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Case 18-2868, Document 213-1, 07/03/2019, 2600261, Page1 of 25
18‐2868; 16‐3945‐cv(L)
Brown v. Maxwell; Dershowitz v. Giuffre
In the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
AUGUST TERM 2018
No. 18‐2868‐cv
JULIE BROWN, MIAMI HERALD COMPANY,
Intervenors‐Appellants,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant‐Appellee,
v.
VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,
Plaintiff‐Appellee.
No. 16‐3945‐cv(L)
No. 17‐1625 (CON)
No. 17‐1722(CON)
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, MICHAEL CERNOVICH, DBA CERNOVICH
MEDIA,
Intervenors‐Appellants,
V.
VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant‐Appellee.*
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
ARGUED: MARCH 6, 2019
DECIDED: JULY 2, 2019
Before: CABRANES, POOLER, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
Intervenors‐Appellants Alan Dershowitz, Michael Cernovich,
and the Miami Herald Company (with reporter Julie Brown) appeal
from certain orders of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective
motions to unseal filings in a defamation suit. We conclude that the
District Court failed to conduct the requisite particularized review
when ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. At the same time,
we recognize the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may
accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. We
therefore clarify the legal tools that district courts should use in
safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. Accordingly, we VACATE
the District Court’s orders entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017,
and August 27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment
record as described further herein, and REMAND the cause to the
District Court for particularized review of the remaining sealed
materials.
Judge Pooler concurs in this opinion except insofar as it orders
the immediate unsealing of the summary judgment record without a
remand.
SANFORD L. BOHRER (Christine N. Walz,
Madelaine J. Harrington, New York, NY, on
the brief), Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, FL,
for Intervenors‐Appellants Julie Brown and
Miami Herald.
TY GEE (Adam Mueller, on the brief),
Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.,
Denver, CO, for Defendant‐Appellee Ghislaine
Maxwell.
PAUL G. CASSELL (Sigrid S. McCawley, Boies
Schiller Flexner LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, on
the brief), S.J Quinney College of Law,
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, for
Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia L. Giuffre.
ANDREW G. CELLI JR. (David A. Lebowitz, on
the brief), Emery, Celli, Brinckerhoff &
Abady LLP, New York, NY, for Intervenor‐
Appellant Alan M. Dershowitz.
MARC RANDAZZA (Jay Marshall Wolman,
Las Vegas, NV, on the brief), Randazza Legal
Group, PLLC, Hartford, CT, for Intervenor‐
Appellant Michael Cernovich.
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
Intervenors‐Appellants Alan M. Dershowitz (“Dershowitz”),
Michael Cernovich (“Cernovich”), and the Miami Herald Company
(with reporter Julie Brown, jointly the “Herald”) appeal from certain
orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective motions
to unseal filings in a defamation suit. We conclude that the District
Court failed to conduct the requisite particularized review when
ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. At the same time, we
recognize the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may
accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. We
therefore clarify the legal tools that district courts should use in
safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. Accordingly, we VACATE
the District Court’s orders entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017,
and August 27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment
record as described further herein, and REMAND the cause to the
District Court for particularized review of the remaining sealed
materials.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Jeffrey Epstein’s Conviction and the CVRA Suit
The origins of this case lie in a decade‐old criminal proceeding
against financier Jeffrey Epstein (“Epstein”). On June 30, 2008, Epstein
pleaded guilty to Florida state charges of soliciting, and procuring a
person under the age of eighteen for, prostitution. The charges
stemmed from sexual activity with privately hired “masseuses,” some
of whom were under eighteen, Florida’s age of consent. Pursuant to
an agreement with state and federal prosecutors, Epstein pleaded to
the state charges. He received limited jail‐time, registered as a sex
offender, and agreed to pay compensation to his victims. In return,
prosecutors declined to bring federal charges.
Shortly after Epstein entered his plea, two of his victims,
proceeding as “Jane Doe 1” and “Jane Doe 2,” filed suit against the
Government in the Southern District of Florida under the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”). The victims sought to nullify the plea
agreement, alleging that the Government failed to fulfill its legal
obligations to inform and consult with them in the process leading up
to Epstein’s plea deal.1
On December 30, 2014, two additional unnamed victims—one
of whom has now self‐identified as Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia Giuffre
(“Giuffre”)—petitioned to join in the CVRA case. These petitioners
included in their filings not only descriptions of sexual abuse by
Epstein, but also new allegations of sexual abuse by several other
prominent individuals, “including numerous prominent American
politicians, powerful business executives, foreign presidents, a well-known
Prime Minister, and other world leaders,” as well as
Dershowitz (a long‐time member of the Harvard Law School faculty
who had worked on Epstein’s legal defense) and Defendant‐Appellee
Ghislaine Maxwell (“Maxwell”).2
Dershowitz moved to intervene, seeking to “strike the
outrageous and impertinent allegations made against him and to
request a show cause order to the attorneys that have made them.”3
Exercising its authority to “strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter . . . on its own,”4 the Florida District Court (Kenneth A. Marra,
Judge) sua sponte struck all allegations against additional parties from
the pleadings, including those against Dershowitz, and therefore
denied Dershowitz’s motion as moot.5
The stricken allegations, however, quickly found their way into
the press, and several media outlets published articles repeating
Giuffre’s accusations. In response to the allegations, on January 3,
2015, Maxwell’s publicist issued a press statement declaring that
Giuffre’s allegations “against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue” and that
her “claims are obvious lies.”6
B. Giuffre Sues Maxwell
On September 21, 2015, Giuffre filed the underlying action
against Maxwell in the Southern District of New York. Giuffre alleged
that Maxwell had defamed her through this and other public
statements. Extensive and hard‐fought discovery followed. Due to the
volume of sealing requests filed during discovery, on August 9, 2016,
the District Court entered a Sealing Order that effectively ceded
control of the sealing process to the parties themselves. The Sealing
Order disposed of the requirement that the parties file individual letter
briefs to request sealing and prospectively granted all of the parties’
future sealing requests. In total, 167 documents—nearly one‐fifth of
the docket—were filed under seal. These sealed documents include,
inter alia, motions to compel discovery, motions for sanctions and
adverse inferences, motions in limine, and similar material.
On January 6, 2017, Maxwell filed a motion for summary
judgment. The parties submitted their memoranda of law and
supporting exhibits contesting this motion under seal. On March 22,
2017, the District Court denied the motion in a heavily redacted 76‐
page opinion. Once again, the entire summary judgment record,
including the unredacted version of the District Court opinion
denying summary judgment, remained under seal. On May 24, 2017,
Maxwell and Giuffre executed a settlement agreement, and the case
was closed the next day.
C. Motions to Intervene and Unseal
Over the course of the litigation before Judge Sweet, three
outside parties attempted to unseal some or all of the sealed material.
On August 11, 2016, Dershowitz moved to intervene, seeking to unseal
three documents that, he argues, demonstrate that Giuffre invented
the accusations against him. On January 19, 2017, Cernovich, an
independent blogger and self‐described “popular political
journalist,”7 moved to intervene, seeking to unseal the summary
judgment record, and Dershowitz joined his motion. On April 6, 2018,
after the case had settled, the Herald moved to intervene and unseal
the entire docket. The District Court granted each of these motions to
intervene, but denied the related requests to unseal in orders entered
November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August 27, 2018, respectively.
The Appellants timely appealed from each of the orders
denying their respective motions to unseal. Although each Appellant
seeks the release of a different set of documents, all argue that the
District Court failed to analyze the documents individually or
properly apply the presumption of public access to court documents.
We therefore ordered that the appeals be heard in tandem and held
argument on March 6, 2019.
On March 11, 2019, we issued an order to show cause why we
“should not unseal the summary judgment motion, including any
materials filed in connection with this motion, and the District Court’s
summary judgment decision.”8 The parties timely filed their
responses.
II. DISCUSSION
There are two categories of sealed material at issue in these
appeals: (1) the summary judgment record, which includes the parties’
summary judgment briefs, their statements of undisputed facts, and
incorporated exhibits; and (2) court filings made in the course of the
discovery process and with respect to motions in limine. In this
Opinion, we explain that our law requires the unsealing of the
summary judgment materials and individualized review of the
remaining sealed materials.
While the law governing public access to these materials is
largely settled, we have not yet adequately addressed the potential
harms that often accompany such access. These harms are apparent.
Over forty years ago, the Supreme Court observed that, without
vigilance, courts’ files might “become a vehicle for improper
purposes.”9 Our legal process is already susceptible to abuse.
Unscrupulous litigants can weaponize the discovery process to
humiliate and embarrass their adversaries. Shielded by the “litigation
privilege,”10 bad actors can defame opponents in court pleadings or
depositions without fear of lawsuit and liability. Unfortunately, the
presumption of public access to court documents has the potential to
exacerbate these harms to privacy and reputation by ensuring that
damaging material irrevocably enters the public record.
We therefore take the opportunity to describe the tools available
to district courts in protecting the integrity of the judicial process, and
emphasize the courts’ responsibility to exercise these powerful tools.
We also caution the public to critically assess allegations contained in
judicial pleadings.
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing a district court’s decision to seal a filing or
maintain such a seal, “we examine the court’s factual findings for clear
error, its legal determinations de novo, and its ultimate decision to seal
or unseal for abuse of discretion.”11
B. The Summary Judgment Materials
With respect to the first category of materials, it is well‐settled
that “documents submitted to a court for its consideration in a
summary judgment motion are—as a matter of law—judicial
documents to which a strong presumption of access attaches, under
both the common law and the First Amendment.”12 In light of this
strong First Amendment presumption, “continued sealing of the
documents may be justified only with specific, on‐the‐record findings
that sealing is necessary to preserve higher values and only if the
sealing order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim.”13
In this case, the District Court erred in several respects.14 First, it
failed to give proper weight to the presumption of access that attaches
to documents filed in connection with summary judgment motions.
The District Court reasoned that the summary judgment materials
were “entitled to a lesser presumption of access” because “summary
judgment was denied by the Court.”15 In assigning a “lesser
presumption” to such materials, the District Court relied on a single
sentence of dicta from our decision in United States v. Amodeo.16 We
have since clarified, however, that this sentence was based on a
“quotation from a partial concurrence and partial dissent in the D.C.
Circuit . . . [and] is thus not the considered decision of either this court
or the D.C. Circuit.”17 In fact, we have expressly rejected the
proposition that “different types of documents might receive different
weights of presumption based on the extent to which they were relied
upon in resolving [a] motion [for summary judgment].”18
Second, in contravention of our precedent, the District Court
failed to review the documents individually and produce “specific, on-the‐
record findings that sealing is necessary to preserve higher
values.”19 Instead, the District Court made generalized statements
about the record as a whole.20 This too was legal error.
Finally, upon reviewing the summary judgment materials in
connection with this appeal, we find that there is no countervailing
privacy interest sufficient to justify their continued sealing. Remand
with respect to these documents is thus unnecessary. Accordingly, and
to avoid any further delay,21 we order that the summary judgment
documents (with minimal redactions) be unsealed upon issuance of
our mandate.22
C. The Remaining Sealed Materials
The law governing disclosure of the remaining sealed material
in this case is only slightly more complex. The Supreme Court has
recognized a qualified right “to inspect and copy judicial records and
documents.”23 In defining “judicial records and documents,” we have
emphasized that “the mere filing of a paper or document with the
court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to
the right of public access.”24 Instead, “the item filed must be relevant
to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial
process in order for it to be designated a judicial document.”25
As our precedent makes clear, a court “perform[s] the judicial
function” not only when it rules on motions currently before it, but
also when properly exercising its inherent “supervisory powers.”26 A
document is thus “relevant to the performance of the judicial function”
if it would reasonably have the tendency to influence a district court’s
ruling on a motion or in the exercise of its supervisory powers, without
regard to which way the court ultimately rules or whether the
document ultimately in fact influences the court’s decision.27
Accordingly, if in applying these standards, a court determines that
documents filed by a party are not relevant to the performance of a
judicial function, no presumption of public access attaches.28
Once an item is deemed relevant to the exercise of judicial
power, “the weight to be given the presumption of access must be
governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article
III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those
monitoring the federal courts.”29 Thus, while evidence introduced at
trial or in connection with summary judgment enjoys a strong
presumption of public access, documents that “play only a negligible
role in the performance of Article III duties” are accorded only a low
presumption that “amounts to little more than a prediction of public
access absent a countervailing reason.”30 Documents that are never
filed with the court, but simply “passed between the parties in
discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption’s reach.”31
The remaining sealed materials at issue here include filings
related to, inter alia, motions to compel testimony, to quash trial
subpoenae, and to exclude certain deposition testimony. All such
motions, at least on their face, call upon the court to exercise its Article
III powers. Moreover, erroneous judicial decision‐making with respect
to such evidentiary and discovery matters can cause substantial harm.
Such materials are therefore of value “to those monitoring the federal
courts.”32 Thus, all documents submitted in connection with, and
relevant to, such judicial decision‐making are subject to at least some
presumption of public access.33
Although a court’s authority to oversee discovery and control
the evidence introduced at trial surely constitutes an exercise of
judicial power, we note that this authority is ancillary to the court’s
core role in adjudicating a case. Accordingly, the presumption of
public access in filings submitted in connection with discovery
disputes or motions in limine is generally somewhat lower than the
presumption applied to material introduced at trial, or in connection
with dispositive motions such as motions for dismissal or summary
judgment.34 Thus, while a court must still articulate specific and
substantial reasons for sealing such material, the reasons usually need
not be as compelling as those required to seal summary judgment
filings.
Here, the precise basis for the District Court’s decision to deny
the motion to unseal these remaining materials is unclear. In the three
paragraphs devoted to the issue, the District Court emphasized the
potential for embarrassment “given the highly sensitive nature of the
underlying allegations,” and concluded that “the documents sealed in
the course of discovery were neither relied upon by [the District] Court
in the rendering of an adjudication, nor necessary to or helpful in
resolving a motion.”35 It is therefore unclear whether the District Court
held that these materials were not judicial documents (and thus are
not subject to a presumption of public access), or found that privacy
interests outweighed a limited right of public access.
On either interpretation, however, the District Court’s holding
was error. Insofar as the District Court held that these materials are not
judicial documents because it did not rely on them in adjudicating a
motion, this was legal error. As explained above, the proper inquiry is
whether the documents are relevant to the performance of the judicial
function, not whether they were relied upon.36 Indeed, decisionmakers
often find that a great deal of relevant material does not
ultimately sway their decision. And insofar as the District Court held
that privacy interests outweigh the presumption of public access in
each of the thousands of pages at issue, that decision—which appears
to have been made without particularized review—amounts to an
abuse of discretion.37
In light of the District Court’s failure to conduct an
individualized review of the sealed materials, it is necessary to do so
now. We believe the District Court is best situated to conduct this
review. The District Court can directly communicate with the parties,
and can therefore more swiftly and thoroughly consider particular
objections to unsealing specific materials. Relatedly, the District Court
can obtain the parties’ assistance in effecting any necessary redactions,
and in notifying any outside parties whose privacy interests might be
implicated by the unsealing. Accordingly, we remand the cause to the
District Court to conduct such a particularized review and unseal all
documents for which the presumption of public access outweighs any
countervailing privacy interests.
D. Protecting the Integrity of Judicial Proceedings
While we disagree with the District Court’s disposition of the
motions to unseal, we share its concern that court files might be used
to “promote scandal arising out of unproven potentially libelous
statements.”38 We therefore describe certain methods courts can
employ to protect the judicial process from being coopted for such
purposes.
The Supreme Court has explained that “[e]very court has
supervisory power over its own records and files” to ensure they “are
not used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal” or “serve
as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption.”39 This
supervisory function is not only within a district court’s power, but
also among its responsibilities.
