John Mearsheimer: Liberal Delusions & How NATO Led Ukraine Down the Primrose Path
Glenn Diesen
Jul 31 2025
John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. Prof. Mearsheimer discusses his book "The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities" and how NATO has been leading Ukraine down the primrose path.
Hi everyone and welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Merchimer. So thank you again for coming
back on the program. Glad to be here Glenn as always. So you wrote uh the book the great the
delusion uh liberal dreams and international realities which is a
fascinating book as it tends to question the entire postcold war world order. I
was wondering if you can explain u what the liberal delusions are and u was
there a specific moment when you felt that the liberal worldview had gone too
far in terms of u organizing US foreign policy.
Well, as you remember, the Cold War ends in 1989. Uh, and then uh in uh 1991, December of
1991, uh the Soviet Union collapses and disappears and we enter what's generally
called the unipolar moment. So the United States is the only great power on
the planet and it doesn't have to worry about great power politics because there
no there is no other great power on the planet. It's just the United States. So
for the first time in our history, we're free to pursue an ideological foreign
policy. We don't have to worry about real polyik. We don't have to worry about the balance of power because we
are supreme. Anyway, we adopt this policy called liberal hegemony starting
in the early 1990s as I said and I believed from the get-go that we were
going to get ourselves into a lot of trouble that this was a policy that was doomed to fail. Uh I think throughout
most of the 1990s uh the evidence pointed in the other direction. It made it look like I was
wrong. uh we managed foreign policy in a rather uh subtle and sophisticated way
even though I think we were pursuing a boneheaded policy. Uh but then in the early 2000 things began to fall apart.
Uh and then I would argue that between 2000 and 2018 when the book was
published um liberal hegemony collapsed and uh the United States found itself in
one disaster after another. So in a very important way, Glenn, what I was trying to do was examine this liberal foreign
policy, which I call liberal hegemony, which began in the early 1990s, and then
try to explain to the readers what the major cases were uh and why I thought
the policy was doomed to fail from the get-go. Yeah, this u the rhetoric from the 90s I
thought thought was fascinating because we could expand an anti-Russian military alliance which would strip Russia of
influence in Europe yet it was referred to as a democratic community. So if the Russians would oppose it, it was because
they feared democracy. And the same as China, the assumption was that if we could pull them into this US-led
economic system, they would become more benign. We would have our democratic peace. But uh how can you explain that?
We didn't really pay attention though to their their concerns because if you listen to Beijing and Moscow, they fear that they were being contained. Uh
it seemed to have been dismissed very much just as a cold war mentality. Does this fit into the liberal delusions?
Well, let's just talk about NATO to begin with. There are three really big
cases here that you want to talk about. uh one is the Bush doctrine and what we
did in the Middle East and this of course all revolves around 911 and the invasion of Iraq. So the Middle East is
one case we should talk about. Second case we should talk about is China and
the policy of engagement which you briefly described and then the third big case of course is NATO expansion. So
let's focus on that to start. Uh it's very important to understand that in the
1990s when NATO expansion got going uh
remember Bill Clinton makes the decision to expand NATO in 1994
and the first trunch of expansion which brings in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is in 99.
Uh but when it starts in the 1990s and even through much of the 2000s, the
early 2000s, it's not aimed at containing Russia. Uh it's very hard for
people to understand that in the context of 2025 given all that's happened since
the Ukraine crisis broke out in 2014. People find it hard to believe that NATO
expansion wasn't designed to contain this evil Russia. But it wasn't. You
want to remember that in the 1990s Russia was a basket case. It was
economically in a disastrous situation and in no way was Russia a threat to go
on the offensive uh against Ukraine or in Eastern Europe. Uh it just was not in
the cards. So when the Clinton administration started the whole process,
uh what they were interested in doing was taking this giant zone of peace uh
that existed in Western Europe and expanding it eastward to cover Eastern
and Western Europe. Uh they didn't want to bring the Russians into the alliance.
There's no question about that. But they were not interested in containing the Russians. They understood full well that
the Russians were unhappy with NATO expansion. Clinton did everything he
could to assuage Boris Yeltson's concerns.
He thought Clinton thought that we could expand NATO and at the same time
maintain good relations with the Russians. Just very important to understand that this was not an
anti-Russian move. Again, the the Clinton administration did not want to
bring Russia into the alliance and that's because Russia would have been a powerful actor inside the alliance and
the United States wanted to run NATO and therefore it wanted to keep the Russians out. But we were not trying to contain
the Russians. We were trying to make Europe whole and we're trying to make
Europe peaceful. And that meant making Eastern Europe look like Western Europe.
