim.

63 Letter from Petrus Arratoon to the Court of Directors, dated 25 January 1759, quoted in Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, p. 432.

64 Watts and Campbell, Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal, Anno. Dom. 1757 pp. 98–9.

65 BL, OIOC, Mss Eur Orme India XI, no. 153.

66 BL, OIOC, IOR, HM 193, no. 158.

67 Ibid., no. 159.

68 Spear, Master of Bengal p. 87.

69 Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 1, p. 440.

70 BL, OIOC, IOR, HM 193, no. 161.

71 Ibid., no. 162.

72 Ibid., no. 167.

73 Ibid., no. 169.

74 Ibid.

75 BL, OIOC, Orme Papers, O.V., CLXIV-A, f. 115.

76 NAI, Home Misc of Ancient Records, 1757, vol. 19, pp. 120–8, 26 July 1757.

77 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 230–1.

78 The Muzaffarnama of Karam Ali in Bengal Nawabs trans. Jadunath Sarkar, Calcutta, 1952, p. 76.

79 Ghulam Husain Salim, Riyazu-s-salatin pp. 375–6.

80 Captain Edward Maskelyne, Journal of the Proceedings of the Troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Clive on the expedition to Bengal BL, OIOC, Mss Eur Orme, vol. 20, p. 30.

81 NAI, Home Misc of Ancient Records, 1757, vol. 19, pp. 120–8, 26 July 1757.

82 BL, OIOC, IOR, HM 193, no. 172.

83 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India p. 55.

84 Hill, Indian Records Series, Bengal in 1756–7 vol. 2, p. 437, Clive to Select Committee, Fort William June 30th 1757.

85 BL, OIOC, IOR, HM 193, no. 194.

86 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 235–42.

87 The Muzaffarnama of Karam Ali p. 78.

88 P. J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America c. 1750– 1783 p. 150; John R. McLane, Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Bengal Cambridge, 1993, p. 150.

89 Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 2, p. 35.

90 Philip Stern has shown how much earlier than was previously understood the Company acquired political power, but there can be no doubt that Plassey hugely augmented this. See Philip J. Stern, The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty & the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India Cambridge, 2011.

91 Ray, The Felt Community pp. 245–6.

92 Keay, The Honourable Company pp. 317–18.

93 Alexander Dow, History of Hindostan 3 vols, Dublin, 1792, vol. 3, p. xxiv.

94 P. J. Marshall, East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century Oxford, 1976, p. 8.
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CHAPTER 4: A PRINCE OF LITTLE CAPACITY

1 Percival Spear, Master of Bengal: Clive and his India London, 1975, p. 97.

2 Ibid.

3 Clive to Mir Jafar, 15 July 1757, OIOC, HM 193, 180; Mark Bence-Jones, Clive of India London, 1974, p. 157.

4 Clive to John Payne, 11 November 1758, National Library of Wales, Clive Mss 200 (2), pp. 102– 4.

5 George Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive New Delhi, 1986, vol. 2, pp. 119–22.

6 Abdul Majed Khan, The Transition in Bengal 1756–1775 Cambridge, 1969, pp. 10–11.

7 J. Price, Five Letters from a Free Merchant in Bengal, to Warren Hastings Esq London, 1778, p. 136; Peter Marshall, Problems of Empire: Britain and India 1757–1813 London, 1968, p. 26.

8 Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive, vol. 2, p. 179; Tillman W. Nechtman, ‘A Jewel in the Crown? Indian Wealth in Domestic Britain in the Late Eighteenth Century’, Eighteenth Century Studies 41:1 (2007), pp. 71–86, p. 74; Spear, Master of Bengal p. 119.

9 Sir Penderel Moon, Warren Hastings and British India London, 1947, p. 35; Abdul Majed Khan, The Transition in Bengal 1756–1775 pp. 28–9.

10 Syed Ghulam Hussain Khan Tabatabai, Seir Mutaqherin Calcutta, 1790–94, vol. 2, pp. 262, 270.

11 Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India London, 1989, p. 62.

12 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 241.

13 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 351.

14 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 262, 250–1, 373; Henry Vansittart, A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal from the Year 1760, to the year 1764, during the Government of Mr Henry Vansittart London, 1766, vol. 1, pp. 151–3.

15 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India p. 86.

16 OIOC, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30 April, 25, 26, 30 July, 27 Aug 1764, Range A, vol. 5, pp. 156–61, 408–21, 444–58; P. J. Marshall, East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century Oxford, 1976, pp. 118, 128; Bence-Jones, Clive of India p. 156.

17 Vansittart, A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal vol. 1, p. 25.

18 Marshall, East India Fortunes p. 120.

19 Quoted in Bence-Jones, Clive of India p. 156.

20 Voyage en Inde du Comte de Modave, 1773–1776 ed. Jean Deloche, Pondicherry, 1971, p. 48.

21 Ibid., pp. 282–7.

22 Quoted by Vansittart, A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal, vol. 2, pp. 79–84.

23 Hastings to Vansittart, 25 April 1762, OIOC, BL Add Mss 29,098, f. 7–8. See also Walter K. Firminger and William Anderson, The Diaries of Three Surgeons of Patna Calcutta, 1909, p. 16.

24 Keith Feiling, Warren Hastings London, 1954, pp. 1–11; Jeremy Bernstein, Dawning of the Raj: The Life & Trials of Warren Hastings Chicago, 2000, pp. 32–5.

25 Feiling, Warren Hastings pp. 39, 66. The portrait is now in the National Portrait Gallery, London, NPG 81.

26 Ibid., pp. 28, 41.

27 Kumkum Chatterjee, Merchants, Politics & Society in Early Modern India Bihar: 1733–1820 Leiden, 1996, pp. 118–23. For other complaints about Pearkes see Vansittart, A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal vol. 1, p. 28.

28 For the Jagat Seths writing to Shah Alam see Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 2, p. 126. For Mir Ashraf’s supp. ort for Shah Alam see BL, Or. 466, Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, pp. 635–.

29 Ghulam Ali Khan alias Bhikhari Khan, Shah Alam Nama BL, Add 24080.

30 The historiography of the period usually contrasts the old thesis of Mughal decline against which are aligned revisionist claims of provincial autonomy and growth. Shah Alam’s story reveals a more complex story than just a case study of decentralisation, and reveals instead the fluidity of the situation and the shifting political allegiances and interests which are not incorporated in either of these linear positions.

31 Sayid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Shah Walli-Allah And His Times Canberra, 1980, p. 170.

32 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 20r–21v.

33 Ghulam Ali Khan alias Bhikhari Khan, Shah Alam Nama BL, Add 24080.

34 Krishna Dayal Bhargava, Browne Correspondence Delhi, 1960, p. 1.

35 Jean Law de Lauriston, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 trans. G. S. Cheema, New Delhi, 2014, p. 297.