In practice, district courts may employ several methods to fulfill
this function. They may, for instance, issue protective orders
forbidding dissemination of certain material “to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden” and require that filings containing such material be submitted
under seal.40 If parties then seek to file such materials, the court may
deny them leave to do so.41 District courts may also seek to counteract
the effect of defamatory statements by explaining on the record that
the statements appear to lack credibility. Moreover, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the district court may strike such
material from the filings on the grounds that it is “redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.”42 Because such rejected or
stricken material is not “relevant to the performance of the judicial
function” it would not be considered a “judicial document” and would
enjoy no presumption of public access.43 Finally, in appropriate
circumstances, district courts may impose sanctions on attorneys and
parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c).44
E. A Cautionary Note
We conclude with a note of caution to the public regarding the
reliability of court filings such as those unsealed today.
Materials submitted by parties to a court should be understood
for what they are. They do not reflect the court’s own findings. Rather,
they are prepared by parties seeking to advance their own interests in
an adversarial process. Although affidavits and depositions are
offered “under penalty of perjury,” it is in fact exceedingly rare for
anyone to be prosecuted for perjury in a civil proceeding.45 Similarly,
pleadings, complaints, and briefs—while supposedly based on
underlying evidentiary material—can be misleading. Such documents
sometimes draw dubious inferences from already questionable
material or present ambiguous material as definitive.
Moreover, court filings are, in some respects, particularly
susceptible to fraud. For while the threat of defamation actions may
deter malicious falsehoods in standard publications, this threat is nonexistent
with respect to certain court filings. This is so because, under
New York law (which governs the underlying defamation claim here),
“absolute immunity from liability for defamation exists for oral or
written statements made . . . in connection with a proceeding before a
court.”46 Thus, although the act of filing a document with a court might
be thought to lend that document additional credibility, in fact,
allegations appearing in such documents might be less credible than
those published elsewhere.47
We have long noted that the press plays a vital role in ensuring
the public right of access and in enhancing “the quality and safeguards
the integrity of the factfinding process.”48 When faithfully observing
its best traditions, the print and electronic media “contributes to public
understanding of the rule of law” and “validates [its] claim of
functioning as surrogates for the public.”49
At the same time, the media does the public a profound
disservice when it reports on parties’ allegations uncritically. We have
previously observed that courts cannot possibly “discredit every
statement or document turned up in the course of litigation,” and we
have criticized “the use by the media of the somewhat misleading term
‘court records’ in referring to such items.”50 Even ordinarily critical
readers may take the reference to “court papers” as some sort of
marker of reliability. This would be a mistake.
We therefore urge the media to exercise restraint in covering
potentially defamatory allegations, and we caution the public to read
such accounts with discernment.
III. CONCLUSION
To summarize, we hold as follows:
(1) Materials submitted in connection with a motion for
summary judgment are subject to a strong presumption of
public access.
(2) The summary judgment record at issue will be unsealed
upon issuance of our mandate, subject to minimal
redactions.51
(3) Materials submitted in connection with, and relevant to,
discovery motions, motions in limine, and other nondispositive
motions are subject to a lesser—but still
substantial— presumption of public access.
(4) The District Court is directed to review the remaining sealed
materials individually and unseal those materials as
appropriate.
(5) District courts should exercise the full range of their
substantial powers to ensure their files do not become
vehicles for defamation.
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the orders of the
District Court entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August
27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment record as
described herein, and REMAND the cause to the District Court for
particularized review of the remaining materials.
In undertaking this task, the District Court may be well‐served
by ordering the parties to submit to the Court unredacted, electronic
copies of the remaining sealed materials, as well as specific, proposed
redactions. The District Court may also order the parties to identify
and notify additional parties whose privacy interests would likely be
implicated by disclosure of these materials.
In the interests of judicial economy, any future appeal in this
matter shall be referred to this panel.
Case 18-2868, Document 213-1, 07/03/2019, 2600261, Page25 of 25
______________
Notes:
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the captions as set out above.
1 On February 21, 2019, the Florida District Court ruled that federal
prosecutors had violated the CVRA by failing to adequately notify the two victims/plaintiffs
of the plea deal. The District Court has not yet determined the appropriate
remedy. See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204–17 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
2 Doe 1 v. United States, No. 08‐CV‐80736‐KAM, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 7, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
5 Doe 1, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2–3.
6 See Giuffre v. Maxwell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 428, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
7 Br. Appellant (Cernovich) 4.
8 Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 18‐2868‐cv, Docket No. 138.
9 Nixon v. Warner Commcʹns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
10 See notes 46–47 and accompanying text, post.
11 Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139
(2d Cir. 2016).
12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We
observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties may
“be assumed to have supported their papers with admissible evidence and nonfrivolous
arguments.” Id. at 122. Insofar as a district court has, through striking a
filing, specifically found that assumption inapplicable, the categorical rule in
Lugosch may not apply. See notes 42–43 and accompanying text, post.
13 Id. at 124. Examples of such countervailing values may include,
depending on the circumstances, preserving “the right of an accused to
fundamental fairness in the jury selection process,” Press‐Enter. Co. v. Superior Court
of California, Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); the protection of attorney‐client
privilege, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125; “the danger of impairing law enforcement or
judicial efficiency,” SEC. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); and “the
privacy interest of those who resist disclosure,” id.
14 Our discussion here focuses specifically on the District Court’s denial of
the Herald’s motion to unseal the entire record. Because this decision grants relief
to all Appellants, we need not discuss any separate, additional error in the District
Court’s denial of the earlier motions to unseal.
15 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 444.
16 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II”) (“One judge [in the District
of Columbia Circuit] has pointed out, for example, that where a district court
denied the summary judgment motion, essentially postponing a final determination
of substantive legal rights, the public interest in access is not as pressing.” (internal
quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)).
17 Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121.
18 Id. at 123.
19 Id. at 124.
20 See, e.g., Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 445 (summarily concluding that all
“[t]he Summary Judgment Judicial Documents openly refer to and discuss these
allegations [of sexual assault and sexual trafficking] in comprehensive detail, and
that those allegations “establish[] a strong privacy interest here”).
21 Cf. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 127 (ordering that “the mandate shall issue
forthwith” to expedite the unsealing process).
22 Upon issuance of our mandate, a minimally redacted version of the
summary judgment record will be made accessible on the Court of Appeals docket.
We have implemented minimal redactions to protect personally identifying
information such as personal phone numbers, contact lists, birth dates, and social
security numbers. We have also redacted the names of alleged minor victims of
sexual abuse from deposition testimony and police reports, as well as deposition
responses concerning intimate matters where the questions were likely only
permitted—and the responses only compelled—because of a strong expectation of
continued confidentiality. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2. While we appreciate the views
expressed in Judge Pooler’s separate opinion, the panel majority believes that the
efforts invested by three former district judges in reviewing these materials
adequately address those concerns.
23 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98.
24 United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo I”).
25 Id.
26 Cf. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2017)
(explaining that, in considering whether the report of a monitor charged with
assessing compliance with a deferred prosecution agreement is a judicial
document, “[ i]f the district court’s conception of its supervisory power in this
context were correct, the Monitor’s Report would quite obviously be relevant to the
performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Whether a specific judicial decision constitutes a
“performance of the judicial function” is a question of law. Accordingly, we review
such determinations de novo. Id. at 134.
27 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145–46 (concluding that documents were relevant to
the performance of a judicial function because they would have “informed” the
district court’s decision whether to discharge or retain a Receiver); see also FTC. v.
Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Federal Rule of
Evidence 401’s “having any tendency” definition of relevance in determining
whether documents were “judicial documents”).
28 As we explain below, there are several (often preferable) tools beyond
sealing that district courts can use to protect their dockets from becoming a vehicle
for irrelevant—and potentially defamatory—accusations. See Section D, post.
29 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.
30 Id. at 1050.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1049.
33 In previous decisions, we have identified an important exception to this
general rule: the presumption of public access does not apply to material that is
submitted to the court solely so that the court may decide whether that same
material must be disclosed in the discovery process or shielded by a Protective
Order. See TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 233.
34 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049–50.
35 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d. at 442 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
36 See text accompanying notes 12–18 and 26–28, ante.
37 See In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 943 n.21 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that “abuse of discretion” is a nonpejorative, legal “term of art”).
38 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 447.
39 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (internal quotation marks).
40 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 229–30.
41 See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Electronic Case Filing Rules & Instructions, February 1,
2019 Edition, Rule 6.1,
http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf/ECF%20Rule ... 0Final.pdf.
42 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Courts may strike material from the pleadings either
“on its own” or “on motion made by a party.” Id. Although motions to strike
material solely “on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immaterial” are
disfavored, when material is also “scandalous,” no such presumption applies. Cf.
Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Talbot
v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“Allegations may be stricken as scandalous if the matter bears no possible relation
to the controversy or may cause the objecting party prejudice.”); Wine Markets Intʹl,
Inc. v. Bass, 177 F.R.D. 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Motions to strike are not generally
favored, except in relation to scandalous matters.”); Alvarado‐Morales v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 617–18 (1st Cir. 1988) (categorizing as scandalous “matter
which impugned the character of defendants”).
43 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145.
44 In relevant part, Rule 11 provides:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049 (describing sanctions available
to the court).
45 Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty to the Law and
Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 35, 47 n.52 (1996) (ʺPerjury cases
are not often pursued . . . .”).
46 Front, Inc. v. Khalil, 24 N.Y.3d 713, 718 (2015); see also Kelly v. Albarino, 485
F.3d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 2007) (adopting the reasoning of the District Court explaining
that this privilege is “the broadest of possible privileges”); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 587 (1977) (“A party to a private litigation or a private prosecutor or
defendant in a criminal prosecution is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as a part of, a judicial
proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has some relation to the
proceeding.”). But see note 47, post.
47 While common law courts have generally interpreted the litigation privilege
broadly, they nevertheless maintain an important (if rarely implemented)
limitation on its scope: to qualify for the privilege, a statement must be “material
and pertinent to the questions involved.” Front, 24 N.Y.3d at 718 (quoting Youmans
v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 219–20 (1897)). It follows, then, that immaterial and
impertinent statements are (at least nominally) actionable, particularly when they
are “so needlessly defamatory as to warrant the inference of express malice.” Id.
(same). It seems to us that when a district court strikes statements from the record
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) on the ground that the matter is “impertinent” and
“immaterial,” it makes the very same determination that permits a defamation
action under the common law. We think the judicial system would be well served
were our common law courts to revitalize this crucial qualification to the litigation
privilege.
48 Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984)
(quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606
(1982)).
49 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.
51 See note 22, ante.
Case 18-2868, Document 213-1, 07/03/2019, 2600261, Page1 of 25
18‐2868; 16‐3945‐cv(L)
Brown v. Maxwell; Dershowitz v. Giuffre
In the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
AUGUST TERM 2018
No. 18‐2868‐cv
JULIE BROWN, MIAMI HERALD COMPANY,
Intervenors‐Appellants,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant‐Appellee,
v.
VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,
Plaintiff‐Appellee.
No. 16‐3945‐cv(L)
No. 17‐1625 (CON)
No. 17‐1722(CON)
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, MICHAEL CERNOVICH, DBA CERNOVICH
MEDIA,
Intervenors‐Appellants,
V.
VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant‐Appellee.*
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
ARGUED: MARCH 6, 2019
DECIDED: JULY 2, 2019
Before: CABRANES, POOLER, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
Intervenors‐Appellants Alan Dershowitz, Michael Cernovich,
and the Miami Herald Company (with reporter Julie Brown) appeal
from certain orders of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective
motions to unseal filings in a defamation suit. We conclude that the
District Court failed to conduct the requisite particularized review
when ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. At the same time,
we recognize the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may
accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. We
therefore clarify the legal tools that district courts should use in
safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. Accordingly, we VACATE
the District Court’s orders entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017,
and August 27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment
record as described further herein, and REMAND the cause to the
District Court for particularized review of the remaining sealed
materials.
Judge Pooler concurs in this opinion except insofar as it orders
the immediate unsealing of the summary judgment record without a
remand.
SANFORD L. BOHRER (Christine N. Walz,
Madelaine J. Harrington, New York, NY, on
the brief), Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, FL,
for Intervenors‐Appellants Julie Brown and
Miami Herald.
TY GEE (Adam Mueller, on the brief),
Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.,
Denver, CO, for Defendant‐Appellee Ghislaine
Maxwell.
PAUL G. CASSELL (Sigrid S. McCawley, Boies
Schiller Flexner LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, on
the brief), S.J Quinney College of Law,
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, for
Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia L. Giuffre.
ANDREW G. CELLI JR. (David A. Lebowitz, on
the brief), Emery, Celli, Brinckerhoff &
Abady LLP, New York, NY, for Intervenor‐
Appellant Alan M. Dershowitz.
MARC RANDAZZA (Jay Marshall Wolman,
Las Vegas, NV, on the brief), Randazza Legal
Group, PLLC, Hartford, CT, for Intervenor‐
Appellant Michael Cernovich.
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
Intervenors‐Appellants Alan M. Dershowitz (“Dershowitz”),
Michael Cernovich (“Cernovich”), and the Miami Herald Company
(with reporter Julie Brown, jointly the “Herald”) appeal from certain
orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective motions
to unseal filings in a defamation suit. We conclude that the District
Court failed to conduct the requisite particularized review when
ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. At the same time, we
recognize the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may
accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. We
therefore clarify the legal tools that district courts should use in
safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. Accordingly, we VACATE
the District Court’s orders entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017,
and August 27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment
record as described further herein, and REMAND the cause to the
District Court for particularized review of the remaining sealed
materials.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Jeffrey Epstein’s Conviction and the CVRA Suit
The origins of this case lie in a decade‐old criminal proceeding
against financier Jeffrey Epstein (“Epstein”). On June 30, 2008, Epstein
pleaded guilty to Florida state charges of soliciting, and procuring a
person under the age of eighteen for, prostitution. The charges
stemmed from sexual activity with privately hired “masseuses,” some
of whom were under eighteen, Florida’s age of consent. Pursuant to
an agreement with state and federal prosecutors, Epstein pleaded to
the state charges. He received limited jail‐time, registered as a sex
offender, and agreed to pay compensation to his victims. In return,
prosecutors declined to bring federal charges.
Shortly after Epstein entered his plea, two of his victims,
proceeding as “Jane Doe 1” and “Jane Doe 2,” filed suit against the
Government in the Southern District of Florida under the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”). The victims sought to nullify the plea
agreement, alleging that the Government failed to fulfill its legal
obligations to inform and consult with them in the process leading up
to Epstein’s plea deal.1
On December 30, 2014, two additional unnamed victims—one
of whom has now self‐identified as Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia Giuffre
(“Giuffre”)—petitioned to join in the CVRA case. These petitioners
included in their filings not only descriptions of sexual abuse by
Epstein, but also new allegations of sexual abuse by several other
prominent individuals, “including numerous prominent American
politicians, powerful business executives, foreign presidents, a well-known
Prime Minister, and other world leaders,” as well as
Dershowitz (a long‐time member of the Harvard Law School faculty
who had worked on Epstein’s legal defense) and Defendant‐Appellee
Ghislaine Maxwell (“Maxwell”).2
Dershowitz moved to intervene, seeking to “strike the
outrageous and impertinent allegations made against him and to
request a show cause order to the attorneys that have made them.”3
Exercising its authority to “strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter . . . on its own,”4 the Florida District Court (Kenneth A. Marra,
Judge) sua sponte struck all allegations against additional parties from
the pleadings, including those against Dershowitz, and therefore
denied Dershowitz’s motion as moot.5
The stricken allegations, however, quickly found their way into
the press, and several media outlets published articles repeating
Giuffre’s accusations. In response to the allegations, on January 3,
2015, Maxwell’s publicist issued a press statement declaring that
Giuffre’s allegations “against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue” and that
her “claims are obvious lies.”6
B. Giuffre Sues Maxwell
On September 21, 2015, Giuffre filed the underlying action
against Maxwell in the Southern District of New York. Giuffre alleged
that Maxwell had defamed her through this and other public
statements. Extensive and hard‐fought discovery followed. Due to the
volume of sealing requests filed during discovery, on August 9, 2016,
the District Court entered a Sealing Order that effectively ceded
control of the sealing process to the parties themselves. The Sealing
Order disposed of the requirement that the parties file individual letter
briefs to request sealing and prospectively granted all of the parties’
future sealing requests. In total, 167 documents—nearly one‐fifth of
the docket—were filed under seal. These sealed documents include,
inter alia, motions to compel discovery, motions for sanctions and
adverse inferences, motions in limine, and similar material.