So to put it in more specific terms, we were trying to spread democracy
eastward, liberal democracy. We were trying to spread institutions eastward.
This is why we were moving NATO and the European Union eastward, right? because
building institutions and incorporating countries institution into institutions
is part of the liberal enterprise. And then furthermore, we were trying to
spread capitalism. We were trying to get everybody in Eastern Europe hooked on capitalism integrated into the American
dominated world economy. And of course, institutions facilitated this. So this
is what liberal hegemony was all about. But of course, as you know very well,
Glenn, the Russians were deeply upset about NATO expansion from the beginning.
Uh Clinton could try to assuage the concerns of Borne Boris Yelson, but it
just didn't work very well. And it didn't work very well with other Russian leaders as well. And they protested, but
there was nothing they could do to stop it because Russia was so weak. So in 1999 you get the first trunch of
expansion as I said and the Russians complain bitterly but can't do anything about it. Then you get the second big
trunch in 2004 and again the Russians complain bitterly
and you know Putin is now in control in Russia. Since 2000, Putin has been in
charge and he's deeply upset as was Boris Yeltson with NATO expansion. But
Putin can't do anything in 2004. So you have another big expansion in 2004.
Then in April 2008, we go to NATO bringing Ukraine into the
alliance and Georgia as well. Uh and this is what leads to the catastrophic
situation that we're now in, right? Because the Russians by 2008
have reached a point where they think they can stand up to the Americans. And Putin says after the April 2008
Bucharist NATO summit where we say Ukraine will be brought into NATO, Putin says this is not happening. This is an
existential threat to Russia. We will not allow it to happen. So this is the
first time NATO faces real resistance. So the question we want to ask ourselves
is what does NATO do in the face of Russian opposition? And the answer is we
double down and we basically think we can shove NATO expansion down Russia's
throat and there's just nothing they can do about it because they're so weak. we could do after 2008 what we did in 1999
and what we did in 2004. But of course that proves not to be the
case. This is a very different situation. And you have a major crisis
that breaks out in 2014. This is when the Russians take Crimea as
you well know and the civil war on the Donbass breaks out. This is 2014.
I want to emphasize that between 2008 and 2014,
even though we doubled down and we were expanding NATO so as to bring in
Ukraine, we were not doing that with the thought in mind that we had to contain
Russia. That was not part of the program. There may have been a few
people in the bowels of the establishment who were thinking in those terms, but that's not the way
policymakers were talking as best we can tell from the available evidence.
After 2014, after February 22nd, 2014,
when the major crisis breaks out in Ukraine, we do 180 degree turn and all
of a sudden we're painting the Russians and Putin in particular as a really
serious threat to Europe that has to be contained. So it's just important to
understand that it's in 2014 that containment of Russia gets linked
to NATO expansion. That is not the case before 2014. I want to make one further
point on this and that is a lot of the planning documents from the 1990s are
now publicly available and it's very clear from those documents that uh the
Americans understood the policym establishment understood that bringing Ukraine into NATO was a very special
case and you were really asking for trouble if you brought Ukraine into
NATO. American policy makers understood that Ukraine was probably a bridge too
far. And of course, in April 2008 at the NATO Bucharest summit, when we say that
we're going to bring Ukraine into NATO, it's perfectly clear that all our fears
were justified. But again, just to repeat myself because it's very important. Instead of backing off and
trying to accommodate the Russians, we believe that we can shove NATO expansion
into Ukraine down their throat. And we find out on February 24th, 2022 that we
were wrong. We can't shove it down their throat. They will not accept it. And here we are today in the middle of a war
that has gone on now for over three years because of our unwillingness or
our inability to accept the fact that this would be NATO expansion that is an
existential threat to Russia. this inability to appreciate the fact
that the Russians seize this as an existential threat, it appears to be somewhat at the heart of this conflict
because when you hear well certain yeah politicians, media or even speak with
them, you get the impression that they they do genuinely believe many of them that Russia shouldn't have any concern
whatsoever about NATO expanding on its borders, any weapon systems. Um
but uh again this is why your articles and books kind of stood out especially in 2014 you had this article in foreign
affairs with the title why the Ukraine crisis I think it was is uh the west's
fault again this is something like waving a red flag in front of you many
of the political establishment but it was very hard to for many people to appreciate that uh this could be a that
the Russian security concerns were legitimate. And uh again in 2015 you
made this um speech which was very must have been seen millions of times in which he argued that the United States
was leading Ukraine down the primrose path suggesting some of it was well
intentioned but it would destroy Ukraine. How
why or how how did you see this? because now 10 years of course what you said would happened happened but uh and you
wrote that the end result would be Ukraine getting wrecked. Uh is this um
solely because Russia had to defend its uh I guess fight for its survival or how
how do you see this? Uh, great question. And I think the way
to conceptualize this is to emphasize the distinction between liberalism and
realism. As I said to you before, Glenn, when the Cold War ends and we, the
United States, end up as the unipole, we're the only great power on the planet. So, we do not have to worry
about realist logic. We do not have to worry about the balance of power. The United
States is free to act according to the dictates of liberalism, which we do. And
many people are arguing, including President Clinton, that uh realism is no
longer relevant for understanding international politics. So when we begin to expand eastward
toward Ukraine, we believe that real polyik is dead and
that we are a benign liberal hegeimon. I
cannot tell you how many times I have heard important people in the foreign
policy establishment say that Russia had nothing to fear from NATO expansion
because we were a liberal and benign hegeimon. Mike McFall has told me that
he told Putin this on a number of occasions and I believe that Mike McFall believed this. The problem is that from
a Russian point of view, the world was being viewed through realist lenses.