36 Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire 4 vols, New Delhi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 315.

37 Tarikh-i Shakir Khani, British Library Oriental manuscripts, Add. 6568, f. 14r.

38 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 pp. 265, 280, 290–1.

39 Ghulam Ali Khan alias Bhikhari Khan, Shah Alam Nama BL, Add 24080. Also John R. McLane, Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Bengal Cambridge, 1993, p. 181.

40 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 338–41.

41 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 342.

42 Hastings to Vansittart, BL, OIOC, Add Mss 29132, f. 103–11; also Moon, Warren Hastings and British India p. 37.

43 John Caillaud, A Narrative of What Happ. ened in Bengal in the Year 1760 London, 1764, p. 15.

44 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 344–5.

45 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, pp. 634–. Also McLane, Land and Local Kingship p. 181.

46 Caillaud, A Narrative of What Happ. ened in Bengal in the Year 1760 p. 25.

47 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, pp. 634–.

48 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, p. 180.

49 Law, A Memoir of the Mughal Empire 1757–61 p. 297.

50 K. K. Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company Calcutta, 1965, p. 15. Shah Alam also lost some of his baggage and his writing desk, which was seized by Archibald Swinton and is now in the Royal Scottish Museum in Edinburgh.

51 Jean-Baptiste Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan Paris, 1822, pp. 203–4.

52 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 404.

53 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 403.

54 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 401–3.

55 Caillaud, A Narrative of What Happ. ened in Bengal in the Year 1760 p. 35.

56 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 371–2.

57 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 374.

58 Hastings to Vansittart, BL, OIOC, Add Mss 29132, f. 103–11.

59 Hastings to Vansittart, 10 July 1760, BL, OIOC, Add Mss 29132, f. 103–11.

60 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India p. 88; Moon, Warren Hastings and British India p. 39; Nicholas B. Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain Harvard, 2006, p. 50.

61 Ghulam Husain Salim, Riyazu-s-salatin: A History of Bengal. Translated from the original Persian by Maulvi Abdus Salam Calcutta, 1902, pp. 385–6.

62 Caillaud, A Narrative of What Happened in Bengal in the Year 1760 p. 50.

63 Lushington to Clive, 3 December 1760, cited in John Malcolm, Life of Robert, Lord Clive London, 1836, vol. II, p. 268.

64 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, p. 681.

65 Ibid., pp. 681–9.

66 P. J. Marshall, Bengal: The British Bridgehead – Eastern India 1740–1828 Cambridge, 1987, p. 86.

67 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, pp. 683, 685.

68 All details on Sumru from Voyage en Inde pp. 420–2.

69 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 500–3.

70 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 421, 434.

71 Ibid., vol 2, pp. 427, 433.

72 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 427.

73 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, pp. 683, 688.

74 Carnac’s Letter to the Select Committee, 5 March 1761, Vansittart, A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal vol. 1, p. 185.

75 Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 18.

76 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 406–7.

77 Recently given by the Swinton family to the Royal Scottish Museum in Edinburgh.

78 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 407.

79 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India pp. 92–3.

80 Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 21.

81 G. J. Bryant, The Emergence of British Power in India, 1600–1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation Woodbridge, 2013, p. 161 n; Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 47.

82 Nandalal Chatterji, Mir Qasim, Nawab of Bengal, 1760–1763 Allahabad, 1935.

83 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan p. 205.

84 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 42.

85 Moon, Warren Hastings and British India p. 39.

86 Vansittart, A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal vol. 1, pp. 300–7, 322–3.

87 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 97–102; Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 2, pp. 227–8.

88 Vansittart, A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal vol. 2, pp. 97–102; Feiling, Warren Hastings pp. 46–7; G. S. Cheema, The Ascent of John Company: From Traders to Rulers (1756–1787) New Delhi, 2017, p. 66.

89 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India pp. 98–9.

90 Moon, Warren Hastings and British India pp. 50–1.

91 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan p. 210.

92 Ghulam Husain Salim, Riyazu-s-salatin pp. 387–8.

93 Vansittart, A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal vol. 2, pp. 164–8; also Rajat Kanta Ray, The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism New Delhi, 2003, pp. 282–7.

94 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 465–6.

95 Ibid.

96 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India p. 100.

97 Firminger and Anderson, The Diaries of Three Surgeons of Patna p. 38.

CHAPTER 5: BLOODSHED AND CONFUSION

1 BL, Or. 466, Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, pp. 700–.

2 Walter K. Firminger and William Anderson, The Diaries of Three Surgeons of Patna Calcutta, 1909, p. 40.

3 Ibid., p. 24.

4 Syed Ghulam Hussain Khan Tabatabai, Seir Mutaqherin Calcutta, 1790–94, vol. 2, pp. 473–4.

5 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, p. 703.

6 Ibid., p. 704.

7 Rajat Kanta Ray, The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism New Delhi, 2003, p. 277; Nicholas Shreeve, Dark Legacy Crossbush, 1996, pp. 11–12.

8 Jean-Baptiste Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan Paris, 1822, pp. 216–18.

9 Luke Scrafton, Observations on Vansittart’s Narrative London, 1770, pp. 48–9.

10 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, pp. 710–3.

11 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 496.

12 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, p. 710.

13 Ibid., p. 711.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 715.

16 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan pp. 218–21.

17 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, p. 708.

18 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan pp. 226–7. I have gone with Gentil’s account as he seems to have been an eyewitness. There are, however, conflicting accounts of the deaths of the Jagat Seth: for example, Ghosha says that they were mercilessly killed by the Nawab himself. ‘They were attended by their faithful servant ( Khidmatgar ) Chuni who could not be persuaded on any account to leave them, and when Kasim Ali [Mir Qasim] was shooting them with arrows he stood before them, so that, he fell first and then the two cousins.’ See Lokanatha Ghosha, The Modern History of the Indian Chiefs, Rajas, Zamindars, &c Calcutta, 1881, p. 346.

19 Firminger and Anderson, The Diaries of Three Surgeons of Patna p. 1.

20 Sir Penderel Moon, Warren Hastings and British India London, 1947, p. 54.

21 Shreeve, Dark Legacy p. 16.

22 Ibid.

23 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan pp. 227–34.

24 Shreeve, Dark Legacy p. 18.

25 Julia Keay, Farzana: The Woman Who Saved an Empire London, 2014, p. 48.

26 Tarikh-i Muzaffari of Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Ansari of Panipat, p. 713.

27 Unlike the Black Hole, the Patna Massacre is almost forgotten. We hardly read about it in history books in Britain and it is completely absent from Indian history books.

28 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 518.

29 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan p. 35.

30 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 514.

31 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan p. 35.

32 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 512.

33 The Bhausahebanci Bhakar quoted in Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Textures of Time, Delhi, 2003, pp. 232–3.

34 Quoted by Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire 4 vols, New Delhi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 316.