On January 6, 2017, Maxwell filed a motion for summary
judgment. The parties submitted their memoranda of law and
supporting exhibits contesting this motion under seal. On March 22,
2017, the District Court denied the motion in a heavily redacted 76‐
page opinion. Once again, the entire summary judgment record,
including the unredacted version of the District Court opinion
denying summary judgment, remained under seal. On May 24, 2017,
Maxwell and Giuffre executed a settlement agreement, and the case
was closed the next day.
C. Motions to Intervene and Unseal
Over the course of the litigation before Judge Sweet, three
outside parties attempted to unseal some or all of the sealed material.
On August 11, 2016, Dershowitz moved to intervene, seeking to unseal
three documents that, he argues, demonstrate that Giuffre invented
the accusations against him. On January 19, 2017, Cernovich, an
independent blogger and self‐described “popular political
journalist,”7 moved to intervene, seeking to unseal the summary
judgment record, and Dershowitz joined his motion. On April 6, 2018,
after the case had settled, the Herald moved to intervene and unseal
the entire docket. The District Court granted each of these motions to
intervene, but denied the related requests to unseal in orders entered
November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August 27, 2018, respectively.
The Appellants timely appealed from each of the orders
denying their respective motions to unseal. Although each Appellant
seeks the release of a different set of documents, all argue that the
District Court failed to analyze the documents individually or
properly apply the presumption of public access to court documents.
We therefore ordered that the appeals be heard in tandem and held
argument on March 6, 2019.
On March 11, 2019, we issued an order to show cause why we
“should not unseal the summary judgment motion, including any
materials filed in connection with this motion, and the District Court’s
summary judgment decision.”8 The parties timely filed their
responses.
II. DISCUSSION
There are two categories of sealed material at issue in these
appeals: (1) the summary judgment record, which includes the parties’
summary judgment briefs, their statements of undisputed facts, and
incorporated exhibits; and (2) court filings made in the course of the
discovery process and with respect to motions in limine. In this
Opinion, we explain that our law requires the unsealing of the
summary judgment materials and individualized review of the
remaining sealed materials.
While the law governing public access to these materials is
largely settled, we have not yet adequately addressed the potential
harms that often accompany such access. These harms are apparent.
Over forty years ago, the Supreme Court observed that, without
vigilance, courts’ files might “become a vehicle for improper
purposes.”9 Our legal process is already susceptible to abuse.
Unscrupulous litigants can weaponize the discovery process to
humiliate and embarrass their adversaries. Shielded by the “litigation
privilege,”10 bad actors can defame opponents in court pleadings or
depositions without fear of lawsuit and liability. Unfortunately, the
presumption of public access to court documents has the potential to
exacerbate these harms to privacy and reputation by ensuring that
damaging material irrevocably enters the public record.
We therefore take the opportunity to describe the tools available
to district courts in protecting the integrity of the judicial process, and
emphasize the courts’ responsibility to exercise these powerful tools.
We also caution the public to critically assess allegations contained in
judicial pleadings.
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing a district court’s decision to seal a filing or
maintain such a seal, “we examine the court’s factual findings for clear
error, its legal determinations de novo, and its ultimate decision to seal
or unseal for abuse of discretion.”11
B. The Summary Judgment Materials
With respect to the first category of materials, it is well‐settled
that “documents submitted to a court for its consideration in a
summary judgment motion are—as a matter of law—judicial
documents to which a strong presumption of access attaches, under
both the common law and the First Amendment.”12 In light of this
strong First Amendment presumption, “continued sealing of the
documents may be justified only with specific, on‐the‐record findings
that sealing is necessary to preserve higher values and only if the
sealing order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim.”13
In this case, the District Court erred in several respects.14 First, it
failed to give proper weight to the presumption of access that attaches
to documents filed in connection with summary judgment motions.
The District Court reasoned that the summary judgment materials
were “entitled to a lesser presumption of access” because “summary
judgment was denied by the Court.”15 In assigning a “lesser
presumption” to such materials, the District Court relied on a single
sentence of dicta from our decision in United States v. Amodeo.16 We
have since clarified, however, that this sentence was based on a
“quotation from a partial concurrence and partial dissent in the D.C.
Circuit . . . [and] is thus not the considered decision of either this court
or the D.C. Circuit.”17 In fact, we have expressly rejected the
proposition that “different types of documents might receive different
weights of presumption based on the extent to which they were relied
upon in resolving [a] motion [for summary judgment].”18
Second, in contravention of our precedent, the District Court
failed to review the documents individually and produce “specific, on-the‐
record findings that sealing is necessary to preserve higher
values.”19 Instead, the District Court made generalized statements
about the record as a whole.20 This too was legal error.
Finally, upon reviewing the summary judgment materials in
connection with this appeal, we find that there is no countervailing
privacy interest sufficient to justify their continued sealing. Remand
with respect to these documents is thus unnecessary. Accordingly, and
to avoid any further delay,21 we order that the summary judgment
documents (with minimal redactions) be unsealed upon issuance of
our mandate.22
C. The Remaining Sealed Materials
The law governing disclosure of the remaining sealed material
in this case is only slightly more complex. The Supreme Court has
recognized a qualified right “to inspect and copy judicial records and
documents.”23 In defining “judicial records and documents,” we have
emphasized that “the mere filing of a paper or document with the
court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to
the right of public access.”24 Instead, “the item filed must be relevant
to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial
process in order for it to be designated a judicial document.”25
As our precedent makes clear, a court “perform[s] the judicial
function” not only when it rules on motions currently before it, but
also when properly exercising its inherent “supervisory powers.”26 A
document is thus “relevant to the performance of the judicial function”
if it would reasonably have the tendency to influence a district court’s
ruling on a motion or in the exercise of its supervisory powers, without
regard to which way the court ultimately rules or whether the
document ultimately in fact influences the court’s decision.27
Accordingly, if in applying these standards, a court determines that
documents filed by a party are not relevant to the performance of a
judicial function, no presumption of public access attaches.28
Once an item is deemed relevant to the exercise of judicial
power, “the weight to be given the presumption of access must be
governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article
III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those
monitoring the federal courts.”29 Thus, while evidence introduced at
trial or in connection with summary judgment enjoys a strong
presumption of public access, documents that “play only a negligible
role in the performance of Article III duties” are accorded only a low
presumption that “amounts to little more than a prediction of public
access absent a countervailing reason.”30 Documents that are never
filed with the court, but simply “passed between the parties in
discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption’s reach.”31
The remaining sealed materials at issue here include filings
related to, inter alia, motions to compel testimony, to quash trial
subpoenae, and to exclude certain deposition testimony. All such
motions, at least on their face, call upon the court to exercise its Article
III powers. Moreover, erroneous judicial decision‐making with respect
to such evidentiary and discovery matters can cause substantial harm.
Such materials are therefore of value “to those monitoring the federal
courts.”32 Thus, all documents submitted in connection with, and
relevant to, such judicial decision‐making are subject to at least some
presumption of public access.33
Although a court’s authority to oversee discovery and control
the evidence introduced at trial surely constitutes an exercise of
judicial power, we note that this authority is ancillary to the court’s
core role in adjudicating a case. Accordingly, the presumption of
public access in filings submitted in connection with discovery
disputes or motions in limine is generally somewhat lower than the
presumption applied to material introduced at trial, or in connection
with dispositive motions such as motions for dismissal or summary
judgment.34 Thus, while a court must still articulate specific and
substantial reasons for sealing such material, the reasons usually need
not be as compelling as those required to seal summary judgment
filings.
Here, the precise basis for the District Court’s decision to deny
the motion to unseal these remaining materials is unclear. In the three
paragraphs devoted to the issue, the District Court emphasized the
potential for embarrassment “given the highly sensitive nature of the
underlying allegations,” and concluded that “the documents sealed in
the course of discovery were neither relied upon by [the District] Court
in the rendering of an adjudication, nor necessary to or helpful in
resolving a motion.”35 It is therefore unclear whether the District Court
held that these materials were not judicial documents (and thus are
not subject to a presumption of public access), or found that privacy
interests outweighed a limited right of public access.
On either interpretation, however, the District Court’s holding
was error. Insofar as the District Court held that these materials are not
judicial documents because it did not rely on them in adjudicating a
motion, this was legal error. As explained above, the proper inquiry is
whether the documents are relevant to the performance of the judicial
function, not whether they were relied upon.36 Indeed, decisionmakers
often find that a great deal of relevant material does not
ultimately sway their decision. And insofar as the District Court held
that privacy interests outweigh the presumption of public access in
each of the thousands of pages at issue, that decision—which appears
to have been made without particularized review—amounts to an
abuse of discretion.37
In light of the District Court’s failure to conduct an
individualized review of the sealed materials, it is necessary to do so
now. We believe the District Court is best situated to conduct this
review. The District Court can directly communicate with the parties,
and can therefore more swiftly and thoroughly consider particular
objections to unsealing specific materials. Relatedly, the District Court
can obtain the parties’ assistance in effecting any necessary redactions,
and in notifying any outside parties whose privacy interests might be
implicated by the unsealing. Accordingly, we remand the cause to the
District Court to conduct such a particularized review and unseal all
documents for which the presumption of public access outweighs any
countervailing privacy interests.
D. Protecting the Integrity of Judicial Proceedings
While we disagree with the District Court’s disposition of the
motions to unseal, we share its concern that court files might be used
to “promote scandal arising out of unproven potentially libelous
statements.”38 We therefore describe certain methods courts can
employ to protect the judicial process from being coopted for such
purposes.
The Supreme Court has explained that “[e]very court has
supervisory power over its own records and files” to ensure they “are
not used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal” or “serve
as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption.”39 This
supervisory function is not only within a district court’s power, but
also among its responsibilities.
In practice, district courts may employ several methods to fulfill
this function. They may, for instance, issue protective orders
forbidding dissemination of certain material “to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden” and require that filings containing such material be submitted
under seal.40 If parties then seek to file such materials, the court may
deny them leave to do so.41 District courts may also seek to counteract
the effect of defamatory statements by explaining on the record that
the statements appear to lack credibility. Moreover, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the district court may strike such
material from the filings on the grounds that it is “redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.”42 Because such rejected or
stricken material is not “relevant to the performance of the judicial
function” it would not be considered a “judicial document” and would
enjoy no presumption of public access.43 Finally, in appropriate
circumstances, district courts may impose sanctions on attorneys and
parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c).44
E. A Cautionary Note
We conclude with a note of caution to the public regarding the
reliability of court filings such as those unsealed today.
Materials submitted by parties to a court should be understood
for what they are. They do not reflect the court’s own findings. Rather,
they are prepared by parties seeking to advance their own interests in
an adversarial process. Although affidavits and depositions are
offered “under penalty of perjury,” it is in fact exceedingly rare for
anyone to be prosecuted for perjury in a civil proceeding.45 Similarly,
pleadings, complaints, and briefs—while supposedly based on
underlying evidentiary material—can be misleading. Such documents
sometimes draw dubious inferences from already questionable
material or present ambiguous material as definitive.
Moreover, court filings are, in some respects, particularly
susceptible to fraud. For while the threat of defamation actions may
deter malicious falsehoods in standard publications, this threat is nonexistent
with respect to certain court filings. This is so because, under
New York law (which governs the underlying defamation claim here),
“absolute immunity from liability for defamation exists for oral or
written statements made . . . in connection with a proceeding before a
court.”46 Thus, although the act of filing a document with a court might
be thought to lend that document additional credibility, in fact,
allegations appearing in such documents might be less credible than
those published elsewhere.47
We have long noted that the press plays a vital role in ensuring
the public right of access and in enhancing “the quality and safeguards
the integrity of the factfinding process.”48 When faithfully observing
its best traditions, the print and electronic media “contributes to public
understanding of the rule of law” and “validates [its] claim of
functioning as surrogates for the public.”49
At the same time, the media does the public a profound
disservice when it reports on parties’ allegations uncritically. We have
previously observed that courts cannot possibly “discredit every
statement or document turned up in the course of litigation,” and we
have criticized “the use by the media of the somewhat misleading term
‘court records’ in referring to such items.”50 Even ordinarily critical
readers may take the reference to “court papers” as some sort of
marker of reliability. This would be a mistake.
We therefore urge the media to exercise restraint in covering
potentially defamatory allegations, and we caution the public to read
such accounts with discernment.
III. CONCLUSION
To summarize, we hold as follows:
(1) Materials submitted in connection with a motion for
summary judgment are subject to a strong presumption of
public access.
(2) The summary judgment record at issue will be unsealed
upon issuance of our mandate, subject to minimal
redactions.51
(3) Materials submitted in connection with, and relevant to,
discovery motions, motions in limine, and other nondispositive
motions are subject to a lesser—but still
substantial— presumption of public access.
(4) The District Court is directed to review the remaining sealed
materials individually and unseal those materials as
appropriate.
(5) District courts should exercise the full range of their
substantial powers to ensure their files do not become
vehicles for defamation.
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the orders of the
District Court entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August
27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment record as
described herein, and REMAND the cause to the District Court for
particularized review of the remaining materials.
In undertaking this task, the District Court may be well‐served
by ordering the parties to submit to the Court unredacted, electronic
copies of the remaining sealed materials, as well as specific, proposed
redactions. The District Court may also order the parties to identify
and notify additional parties whose privacy interests would likely be
implicated by disclosure of these materials.
In the interests of judicial economy, any future appeal in this
matter shall be referred to this panel.
Case 18-2868, Document 213-1, 07/03/2019, 2600261, Page25 of 25
______________
Notes:
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the captions as set out above.
1 On February 21, 2019, the Florida District Court ruled that federal
prosecutors had violated the CVRA by failing to adequately notify the two victims/plaintiffs
of the plea deal. The District Court has not yet determined the appropriate
remedy. See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204–17 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
2 Doe 1 v. United States, No. 08‐CV‐80736‐KAM, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 7, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
5 Doe 1, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2–3.
6 See Giuffre v. Maxwell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 428, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
7 Br. Appellant (Cernovich) 4.
8 Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 18‐2868‐cv, Docket No. 138.
9 Nixon v. Warner Commcʹns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
10 See notes 46–47 and accompanying text, post.
11 Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139
(2d Cir. 2016).
12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We
observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties may
“be assumed to have supported their papers with admissible evidence and nonfrivolous
arguments.” Id. at 122. Insofar as a district court has, through striking a
filing, specifically found that assumption inapplicable, the categorical rule in
Lugosch may not apply. See notes 42–43 and accompanying text, post.
13 Id. at 124. Examples of such countervailing values may include,
depending on the circumstances, preserving “the right of an accused to
fundamental fairness in the jury selection process,” Press‐Enter. Co. v. Superior Court
of California, Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); the protection of attorney‐client
privilege, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125; “the danger of impairing law enforcement or
judicial efficiency,” SEC. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); and “the
privacy interest of those who resist disclosure,” id.
14 Our discussion here focuses specifically on the District Court’s denial of
the Herald’s motion to unseal the entire record. Because this decision grants relief
to all Appellants, we need not discuss any separate, additional error in the District
Court’s denial of the earlier motions to unseal.
15 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 444.
16 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II”) (“One judge [in the District
of Columbia Circuit] has pointed out, for example, that where a district court
denied the summary judgment motion, essentially postponing a final determination
of substantive legal rights, the public interest in access is not as pressing.” (internal
quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)).
17 Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121.
18 Id. at 123.
19 Id. at 124.
20 See, e.g., Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 445 (summarily concluding that all
“[t]he Summary Judgment Judicial Documents openly refer to and discuss these
allegations [of sexual assault and sexual trafficking] in comprehensive detail, and
that those allegations “establish[] a strong privacy interest here”).
21 Cf. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 127 (ordering that “the mandate shall issue
forthwith” to expedite the unsealing process).
22 Upon issuance of our mandate, a minimally redacted version of the
summary judgment record will be made accessible on the Court of Appeals docket.