From a Russian point of view, the United States was a behemoth. It ran an
alliance that had been a mortal enemy during the Cold War. And the United
States was marching that alliance up to Russia's doorsteps. From a Russian point
of view, this was all seen through realist lenses. From an American point
of view, realism was dead and it was seen from a liberal perspective.
So, you had this real clash of uh let's
call them ideologies for lack of a better term. you had this real clash of ideologies or world views that was
destined to lead to huge trouble because the Americans simply couldn't put
themselves in the shoes of the Russians. I always found this amazing. I used to say,
"Can't you understand why from a Russian perspective NATO expansion into Ukraine
looks threatening?" You know, realism 101 tells you that's the case. This of course is why George
Kennan opposed NATO expansion in the 1990s and many others like Bill Perry
who was the secretary of defense opposed NATO expansion. They were thinking about it in a realist from a realist
framework. They were basically saying that if you're the Russians and you see NATO marching up to your doorstep, this
is going to cause huge problems. But the vast majority of people in the foreign policy establishment just were not
thinking about how international relations works in those terms, in those
realist terms. They viewed it more in liberal terms. This is why we were not
really interested in containing Russia until 2014. And this is why American
policymakers could argue that the Russians have nothing to fear. The United States is a benign hegeimon. For
a realist like me, it's crazy for people to talk like that. That's just not the way the world works. But if you're a
thoroughgoing liberal and you believe that liberalism is the dominating ideology in international politics now
that the cold war is over with, you don't think in those terms. You think that a country like the United States
and NATO uh are benign actors on the world stage. So you had this complete uh
mismatch in world views and both sides you know ended up as a result in a major
crisis in 2014 and then in a major war in 2022.
This is the often the well the dark side of the liberal theories. If you assume that um it's internal characteristics of
states that dictate their behavior, you would assume that some actors are inherently good, some are inherently
aggressive because when you post um which you have done in uh well in in
your articles as well where you say well let's put oursel in the shoes of the Russians. If if did the Russians or the
Chinese were establishing military bases and uh putting up their missiles in Mexico, uh would the United States not
react in the same way? And usually the response one would get was well we it can't be compared because again as you
suggest we are benign. So these are good versus good weapons versus bad weapons effectively. So it becomes very
difficult to put yourself in the shoes of the opponent. I guess you know in the struggle between liberalism and realism
the Europeans they strike me as very constructivist as well. They fear that the language you use socially constructs
a world. So they there's a it leaves an assumption that mere realist analysis is
somehow immoral. If you say that the Russians should be concerned about NATO and its borders, you are effectively
normalizing cold war thinking. And so the best thing you should do is not say
it. So you should not put yourself in the shoes of the opponent because you might legitimize this idea of a real
politic that this is something we haven't overcome yet. Uh but it does take me to the another argument we often
hear with Ukraine which is Ukraine has the right to join any military alliance
it desires and um it should be allowed to choose its own security arrangements
which sounds awfully moral uh because it suggests sovereignty. It if you don't
accept this it suggests Russia should have a say over Ukraine. Uh however, if
you translate this into actual politics, it led to the destruction of Ukraine. So how how would you redefine I guess
morality uh from a realist perspective? And well, I agree with everything you
said, you know, when you talk about Ukraine having the right to choose its
own foreign policy and therefore to join any alliance that it sees fit to join.