35 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 528, 558.

36 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 38v–39r.

37 Ibid., 39r.

38 Ibid., 40v–41r.

39 Naga Gossains were not unfamiliar with musketry and some even fought on horseback, according to Ghulam Hussain Khan, describing Rajendragiri’s defence of Allahabad in 1751, though it is true that they excelled at close-quarter combat. William Pinch details the evolution of their military style in chapter two of Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires Cambridge 2006. It is difficult to get a firm sense of the distribution of arms among Naga soldiers, but see the description of the prolonged sanyasi/fakir insurgency in Bengal in David N. Lorenzen, ‘Warrior Ascetics in Indian History’, in Journal of the American Oriental Society vol. 98, no. 1 (January– March 1978), pp. 61–75.

40 CPC 1, items 2130–1, 2136; Ashirbadi Lal Srivastava, Shuja ud-Daula vol. 1, 1754–1765 Calcutta, 1939, p. 182; Rajat Kanta Ray, ‘Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765–818’, in Peter Marshall, The Eighteenth Century, Oxford, 1998, pp. 518–19.

41 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 41v.

42 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 530.

43 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 531.

44 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932. 42v.

45 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 530.

46 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932. 42v.

47 Ibid., 43v.

48 Ibid., 43v–44r.

49 Ibid., 44r.

50 Ibid.

51 René-Marie Madec, Mémoire ed. Jean Deloche, Pondicherry 1983, p. 71.

52 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 565.

53 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 44r.

54 Ibid., 45v.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., 45r.

57 Ashirbadi Lal Srivastava, Shuja ud-Daula vol. 1, p. 232.

58 Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India London, 1989, p. 111.

59 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan p. 258–9.

60 Ibid.

61 Madec, Mémoire p. 74.

62 Fakir Khairud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 45v.

63 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 530.

64 Ibid.

65 The Late Reverend John Entick et al., The Present State of the British Empire 4 vols, London, 1774, vol. IV, p. 533.

66 Philip J. Stern, The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty & the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India Cambridge, 2011, p. 3.

67 Thomas Twining, Travels in India One Hundred Years Ago London, 1983, pp. 144–5.

68 For the domestic political background at this time, see James Vaughn, The Politics of Empire at the Accession of George III, Princeton, 2009.

69 Keay, Farzana pp. 53, 89.

70 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, pp. 583–4.

71 Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan p. 259.

72 Sadasukh Dihlavi, Munkatab ut-Tawarikh trans. Sir H. M. Elliot and John Dowson The History of India Told By Its Own Historians, London, 1867, vol. VIII, p. 408.

73 Richard B. Barnett, North India Between Empires: Awadh, the Mughals, and the British 1720– 1801 Berkeley, 1980, p. 73.

74 Amar Farooqui, Zafar, and the Raj: Anglo-Mughal Delhi, c. 1800–1850 New Delhi, 2013, pp. 8–9.

75 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 2, p. 571.

76 Shah Alam II to the Council, n.d., received in Calcutta 6 Dec 1764, NAI, Foreign Department Secret Consultations, 1764, 2A, 738; CPC 1, lv, p. 353.

77 K. K. Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company Calcutta, 1965, pp. 28–9.

78 Bengal Despatches, February 1764, quoted in Mark Bence-Jones, Clive of India London, 1974, p. 205.

79 Percival Spear, Master of Bengal: Clive and his India London, 1975, pp. 130–1.

80 Clive to Carnac, 7 May 1762, quoted in Bence-Jones, Clive of India p. 208.

81 Bence-Jones, Clive of India p. 208.

82 H. V. Bowen, ‘Lord Clive and speculation in East India Company stock, 1766’, Historical Journal 30 (1987), pp. 905–20. For two other excellent essays on Clive’s loot and its fallout back home: Bruce Lenman and Philip Lawson, ‘Robert Clive, the “Black Jagir” and British Politics’, in Historical Journal vol. 26, no. 4 (December 1983), pp. 801–29, and C. H. Philips, ‘Clive in the English Political World, 1761–4’, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, vol. 12, no. 3/44, Oriental and African Studies Presented to Lionel David Barnett by His Colleagues, Past and Present (1948), pp. 695–702.

83 BL, OIOC, BL G37/4/1, f. 42; Barnett, North India Between Empires p. 74.

84 Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 38.

85 Clive and Carnac to Council, 14 July, quoted in Ashirbadi Lal Srivastava, Shuja ud-Daula vol. 2 1765–1775 Calcutta, 1939, p. 10; Barnett, North India Between Empires p. 75.

86 Quoted in Bence-Jones, Clive of India p. 219.

87 Clive to Sykes, 3 August 1765, quoted in Barnett, North India Between Empires p. 74.

88 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, pp. 9–10. Sheikh Itesamuddin, who was involved in writing the text of the Treaty of Allahabad with another munshi, reported that Shah Alam with tears in his eyes told Clive and Carnac, who were getting ready to leave after the signing of the Treaty, that they were abandoning him among his enemies without a thought for his safety ( Shigurf Namah 1825:5). See Mirza Itesamuddin, Shigurf Namah-i-Velaet translated from Persian to English by James Edward Alexander (London, 1827). Itesamuddin travelled from the subcontinent to England in 1767 to place Shah Alam’s request before King George III of England. Quoted in Jeena Sarah Jacob, ‘The travellers’ tales: The travel writings of Itesamuddin and Abu Taleb Khan’, in William A. Pettigrew and Mahesh Gopalan, The East India Company, 1600–1857: Essays on Anglo-Indian Connection London and New York, 2017, p. 141.

89 Ghulam Husain Salim, Riyazu-s-salatin pp. 398, 413–14.

90 George Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive New Delhi, 1986, vol. 2, p. 335.

91 The question of the relative importance of Company imports of bullion to the Bengal economy is contested – see Rajat Datta, Society, Economy and the Market: Commercialisation in Rural Bengal, c1760–1800 New Delhi, 2000. So is the question of to what degree the Company ruthlessly asset-stripp. ed Bengal. As Peter Marshall put in a letter to me, ‘You can certainly make a case that “India would henceforth be treated as if it were a vast plantation to be milked and exploited, with all its profits shipped overseas.” But I do not think you cannot ignore that there was a rhetoric of just rule in the EIC going back to the seventeenth century and that the directors try, however ineffectually, to enforce it after 1757. Their failure to do so is the ostensible reason for increasing state intervention. Unrelenting plunder would ruin Bengal and, a maxim endlessly repeated, kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. The [directors tried to ensure that the] goose must be carefully looked after. Many of the articulate servants in India certainly shared this rhetoric, Hastings most obviously. You can say, reasonably, that considerations of good governance repeatedly gave way, especially in times of emergency, to the imperatives to maximise resources, but I do not think that you can deny that they existed.’ With many thanks to PJM for his kindness in looking over my manuscript and for all his encouragement and assistance over many years.