We have implemented minimal redactions to protect personally identifying
information such as personal phone numbers, contact lists, birth dates, and social
security numbers. We have also redacted the names of alleged minor victims of
sexual abuse from deposition testimony and police reports, as well as deposition
responses concerning intimate matters where the questions were likely only
permitted—and the responses only compelled—because of a strong expectation of
continued confidentiality. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2. While we appreciate the views
expressed in Judge Pooler’s separate opinion, the panel majority believes that the
efforts invested by three former district judges in reviewing these materials
adequately address those concerns.
23 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98.
24 United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo I”).
25 Id.
26 Cf. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2017)
(explaining that, in considering whether the report of a monitor charged with
assessing compliance with a deferred prosecution agreement is a judicial
document, “[ i]f the district court’s conception of its supervisory power in this
context were correct, the Monitor’s Report would quite obviously be relevant to the
performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Whether a specific judicial decision constitutes a
“performance of the judicial function” is a question of law. Accordingly, we review
such determinations de novo. Id. at 134.
27 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145–46 (concluding that documents were relevant to
the performance of a judicial function because they would have “informed” the
district court’s decision whether to discharge or retain a Receiver); see also FTC. v.
Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Federal Rule of
Evidence 401’s “having any tendency” definition of relevance in determining
whether documents were “judicial documents”).
28 As we explain below, there are several (often preferable) tools beyond
sealing that district courts can use to protect their dockets from becoming a vehicle
for irrelevant—and potentially defamatory—accusations. See Section D, post.
29 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.
30 Id. at 1050.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1049.
33 In previous decisions, we have identified an important exception to this
general rule: the presumption of public access does not apply to material that is
submitted to the court solely so that the court may decide whether that same
material must be disclosed in the discovery process or shielded by a Protective
Order. See TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 233.
34 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049–50.
35 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d. at 442 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
36 See text accompanying notes 12–18 and 26–28, ante.
37 See In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 943 n.21 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that “abuse of discretion” is a nonpejorative, legal “term of art”).
38 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 447.
39 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (internal quotation marks).
40 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 229–30.
41 See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Electronic Case Filing Rules & Instructions, February 1,
2019 Edition, Rule 6.1,
http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf/ECF%20Rule ... 0Final.pdf.
42 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Courts may strike material from the pleadings either
“on its own” or “on motion made by a party.” Id. Although motions to strike
material solely “on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immaterial” are
disfavored, when material is also “scandalous,” no such presumption applies. Cf.
Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Talbot
v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“Allegations may be stricken as scandalous if the matter bears no possible relation
to the controversy or may cause the objecting party prejudice.”); Wine Markets Intʹl,
Inc. v. Bass, 177 F.R.D. 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Motions to strike are not generally
favored, except in relation to scandalous matters.”); Alvarado‐Morales v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 617–18 (1st Cir. 1988) (categorizing as scandalous “matter
which impugned the character of defendants”).
43 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145.
44 In relevant part, Rule 11 provides:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that . . . it is not being presented
for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation . . . . [T]he court may impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the
rule or is responsible for the violation . . . . The sanction may include
nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed
on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing
payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and
other expenses directly resulting from the violation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049 (describing sanctions available
to the court).
45 Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty to the Law and
Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 35, 47 n.52 (1996) (ʺPerjury cases
are not often pursued . . . .”).
46 Front, Inc. v. Khalil, 24 N.Y.3d 713, 718 (2015); see also Kelly v. Albarino, 485
F.3d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 2007) (adopting the reasoning of the District Court explaining
that this privilege is “the broadest of possible privileges”); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 587 (1977) (“A party to a private litigation or a private prosecutor or
defendant in a criminal prosecution is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as a part of, a judicial
proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has some relation to the
proceeding.”). But see note 47, post.
47 While common law courts have generally interpreted the litigation privilege
broadly, they nevertheless maintain an important (if rarely implemented)
limitation on its scope: to qualify for the privilege, a statement must be “material
and pertinent to the questions involved.” Front, 24 N.Y.3d at 718 (quoting Youmans
v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 219–20 (1897)). It follows, then, that immaterial and
impertinent statements are (at least nominally) actionable, particularly when they
are “so needlessly defamatory as to warrant the inference of express malice.” Id.
(same). It seems to us that when a district court strikes statements from the record
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) on the ground that the matter is “impertinent” and
“immaterial,” it makes the very same determination that permits a defamation
action under the common law. We think the judicial system would be well served
were our common law courts to revitalize this crucial qualification to the litigation
privilege.
48 Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984)
(quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606
(1982)).
49 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.
51 See note 22, ante.
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Re: Data set 1 - 8
by admin » Thu Dec 25, 2025 1:43 am
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/D ... 010467.pdf
From: [DELETE] [DELETE]
Sent: Wednesday, July 3, 2019 12:05 PM
To: [DELETE] (USANYS) [DELETE] [DELETE] [DELETE] [DELETE] [DELETE] [DELETE]
Cc: [DELETE] (USANYS) [DELETE]
Subject: RE: Epstein draft press materials
[DELETE]
[DELETE]
[DELETE]
[DELETE]
[DELETE]
From: [DELETE] [DELETE]
Sent: Wednesday, July 3, 2019 12:05 PM
To: [DELETE] (USANYS) [DELETE] [DELETE] [DELETE] [DELETE] [DELETE] [DELETE]
Cc: [DELETE] (USANYS) [DELETE]
Subject: RE: Epstein draft press materials
[DELETE]
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Re: Data set 1 - 8
by admin » Thu Dec 25, 2025 1:47 am
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/D ... 010471.pdf
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by
[DELETE]
Assistant Director in Charge
FBI New York Field Office
Jeffrey Epstein Arrest
July X, 2019
Preserving the innocence of children is the most important
responsibility we carry as adults. Failing them, in any way, is not an
option.
And yet there are some who blatantly disregard this golden rule, using
whatever tools they have at their disposal to lure children into a life of
which they should never be exposed.
As we allege today, Jeffrey Epstein is one of those people.
As of x a.m., he is under arrest.../At X p.m., as he was X, we placed
him under arrest. Epstein has been charged with one count each of sex
trafficking and sex trafficking conspiracy.
For at least a three year period, from 2002-2005, he is alleged to have
sexually exploited and abused dozens of minor girls at his homes in
New York City and Palm Beach, Florida.
The girls were recruited in a variety of ways, usually by employees of
Epstein and victim recruiters themselves.
• The victim recruiters and the girls they found typically received
hundreds of dollars in cash.
The estimated dozens of victims were as young as 14 years old at the
time of recruitment.
• Children who were made to give Epstein massages while they
were nude or partially nude.
• Children who were asked to engage in direct and indirect sex acts
for money.
• Children who were enticed to do all of this at the hands of a man
more than or nearly three times their age.
Those who have been victimized by child sexual predators are
frequently haunted by memories of these crimes well into adulthood,
and often for the rest of their lives. They bear the burden of someone
else's criminal behavior.
As an FBI agent, and as a father first, I stand among many who make
it our mission to put child predators behind bars where they belong; to
listen to every child who feels they've been exploited; and to advocate
for the most vulnerable among us.
Today I'm asking everyone to take a good look at this man. If you've
been victimized by him in any way, or have any additional information
about his alleged illegal behavior, we want to hear from you.
• Whatever age you are now
• Whatever age you were then
• And no matter when or where the incident or incidents took place
Your bravery might just empower others to speak out about crimes
committed against them.
It's important to remember, there never was, nor will there ever be, an
excuse for this kind behavior. In the eyes of the FBI, the victim always
comes first.
Many thanks, as always, to our partners from the Southern District of
New York. Last but not least, I extend my sincere congratulations to
the FBI's Criminal Division in New York for their hard work on this
investigation.
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by
[DELETE]
Assistant Director in Charge
FBI New York Field Office
Jeffrey Epstein Arrest
July X, 2019
Preserving the innocence of children is the most important
responsibility we carry as adults. Failing them, in any way, is not an
option.
And yet there are some who blatantly disregard this golden rule, using
whatever tools they have at their disposal to lure children into a life of
which they should never be exposed.
As we allege today, Jeffrey Epstein is one of those people.
As of x a.m., he is under arrest.../At X p.m., as he was X, we placed
him under arrest. Epstein has been charged with one count each of sex
trafficking and sex trafficking conspiracy.
For at least a three year period, from 2002-2005, he is alleged to have
sexually exploited and abused dozens of minor girls at his homes in
New York City and Palm Beach, Florida.
The girls were recruited in a variety of ways, usually by employees of
Epstein and victim recruiters themselves.
• The victim recruiters and the girls they found typically received
hundreds of dollars in cash.
The estimated dozens of victims were as young as 14 years old at the
time of recruitment.
• Children who were made to give Epstein massages while they
were nude or partially nude.
• Children who were asked to engage in direct and indirect sex acts
for money.
• Children who were enticed to do all of this at the hands of a man
more than or nearly three times their age.
Those who have been victimized by child sexual predators are
frequently haunted by memories of these crimes well into adulthood,
and often for the rest of their lives. They bear the burden of someone
else's criminal behavior.
As an FBI agent, and as a father first, I stand among many who make
it our mission to put child predators behind bars where they belong; to
listen to every child who feels they've been exploited; and to advocate
for the most vulnerable among us.
Today I'm asking everyone to take a good look at this man. If you've
been victimized by him in any way, or have any additional information
about his alleged illegal behavior, we want to hear from you.
• Whatever age you are now
• Whatever age you were then
• And no matter when or where the incident or incidents took place
Your bravery might just empower others to speak out about crimes
committed against them.
It's important to remember, there never was, nor will there ever be, an
excuse for this kind behavior. In the eyes of the FBI, the victim always
comes first.
Many thanks, as always, to our partners from the Southern District of
New York. Last but not least, I extend my sincere congratulations to
the FBI's Criminal Division in New York for their hard work on this
investigation.
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Re: Data set 1 - 8
by admin » Thu Dec 25, 2025 1:53 am
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/D ... 010474.pdf
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 205-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/05/2013 Page 1 of 20
Appendix B
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 205-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/05/2013 Page 2 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON
JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2,
Petitioners,
vs.
UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
UNITED STATES' SEALED MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The United States hereby requests that this Court enter an order dismissing these
proceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section
3771 (DE I, the "Petition"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have
advanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.1 This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition because
Petitioners lack Article III standing and because the claims raised by Petitioners in these
proceedings are not constitutionally ripe.
I. The Claims Raised in the Petition Must Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction Because the Petitioners Lack Standing to Bring Those Claims.
These proceedings pursuant to the CVRA must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because Petitioners lack standing to pursue the remedies that they are seeking for
alleged CVRA violations. As the Supreme Court has explained,
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (7'OC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81
(2000); see also, e.g., Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1038 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). Moreover, "a
plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought." Friends of the
Earth, 528 U.S. at 185.
Here, the record incontrovertibly demonstrates that Petitioners cannot satisfy the third
prong of the standing test, and the Petition and these proceedings must accordingly be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 E.g., Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. South Florida
Water Management Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011) ("If at any point in the litigation
the plaintiff ceases to meet all three requirements for constitutional standing, the case no longer
presents a live case or controversy, and the federal court must dismiss the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction."); Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1161 (11th
Cir. 2007) ("[T]he issue of constitutional standing is jurisdictional ...."); National Parks
Conservation Assn v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[ b]ecause the
constitutional standing doctrine stems directly from Article III's 'case or controversy'
requirement, this issue implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, and accordingly must be
addressed as a threshold matter regardless of whether it is raised by the parties.") (citation
omitted).
In these proceedings, the only identified legal relief that Petitioners have sought pursuant
to the CVRA is the setting aside of the Non-Prosecution Agreement that was entered into
between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida
("USAO-SDFL"). See, e.g., DE 99 at 6 (recognizing that the relief Petitioners seek "is to
invalidate the non-prosecution agreement"). But even assuming arguendo that Petitioners' rights
under the CVRA were violated when Epstein and the USAO-SDFL entered into the Non-
Prosecution Agreement, constitutional due process guarantees do not allow either the Non-
Prosecution Agreement — which by its terms induced Epstein to, inter alia, plead guilty to state
criminal charges and serve an 18-month sentence of state incarceration' — or the governmental
obligations undertaken therein to be set aside! See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
262 (1971) ("[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled."); United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Due
process requires the government to adhere to the terms of any plea bargain or immunity
agreement it makes."). Indeed, even if this Court were somehow to set aside the Non-
Prosecution Agreement on the authority of the CVRA, and even if after consultation with
Petitioners the United States determined that it would be proper and desirable to institute a
criminal prosecution in the Southern District of Florida against Epstein on the criminal charges
contemplated in the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the United States would still be
constitutionally required to adhere to the negotiated terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement.
See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Harvey, 869 F.2d at 1443.
Due process considerations further bar this Court from setting aside a non-prosecution
agreement that grants contractual rights to a contracting party (Epstein) who has not been made a
party to the proceedings before the Court. See, e.g., School Dist of City of Pontiac v. Secretary
of U.S. Dept of Ethic., 584 F.3d 253, 303 (6th Cir. 2009) ("It is hornbook law that all parties to a
contract are necessary in an action challenging its validity . . . ."); Dawavendewa v. Salt River
Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist, 276 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A] party to a contract is
necessary, and if not susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that
contract."); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975) ("No procedural
principle is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to set aside a lease
or a contract, all parties who may be affected by the determination of the action are
indispensable."); see also National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940) ("It is
elementary that it is not within the power of any tribunal to make a binding adjudication of the
rights in personam of parties not brought before it by due process of law.").5
Additionally, a "favorable ruling" from this Court will not provide Petitioners with
anything for the alleged CVRA violations that is not already available to them. For the due
process reasons already discussed above, the United States must legally abide by the terms of the
Non-Prosecution Agreement even if this Court should somehow set the agreement aside for
Petitioners to consult further with the government attorney handling the case. Moreover, as will
be explained in greater detail below, see infra at 8-12, Petitioners already have the present ability
to confer with an attorney for the government about a federal criminal case against Epstein —
whether or not the Non-Prosecution Agreement is set aside — because the investigation and
potential federal prosecution of Epstein for crimes committed against the Petitioners and others
remains a legally viable possibility.6
The present proceedings under the CVRA must accordingly be dismissed for lack of
standing because Petitioners simply have no injury that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
ruling in these proceedings. See, e.g., Scott v. Taylor, 470 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that there was no standing where it was speculative that remedy that Plaintiff sought
would redress claimed injury).
II. The Claims Raised in the Petition Are Not Constitutionally Ripe, and These
Proceedings Must Thus Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
This Court must also dismiss these proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because the Petitioners' claims are not constitutionally ripe.
Ripeness, like standing, "originate[s] from the Constitution's Article III requirement that
the jurisdiction of the federal courts be limited to actual cases and controversies." Elend v.
Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2006). "'The ripeness doctrine keeps federal courts
from deciding cases prematurely,' Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir.
2006), and `protects [them] from engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the
review of potential or abstract disputes,' Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586,
589 (11th Cir.1997)." United States v. Rivera, 613 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir. 2010); see also
Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The ripeness doctrine prevent[s] the
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements . . . .'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of
Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the
ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore determine "'whether there is sufficient injury to meet
Article III's requirement of a case or controversy and, if so, whether the claim is sufficiently
mature, and the issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by
the court."' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d
1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)).
When evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: "(1) the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision, and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."' Id.
(quoting Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1524 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)));
see also, e.g., Association For Children for Enforcement of Support, Inc. v. Conger, 899 F.2d
1164, 1165 (11th Cir. 1990). Under the doctrine, "[a] claim is not ripe when it is based on
speculative possibilities," In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011), Such as if the claim
"'rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur
at all,"' Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FERC, 140 F.3d 1392, 1404 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Texas v.
United States, 523U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). Indeed, "[t]he ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent
federal courts from engaging in such speculation and prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily
reaching constitutional issues." Pittman, 267 F.3d at 1280.
In these proceedings, the Petitioners have sought to set aside the Non-Prosecution
Agreement between Epstein and the USAO-SDFL so that Petitioners can "confer with the
attorney for the Government" about the possible filing of federal criminal charges against
Epstein and the potential disposition of any such charges. See, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 6-7
(seeking an "[o]rder that the [non-prosecution] agreement that was negotiated is invalid" so that
Petitioners can exercise the right to confer with the government); id. at 19-20, 24; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771(a)(5); see also DE 1 at 2 ¶ 5 (claiming that Petitioner was "denied her rights" under the
CVRA because she "received no consultation with the attorney for the government regarding the
possible disposition of the charges").