It's a very attractive argument from a liberal point of view because as you well know, liberals place a high premium
on rights. Uh so if you say that somebody has a right as a sovereign state or a country has a right as a
sovereign state uh to join NATO, there's a certain intuitive attractiveness to
that argument. I fully understand. But again, in the real world,
realism basically frames how people think about
international politics. And from a Russian point of view, what they want to
know with regard to Ukraine joining NATO is how that affects their security. The
Russians are interested in their security. The Ukrainians are interested
in their security. The Americans are interested in their security. This is just the way the world works. It makes
perfect sense. Every state should want to maximize its security. Well, from the
Russian point of view, they may think that Ukraine has certain rights, but
from the Russian point of view, what's most important is their security. And
Ukraine exercising its so-called right to join NATO threatens their security.
And by the way, they think it threatens their security in an existential way. We
cannot underestimate that. You know, many people in the west will say, "Oh,
it's Ukraine joining NATO is not an existential threat to Russia." Well,
they may not think it is, but the Russians think it is. And it's what the Russians think that matters. They think
it's an existential threat. So, I believe that if you are Ukraine,
you have to take into account Russian thinking on the matter of you Ukraine
joining NATO. And if you don't, you're going to get yourself into really deep trouble.
And I think many Ukrainians initially understood that. But as time went by, the number of Ukrainians who understood
that logic seemed to diminish. And uh what happened is that the West and the
Ukrainian foreign policy establishment both came to the conclusion that Ukraine had this right and Ukraine could just do
whatever they want. And Ukraine, excuse me, NATO, by the way, we want to emphasize, has an open door policy. it
can invite any country that it wants into the alliance and the Russians don't have a veto over that. That was their
thinking. Well, the Russians simply refuse to accept that logic and the end
result is that Ukraine is in the process of being destroyed. This is a travesty.
It's just hard to believe how terrible this is for Ukraine. And this is all a
result of the fact that we in the west believed that Ukraine had a right to
join NATO and NATO had a right to invite Ukraine into the alliance. And if the
Russians didn't like it, that was just too bad. They had to accept it. And we
acted on that basic logic. And the end result is we have played a central role.
may be the central role in destroying Ukraine. Well, if NATO had negotiated some kind
of a security system in Europe with the Russians uh based on mitigating the
security competition, of course, this could have taken uh Ukraine away from being a front line. But it seemed that
when NATO said, well, we have an open door policy, Ukraine has been invited.
um it wasn't possible for Russia to discuss anymore with NATO because a decision had been made and instead uh
the pressure had then to be put on Ukraine not to accept this offer which
is why I guess you end up with a war. But now that we're in this three plus years since the Russian invasion or more
than a decade since again 2014, how do you end the Ukraine war from a realist
uh view? because uh uh it's I I I don't hear any constructive thoughts coming
out of uh the European capitals especially the the main argument is
still well Ukraine has a lot to fear now from Russia which I wouldn't disagree with they certainly do but so NATO still
has to be um on on the table and uh
Russia will just have to accept this you know just yeah don't don't bend the knee
to the Russian and keep insisting on this that this is the moral thing to do.
So I guess from the realist perspective, how how do you end the Ukraine war?
Well, from an American perspective, uh I'm principally concerned about the rise
of China. Uh I'm principally interested in containing China, not interested in
fighting a war with China, but I want to make sure that China does not dominate Asia uh the way that it would like to.
Uh, and from my point of view as a realist, what I'm interested in doing is putting an end to the Ukraine war as
quickly as possible. Uh, so that the United States can pivot to Asia fully
and so that the United States can have better relations with the Russians. At this point, it's hard to imagine us
having good relations with the Russians, but hopefully we could have better relations. Uh so if I'm the United
States, I'd go to great lengths to shut down the war uh with a negotiated settlement and that means accepting the
main Russian demands and there are three of them uh in my opinion. Uh one is that
NATO I mean that Ukraine has to be neutral. That means it cannot be a NATO
and there cannot be western especially American security guarantees. Has to be
a truly neutral Ukraine. Number two, Ukraine has to disarm somewhat uh at
least to the point where it does not have significant offensive capability that could threaten Russia. And number
three, Ukraine has to accept the fact that it has lost Crimea and those four
Oblas in the eastern part of Ukraine that the Russians have already enexed.