92 Bowen, Revenue and Reform pp. 111–12; Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India p. 125.

93 Bence-Jones, Clive of India p. 221.

94 Om Prakash, ‘From Market-Determined to Coercion-based: Textile Manufacturing in Eighteenth-Century Bengal’, in Giorgio Riello and Tirthankar Roy (eds), How India Clothed the World: The World of South Asian Textiles, 1500–1800 Leiden, 2013, pp. 224–41.

95 Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 45; Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India p. 125; Jon Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire London, 2016, p. 115.

96 Quoted in John R. McLane, Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Bengal Cambridge, 1993, p. 195.

97 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, pp. 3, 46, 192–3, 202–4. See also the brilliant analysis of Khan’s observations in Rajat Kanta Ray, ‘Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765–818’, in Marshall, The Eighteenth Century pp. 514–15. Also P. J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America c. 1750–1783 Oxford, 2007, p. 260.

98 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, pp. 158–213. Talking about the annual drain of wealth from Bengal, the Company’s whistleblower Alexander Dow wrote: ‘They [the Company] began to drain the reservoir without turning into it any stream to prevent it from being exhausted’, quoted in Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement Durham, NC, 1983, p. 33.

99 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, pp. 158–213.

100 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 32, 181, 194–5.

101 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India p. 224.

CHAPTER 6: RACKED BY FAMINE

1 OIOC, SCC, P/A/9, 29 November 1769. There is a large body of scholarship on the terrible Bengal famine of 1769–79. The best work on the Bengal famine and its effects in rural Bengal can be found in Rajat Datta, Society, Economy and the Market: Commercialisation in Rural Bengal, c1760–1800 New Delhi, 2000, chapter five, pp. 238–84. Rajat Datta argues that while military conquests, political dislocations and Company exactions certainly contributed to the vulnerability of peasants, there had been a major shift in agriculture and the economy under the Company which contributed to the intensity of the famine. Bengal’s prosperity was vulnerable and ecologically it was undergoing major changes. The flow of the rivers was moving eastward and cultivation was spreading eastward too. While the west of Bengal was drying out, which made it desperately vulnerable to famine if the rains failed, the east was flourishing. It escaped the 1769–70 famine, although as Datta shows, flooding was to devastate it later.

Bengal had witnessed a long intensification of wet rice cultivation under the Nawabs. This was a long-drawn-out process of ecological transformation whereby the eastern Bengal delta constituted an agrarian frontier where provincial Mughal officials had directly encouraged forest clearing, water control and wet rice cultivation from the later sixteenth century up to the middle of the eighteenth century. See J. F. Richards, The Unending Frontier: An Environmental History of the Early Modern World Berkeley, 2003, p. 33.

The pioneering work in this field has been done by Richard Eaton who, in his study of the Bengal frontier, argues that the provincial Mughal officials deepened the roots of their authority in the countryside through encouraging intensive wet rice cultivation at a time when the Mughal power in Delhi was steadily diminishing. This patronage system, introduced by the Nawabs, which had played a decisive role in the steady growth of food grains, ended in 1760 with the paramountcy of the East India Company in the Bengal region. See Richard M. Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204–1760 Berkeley, 1993, p. 5.

Datta’s account emphasises the expansion of the regional market in grains which may have made peasants more exposed to price shocks. He also makes an important point about the geographical imbalance of the famine, which he believes was more severe in western Bengal and Bihar and practically non-existent in eastern Bengal. Therefore to speak of all-Bengal mortality and to peg it at 10 million is not possible. The veteran historian of the EIC, Peter Marshall, largely agrees with Datta’s account. In a letter to me he wrote: ‘The entrenched assumption, from contemporary polemics to our own times, is that British conquest ruined Bengal. I suppose that I belong to a minority opinion, most authoritatively expounded by Rajat Datta, which is sceptical of the decisive influence of the British, let alone of specific individuals, on the fortunes of the province. There of course can be no doubt that Bengal was potentially a highly fertile and productive province. It had developed a sophisticated commercialised economy … The British stimulated commercialisation by the growth of their export trades and of the great conurbation at Calcutta. Did their access to political power have adverse affects? Probably. They may well have taxed more severely, even if they had no capacity to extract directly from the mass of peasants. They regulated some trades, such as high-quality textiles or salt, to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of indigenous merchants and artisans, but the huge grain trade was surely beyond their capacity to interfere in significantly. On the whole, I doubt whether the British either “caused” the famine or what you seem to see in Chapter Eight as the recovery of Bengal under Hastings and Cornwallis … I think Bengalis largely made their own history … I would not credit Hastings with the recovery of Bengal, since I do not think it was in his or any other British individual’s capacity to bring about such a thing.’

These are clearly complicated matters, involving ecological as well as economic history, and the jury remains out. I have tried to argue here, however, that whether or not the Company was directly responsible for the famine, or whether ecological factors played a more important role, its incompetent response made the famine in West Bengal much more deadly, while its excessive tax collecting hugely exacerbated the sufferings of the Bengalis under its rule –which was certainly the opinion of many observers, both Indian and British, who wrote accounts of the disaster at the time.

2 OIOC, Bengal Public Consultations, 23 October 1769.

3 Datta, Society, Economy and the Market p. 244.

4 Abdul Majed Khan, The Transition in Bengal 1756–1775 Cambridge, 1969, p. 218.

5 Datta, Society, Economy and the Market p. 244.

6 Quoted in John R. McLane, Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Bengal Cambridge, 1993, p. 196.

7 For Richard Becher’s Report on Cannibalism, see OIOC, SCC, P/A/10.

8 Datta, Society, Economy and the Market p. 252; Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India Cambridge, 2007, p. 72.

9 I am going here with the figures of Datta, Society, Economy and the Market p. 264, who has done the most intensive and detailed work on the famine. He rejects the widely quoted figure given by Warren Hastings (who was in London at the time) that 10 million, one-third of the population, died based on detailed village-by-village study of tax returns in the years before and after the famine. Data has shown that the famine was at its worst in West Bengal, and that large parts of Eastern Bengal were unaffected. See also Jon Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire London, 2016, p. 114, and Abdul Majed Khan, The Transition in Bengal 1756– 1775 Cambridge, 1969, p. 219.

10 Joseph Price, The Saddle Put on the Right Horse London, 1783, vol. 1, p. 33. See also Wilson, India Conquered p. 114.

11 OIOC, HM, vol. 102, p. 94. Also Wilson, India Conquered p. 113.

12 Khan, The Transition in Bengal p. 219.

13 Datta, Society, Economy and the Market p. 259.

14 Syed Ghulam Hussain Khan Tabatabai, Seir Mutaqherin Calcutta, 1790–94, vol. 3, p. 56.

15 W. W. Hunter, The Annals of Rural Bengal London, 1868, pp. 43–5.

16 Khan, The Transition in Bengal p. 219; S. C. Mukhopadhyay, British Residents at the Darbar of Bengal Nawabs at Murshidabad 1757–1772 Delhi [n.d.], p. 388.