Notwithstanding the Non-Prosecution Agreement, Petitioners are and have been free to
confer with attorneys for the government about the investigation and potential prosecution of
Epstein. At least one attorney for the government (Assistant United States Attorney Villafana
from the USAO-SDFL) had spoken to Petitioners about the offenses committed against them by
Epstein prior to the signing of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, see, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr.
at 22 (acknowledging that prosecutors spoke to Petitioners "about what happened" to them); DE
48 at 6 ¶ 8; see also DE 99 at 3, and government attorneys have on multiple occasions offered to
confer with Petitioners, see, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 13 ("I will always confer, sit down
with Jane Doe 1 and 2, with the two agents and Ms. Villafana. We'll be happy to sit down with
them."). Indeed, on December 10, 2010, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
Florida, accompanied by supervisory and line prosecutors from the USAO-SDFL, personally
conferred with Petitioners' counsel and with Petitioner Jane Doe #1 and entertained discussion
about Petitioners' desires to see Epstein criminally prosecuted on federal charges.7 The United
States Attorney and prosecutors in the USAO-SDFL have also corresponded with Petitioners'
counsel on multiple occasions about Petitioners' desires to have Epstein criminally prosecuted on
federal charges.8
Additionally, [DELETE]
a number of districts outside the Southern District of Florida (e.g., the Southern
District of New York and the District of New Jersey) share jurisdiction and venue with the
Southern District of Florida over potential federal criminal charges based on the alleged sexual
acts committed by Epstein against the Petitioners. Epstein is thus subject to potential
prosecution for such acts in those districts. Furthermore, because of the nature of the allegations
against Epstein, the filing of such potential charges against Epstein still remains temporally
viable; charges for such sexual activities involving minors are not barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3283, 3299. Petitioners are free to contact the United
States Attorney's Office in those districts and seek to confer with government attorneys in those
offices about investigating and potentially prosecuting Epstein based on the alleged federal
crimes committed against them.9
Petitioners nonetheless have appeared to contend throughout these proceedings that the
many opportunities that they have been given to consult with the attorneys for the government
about Epstein's offenses and the potential charges against Epstein — opportunities which continue
to be available to Petitioners — are not meaningful under the CVRA due to the existence of the
Non-Prosecution Agreement. According to Petitioners, the Non-Prosecution Agreement has
given Epstein a "free pass" on federal criminal charges for the offenses he committed against
Petitioners and others. See, e.g., DE 9 at 15 (characterizing Non-Prosecution Agreement as "a
`free pass' from the federal government"), 2 (contending that the Non-Prosecution Agreement
"allowed [Epstein] ... to escape all federal prosecution for dozens of serious federal sex offenses
against minors"), 7 ("the wealthy defendant has escaped all federal punishment"), 12 ("[T]he
agreement prevents federal prosecution of the defendant for numerous sex offenses."); DE 77 at
2 (describing Non-Prosecution Agreement as "an agreement that blocked federal prosecution of
Epstein for the multitude of sex offenses he committed again [sic] the victims"), 17 ("The [Non-
Prosecution Agreement] barred prosecution of the federal sexual offenses that Epstein had
committed against Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 . . ."),I° That is simply not so.
Contrary to Petitioners' contentions, there has been no disposition by the government of
any federal criminal charges against Epstein. No federal charges involving Petitioners have ever
been brought against Epstein, and no such federal charges have been resolved. The Non-
Prosecution Agreement about which Petitioners complain disposes of no federal criminal
charges against Epstein, and that agreement does not bar the United States from bringing federal
criminal charges against Epstein. Instead, when addressing potential federal criminal charges
against Epstein, the USAO-SDFL merely agreed in the Non-Prosecution Agreement that:
and that
Non-Prosecution Agreement at 2 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Non-Prosecution Agreement simply obligated the government not to prosecute
Epstein in the Southern District of Florida for the offenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution
Agreement. The Non-Prosecution Agreement does not bar the United States from bringing
federal criminal charges against Epstein for the offenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution
Agreement in any other district in the nation." See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678,
680 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Where . . . the prosecutor is not found to have made promises relating to
nonprosecution of charges in another district and the [defendant] is not found to have relied on
such alleged promises, this Court will affirm the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the
subsequent prosecutions."). Neither does the Non-Prosecution Agreement bar prosecution in any
district for offenses not identified in the agreement.
Petitioners contend that the CVRA gives a victim the right to confer with the attorney for
the government before there is a disposition of contemplated, but-not-yet-filed federal criminal
charges arising from offenses against the victim. But, although the government disputes that the
CVRA creates such a right,'2 the Petitioners have never been denied any such right. The
Petitioners have had and still have the ability confer to with the attorney for the government
about potential federal criminal charges against Epstein and about the potential disposition of
any such charges, should they be filed. In fact, Petitioners are free to approach the United States
Attorney's Offices in districts such as the Southern District of New York and the District of New
Jersey — whose authority to institute criminal charges against Epstein in their districts has not
been curtailed by the Non-Prosecution Agreement — to discuss the possibility of pursuing federal
criminal charges against Epstein.13 Nothing precludes Petitioners from doing so, and there is
nothing to indicate that Petitioners' wishes to confer with government attorneys in those districts
would be rebuffed in any way. Indeed, it would be rank speculation by Petitioners to contend
otherwise.
Here, Petitioners have acknowledged that the best relief they can hope to obtain through
these proceedings is the ability to confer with the attorneys for the government. See, e.g., July
II, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 7 (agreeing that "the best [Petitioners] can get" is the "right to confer").
Yet, under the circumstances, a claim that Petitioners have been denied the opportunity to confer
with the attorney for the government about the filing and disposition of criminal charges against
Epstein is premature and constitutionally unripe. "This is plainly the type of hypothetical case
that [a court] should avoid deciding." Association for Children for Enforcement of Support, Inc.
v. Conger, 899 F.2d 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 1990). Any speculation by Petitioners that they might
prospectively be denied the opportunity to confer with the government about still-legally-viable
federal charges against Epstein simply cannot ripen Petitioners' claims. See id. (recognizing that
courts "do not generally decide cases based on a party's predicted conduct").
For these reasons, Petitioners' claims in these proceedings should be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding that claims that are "based on events that may take place in the future" are to be
"dismissed for lack of jurisdiction") (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570,
1574 n.7 (1 1 th Cir. 1989) ("[R]ipeness goes to whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case.")); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1415 (11th Cir. 1994)
("The question of ripeness `goes to whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.")
(quoting Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1573); see also Jacksonville Property Rights Ass 'n, Inc. v. City
of Jacksonville, 635 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that when plaintiffs ask a
court "to issue a declaration on an issue that might never impact their substantive rights," they
are "asking th[e] court either to issue an impermissible advisory opinion, or to decide a case that
is not yet ripe for decision"), reh'g & reh g en banc denied, Case No. 09-15629, Fed. App'x
(11th Cir. Jun. 29, 2011) (Table).
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the United States respectfully requests that this Court
enter an order dismissing the Petitioners' claims and these proceedings for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
WIFREDO A. FERRER
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
By:
Dexter A. Lee
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0936693
99 N.E. 4th Street
Miami, Florida 33132
Tel: (305) 961-9320; Fax: (305) 530-7139
Email: [email protected]
Eduardo 1. SInchez
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 877875
99 N.E. 4th Street
Miami, Florida 33132
Tel: (305) 961-9057; Fax: (305) 536-4676
Email: [email protected]
A. Marie Villafana
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0018255
500 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 400
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
Tel: (561) 820-8711; Fax: (561) 820-8777
Email: [email protected]
Attorneys for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing United States' Sealed
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction was served via United States Mail this
7th day of November, 2011, upon Counsel for Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2,
accompanied by a copy of the November 7, 2011 Sealed Order Granting Government's Motion
for Limited Disclosure of Grand Jury Matter. Pursuant to the Order regarding the disclosure of
Grand Jury Information, a copy was not served upon the proposed intervenors.
A. Marie Villafana
Assistant United States Attorney
SERVICE LIST
Jane Does 1 and 2 v. United States,
Case No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida
Brad Edwards, Esq.,
The Law Offices of Brad Edwards & Associates, LLC
2028 Harrison Street, Suite 202
Hollywood, Florida 33020
(954) 414-8033
Fax: (954) 924-1530
Paul G. Cassell
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the
University of Utah
332 S. 1400 E.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
(801) 585-5202
Fax: (801) 585-6833
E-mail: [email protected]
Attorneys for Jane Doe # 1 and Jane Doe # 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
IN RE:
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
FEDERAL GRAND JURY 05-02(WPB) AND
FEDERAL GRAND JURY 07-103(WPB)
Sealed Order Granting
Government's Motion for Limited Disclosure of Grand Jury Matter
***
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
IN RE:
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
FEDERAL GRAND JURY 05-02(WPB) AND
FEDERAL GRAND JURY 07-103(WPB)
Sealed Order Granting
Government's Motion for Limited Disclosure of Grand Jury Matter
This cause comes before the Court on the Government's Sealed Ex Parte Motion for
Limited Disclosure of Grand Jury Matter Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i). After
careful consideration of the pounds raised in said motions, and the Court being otherwise
advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Government's Motion for Limited Disclosure of
Grand Jury Matter Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i) is GRANTED. The Government
is authorized to disclose in Jane Doe No. .1 and Jane Doe No. 2 v. United States, Case No. 08-
80736-Civ-Marra (S.D. Fla.). [DELETE]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that disclosure pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(eX3XEXi)
shall be conditioned on the following:
(1) the disclosure of the aforementioned grand jury information shall be limited to filings
made under seal in Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra;
(2) the service of filings containing the aforementioned grand jury information shall be
limited to counsel for Petitioners Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 and for the
government in Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra, and shall be accompanied by a copy of
this Order; and
(3) further dissemination by any person or entity receiving disclosure of the grand jury
information authorized to be disclosed by this Order shall be limited to the individual
Petitioners in Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra, and any dissemination of such grand
jury information shall be accompanied by a copy of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Florida, this 7
day of
November, 2011.
DONALD M. MIDDLEBROOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
_______________
Notes:
1. See, e.g., Gntpo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004)
("Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction can of course be raised at any time prior to final
judgment."); United States v. Giraldo-Prado, 150 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing
that "a party may raise jurisdiction at any time during the pendency of the proceedings"); Harrell
& Sumner Contracting Co. v. Peabody Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1977)
("[ u]nder Rule 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time by motion of a party or otherwise."); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In the
present motion, the United States seeks dismissal of Petitioners' claims based on both a legal and
factual challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. This Court may properly consider
and weigh evidence beyond Petitioners' allegations when evaluating such a challenge to the
Court's subject matter jurisdiction:
Makro Capital of America, Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted); see also, e.g., McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e
determine whether this lawsuit survives the government's factual attack [on subject matter
jurisdiction] by looking to matters outside the pleadings, and we do not accord any presumptive
truthfulness to the allegations in the complaint."); Stag° v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960-61
(11th Cir. 1999).
2 Although Petitioners also fail to satisfy the first and second prongs of the standing test, this Court need not reach or address those issues because an analysis of the third prong of the
standing test incontrovertibly establishes the Petitioners' lack of standing. Nonetheless, the
circumstances which demonstrate Petitioners' lack of a concrete injury traceable to government
conduct are explored infra in Section II of this memorandum, which addresses how Petitioners'
claims and these proceedings lack constitutional ripeness.
3 See also July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 20-21 (Petitioners' acknowledgement that Epstein's
reliance on promises in Non-Prosecution Agreement led to his guilty plea to state charges and his subsequent 18-month state incarceration).
4 To the extent that the Petitioners' requested invalidation of the Non-Prosecution
Agreement would implicitly reject and nullify the correctness of both the state court's acceptance
of Epstein's guilty plea and the resulting judgment of conviction —which were induced in part by
the Non-Prosecution Agreement — such judicial action might raise additional questions about this
Court's jurisdiction under the Rooker/Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d
1258, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2009); Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466-68 (11th Cir. 1996).
5 Significantly, it is Epstein's contractual rights under the non-prosecution agreement that
Petitioners seek to void through these proceedings.
6 Petitioners' present, as well as past, ability to confer with an attorney for the government
also demonstrates that Petitioners fail to satisfy the first two prongs of the standing test:
Petitioners have simply not suffered a concrete injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged
government conduct.
7 The United States Attorney also offered to confer with Jane Doe #2, but Jane Doe #2
declined the invitation and did not attend the meeting that was scheduled with the United States
Attorney.
8 Since that time, the USAO-SDFL has been recused by the Department of Justice from
prospective responsibility for any criminal investigation or potential prosecution relating to
Epstein's alleged sexual activities with minor females. The Department of Justice has reassigned
responsibility for the investigation and potential prosecution of such criminal matters in the
Southern District of Florida to the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of
Florida for consideration of any prosecutorial action that may be authorized and appropriate.
9 The USAO-SDFL has no present knowledge about whether the United States Attorney's
Offices in those districts have opened any investigations into the allegations that have been made
against Epstein, whether those offices are even aware of those allegations or the evidence
supporting them, or what investigative or prosecutorial actions, if any, those offices might take in
the future. Nonetheless, should any investigation be underway or should an investigation be
initiated involving such allegations, the evidence gathered [DELETE] in the Southern
District of Florida could be disclosed to federal prosecutors and federal grand juries in New York
or New Jersey. See [DELETE]
10 This Court has also previously described the Non-Prosecution Agreement as "an
agreement under which . . . the U.S. Attorney's Office would agree not to prosecute Epstein for
federal offenses." DE 99 at 2-3. That description of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, however,
was not based on the Court's interpretation of the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, but
was instead based on "allegations" by Petitioners that the Court concluded were "not yet
supported by evidence" but upon which the Court nonetheless relied "solely to provide the
context for the threshold issues addressed in" its September 26, 2011 Order. Id. at 2 n.2.
11 Significantly, under the governing provision of the United States Attorney's Manual, the
USAO-SDFL did not have the authority to unilaterally bar Epstein's prosecution in any other
district in the country:
USAM 9-27.641 (Multi-District (Global) Agreement Requests).
12 The government acknowledges that this Court has nonetheless ruled that "as a matter of
law the CVRA can apply before formal charges are filed," DE 99 at 10; see also id. at 6-9, but
has not yet determined "whether the particular rights asserted here attached," id. at 10.
13 Petitioners could also approach the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle
District of Florida, but, due to that office's recusal-based derivative prosecutorial responsibilities
in the Southern District of Florida, see supra note 8, the Non-Prosecution Agreement would
constrain the possible filing of federal charges by that office in the Southern District of Florida.
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 205-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/05/2013 Page 1 of 20
Appendix B
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 205-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/05/2013 Page 2 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON
JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2,
Petitioners,
vs.
UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
UNITED STATES' SEALED MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The United States hereby requests that this Court enter an order dismissing these
proceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section
3771 (DE I, the "Petition"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have
advanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.1 This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition because
Petitioners lack Article III standing and because the claims raised by Petitioners in these
proceedings are not constitutionally ripe.
I. The Claims Raised in the Petition Must Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction Because the Petitioners Lack Standing to Bring Those Claims.
These proceedings pursuant to the CVRA must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because Petitioners lack standing to pursue the remedies that they are seeking for
alleged CVRA violations. As the Supreme Court has explained,
to satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has
suffered an "injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (7'OC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81
(2000); see also, e.g., Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1038 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). Moreover, "a
plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought." Friends of the
Earth, 528 U.S. at 185.
Here, the record incontrovertibly demonstrates that Petitioners cannot satisfy the third
prong of the standing test, and the Petition and these proceedings must accordingly be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 E.g., Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. South Florida
Water Management Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011) ("If at any point in the litigation
the plaintiff ceases to meet all three requirements for constitutional standing, the case no longer
presents a live case or controversy, and the federal court must dismiss the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction."); Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1161 (11th
Cir. 2007) ("[T]he issue of constitutional standing is jurisdictional ...."); National Parks
Conservation Assn v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[ b]ecause the
constitutional standing doctrine stems directly from Article III's 'case or controversy'
requirement, this issue implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, and accordingly must be
addressed as a threshold matter regardless of whether it is raised by the parties.") (citation
omitted).