So those are the three principal demands. And if I'm Donald Trump, I would accept those demands. I'd go to
great lengths to work out a deal uh accepting those three main demands. And
by the way, I think that agreement would be in Ukraine's interest. I think
Ukraine has a deep-seated interest in ending this war as soon as possible and
the only way to end it as soon as possible with an agreement is by accepting Russia's main demands. So I
think this is in Ukraine's interest as well as in the United States's interest. And again, as I said, we would then we
meaning the Americans then be able to pivot to Asia where we could focus on containing China. Now,
the problem that we face here uh is first of all, the Ukrainians won't accept this deal. Uh there's no way
they're going to give up that territory. Uh and I think it's extremely unlikely
that they will uh be willing uh to go along without some sort of security
guarantee uh and disarming. I don't see them doing that either. So I I I find it
hard to imagine the Ukrainians accepting u those uh demands, Putin's demands.
Furthermore, I find it hard to imagine the Europeans accepting those demands because I think the Europeans have a
vested interest in seeing the war go on. And the reason is they want to keep the Americans in Europe. Uh I actually
believe European leaders greatest fear is not uh the Russians. They don't worry
that much about a Russian threat. They engage in threat inflation, but it's mainly rhetoric. Uh their greatest fear
is the United States will leave Europe. Uh and if the United States remains committed to an ongoing war in Ukraine,
even if it's at a reduced level, the Americans remain in Europe. So I don't think you're going to get the Europeans
to go along with a deal either. So even if the Americans um want uh to cut a
deal, I don't think the Europeans or the Ukrainians are going to cut that deal. That's a deal on Putin's terms. So I
think Glenn, the sad truth is that this one is going to be settled on the battlefield. That's what my sort of
realist framework tells me. Uh you're not going to get a negotiated settlement. And then the only
interesting question is do the United does the United States pull out of Europe for the most part? Does it pull
its troops out? Uh, and that's a serious possibility uh because of the need to pivot to Asia.
And we don't want to lose sight of the fact that there's also the whole Middle East mess, right? Because the United
States is joined at the hip with Israel. We give lots of weaponry to Israel that
could be used by the Ukrainians or and more importantly could be used in East
Asia to deal with the Chinese. Uh and uh we have all sorts of military
assets deployed in the Middle East and so forth and so on. So the United
States if you really think about it from a grand strategic point of view is involved in three areas of the world.
One is East Asia, two is Europe, Ukraine, and three is the Middle East.
And it's in our interest to greatly reduce our presence in the Middle East and in Europe and to focus on East Asia,
but we're unable to do that. It's really quite remarkable the situation we are
in. Uh we are deeply involved in the Middle East. There's no evidence that
that's going to change. And we are deeply involved in Ukraine. And if you look at what Trump is doing for all his
talk about ending the Ukraine war, improving relations with the Russians, and reducing our presence in Europe, uh
he's not done much of anything on those three fronts. Uh so, you know, we're
pretty much back where uh we were when he entered the White House on January
20th of this year. You know, this is uh you know, this is
what I thought was the great hope of Trump. uh the ability to pull out of the Middle East and Europe. Again, this is
what he was communicating as well during the campaign. Um, but you said of course
as an American, but if you were a European or advising the Europeans, what would you do in this uh position that
Europe's in now? Because as you said, there's this dilemma if uh the Europeans kind of need the United States to remain
in Europe as a pacifier to prevent security competition between the
Europeans, but also to um elevate the relevance of Europe, I guess. But the more Europeans attempt to pull in the
Americans into Europe, be it through perpetuating perpetuating the war in Ukraine or through this horrible trade
agreements which you know anything to keep the Americans there, then the Europeans will become economically
weaker um more unstable and uh overall it will
become less and less relevant and the US will lose further interest in Europe. So what is uh what what would you advise to
the Europeans at this point as we're stuck in um economic decline and uh
again we're now almost in a direct war with the world's largest nuclear power.
If I were the Europeans, I would do the opposite of what I think they are doing.
Uh I'd go to great lengths to shut down the war in Ukraine, get the best possible deal for Ukraine.
uh and then at the same time improve relations with Russia uh and do that
with the thought in mind that good relations with Russia and good relations with China are essential for European
economic growth. Uh I'd go to great lengths of course not to antagonize the
Americans uh and do everything I could to keep the Americans in Europe. But if I were a
European, I would accept the fact that it is likely that the Americans will
leave Europe in good part. Uh I think you can make an argument that uh Trump
is a bit of an anomaly and once Trump is gone uh we can go back to business as
usual. Uh, I wouldn't put a lot of stock in that argument, but it would be an argument I'd pay some attention to, and
I'd go to some lengths uh to have or I'd go to great lengths to have good relations with the Americans uh in case
things do improve once Trump leaves. But, uh, if if I'm the Europeans, I'm
not betting a lot of money, uh, on American support down the road. The
United States is basically a rogue elephant. I think most European leaders understand
that uh behind closed doors. Uh they won't say it publicly. Uh although
occasionally it pops out. But you know, is the United States really a trustworthy ally anymore? If you're a
European, do you want to put all your chips in that basket? I don't think so. Uh the United States looks like it's an
irresponsible state. Donald Trump does not look like a leader that I'd want to, you know, place a lot of reliance on.