17 Jeremy Bernstein, Dawning of the Raj: The Life & Trials of Warren Hastings Chicago, 2000, p. 11.

18 Datta, Society, Economy and the Market p. 259.

19 Dean Mahomet, The Travels of Dean Mahomet Berkeley, 1997, pp. 35–6.

20 Mukhopadhyay, British Residents at the Darbar of Bengal Nawabs at Murshidabad p. 388.

21 Datta, Society, Economy and the Market pp. 256–60; Nick Robins, The Corporation That Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational London, 2006, p. 90.

22 Romesh Chunder Dutt, The Economic History of India under Early British Rule, 1757–1837 London, 1908, p. 52.

23 P. J. Marshall, Bengal: The British Bridgehead – Eastern India 1740–1828 Cambridge, 1987, p. 134.

24 Mukhopadhyay, British Residents at the Darbar of Bengal Nawabs at Murshidabad p. 378; Khan, The Transition in Bengal p. 217.

25 Khan, The Transition in Bengal p. 222.

26 Gentleman’s Magazine September 1771. The author signed himself merely as ‘JC’, but some passages closely mirror those in John Debrit’s memoirs.

27 Robins, The Corporation That Changed the World p. 94.

28 Gentleman’s Magazine September 1771.

29 Mukhopadhyay, British Residents at the Darbar of Bengal Nawabs at Murshidabad p. 399.

30 Quoted in George Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive New Delhi, 1986, vol. 2, p. 383.

31 Quoted in H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756–1833 Cambridge, 2006, p. 16.

32 H. V. Bowen, Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics, 1757–1773 Cambridge, 1991, p. 95.

33 Gentleman’s Magazine April 1767, p. 152; Robins, The Corporation That Changed the World p. 17.

34 P. J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America c. 1750– 1783 Oxford, 2007, p. 199.

35 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea London, 2003, p. 42.

36 Quoted in Tillman W. Nechtman, Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain Cambridge, 2010, p. 87.

37 Jack Green, Arenas of Asiatic Plunder London, 1767, Robins, The Corporation That Changed the World p. 103.

38 Extract from Act II of The Nabob a play by Samuel Foote, quoted in P. J. Marshall, Problems of Empire: Britain and India, 1757–1813 London, 1968.

39 Arthur Young, Political Essays concerning the present state of the British Empire London, 1772, p. 518.

40 Alexander Dow, History of Hindostan 3 vols, Dublin, 1792, vol. 3, p. v; Ranajit Guha points out that long before R. C. Dutt and Digby and later nationalists, the phrase ‘drain of wealth’ had come into common use through the Company officials such as Dow. Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement, Durham, NC, 1983, pp. 33– 4.

41 William Bolts, Considerations on Indian Affairs; Particularly Respecting the Present State of Bengal and its Dependencies 3 vols, London, 1772–5.

42 N. L. Hallward, William Bolts: A Dutch Adventurer Under John Company Cambridge, 1920; Willem G. J. Kuiters, The British in Bengal 1756–1773: A Society in Transition seen through the Biography of a Rebel: William Bolts (1739–1808) Paris, 2002. Lucy Sutherland cites Bolts as being responsible for turning public opinion against Clive. Lucy S. Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics Oxford, 1952, p. 221.

43 This story is the origin of the later nationalist myth that the British themselves cut off the thumbs of workers in order to break Indian textile production and so assist the import of Lancashire cotton.

44 There is a good analysis of Bolts’ writings in Nicholas B. Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain Harvard, 2006, pp. 250–4. See also Travers, Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India pp. 61–2.

45 Ralph Leycester to Warren Hastings, March 1772, BL, Add Mss 29133, f. 72.

46 Quoted in Dirks, The Scandal of Empire p. 15.

47 The Monthly Review (1772); see also Robins, The Corporation That Changed the World pp. 78, 96.

48 Bowen, Revenue and Reform p. 127; H. Hamilton, ‘The Failure of the Ayr Bank, 1772’, Economic History Review 2nd series, VIII (1955–6), pp. 405–17.

49 The Correspondence of Adam Smith ed. E. C. Mossner and I. S. Ross, 2nd edn, Oxford, 1987, p. 162, quoted by Emma Rothschild in her brilliant unpublished essay, ‘The East India Company and the American Revolution’.

50 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires p. 212.

51 Bowen, Revenue and Reform p. 117.

52 BL, Add Mss, 29133, f. 534, quoted in Bowen, Revenue and Reform pp. 119–21.

53 Bernstein, Dawning of the Raj p. 81. Robins, The Corporation That Changed the World pp. 90–5.

54 Bowen, Revenue and Reform p. 127.

55 Quoted in Wilson, India Conquered p. 129.

56 Anon, The Present State of the British Interest in India, quoted in Monthly Review vol. XLVIII
(1773), p. 99.

57 Thomas Pownall The Right, Interest and Duty of Government, as concerned in the affairs of the East India Company revised edn, 1781, p. 4. Quoted in Bowen, The Business of Empires p. 17.

58 George III to Grafton, 9 Dec 1766, in J. Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, 1760–1783 6 vols (1927–8), vol. I, pp. 423–4. Quoted in Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires p. 209.

59 Bowen, Revenue and Reform p. 85.

60 Forrest, The Life of Lord Clive vol. 2, pp. 404–5.

61 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 408–9.

62 Nechtman, Nabobs p. 84.

63 28 May 1773, BL, Egerton Mss, 249, ff. 84–6.

64 BL, Egerton Mss, 240, pp. 221, 225–6.

65 For the case in supp. ort of Francis as ‘Junius’, see The Letters of Junius ed. John Cannon, Oxford, 1978.

66 See Linda Colley’s brilliant article: ‘Gendering the Globe: The Political and Imperial Thought of Philip Francis’, Past & Present no. 209 (November 2010), pp. 117–48. See also Sophia Weitzman, Warren Hastings and Philip Francis Manchester, 1929; Keith Feiling, Warren Hastings London, 1954, p. 138.

67 W. S. Lewis et al., The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole’s Correspondence 48 vols, New Haven, CT, 1937–83, vol. 32, pp. 61–2.

68 Quoted in Mark Bence-Jones, Clive of India London, 1974, pp. 300, 356. Patty Ducarel was a sister of General Gustavus Ducarel (1745–1800).

69 Nechtman, Nabobs p. 87; Bence-Jones, Clive of India p. 299.

70 Travers, Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India pp. 150–1.

71 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 133.

72 Ibid.

73 Sophia Weitzman, Warren Hastings and Philip Francis Manchester, 1929, p. 227.

74 Ibid., pp. 221–2.

75 Ibid., p. 224.

76 Feiling, Warren Hastings pp. 232–3.

77 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, p. 168.