In these proceedings, the only identified legal relief that Petitioners have sought pursuant
to the CVRA is the setting aside of the Non-Prosecution Agreement that was entered into
between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida
("USAO-SDFL"). See, e.g., DE 99 at 6 (recognizing that the relief Petitioners seek "is to
invalidate the non-prosecution agreement"). But even assuming arguendo that Petitioners' rights
under the CVRA were violated when Epstein and the USAO-SDFL entered into the Non-
Prosecution Agreement, constitutional due process guarantees do not allow either the Non-
Prosecution Agreement — which by its terms induced Epstein to, inter alia, plead guilty to state
criminal charges and serve an 18-month sentence of state incarceration' — or the governmental
obligations undertaken therein to be set aside! See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
262 (1971) ("[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled."); United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Due
process requires the government to adhere to the terms of any plea bargain or immunity
agreement it makes."). Indeed, even if this Court were somehow to set aside the Non-
Prosecution Agreement on the authority of the CVRA, and even if after consultation with
Petitioners the United States determined that it would be proper and desirable to institute a
criminal prosecution in the Southern District of Florida against Epstein on the criminal charges
contemplated in the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the United States would still be
constitutionally required to adhere to the negotiated terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement.
See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Harvey, 869 F.2d at 1443.
Due process considerations further bar this Court from setting aside a non-prosecution
agreement that grants contractual rights to a contracting party (Epstein) who has not been made a
party to the proceedings before the Court. See, e.g., School Dist of City of Pontiac v. Secretary
of U.S. Dept of Ethic., 584 F.3d 253, 303 (6th Cir. 2009) ("It is hornbook law that all parties to a
contract are necessary in an action challenging its validity . . . ."); Dawavendewa v. Salt River
Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist, 276 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A] party to a contract is
necessary, and if not susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that
contract."); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975) ("No procedural
principle is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to set aside a lease
or a contract, all parties who may be affected by the determination of the action are
indispensable."); see also National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940) ("It is
elementary that it is not within the power of any tribunal to make a binding adjudication of the
rights in personam of parties not brought before it by due process of law.").5
Additionally, a "favorable ruling" from this Court will not provide Petitioners with
anything for the alleged CVRA violations that is not already available to them. For the due
process reasons already discussed above, the United States must legally abide by the terms of the
Non-Prosecution Agreement even if this Court should somehow set the agreement aside for
Petitioners to consult further with the government attorney handling the case. Moreover, as will
be explained in greater detail below, see infra at 8-12, Petitioners already have the present ability
to confer with an attorney for the government about a federal criminal case against Epstein —
whether or not the Non-Prosecution Agreement is set aside — because the investigation and
potential federal prosecution of Epstein for crimes committed against the Petitioners and others
remains a legally viable possibility.6
The present proceedings under the CVRA must accordingly be dismissed for lack of
standing because Petitioners simply have no injury that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
ruling in these proceedings. See, e.g., Scott v. Taylor, 470 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that there was no standing where it was speculative that remedy that Plaintiff sought
would redress claimed injury).
II. The Claims Raised in the Petition Are Not Constitutionally Ripe, and These
Proceedings Must Thus Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
This Court must also dismiss these proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because the Petitioners' claims are not constitutionally ripe.
Ripeness, like standing, "originate[s] from the Constitution's Article III requirement that
the jurisdiction of the federal courts be limited to actual cases and controversies." Elend v.
Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2006). "'The ripeness doctrine keeps federal courts
from deciding cases prematurely,' Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir.
2006), and `protects [them] from engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the
review of potential or abstract disputes,' Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586,
589 (11th Cir.1997)." United States v. Rivera, 613 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir. 2010); see also
Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The ripeness doctrine prevent[s] the
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements . . . .'") (quoting Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of
Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the
ripeness doctrine, a court must therefore determine "'whether there is sufficient injury to meet
Article III's requirement of a case or controversy and, if so, whether the claim is sufficiently
mature, and the issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by
the court."' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d
1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)).
When evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: "(1) the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision, and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."' Id.
(quoting Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1524 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)));
see also, e.g., Association For Children for Enforcement of Support, Inc. v. Conger, 899 F.2d
1164, 1165 (11th Cir. 1990). Under the doctrine, "[a] claim is not ripe when it is based on
speculative possibilities," In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011), Such as if the claim
"'rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur
at all,"' Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FERC, 140 F.3d 1392, 1404 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Texas v.
United States, 523U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). Indeed, "[t]he ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent
federal courts from engaging in such speculation and prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily
reaching constitutional issues." Pittman, 267 F.3d at 1280.
In these proceedings, the Petitioners have sought to set aside the Non-Prosecution
Agreement between Epstein and the USAO-SDFL so that Petitioners can "confer with the
attorney for the Government" about the possible filing of federal criminal charges against
Epstein and the potential disposition of any such charges. See, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 6-7
(seeking an "[o]rder that the [non-prosecution] agreement that was negotiated is invalid" so that
Petitioners can exercise the right to confer with the government); id. at 19-20, 24; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771(a)(5); see also DE 1 at 2 ¶ 5 (claiming that Petitioner was "denied her rights" under the
CVRA because she "received no consultation with the attorney for the government regarding the
possible disposition of the charges").
Notwithstanding the Non-Prosecution Agreement, Petitioners are and have been free to
confer with attorneys for the government about the investigation and potential prosecution of
Epstein. At least one attorney for the government (Assistant United States Attorney Villafana
from the USAO-SDFL) had spoken to Petitioners about the offenses committed against them by
Epstein prior to the signing of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, see, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr.
at 22 (acknowledging that prosecutors spoke to Petitioners "about what happened" to them); DE
48 at 6 ¶ 8; see also DE 99 at 3, and government attorneys have on multiple occasions offered to
confer with Petitioners, see, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 13 ("I will always confer, sit down
with Jane Doe 1 and 2, with the two agents and Ms. Villafana. We'll be happy to sit down with
them."). Indeed, on December 10, 2010, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
Florida, accompanied by supervisory and line prosecutors from the USAO-SDFL, personally
conferred with Petitioners' counsel and with Petitioner Jane Doe #1 and entertained discussion
about Petitioners' desires to see Epstein criminally prosecuted on federal charges.7 The United
States Attorney and prosecutors in the USAO-SDFL have also corresponded with Petitioners'
counsel on multiple occasions about Petitioners' desires to have Epstein criminally prosecuted on
federal charges.8
Additionally, [DELETE]
a number of districts outside the Southern District of Florida (e.g., the Southern
District of New York and the District of New Jersey) share jurisdiction and venue with the
Southern District of Florida over potential federal criminal charges based on the alleged sexual
acts committed by Epstein against the Petitioners. Epstein is thus subject to potential
prosecution for such acts in those districts. Furthermore, because of the nature of the allegations
against Epstein, the filing of such potential charges against Epstein still remains temporally
viable; charges for such sexual activities involving minors are not barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3283, 3299. Petitioners are free to contact the United
States Attorney's Office in those districts and seek to confer with government attorneys in those
offices about investigating and potentially prosecuting Epstein based on the alleged federal
crimes committed against them.9
Petitioners nonetheless have appeared to contend throughout these proceedings that the
many opportunities that they have been given to consult with the attorneys for the government
about Epstein's offenses and the potential charges against Epstein — opportunities which continue
to be available to Petitioners — are not meaningful under the CVRA due to the existence of the
Non-Prosecution Agreement. According to Petitioners, the Non-Prosecution Agreement has
given Epstein a "free pass" on federal criminal charges for the offenses he committed against
Petitioners and others. See, e.g., DE 9 at 15 (characterizing Non-Prosecution Agreement as "a
`free pass' from the federal government"), 2 (contending that the Non-Prosecution Agreement
"allowed [Epstein] ... to escape all federal prosecution for dozens of serious federal sex offenses
against minors"), 7 ("the wealthy defendant has escaped all federal punishment"), 12 ("[T]he
agreement prevents federal prosecution of the defendant for numerous sex offenses."); DE 77 at
2 (describing Non-Prosecution Agreement as "an agreement that blocked federal prosecution of
Epstein for the multitude of sex offenses he committed again [sic] the victims"), 17 ("The [Non-
Prosecution Agreement] barred prosecution of the federal sexual offenses that Epstein had
committed against Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 . . ."),I° That is simply not so.
Contrary to Petitioners' contentions, there has been no disposition by the government of
any federal criminal charges against Epstein. No federal charges involving Petitioners have ever
been brought against Epstein, and no such federal charges have been resolved. The Non-
Prosecution Agreement about which Petitioners complain disposes of no federal criminal
charges against Epstein, and that agreement does not bar the United States from bringing federal
criminal charges against Epstein. Instead, when addressing potential federal criminal charges
against Epstein, the USAO-SDFL merely agreed in the Non-Prosecution Agreement that:
on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the Southern
District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be deferred
in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the
following conditions and the requirements of this Agreement set forth below.
and that
After timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no
prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any
other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses
that arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this
District, and the charges against Epstein if any, will be dismissed.
Non-Prosecution Agreement at 2 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Non-Prosecution Agreement simply obligated the government not to prosecute
Epstein in the Southern District of Florida for the offenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution
Agreement. The Non-Prosecution Agreement does not bar the United States from bringing
federal criminal charges against Epstein for the offenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution
Agreement in any other district in the nation." See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678,
680 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Where . . . the prosecutor is not found to have made promises relating to
nonprosecution of charges in another district and the [defendant] is not found to have relied on
such alleged promises, this Court will affirm the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the
subsequent prosecutions."). Neither does the Non-Prosecution Agreement bar prosecution in any
district for offenses not identified in the agreement.
Petitioners contend that the CVRA gives a victim the right to confer with the attorney for
the government before there is a disposition of contemplated, but-not-yet-filed federal criminal
charges arising from offenses against the victim. But, although the government disputes that the
CVRA creates such a right,'2 the Petitioners have never been denied any such right. The
Petitioners have had and still have the ability confer to with the attorney for the government
about potential federal criminal charges against Epstein and about the potential disposition of
any such charges, should they be filed. In fact, Petitioners are free to approach the United States
Attorney's Offices in districts such as the Southern District of New York and the District of New
Jersey — whose authority to institute criminal charges against Epstein in their districts has not
been curtailed by the Non-Prosecution Agreement — to discuss the possibility of pursuing federal
criminal charges against Epstein.13 Nothing precludes Petitioners from doing so, and there is
nothing to indicate that Petitioners' wishes to confer with government attorneys in those districts
would be rebuffed in any way. Indeed, it would be rank speculation by Petitioners to contend
otherwise.
Here, Petitioners have acknowledged that the best relief they can hope to obtain through
these proceedings is the ability to confer with the attorneys for the government. See, e.g., July
II, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 7 (agreeing that "the best [Petitioners] can get" is the "right to confer").
Yet, under the circumstances, a claim that Petitioners have been denied the opportunity to confer
with the attorney for the government about the filing and disposition of criminal charges against
Epstein is premature and constitutionally unripe. "This is plainly the type of hypothetical case
that [a court] should avoid deciding." Association for Children for Enforcement of Support, Inc.
v. Conger, 899 F.2d 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 1990). Any speculation by Petitioners that they might
prospectively be denied the opportunity to confer with the government about still-legally-viable
federal charges against Epstein simply cannot ripen Petitioners' claims. See id. (recognizing that
courts "do not generally decide cases based on a party's predicted conduct").
For these reasons, Petitioners' claims in these proceedings should be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding that claims that are "based on events that may take place in the future" are to be
"dismissed for lack of jurisdiction") (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570,
1574 n.7 (1 1 th Cir. 1989) ("[R]ipeness goes to whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case.")); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1415 (11th Cir. 1994)
("The question of ripeness `goes to whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.")
(quoting Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1573); see also Jacksonville Property Rights Ass 'n, Inc. v. City
of Jacksonville, 635 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that when plaintiffs ask a
court "to issue a declaration on an issue that might never impact their substantive rights," they
are "asking th[e] court either to issue an impermissible advisory opinion, or to decide a case that
is not yet ripe for decision"), reh'g & reh g en banc denied, Case No. 09-15629, Fed. App'x
(11th Cir. Jun. 29, 2011) (Table).
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the United States respectfully requests that this Court
enter an order dismissing the Petitioners' claims and these proceedings for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
WIFREDO A. FERRER
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
By:
Dexter A. Lee
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0936693
99 N.E. 4th Street
Miami, Florida 33132
Tel: (305) 961-9320; Fax: (305) 530-7139
Email: [email protected]
Eduardo 1. SInchez
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 877875
99 N.E. 4th Street
Miami, Florida 33132
Tel: (305) 961-9057; Fax: (305) 536-4676
Email: [email protected]
A. Marie Villafana
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0018255
500 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 400
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
Tel: (561) 820-8711; Fax: (561) 820-8777
Email: [email protected]
Attorneys for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing United States' Sealed
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction was served via United States Mail this
7th day of November, 2011, upon Counsel for Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2,
accompanied by a copy of the November 7, 2011 Sealed Order Granting Government's Motion
for Limited Disclosure of Grand Jury Matter. Pursuant to the Order regarding the disclosure of
Grand Jury Information, a copy was not served upon the proposed intervenors.
A. Marie Villafana
Assistant United States Attorney
SERVICE LIST
Jane Does 1 and 2 v. United States,
Case No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida
Brad Edwards, Esq.,
The Law Offices of Brad Edwards & Associates, LLC
2028 Harrison Street, Suite 202
Hollywood, Florida 33020
(954) 414-8033
Fax: (954) 924-1530
Paul G. Cassell
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the
University of Utah
332 S. 1400 E.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
(801) 585-5202
Fax: (801) 585-6833
E-mail: [email protected]
Attorneys for Jane Doe # 1 and Jane Doe # 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
IN RE:
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
FEDERAL GRAND JURY 05-02(WPB) AND
FEDERAL GRAND JURY 07-103(WPB)
Sealed Order Granting
Government's Motion for Limited Disclosure of Grand Jury Matter
***
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
IN RE:
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
FEDERAL GRAND JURY 05-02(WPB) AND
FEDERAL GRAND JURY 07-103(WPB)
Sealed Order Granting
Government's Motion for Limited Disclosure of Grand Jury Matter
This cause comes before the Court on the Government's Sealed Ex Parte Motion for
Limited Disclosure of Grand Jury Matter Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i). After
careful consideration of the pounds raised in said motions, and the Court being otherwise
advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Government's Motion for Limited Disclosure of
Grand Jury Matter Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i) is GRANTED. The Government
is authorized to disclose in Jane Doe No. .1 and Jane Doe No. 2 v. United States, Case No. 08-
80736-Civ-Marra (S.D. Fla.). [DELETE]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that disclosure pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(eX3XEXi)
shall be conditioned on the following:
(1) the disclosure of the aforementioned grand jury information shall be limited to filings
made under seal in Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra;
(2) the service of filings containing the aforementioned grand jury information shall be
limited to counsel for Petitioners Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 and for the
government in Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra, and shall be accompanied by a copy of
this Order; and
(3) further dissemination by any person or entity receiving disclosure of the grand jury
information authorized to be disclosed by this Order shall be limited to the individual
Petitioners in Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra, and any dissemination of such grand
jury information shall be accompanied by a copy of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Florida, this 7
day of
November, 2011.
DONALD M. MIDDLEBROOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
_______________
Notes:
1. See, e.g., Gntpo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004)
("Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction can of course be raised at any time prior to final
judgment."); United States v. Giraldo-Prado, 150 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing
that "a party may raise jurisdiction at any time during the pendency of the proceedings"); Harrell
& Sumner Contracting Co. v. Peabody Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1977)
("[ u]nder Rule 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time by motion of a party or otherwise."); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In the
present motion, the United States seeks dismissal of Petitioners' claims based on both a legal and
factual challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. This Court may properly consider
and weigh evidence beyond Petitioners' allegations when evaluating such a challenge to the
Court's subject matter jurisdiction:
Factual attacks [on a Court's subject matter jurisdiction] ... "challenge subject
matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings." In resolving a factual
attack, the district court "may consider extrinsic evidence such as testimony and
affidavits." Since such a motion implicates the fundamental question of a trial court's jurisdiction, a "trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as
to the existence of its power to hear the case" without presuming the truthfulness
of the plaintiff's allegations.