So, if I'm the Europeans, I'd think about improving relations with the Russians, shutting down the Ukraine war
uh and rebuilding uh economies.
Well, this all sounds like common sense, but do you think it's uh the liberal delusion that prevents us from pursuing
what is essentially common sense? Because the the realist analysis you present now, they used to be normal and
uh acceptable. But these days as I mentioned before it's seen as being deeply immoral and even a betrayal of
betrayal of our liberal values that uh you know this would lead to the break up
of the political west which is the foundation of liberal hedgemony and it would mean causing up against Russia
which is an authoritarian power. Is is is this what's preventing us from doing it this liberal delusions about how the
world works? I don't know whether it's liberal delusions or just plain delusions.
Uh when I listen to European leaders speak uh about the Ukraine war, I I
think they are by and large delusional. Uh I don't understand fully why that is
the case. Uh but uh
it's just sort of hard to understand why uh
why European leaders are just not more hardheaded uh about uh what's going on
here. Uh it could be Glenn that my basic point that the Europeans worry more than
anything else about the United States leaving Europe and uh therefore they
think that it's important to keep the Ukraine war going and keep the Americans in the fight is what's driving this
train. And uh uh one could argue if that's true that's not delusional. That
makes good strategic sense. the Europeans have a goal here, which is to keep the Americans in Europe. Uh, and
they're doing what's necessary to make that happen. So, you could make that argument. U, I think it's a wrongheaded
argument. I think the Europeans are delusional. Uh, but, uh, but who knows?
I think one of the interesting questions is what happens over the next 10 years
as the elites uh who you know came of age in the
unipolar moment pass on and they're replaced by a new set of elites who are
not uh consumed with this uh liberal view of the west as the good guy uh and
who understand that the west is in trouble and that you know uh significant
uh changes have to be made in the way Europe does business. Uh I think it's
going to be very interesting to watch that because we we are at a plastic moment in history. Uh just very
important to understand that. Uh the unipolar moment is over. uh and uh we're
now in a multi-olar world and that's slowly but steadily becoming very clear
to everyone and we're not only in a multi-olar world but if you look at what's happening
inside European states and even the United States is you have a huge amount of
immigration into these societies uh and uh there's just a lot more uh
change taking place inside of these states uh than was the case uh in the
past uh or in the recent past. And I think that given that you know Europeans
don't make large numbers of babies and they're probably going to end up importing lots of people uh I think that
what happens inside the various European states uh is going to be a source of
friction, a source of real trouble. uh these states are not uh states that have
a rich history of absorbing immigrants in a smooth way. Uh even the United
States which has a rich history of absorbing immigrants uh has not had a
smooth ride all along. All you have to do is look at uh immigration into the
United States from about 1830 1835 up till 1924 when we shut the gates. Uh
that's when all the European uh immigrants came in. Uh it was quite
messy process. Immigration is very hard to manage. And what I'm saying is there's going to be a lot of immigration
into Europe. Uh there already has been, but there's going to be more in the future. and how that's handled is uh
going to be a very uh tricky issue. Uh and uh so I think inside states, you
know, we're at a plastic moment and I think in terms of international politics, we're at a plastic moment. Uh
just talking about the pivot to Asia and what that means. It's looking at what's going on in the Middle East, thinking
about, you know, what's the future of relations between Russia and Europe.
Leave Ukraine out. what's the relationship uh look like between Russia on one side
and Europe on the other? Uh doesn't look very good to me moving forward. And uh
so uh I think there's a lot up in the air. Just as a last question for I guess
concluding remarks in why why do you think liberal hedgeimony was always
doomed to fail? It does appear that it's failed now that NATO is contributing greatly yeah to the destruction of
Ukraine. We're now very much complicit in genocide in the Middle East. Uh it
just well there's no hedgeimony anymore. It doesn't seem very liberal. Uh it's, you know, it's a bit like the Holy Roman
Empire ended when it wasn't Holy, it wasn't Roman and it wasn't empire. So,
but but why was it doomed to fail from the beginning from your perspective?