78 Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India London, 1989, p. 148.

79 Travers, Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India p. 139.

80 Sir Penderel Moon, Warren Hastings and British India London, 1947, p. 113.

81 G. R. Gleig, Memoirs of the Life of the Rt Hon Warren Hastings, First Governor General of Bengal 3 vols, London, 1841, vol. 1, p. 317.

82 Hastings to J. Dupre, 11 November 1772, BL, Add Mss 29,127, f. 63v. Hastings to L. Sullivan, Kasimbazar, 7 September 1772, ibid., f. 38v.

83 Bernstein, Dawning of the Raj pp. 89–90.

84 Quoted in ibid., p. 57.

85 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India p. 149.

86 Moon, Warren Hastings and British India p. 87.

87 Quoted in Bernstein, Dawning of the Raj, p. 147. For Jones see S. N. Mukherjee, Sir William Jones: A Study of Eighteenth-Century Attitudes to India Cambridge, 1968.

88 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 138.

89 Bhagavad Gita 2, 47–51, translated for me by Sir James Mallinson. For Hastings’ attachment to these verses, see Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 238.

90 Colley, Gendering the Globe p. 121; Moon, Warren Hastings and British India p. 348.

91 Some post-colonial historians have taken a more benign attitude to Francis, notably Ranajit Guha, one of the founders of Subaltern Studies, who has written admiringly of his wide reading of radical French thinkers and the intellectual rigour which he channelled into projects for agrarian, administrative and monetary reform in Bengal. See Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal especially chapters 3–4.

92 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, pp. 184–6.

93 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 160.

94 Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Textures of Time: Writing History in South India 1600–1800 New York, 2003, p. 230, quoting the Bhausahebanci Bhakar.

95 Ibid., p. 231. See also the always excellent Uday S. Kulkarni, ‘Solstice at Panipat: An Authentic Account of the Panipat Campaign’, Pune, 2012; Jadunath Sarkar, ‘Events Leading up to Panipat and Panipat, 1761’, in India Historical Quarterly (June 1934), pp. 258–73 and pp. 547–58.

96 Irfan Habib (ed.), Resistance and Modernisation under Haidar Ali & Tipu Sultan New Delhi, 1999, Introduction, p. xxii.

97 Letter from the Court of Directors to the Council in Bengal, 27 April 1765, in Fort William- India House Correspondence London, 1949–58, vol. 4, p. 96.

98 For the bore of the Mysore artillery see Jean-Marie Lafont, Indika: Essays in Indo-French Relations 1630–1976 Delhi, 2000, p. 157. For the rockets see Linda Colley, ‘Going Native, Telling Tales: Captivity, Collaborations and Empire’, in Past & Present no. 168 (August 2000), p. 190.

99 Captain Mathews, cited in Partha Chatterjee, The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power Princeton, 2012, p. 85.

100 John Carnac to the Bombay Council, 1 January 1779, BL, OIOC, P/D/63, f. 132.

101 Replies to Resolutions, 24/01/1782, BL, IOR, bscc P/D/68, ff. 617–18, 24, quoted in Mesrob Vartavarian, ‘An Open Military Economy: The British Conquest of South India Reconsidered, 1780–799’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient vol. 57, no. 4 (2014), pp. 486–510, p. 494.

102 Stewart Gordon, The Marathas: 1600–1818 Cambridge, 1993, p. 164.

103 For Nana Phadnavis and his celebrated intelligence network, see C. A. Bayly, Empire & Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India 1780–1870 Cambridge, 1996, pp. 31–2.

104 Govind Sakharam Sardesai, A New History of the Marathas 3 vols, Baroda, 1948, vol. 3, pp. 97–8.

105 Rajat Kanta Ray, ‘Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765–818’, in Peter Marshall, The Eighteenth Century Oxford, 1998, p. 519.

106 Mark Wilks, Historical sketches of the south of India vol. 2, 1820, pp. 261–2; Vartavarian, ‘An Open Military Economy’, pp. 486–10, p. 491.

107 Bernstein, Dawning of the Raj p. 134.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid., pp. 113–14.

110 BL, Add Mss 39, 878, f. 36; Moon, Warren Hastings and British India p. 249.

111 Bernstein, Dawning of the Raj p. 82.

112 Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin vol. 3, p. 125.

113 Captain Muat’s Account of the Defeat at Pollilur BL, IOR, HM 223, p. 117.

114 Ibid.

115 John Baillie’s Account of Pollilur BL, IOR, HM 223, pp. 160–6.

116 Ibid.

117 Captain Wood’s Account of Pollilur BL, IOR, HM 211, f. 246.

118 Captain Muat’s Account of the Defeat at Pollilur BL, IOR, HM 223, pp. 83–5.

119 A lieutenant of the 73rd Highland Regiment, in Alan Tritton, When the Tiger Fought the Thistle London, 2013, pp. 271–2.

120 Tritton, When the Tiger Fought the Thistle pp. 243, 248–53, 262–3.

121 John Baillie’s Account of Pollilur BL, IOR, HM 223, pp. 160–6.

122 Tritton, When the Tiger Fought the Thistle pp. 272–4.

123 Quoted by Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan Calcutta, 1951, p. 15.

124 Ross to Macartney, 07/06/1781, IOR, HM 330, ff. 259–61; Davis to Coote, 02/07/1781, Add. Mss 22439, f. 9, quoted in Vartavarian, ‘An Open Military Economy’, p. 507.

125 It was actually the job of boys and young men from some hereditary drummer castes to dance as girls. From the Mysore perspective, this may not have been anywhere near as extraordinary or outrageous as it sounds, though of course the British would have found it hugely humiliating. Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600–1850 London, 2002, pp. 276–91; Colley, ‘Going Native, Telling Tales: Captivity, Collaborations and Empire’, in Past & Present, no. 168 (August 2000).

126 James Scurry, The Captivity, Sufferings and Escape of James Scurry, who was detained a prisoner during ten years, in the dominions of Haidar Ali and Tipp. oo Saib London, 1824, pp. 252–3.

127 G. J. Bryant, The Emergence of British Power in India, 16oo–1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation Woodbridge, 2013, p. 291.

128 BL, OIOC, HM 246, f. 335.

129 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 246.

130 Moon, Warren Hastings and British India p. 5.

131 Incomplete Draft (1785) of an account of the Mysore War (1780–84), BL, OIOC, Mss Eur K 116, f. 84. Quoted in Maya Jasanoff Edge of Empire: Conquest and Collecting in the East, 1750–1850 London, 2005, p. 158.

132 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires pp. 330–2.

133 Quoted by Emma Rothschild in her unpublished essay, ‘The East India Company and the American Revolution’.

134 Narrative of all the Proceedings and Debates … on East India Affairs (1784), p. 89, quoted in Colley, Captives p. 272.