Well, I think the best way to answer that question is to talk about the
relationship between liberalism on one hand and nationalism and realism on the other hand. Uh I think talking about
those three ideologies and how they relate to each other tells you a lot about what went wrong. Uh, as I said
when we were talking about NATO expansion into Ukraine, the Russians were thinking as realists and the
Americans and their European allies were thinking as liberals. And when you put
realism up against liberalism, realism wins every time. Uh,
furthermore, when you put nationalism up against liberalism, nationalism wins
every time. It's very important to understand that liberal hegemony was all
about interfering in the politics of other countries
for the main purpose of turning them into liberal democracies. You just want
to think about this. Liberal hegemony was all about spreading liberalism
across the planet, creating a globe that was populated by nothing but liberal
democracies. You remember when the cold war ends, Francis Fukuyama writes this very famous article called the end of
history. And the Fukuyama argument basically says that we in the west
defeated fascism in the first half of the 20th century. communism in the second half of
the 20th century and the future is all liberalism. States are going to turn into liberal
democracies and in an ex inexurable way. This is why Frank concludes at the end
of his essay that the future is going to be boring. It's going to be boring
because the world is populated by liberal democracies. Well, what that does is it leaves the
United States to think that it can spread liberal democracy all over the
planet and oftentimes at the end of a rifle barrel. But the problem is that
nationalism is going to get in the way because nation states, nation states,
that's the embodiment of the concept of nationalism. nation states resist other
states interfering in their politics and telling them what kind of political
system they can have. So you have the United States going into the Middle East with the Bush doctrine for the express
purpose of turning the Middle East into a sea of liberal democracies. We're
basically saying we can go in to the Middle East and we can interfere in the
politics of sovereign states and we can turn them into liberal democracies
because liberal democracy is the best possible political order for everybody.
And furthermore, Frank Fukyama tells us that this is inevitable anyway. Well,
when you think like that, it's not long before you run up against nationalism.
And nationalism is where countries say, "We are sovereign states and we'll
decide what kind of political system we have and we don't want you invading our
country and telling us what to do." So in a very important way, you see that
this liberal foreign policy ran up against realism
and it ran up against nationalism because this liberal foreign policy involves right pushing other countries
around in ways that might violate their security. And furthermore, and that's
where the realism comes in. And furthermore, it calls for interfering in the domestic politics.
It calls for challenging the sovereignty of other states and that brings
nationalism into play. And the best example just very quickly to highlight this is China.
The United States adopted a policy of engagement towards
China. Engagement is just another way of saying liberal hegemony. What was the
United States trying to do with China? What we wanted to do was we wanted to
turn China into a liberal democracy. We went to great lengths to help it grow economically. We wanted to get it hooked
on capitalism. We wanted to foster economic interdependence between China
and other countries. Furthermore, we wanted to integrate China into international institutions like the
World Trade Organization. And the widespread belief, Glenn, was that China would eventually become a liberal
democracy. And once it became a liberal democracy, we would all live happily ever after. But you have to put yourself
in the shoes of Chinese leaders in Beijing. First of all, they don't want
the United States turning China into a liberal democracy. The Chinese believe
that they'll decide what kind of political system they will have. And they don't want the American political
system. They don't want liberal democracy. So you get resistance from
China to this liberal hegemony that's based on nationalism. And then
furthermore there's the realist dimension to this. The Chinese much like the Russians
unsurprisingly fear American military power. They fear the Udipole. And as
China gets richer unsurprisingly it turns its economic might into military
might. Now all of these liberal hegeminists in the west say, "Why are
the Chinese doing that? They have nothing to fear from the United States. The United States is a b is a benign
hedgeimon." Well, if you're sitting in Beijing, just like if you're sitting in Moscow or you're sitting in Baghdad, the
United States doesn't look like a benign hegeimon. It looks like a serious
threat. Again, you see realist logic kicking in and you see nationalism
kicking in. The idea that we are sovereign states and we don't want the United States telling us how to do
business. As you know, when people start talking about the Russians involved in
getting involved in an American election, the whole Russia gate business, which of course was not true,
but Americans talked about uh Russian interference in the 2016 election. This
enraged Americans. Why? Because we thought the Russians were violating American sovereignty. I want to be
clear, they weren't, right? This is all a myth. But let's assume the myth was
true. The belief was that they were violating our sovereignty. This is
unacceptable. This is nationalism at play. It's nationalism inside the United
States. Well, unsurprisingly, other countries around the world think in the same way. So the bottom line, Glenn, is
that we adopted when the cold war ended this policy of liberal hegemony which
was basically a liberal theory of how to deal with the world and it ran into
realism and nationalism and it ultimately failed.