135 Feiling, Warren Hastings p. 230.

136 Parliamentary History 21 (1780–81), pp. 1201–2, quoted in Colley, Captives p. 275.

137 Lewis et al., The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole’s Correspondence 48 vols, vol. 29, p. 123.


[bCHAPTER 7: THE DESOLATION OF DELHI[/b]

1 Victoria & Albert Museum (V&A), IS.38–1957.

2 Even if the jewelled Peacock Throne of Shah Jahan had long been stolen and destroyed and what remained was only a wooden replica, sitting in a half-ruined palace.

3 NAI, Select Committee Proceedings, 2 Jan to 6 Dec, 1771, No. 18; Headquarters, Allahabad, 20 April 1771, pp. 177–81.

4 CPC 3, pp. 134–5, no. 504, 14 Dec 1770; CPC 3, p. 98, no. 329, 11 Aug, to the King; CPC 3, p. 194, no. 719, 22 April, to the King; K. K. Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company Calcutta, 1965, p. 57.

5 NAI, Select Committee Progs, 2 Jan to 6 Dec, 1771, No. 18; Fort William, 20 April 1771, pp. 177–81.

6 William Francklin, The History of Shah Alam London, 1798, p. 36.

7 NAI, Select Committee Progs, 2 Jan to 6 Dec, 1771, No. 18; Fort William, 17 May, pp. 184–7.

8 Francklin, The History of Shah Alam pp. 27–8.

9 NAI, Select Committee Progs, 2 Jan to 6 Dec, 1771, No. 18; Fort William, 17 May, pp. 184–7.

10 CPC 3, pp. 190–1, no. 702, 14 Dec 1770, General Barker to Nawab Shuja ud-Daula; CPC 3, p. 189, no. 698, General Barker to the King.

11 Jean-Baptiste Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan pp. 257–9.

12 Michael H. Fisher, ‘Diplomacy in India 1526–858’, in H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid, Britain’s Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c. 1550–850 Cambridge, 2012, pp. 276–7. I’tisam al-Din’s book, Shigrif-namah-i Vilayet is at BL, Or. 200. For a full translation, via Bengali, see The Wonders of Vilayet, being a memoir, originally in Persian, of a visit to France and Britain trans. Kaiser Haq, Leeds, 2001.

13 Nandalal Chatterji, Verelst’s Rule in India 1939, p. 129.

14 There is a fascinating popular ballad on the Battle of Panipat which gives a sense of the scale of the upheaval it caused. K. R. Qanungo, ‘Fragment of a Bhao Ballad in Hindi’, Historical Essays Calcutta, 1968, pp. 81–113.

15 Percival Spear, The Twilight of the Moghuls Cambridge, 1951, p. 16.

16 Jadunath Sarkar, The Fall of the Mughal Empire 4 vols, New Delhi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 329.

17 Ganga Singh, Ahmed Shah Durrani p. 326. See also Gulfishan Khan, Indian Muslim Perceptions of the West during the Eighteenth Century, Karachi, 1998, pp. 72–8, and K. K. Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company pp. 49–50.

18 Ganga Singh, Ahmad Shah Durrani Patiala, 1959, p. 326.

19 Jadunath Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1: Delhi Affairs (1761–1788) Bombay, 1953, p. 21.

20 Michael Edwardes, King of the World: The Life of the Last Great Moghul Emperor London, 1970, p. 172.

21 Govind Sakharam Sardesai, A New History of the Marathas 3 vols, Baroda, 1948, vol. 3, p. 138.

22 Iqbal Husain, The Rise and Decline of the Ruhela Chieftaincies in 18th Century India Aligarh, 1994, p. 138.

23 Francklin, The History of Shah Alam pp. 50, 70.

24 BL, Add 6585, Shakir Khan, Tarikh-i Shakir Khani f. 91.

25 CPC 3, p. 216, no. 798, from Nawab Shuja ud-Daula, 22 June 1771.

26 Ibid.

27 CPC 3, p. 215, no. 795, General Barker to the King, 20 June 1771.

28 CPC 3, p. 225, no. 828, 22 May; from Raja Shitab Ray, 20 July; NAI, Select Committee Progs, 2 Jan to 6 Dec, 1771, No. 18; Fort William, 6 July 1771, pp. 266–9.

29 Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company pp. 58–9.

30 NAI, Select Committee Progs, 2 Jan to 6 Dec, 1771, No. 18; Allahabad, 17 July 1771, pp. 258– 9.

31 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 36; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 2, pp. 330–1.

32 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 47.

33 NAI, Foreign Select Committee Progs, 1772–3, vol. 20, 10 Jan 1772.

34 Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 59.

35 Voyage en Inde du Comte de Modave, 1773–1776 ed. Jean Deloche, Pondicherry, 1971.

36 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 55; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol 2, p. 331.

37 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 57.

38 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 3, p. 32.

39 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 58.

40 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 3, p. 34; Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, f. 207–8.

41 Husain, The Rise and Decline of the Ruhela Chieftaincies in 18th Century India p. 144.

42 Sardesai, A New History of the Marathas vol. 2, p. 516.

43 Mirza ‘Ali Bakht, Waqi’at-i Azfari ed. T. Chandrasekharan and Syed Hamza Hussain Omari, Madras, 1957, p. 5.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., pp. 5–6.

46 This section is derived from a brilliant essay by Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam in Writing the Mughal World New York, 2012, pp. 433–44.

47 Quoted in Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 81.

48 Voyage en Inde p. 231.

49 Stephen P. Blake, Shahjahanabad: The Sovereign City in Mughal India, 1639–1739 Cambridge, 1991, p. 167.

50 C. M. Naim (translated, annotated and introduced), Zikr-I Mir: The Autobiography of the Eighteeenth Century Mughal Poet, Mir Muhammad Taqi ‘Mir’ New Delhi, 1998, pp. 83–5, 93– 4.

51 Khurshidul Islam and Ralph Russell, Three Mughal Poets: Mir, Sauda, Mir Hasan New Delhi, 1991, pp. 221–2, 247–8.

52 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 45.

53 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 3, p. 35.

54 René-Marie Madec, Mémoire ed. Jean Deloche, Pondicherry, 1983, p. 170.

55 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 61.

56 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 3, p. 55.

57 These translations are taken from a beautiful essay by David Lunn and Katherine Butler Schofield, ‘Delight, Devotion and the Music of the Monsoon at the Court of Emperor Shah ‘Alam II’, in Imke Rajamani, Margrit Pernau and Katherine Butler Schofield (eds), Monsoon Feelings: A History of Emotions in the Rain New Delhi, 2018, pp. 219–54.

58 Lunn and Butler Schofield, ‘Delight, Devotion and the Music of the Monsoon at the Court of Emperor Shah ‘Alam II’, pp. 219–4.