I think it's important what you said there that because it's not as if it's liberal democracies only west and the
rest of the world are nationalist that this is also yeah within the west that is the the United States and yeah also
has nationalism. So it is uh and I think ignoring this is also part of the reason
why we have this uh populist revolt now. Um but uh again this liberal delusion I
think this is why well at the moment Beijing is watching NATO in war with
Russia. They're watching the attack on Iran and still it's uh argued that they
should not fear anything that we're all benign. It it seems a bit like crazy town for them but uh I guess yeah that
hits the core. Um yeah, if I can make one more point, Glenn,
just on your comment about the fact that the Americans were thinking very much
like nationalists. What's interesting is that during the unipolar moment when we were pursuing
this liberal foreign policy, there's all sorts of evidence that we were thinking
very much according to the logic of nationalism. uh although we would never acknowledge
this and the best example of this is Matteline Albbright and her famous or
infamous comment that the United States is the indispensable nation that we
stand taller and we see further. If you think about that and and remember
Mattaline Albbright is a liberal of the first order. I mean, if there's anybody
who embodies liberal hegemony, it's got to be Matteline Albbright. But
at the same time, she's a first order nationalist. Listen to what she's saying. We, meaning the United States,
we are the indispensable nation. There's the word nation,
nationalism. We stand taller. We see further. This is
the chauvinism that invariably lies at the heart of any nationalism, right?
Virtually every country believes that it is the chosen people, right? We are the
city on the hill, right? That's nationalism. So here you have Maline
Albbright, right? This card carrying liberal who's also a card carrying nationalist. And what Maline Albbright
is is that she's a liberal nationalist. This is a term that we used to use when
I was in graduate school to describe Max Vber. He was a liberal nationalist.
Right? Maline Albbright is a liberal nationalist. But she does not understand
or she did not understand the nationalist dimension of her identity.
She didn't understand that she was a nationalist and that others in the world
think in terms of nationalism as well as liberalism. So that means you have to be
extremely careful when you start talking about interfering in the politics of
other countries because nationalism again is such a powerful force.
I guess there's a danger of ignoring realism because uh I think it was in
Raymond Aaron uh he he wrote in the 1960s that the idealist uh believing
that he has broken with power politics uh exaggerates its crimes and this is when you have the the the liberal
assumption fueled with the the realist or nationalist realities
and uh yeah I think It's uh very relevant to see the conflicts which we're involved in today.
Well, but the thing is Glenn, mo just building on your point, most people think that realists are wararm mongers,
right? Th this gets back to your point about social constructivists who see realists as the uh principal cause of
all our troubles in the world. And if only the realists would go away, we'd live happily ever after. The fact is
that realists like you and realists like me and realists like George Kennan and
realists like Raymond Arone have a very healthy sense of the limits of power.
That's why we would not have favored NATO expansion into Ukraine and we would
have avoided this giant catastrophe that we're now facing because realists understand yes power matters but there
are limits to what you can do in international politics because other states will balance against you.
Liberals on the other hand tend to cut in the other direction. You know it's
the whole idea that we the Americans, we the West, we're the good guys. We can expand here, there, and everywhere. And
people will understand that we're benign because we're liberal. And they liberals
do not have a healthy sense of the limits of military power. And they end
up pursuing a very ambitious agenda to boot. You want to remember that liberal
hegemony is all about turning the entire planet into a body of states that look
like the United States. That's our goal. We want to make everybody look like us and we're willing to do it at the end of
a rifle barrel. This is going to end up with a lot of forever wars. This is very
foolish. And of course, realists argue against that. So my bottom line here is
that you'd have fewer wars if realists were in charge than when liberals were
in charge. And furthermore, with regard to Ukraine, if the realists had been in
charge, Ukraine would be fully intact today in all likelihood
inside its pre204 borders. But instead, the country is now
a dysfunctional rump state and is going to remain a dysfunctional rump state
because the west and the Ukrainians did not act according to realist logic.
Professor Mshimemer, thank you so much. Uh it's uh no I think it's very important um uh yeah insights because I
even have debates with people these days in ASCO if we could go back to 2014 not
pursue this regime change in Ukraine so they would have kept all their population Crimea you know avoid this
war should we have done it it's like well it was the right thing to do so so I think this is the yeah
the question yeah what perhaps it would have been much more peaceful if the realist would have decided that politics
back then. So, thanks again for your time and letting me pick your brain. My pleasure, Glenn. I enjoyed it
thoroughly.