59 Modave writes well on this. See Voyage en Inde pp. 427–8.

60 Ibid., pp. 420–2.

61 Ibid., p. 422.

62 Ibid., p. 103.

63 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, pp. 68–9. ‘This victory proved,’ as Khair ud-Din writes, ‘the title page of Mirza Najaf Khan’s record of victories and the first rung in the ladder of his fortune.’ Quoted in K. R. Qanungo, History of the Jats Calcutta, 1925, pp. 145–6.

64 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History pp. 72–3. On the battle of Barsana see F. S. Growse, Mathura: A District Memoir 1883.

65 The fort of Ballabhgarh was captured on 20 April 1774, and Farukhnagar 6 May 1774. See Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 3, p. 64.

66 Ibid., p. 83.

67 Emile Barbé, Le Nabob René Madec Paris, 1894, Sec. 48.

68 Voyage en Inde p. 438. Khair ud-Din captures the valour of the Jats during their war with Mirza Najaf Khan. He says, ‘Not a single man tried to save his life. If they had fought unitedly they would have slain many more and safely made their way out [of the fort].’ Qanungo adds that ‘no johar seems to have been lighted at Deeg; women and children were put to sword.’ See Qanungo, History of the Jats p. 174, fn. 15.

69 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 75.

70 Yuthika Sharma, ‘From Miniatures to Monuments: Picturing Shah Alam’s Delhi (1771–806)’, in Alka Patel and Karen Leonard (eds), Indo-Muslim Cultures in Transition Leiden, 2002, pp. 126–30.

71 Voyage en Inde pp. 434–5.

72 Antoine Polier, Shah Alam II and his Court Calcutta, 1947, p. 99.

73 Voyage en Inde pp. 432–4.

74 Ibid., pp. 217–18.

75 Polier, Shah Alam II and his Court pp. 67–9.

76 Voyage en Inde pp. 254–69.

77 CPC 4, p. 95, no. 506, 9 Sept 1773, from the King.

78 Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India London, 1989, p. 158.

79 Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 69.

80 Sir Penderel Moon, Warren Hastings and British India London, 1947, pp. 158–9.

81 Sir John Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War Oxford, 1892, p. 97.

82 BL, IOR, HM/336, f. 1–8.

83 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 116v.

84 Ibid., 117r–120v.

85 Quoted in Qanungo, History of the Jats pp. 185–6.

86 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, 120v.

87 Sayid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Shah ‘Abd al’Aziz: Puritanism, Sectarianism and Jihad Canberra, 1982, p. 29.

88 Urdu Letters of Mirza Asadu’llah Khan Ghalib New York, 1987, p. 435.

89 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, pp. 105–6.

90 Ibid., p. 146.

91 Ibid., p. 124; Ganda Singh, ‘Colonel Polier’s Account of the Sikhs’, The Panjab Past and Present 4 (1970), pp. 239, 24.

92 Spear, The Twilight of the Moghuls p. 21.

93 C. A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion Cambridge, 1983, p. 102.

94 Islam and Russell, Three Mughal Poets pp. 62–3.

95 Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 86.

96 Sayid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Shah ‘Abd al’Aziz: Puritanism, Sectarianism and Jihad p. 47.

97 Quoted in Jean-Marie Lafont, Indika: Essays in Indo-French Relations 1630–1976 Delhi, 2000, p. 179.

98 Ibid.

99 Herbert Compton, The European Military Adventurers of Hindustan London, 1943, pp. 8–9; Lafont, Indika p. 185.

100 Sayid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Shah ‘Abd al’Aziz: Puritanism, Sectarianism and Jihad pp. 29–30.

101 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 127.

102 Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, in Writing the Mughal World New York, 2012, pp. 416–23.

103 Mirza ‘Ali Bakht, Waqi’at-i Azfari ed. T. Chandrasekharan and Syed Hamza Hussain Omari, Madras, 1957, p. 6.

104 Ibid., p. 8.

105 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, f. 212.

106 Ibid.

107 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 195.

108 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, f. 214.

109 Ibid., f. 213. This section is translated in Sir H. M. Elliot and John Dowson, A History of India as Told By Its Own Historians 8 vols, London, 1867–77, vol. VIII, p. 246.

110 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932. f. 214. Also Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 3, p. 270.

111 Dutta, Shah Alam II & The East India Company p. 101.

112 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, v. This section is translated in Elliot and Dowson, A History of India as Told By Its Own Historians vol. VIII, pp. 246–7.

113 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, f. 214.

114 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 199.

115 Sarkar app. ears to have got the wrong mosque when he writes ‘Qadir removed the golden coating of the Jami Masjid and sold it but he was prevented from similarly stripping the remainder by Maniyar Singh who warned him that such an outrage on the holy edifice would rouse the entire city population in arms against him.’ See Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire vol. 3, p. 273.

116 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, f. 214.

117 Mirza ‘Ali Bakht, Waqi’at-I Azfari ed. Chandrasekharan and Syed Hamza Hussain Omari, p. 9.

118 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, f. 214.

119 Ibid., f. 215.

120 Ibid., f. 216.

121 BL, Add Mss 29171, ff 319–20, Jonathan Scott to Warren Hastings.

122 Fakir Khairud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, ?v. This section is translated in Elliot and Dowson, A History of India as Told By Its Own Historians vol. VIII, p. 248.

123 Francklin, The History of Shah Alam p. 127.

124 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL Or. 1932, f. 216. This section is translated in Elliot and Dowson, A History of India as Told By Its Own Historians vol. VIII, p. 249, but I have added a few details censored by those Victorians.

125 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, f. 217r. Previously untranslated.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid. This section was heavily bowdlerised by Elliot and Dowson. The Persian language is brutal: ‘ Mi-khwaham ke in-ha-ra dar zomra-ye parastaran-e khod dakhel nemayam wa dad-e mobasherat deham! wa hama dokhtaran-e salatin be Afghana separam, ke az notfa-ye an-ha farzandan-e jawan-mard be-ham-resad. ’

128 Mirza ‘Ali Bakht, Waqi’at-I Azfari, ed. Chandrasekharan and Syed Hamza Hussain Omari, p. 8.

129 Ibid., p. 9.

130 Julia Keay, Farzana: The Woman Who Saved an Empire London, 2014, pp. 183–4.

131 Ibid., p. 184.

132 Sarkar (ed.), Persian Records of Maratha History 1, p. 200.

133 Francklin, The History of Shah Alam p. 189.

134 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, ?v. This section is translated in Elliot and Dowson, A History of India as Told By Its Own Historians vol. VIII, p. 253.

135 Francklin, The History of Shah Alam p. 190.

136 Fakir Khair ud-Din Illahabadi, ‘ Ibrat Nama BL, Or. 1932, ?v. This section is translated in Elliot and Dowson, A History of India as Told By Its Own Historians vol. VIII, p. 254.

137 Francklin, The History of Shah Alam p. 190.
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