Makro Capital of America, Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted); see also, e.g., McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e
determine whether this lawsuit survives the government's factual attack [on subject matter
jurisdiction] by looking to matters outside the pleadings, and we do not accord any presumptive
truthfulness to the allegations in the complaint."); Stag° v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960-61
(11th Cir. 1999).
2 Although Petitioners also fail to satisfy the first and second prongs of the standing test, this Court need not reach or address those issues because an analysis of the third prong of the
standing test incontrovertibly establishes the Petitioners' lack of standing. Nonetheless, the
circumstances which demonstrate Petitioners' lack of a concrete injury traceable to government
conduct are explored infra in Section II of this memorandum, which addresses how Petitioners'
claims and these proceedings lack constitutional ripeness.
3 See also July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 20-21 (Petitioners' acknowledgement that Epstein's
reliance on promises in Non-Prosecution Agreement led to his guilty plea to state charges and his subsequent 18-month state incarceration).
4 To the extent that the Petitioners' requested invalidation of the Non-Prosecution
Agreement would implicitly reject and nullify the correctness of both the state court's acceptance
of Epstein's guilty plea and the resulting judgment of conviction —which were induced in part by
the Non-Prosecution Agreement — such judicial action might raise additional questions about this
Court's jurisdiction under the Rooker/Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d
1258, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2009); Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466-68 (11th Cir. 1996).
5 Significantly, it is Epstein's contractual rights under the non-prosecution agreement that
Petitioners seek to void through these proceedings.
6 Petitioners' present, as well as past, ability to confer with an attorney for the government
also demonstrates that Petitioners fail to satisfy the first two prongs of the standing test:
Petitioners have simply not suffered a concrete injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged
government conduct.
7 The United States Attorney also offered to confer with Jane Doe #2, but Jane Doe #2
declined the invitation and did not attend the meeting that was scheduled with the United States
Attorney.
8 Since that time, the USAO-SDFL has been recused by the Department of Justice from
prospective responsibility for any criminal investigation or potential prosecution relating to
Epstein's alleged sexual activities with minor females. The Department of Justice has reassigned
responsibility for the investigation and potential prosecution of such criminal matters in the
Southern District of Florida to the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of
Florida for consideration of any prosecutorial action that may be authorized and appropriate.
9 The USAO-SDFL has no present knowledge about whether the United States Attorney's
Offices in those districts have opened any investigations into the allegations that have been made
against Epstein, whether those offices are even aware of those allegations or the evidence
supporting them, or what investigative or prosecutorial actions, if any, those offices might take in
the future. Nonetheless, should any investigation be underway or should an investigation be
initiated involving such allegations, the evidence gathered [DELETE] in the Southern
District of Florida could be disclosed to federal prosecutors and federal grand juries in New York
or New Jersey. See [DELETE]
10 This Court has also previously described the Non-Prosecution Agreement as "an
agreement under which . . . the U.S. Attorney's Office would agree not to prosecute Epstein for
federal offenses." DE 99 at 2-3. That description of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, however,
was not based on the Court's interpretation of the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, but
was instead based on "allegations" by Petitioners that the Court concluded were "not yet
supported by evidence" but upon which the Court nonetheless relied "solely to provide the
context for the threshold issues addressed in" its September 26, 2011 Order. Id. at 2 n.2.
11 Significantly, under the governing provision of the United States Attorney's Manual, the
USAO-SDFL did not have the authority to unilaterally bar Epstein's prosecution in any other
district in the country:
No district or division shall make any agreement, including any agreement not to
prosecute, which purports to bind any other district(s) or division without the
express written approval of the United States Attorney(s) in each affected district
and/or the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division.
USAM 9-27.641 (Multi-District (Global) Agreement Requests).
12 The government acknowledges that this Court has nonetheless ruled that "as a matter of
law the CVRA can apply before formal charges are filed," DE 99 at 10; see also id. at 6-9, but
has not yet determined "whether the particular rights asserted here attached," id. at 10.
13 Petitioners could also approach the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle
District of Florida, but, due to that office's recusal-based derivative prosecutorial responsibilities
in the Southern District of Florida, see supra note 8, the Non-Prosecution Agreement would
constrain the possible filing of federal charges by that office in the Southern District of Florida.
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Re: Data set 1 - 8
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https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/D ... 009747.pdf
Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 1 of 20
'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TOVA NOEL and
MICHAEL THOMAS,
Defendants.
X
INDICTMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. On or about August 10, 2019, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL
THOMAS, the defendants, in dereliction of their duties as
correctional officers at the Metropolitan Correctional Center
("MCC"), repeatedly failed to perform mandated counts of prisoners
under their watch in the MCC's Special Housing Unit ("SHU").
Instead, for substantial portions of their shifts, NOEL and THOMAS
sat at their desk, browsed the internet, and moved around the
common area of the SHU. To conceal their failure to perform their
duties, NOEL and THOMAS repeatedly signed false certifications
attesting to having conducted multiple counts of inmates when, in
truth and in fact, they never conducted such counts. As a result
of those false statements, the MCC believed prisoners in the SHU
were being regularly monitored and accounted for when, in fact, as
a result of the defendants' conduct, no correctional officer
conducted any count or round of the SHU from approximately 10:30
EFTA00009747
Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 2 of 20
p.m. on August 9 until approximately 6:30 a.m. on August 10, at
which time, as alleged herein, NOEL and THOMAS discovered the body
of an MCC inmate, Jeffrey Epstein, who had committed suicide
overnight while unobserved.
RELEVANT INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES
2. The MCC is a federal administrative detention
facility located in Manhattan that is run by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons ("BOP"). The MCC is one of several facilities used to
house inmates who have been charged with federal crimes in the
Southern District of New York and are awaiting trial. The MCC
employs correctional officers, whose primary duty is to ensure the
care, custody, and control of the inmate population of the MCC.
3. TOVA NOEL, the defendant, has been employed as a
correctional officer at the MCC since approximately 2016. As of
August 2019, NOEL's primary assignment was the SHU. On August 9,
2019, NOEL worked a regular shift from 4 p.m. to 12 a.m. in the
SHU, and then worked an overtime shift from 12 a.m. to 8 a.m. on
August 10, 2019, also in the SHU. NOEL had also worked a regular
shift in the SHU the day before, August 8, 2019, from 12 p.m. to
8 p.m.
4. MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendant, has been employed as
a correctional officer at the MCC since approximately 2007.
Beginning in approximately 2013, THOMAS was assigned to work as a
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Case 1 19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 3 of 20
materials handler supervisor, although THOMAS regularly worked
overtime shifts as a correctional officer, including in the SHU.
THOMAS worked an overtime shift in the SHU on August 10, 2019,
from 12 a.m. to 8 a.m. THOMAS did not work his regular shift on
August 8 or August 9, 2019, but did work an overtime shift in the
SHU on August 9, 2019 from 12 a.m. to 8 a.m.
5. As detailed herein, Jeffrey Epstein was
incarcerated at the MCC between his arrest on July 6, 2019, and
his suicide on August 10, 2019. Epstein was detained pending
trial in the Southern District of New York on sex trafficking
charges.
THE MCC AND INSTITUTIONAL COUNTS
6. The MCC, which houses approximately 750 inmates at
any given time, assigns inmates to various housing units within
the MCC. The SHU is a housing unit within the MCC where inmates
are securely separated from the general inmate population to ensure
their own safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates.
The SHU is located on the ninth floor of the MCC, and access to
that floor is controlled by a locked door that can be opened
remotely only by an officer in the MCC's centralized control center
(the "Control Center"), which is located on the first floor of the
MCC. Access into the SHU is also controlled by a second locked
door to which only correctional officers assigned to the SHU have
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Case 1 19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 4 of 20
keys while on duty. Within the SHU, inmates are assigned to six
separate tiers, each of which can be accessed only via a single
locked door to which the correctional officers assigned to the SHU
have keys while on duty. Each tier has eight cells, each of which
can house either one or two prisoners, and each individual cell -
which is made of cement and metal - is accessed only through a
single locked door, to which only correctional officers assigned
to the SHU have keys while on duty.
7. The BOP requires correctional officers assigned to
guard inmates at the MCC to conduct institution-wide counts of
inmates at regular, scheduled intervals to ensure that each inmate
is alive and accounted for within the MCC (the "institutional
count"). On weekdays, the MCC conducts five institutional countarb
at 4 p.m., 10 p.m., 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. Performing an
institutional count is one of the most basic and essential aspects
of a correctional officer's job, and the count is one of the most
basic and essential functions of daily operation of the MCC. Two
officers are required to perform the institutional count for each
housing unit, including the SHU, and are further required to
document their performance of the count
called a count slip
on an official MCC form
To perform the institutional count in Lhe
Silo, two officers must walk from tier to tier to observe and count
each individual inmate.
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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 5 of 20
8. On the count slip, both correctional officers are
required to fill in the date and time the count was performed,
write the total number of inmates physically present in the unit
counted, and then sign the count slip. Once the correctional
officers have completed and signed the count slips, the count slips
are then collected and delivered to the Control Center, where
officers within the Control Center are responsible for comparing
the count slips from each housing unit to the institution's inmate
roster to ensure that each inmate is accounted for. Only after
all the count slips are collected from each housing unit, and the
numbers on the slips are matched to the institution's inmate
roster, can the institutional count be deemed "cleared" or
completed. If a housing unit's count slip is incorrect or
incomplete, then the institution cannot "clear" the count.
Instead, the count must be completely redone in that housing unit
via a more-intensive version of the institutional count called a
"bed book count," in which officers must compare every individual
inmate to the institution's inmate roster. Records of each
institutional count, including the count slips, are provided to a
supervising official and retained by the MCC.
9. In addition to the institutional count, the BOP
requires correctional officers assigned to the SHU to walk each of
the tiers of the SHU - which is called a "round" - every thirty
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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 6 of 20
minutes ("30-minute rounds"). Like the institutional counts,
correctional officers conduct 30-minute rounds to ensure that each
inmate is alive and accounted for within his cell. Correctional
officers working in the SHU are required to complete a form, which
is reviewed and signed by their supervisor, documenting the date
and time of each 30-minute round in each tier of the SHU.
EPSTEIN'S PRIOR APPARENT SUICIDE ATTEMPT
10. On July 6, 2019, inmate Jeffrey Epstein was
arrested and detained at the MCC on sex trafficking charges. On
July 10, 2019, Epstein was assigned to the SHU due to, among other
things, risk factors for suicidality and safety concerns relating
to housing him with the MCC's general population.
11. On July 23, 2019, while Epstein was housed in the
SHU, MCC officers responded to an emergency call, and found Epstein
on the floor of his cell with a strip of bedsheet around his neck.
MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendant, was one of the MCC officers who
responded to the incident. Epstein was subsequently transferred
out of the SHU and was placed on suicide watch. Inmates placed
on suicide watch are housed in a cell on the hospital wing floor
of the MCC, and are watched twenty-four hours a day by a staff
member or a specially trained inmate companion.
12. Epstein remained on suicide watch for approximately
twenty-four hours, and then was transferred to psychological
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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 7 of 20
observation, until July 30, 2019. Psychological observation is
less restrictive than suicide watch, but inmates are still housed
in the hospital wing of the MCC and watched twenty-four hours a
day.
13. On July 30, 2019, Epstein was transferred back to
the SHU, and, at the direction of the MCC's psychological staff,
was required to have an assigned cellmate. Epstein was also
assigned to the cell closest to the correctional officers' desk in
the common area of the SHU, which was approximately fifteen feet
from the cell. Conducting the required institutional counts and
thirty-minute rounds in the SRO were also part of the MCC's
procedures for ensuring the safety of inmates, including Epstein.
EVENTS OF AUGUST 9-10, 2019
14. On August 9, 2019, Epstein's cellmate was
transferred out of the MCC in a routine, pre-arranged transfer at
approximately 8 a.m. Despite the MCC's psychological staff's
direction that Epstein have a cellmate, no new cellmat6 was
assigned to Epstein's cell.
15. TOVA NOEL, the defendant, was one of the assigned
officers on duty in the SHU from 4 p.m. on August 9, 2019 to 8
a.m. on August 10. From 4 p.m. to 12 a.m., two other officers
were on duty with NOEL in the SHU: one officer was assigned to
work from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. ("Officer-1"), and one officer was
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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 8 of 20
assigned to work from 4 p.m. to 12 a.m. ("Officer-2"). MICHAEL
THOMAS, the defendant, started his shift in the SHU at 12 a.m. on
August 10. From 12 a.m. until 8 a.m. on August 10, NOEL and THOMAS
were the only two officers on duty in the SHU.
16. During the time period from 4 p.m. on August 9 to
8 a.m. on August 10, the officers on duty in the SHU, including
TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants, were responsible for
conducting five institutional counts: 4 p.m. and 10 p.m. on August
9; and 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. on August 10. NOEL, THOMAS and
the other officers on duty were also responsible for completing
paperwork attesting to each of those counts. While, as detailed
herein, count slips were completed for each institutional count,
in fact, not a single one of those institutional counts was done.
17. TOVA NOEL, the defendant, and Officer-1 were
responsible for conducting the 4 p.m. institutional count in the
SHU. As video from the MCC's internal video surveillance system
makes clear, NOEL and Officer-1 did not perform the 4 p.m. count.
Nonetheless, NOEL and Officer-1
that falsely stated
completed and signed a count slip
that the 4 p.m. institutional count had been
performed. In reliance on that falsified count slip, at
approximately 5:03 p.m., the Control Center cleared the 4 p.m.
count.
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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 9 of 20
18. That evening, Epstein returned to the SHU from his
attorney visit and was escorted into his cell by TOVA NOEL, the
defendant, and another officer at approximately 7:49 p.m. NOEL
and the other officer left the tier in which Epstein was housed
immediately thereafter.
19. By or before 10 p.m., all inmates in the MCC were
locked in their cells for the night. At or around that time, TOVA
NOEL, the defendant, and Officer-2 were responsible for conducting
the 10 p.m. institutional count in the SHU. However, video from
the MCC's internal video surveillance system shows that NOEL and
Officer-2 did not perform the 10 p.m. count.
and Officer-2
Nonetheless, NOEL
completed and signed a count slip falsely stating
that the 10 p.m. institutional count had been performed. In
reliance on that falsified count slip, at approximately 10:36 p.m.,
the Control Center cleared the 10 p.m. count.
20. As reflected on video obtained from the MCC's
internal video surveillance system, at approximately 10:30 p.m. on
August 9, 2019 - after TOVA NOEL, the defendant, had signed and
submitted the 10 p.m. count slip and the institutional count had
been completed - NOEL briefly walked up to, and then walked back
from, the door to the tier in which Epstein was housed. As
confirmed by the video obtained from the MCC's internal video
surveillance system, this was the last time anyone, including any
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Case 1:19-cr-.00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 10 of 20
correctional officer, walked up to, let alone entered, the only
entrance to the tier in which Epstein was housed until
approximately 6:30 a.m. on August 10.
21. Officer-l's shift ended at approximately 10 p.m.,
and at approximately 12 a.m., MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendant,
replaced Officer-2, joining TOVA NOEL, the defendant, as the only
two correctional officers on duty in the SHU. NOEL and THOMAS
were responsible for conducting the 12 a.m. institutional count in
the SHU. As confirmed by video from the MCC's internal video
surveillance system, NOEL and THOMAS did not perform the 12 a.m.
GEM Nonetheless, NOEL and THOMAS completed and signed a count
fnfor the 12 a.m. count that falsely stated that the
institutional count had been performed. In reliance on that
falsified count slip, at approximately 12:49 a.m., the Control
Center cleared the 12 a.m. count.
22. TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants, were
additionally responsible for conducting the 3 a.m. and 5 a.m.
institutional counts in the SHU. As confirmed by video from the
MCC's internal video surveillance system, NOEL and THOMAS did not
perform either the 3 a.m. or the 5 a.m. counts. NOEL and THOMAS
nonetheless completed and signed count slips for both counts that
falsely stated that they had performed the 3 a.m. and 5 a.m.
institutional counts. In reliance on those falsified count slips,
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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 11 of 20
at approximately 3:24 a.m. and 5:30 a.m., the Control Center
cleared the 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. counts, respectively.
23. Moreover, despite the requirement that officers on
duty in the SHU conduct and document regular, 30-minute rounds,
TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants, did not perform any
of the required 30-minute rounds during their shift between
approximately 12 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. Nonetheless, NOEL completed
and signed more than 75 separate 30-minute round entries falsely
affirming that they had, in fact, conducted such rounds.
24. During the night, instead of completing the
required counts and rounds, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the
defendants, were seated at the correctional officers' desk in the
SHU common area (as noted above, approximately 15 feet from
Epstein's cell), used the computers, and moved around the SHU
common area. For a period of approximately two hours, NOEL and
THOMAS sat at their desk without moving, and appeared to have been
asleep. NOEL used the computer periodically throughout the night,
including to search the Internet for furniture sales and benefit
websites. THOMAS used the computer briefly around 1 a.m., 4 a.m.,
and 6 a.m. to search for motorcycle sales and sports news.
25. At approximately 4 a.m., the overnight supervisor
briefly visited NOEL and THOMAS in the SHU, and conferred with
NOEL and THOMAS, who were seated at and around the officers' desk,
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before leaving. At approximately 5:30 a.m., another correctional
officer briefly walked through the SHU common area. Aside from
those two officers, as confirmed by video surveillance, no one
else entered the SHU, no one conducted any counts or rounds
throughout the night, and no one entered the tier in which Epstein
was housed.
26. Shortly after 6 a.m. on August 10, 2019, MICHAEL
THOMAS and TOVA NOEL, the defendants, received a delivery of
breakfast carts into the SHU, after which time they were again the
only officers in the SHU. Shortly after 6:30 a.m., NOEL and THOMAS
walked up to and entered the tier in which Epstein was housed to
serve breakfast. At approximately 6:33 a.m., an alarm was
activated in the SHU. Epstein was alone in his cell and not
responsive, with a noose around his neck. A supervisor who had
just started his shift ("Supervisor-1") responded to the alarm
almost immediately thereafter, and as NOEL approached the door to
the SHU to open the door for Supervisor-1, NOEL told Supervisor-1
that "Epstein hung himself." After arriving in the SHU,
Supervisor-1 spoke with THOMAS and NOEL. NOEL told Supervisor-1
" we did not complete the 3 a.m. nor 5 a.m. rounds." THOMAS stated,
" we messed up," and "I messed up, she's not to blame, we didn't do
any rounds."
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27. Epstein was transferred to a local hospital where
he was declared dead shortly thereafter. The Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner of the City of New York conducted an autopsy and
determined that Epstein had committed suicide by hanging himself.
STATUTORY ALLEGATIONS
COUNT ONE
(Conspiracy)
The Grand Jury charges:
28. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
29. In or about August 2019, in the Southern District
of New York, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants,
knowingly conspired with each other to:
a. Knowingly defraud the United States by
impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of a
department or agency of the United States, to wit, the MCC's
function to ensure the care, custody, and control of its inmate
population.
b. Knowingly make and use a false writing or
document knowing the same to contain a materially false,
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and entry with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
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department or agency of the United States, in violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1001 (a)(3).
30. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the
illegal objects thereof, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the
defendants, committed the following overt acts, among others, in
the Southern District of New York:
a. On August 10, 2019, NOEL and THOMAS falsely
certified, on an MCC count slip, that they had performed the 12
a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they had not in fact
done so.
b. On August 10, 2019, NOEL and THOMAS falsely
certified, on an MCC count slip, that they had performed the 3
a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they had not in fact
done so.
C. On August 10, 2019, NOEL and THOMAS falsely
certified, on an MCC count slip, that they had performed the 5
a.m. institutional count of the SHU at MCC, when they had not in
fact done so.
d. On August 10, 2019, NOEL falsely certified that
she and THOMAS had performed a series of 30-minute rounds of the
SHU between 12 a.m. and 6:30 a.m., when they had not in fact done
so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371)
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COUNT TWO
(False Records - 4 p.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
31. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
32. On or about August 9, 2019, in the Southern District
of New York, TOVA NOEL, the defendant, willfully and knowingly did
make and use a false writing or document knowing the same to
contain a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement
and entry with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States, and
did attempt to do the same, to wit, NOEL created, signed, and
submitted to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that
she had performed the 4 p.m. institutional count of the SHU, when
she had not in fact done so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
COUNT THREE
(False Records - 10 p.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
33. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
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34. On or about August 9, 2019, in the Southern District
of New York, TOVA NOEL, the defendant, willfully and knowingly did
make and use a false writing or document knowing the same to
contain a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement
and entry with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States, and
did attempt to do the same, to wit, NOEL created, signed, and
(submitted to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that
'she had performed the 10 p.m. institutional count of the SHU, when
she had not in fact done so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
COUNT FOUR
(False Records - 12 a.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
35. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
36. On or about August 10, 2019, in the Southern
District of New York, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants,
willfully and knowingly did make and use a false writing or
document knowing the same to contain a materially false,
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and entry with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
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administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States, and did attempt to do
the same, to wit, NOEL and THOMAS created, signed, and submitted
to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that they had
performed the 12 a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they
had not in fact done so.
(Title 18, united States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
COUNT FIVE
(False Records - 3 a.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
37. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
38. On or about August 10, 2019, in the Southern
District of New York, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants,
willfully and knowingly did make and use a false writing or
document knowing the same to contain a materially false,
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and entry with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States, and did attempt to do
the same, to wit, NOEL and THOMAS created, signed, and submitted
to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that they had
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performed the 3 a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they had
not in fact done so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
COUNT SIX
(False Records - 5 a.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
39. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
40. On or about August 10, 2019, in the Southern
District of New York, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants,
willfully and knowingly did make and use a false writing or
document knowing the same to contain a materially false,
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and entry with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States, and did attempt to do
the same, to wit, NOEL and THOMAS created, signed, and submitted
to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that they had
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performed the S a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they had
not in fact done so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
GEOFFR BERMAN
United States Attorney
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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 20 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- v. -
TOVA NOEL and
MICHAEL THOMAS,
Defendants.
INDICTMENT
19 Cr.
Title 18, United States Code,
Sections 371, 1001(a) (3), and 2.
GEOFFREY S. BERMAN
United States Attorney
A TRUE BILL
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EFTA00009766
Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 1 of 20
'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TOVA NOEL and
MICHAEL THOMAS,
Defendants.
X
INDICTMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. On or about August 10, 2019, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL
THOMAS, the defendants, in dereliction of their duties as
correctional officers at the Metropolitan Correctional Center
("MCC"), repeatedly failed to perform mandated counts of prisoners
under their watch in the MCC's Special Housing Unit ("SHU").
Instead, for substantial portions of their shifts, NOEL and THOMAS
sat at their desk, browsed the internet, and moved around the
common area of the SHU. To conceal their failure to perform their
duties, NOEL and THOMAS repeatedly signed false certifications
attesting to having conducted multiple counts of inmates when, in
truth and in fact, they never conducted such counts. As a result
of those false statements, the MCC believed prisoners in the SHU
were being regularly monitored and accounted for when, in fact, as
a result of the defendants' conduct, no correctional officer
conducted any count or round of the SHU from approximately 10:30
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p.m. on August 9 until approximately 6:30 a.m. on August 10, at
which time, as alleged herein, NOEL and THOMAS discovered the body
of an MCC inmate, Jeffrey Epstein, who had committed suicide
overnight while unobserved.
RELEVANT INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES
2. The MCC is a federal administrative detention
facility located in Manhattan that is run by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons ("BOP"). The MCC is one of several facilities used to
house inmates who have been charged with federal crimes in the
Southern District of New York and are awaiting trial. The MCC
employs correctional officers, whose primary duty is to ensure the
care, custody, and control of the inmate population of the MCC.
3. TOVA NOEL, the defendant, has been employed as a
correctional officer at the MCC since approximately 2016. As of
August 2019, NOEL's primary assignment was the SHU. On August 9,
2019, NOEL worked a regular shift from 4 p.m. to 12 a.m. in the
SHU, and then worked an overtime shift from 12 a.m. to 8 a.m. on
August 10, 2019, also in the SHU. NOEL had also worked a regular
shift in the SHU the day before, August 8, 2019, from 12 p.m. to
8 p.m.
4. MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendant, has been employed as
a correctional officer at the MCC since approximately 2007.
Beginning in approximately 2013, THOMAS was assigned to work as a
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materials handler supervisor, although THOMAS regularly worked
overtime shifts as a correctional officer, including in the SHU.
THOMAS worked an overtime shift in the SHU on August 10, 2019,
from 12 a.m. to 8 a.m. THOMAS did not work his regular shift on
August 8 or August 9, 2019, but did work an overtime shift in the
SHU on August 9, 2019 from 12 a.m. to 8 a.m.
5. As detailed herein, Jeffrey Epstein was
incarcerated at the MCC between his arrest on July 6, 2019, and
his suicide on August 10, 2019. Epstein was detained pending
trial in the Southern District of New York on sex trafficking
charges.
THE MCC AND INSTITUTIONAL COUNTS
6. The MCC, which houses approximately 750 inmates at
any given time, assigns inmates to various housing units within
the MCC. The SHU is a housing unit within the MCC where inmates
are securely separated from the general inmate population to ensure
their own safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates.
The SHU is located on the ninth floor of the MCC, and access to
that floor is controlled by a locked door that can be opened
remotely only by an officer in the MCC's centralized control center
(the "Control Center"), which is located on the first floor of the
MCC. Access into the SHU is also controlled by a second locked
door to which only correctional officers assigned to the SHU have
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keys while on duty. Within the SHU, inmates are assigned to six
separate tiers, each of which can be accessed only via a single
locked door to which the correctional officers assigned to the SHU
have keys while on duty. Each tier has eight cells, each of which
can house either one or two prisoners, and each individual cell -
which is made of cement and metal - is accessed only through a
single locked door, to which only correctional officers assigned
to the SHU have keys while on duty.
7. The BOP requires correctional officers assigned to
guard inmates at the MCC to conduct institution-wide counts of
inmates at regular, scheduled intervals to ensure that each inmate
is alive and accounted for within the MCC (the "institutional
count"). On weekdays, the MCC conducts five institutional countarb
at 4 p.m., 10 p.m., 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. Performing an
institutional count is one of the most basic and essential aspects
of a correctional officer's job, and the count is one of the most
basic and essential functions of daily operation of the MCC. Two
officers are required to perform the institutional count for each
housing unit, including the SHU, and are further required to
document their performance of the count
called a count slip
on an official MCC form
To perform the institutional count in Lhe
Silo, two officers must walk from tier to tier to observe and count
each individual inmate.
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8. On the count slip, both correctional officers are
required to fill in the date and time the count was performed,
write the total number of inmates physically present in the unit
counted, and then sign the count slip. Once the correctional
officers have completed and signed the count slips, the count slips
are then collected and delivered to the Control Center, where
officers within the Control Center are responsible for comparing
the count slips from each housing unit to the institution's inmate
roster to ensure that each inmate is accounted for. Only after
all the count slips are collected from each housing unit, and the
numbers on the slips are matched to the institution's inmate
roster, can the institutional count be deemed "cleared" or
completed. If a housing unit's count slip is incorrect or
incomplete, then the institution cannot "clear" the count.
Instead, the count must be completely redone in that housing unit
via a more-intensive version of the institutional count called a
"bed book count," in which officers must compare every individual
inmate to the institution's inmate roster. Records of each
institutional count, including the count slips, are provided to a
supervising official and retained by the MCC.
9. In addition to the institutional count, the BOP
requires correctional officers assigned to the SHU to walk each of
the tiers of the SHU - which is called a "round" - every thirty
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minutes ("30-minute rounds"). Like the institutional counts,
correctional officers conduct 30-minute rounds to ensure that each
inmate is alive and accounted for within his cell. Correctional
officers working in the SHU are required to complete a form, which
is reviewed and signed by their supervisor, documenting the date
and time of each 30-minute round in each tier of the SHU.
EPSTEIN'S PRIOR APPARENT SUICIDE ATTEMPT
10. On July 6, 2019, inmate Jeffrey Epstein was
arrested and detained at the MCC on sex trafficking charges. On
July 10, 2019, Epstein was assigned to the SHU due to, among other
things, risk factors for suicidality and safety concerns relating
to housing him with the MCC's general population.
11. On July 23, 2019, while Epstein was housed in the
SHU, MCC officers responded to an emergency call, and found Epstein
on the floor of his cell with a strip of bedsheet around his neck.
MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendant, was one of the MCC officers who
responded to the incident. Epstein was subsequently transferred
out of the SHU and was placed on suicide watch. Inmates placed
on suicide watch are housed in a cell on the hospital wing floor
of the MCC, and are watched twenty-four hours a day by a staff
member or a specially trained inmate companion.
12. Epstein remained on suicide watch for approximately
twenty-four hours, and then was transferred to psychological
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observation, until July 30, 2019. Psychological observation is
less restrictive than suicide watch, but inmates are still housed
in the hospital wing of the MCC and watched twenty-four hours a
day.
13. On July 30, 2019, Epstein was transferred back to
the SHU, and, at the direction of the MCC's psychological staff,
was required to have an assigned cellmate. Epstein was also
assigned to the cell closest to the correctional officers' desk in
the common area of the SHU, which was approximately fifteen feet
from the cell. Conducting the required institutional counts and
thirty-minute rounds in the SRO were also part of the MCC's
procedures for ensuring the safety of inmates, including Epstein.
EVENTS OF AUGUST 9-10, 2019
14. On August 9, 2019, Epstein's cellmate was
transferred out of the MCC in a routine, pre-arranged transfer at
approximately 8 a.m. Despite the MCC's psychological staff's
direction that Epstein have a cellmate, no new cellmat6 was
assigned to Epstein's cell.
15. TOVA NOEL, the defendant, was one of the assigned
officers on duty in the SHU from 4 p.m. on August 9, 2019 to 8
a.m. on August 10. From 4 p.m. to 12 a.m., two other officers
were on duty with NOEL in the SHU: one officer was assigned to
work from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. ("Officer-1"), and one officer was
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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 8 of 20
assigned to work from 4 p.m. to 12 a.m. ("Officer-2"). MICHAEL
THOMAS, the defendant, started his shift in the SHU at 12 a.m. on
August 10. From 12 a.m. until 8 a.m. on August 10, NOEL and THOMAS
were the only two officers on duty in the SHU.
16. During the time period from 4 p.m. on August 9 to
8 a.m. on August 10, the officers on duty in the SHU, including
TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants, were responsible for
conducting five institutional counts: 4 p.m. and 10 p.m. on August
9; and 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. on August 10. NOEL, THOMAS and
the other officers on duty were also responsible for completing
paperwork attesting to each of those counts. While, as detailed
herein, count slips were completed for each institutional count,
in fact, not a single one of those institutional counts was done.
17. TOVA NOEL, the defendant, and Officer-1 were
responsible for conducting the 4 p.m. institutional count in the
SHU. As video from the MCC's internal video surveillance system
makes clear, NOEL and Officer-1 did not perform the 4 p.m. count.
Nonetheless, NOEL and Officer-1
that falsely stated
completed and signed a count slip
that the 4 p.m. institutional count had been
performed. In reliance on that falsified count slip, at
approximately 5:03 p.m., the Control Center cleared the 4 p.m.
count.
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18. That evening, Epstein returned to the SHU from his
attorney visit and was escorted into his cell by TOVA NOEL, the
defendant, and another officer at approximately 7:49 p.m. NOEL
and the other officer left the tier in which Epstein was housed
immediately thereafter.
19. By or before 10 p.m., all inmates in the MCC were
locked in their cells for the night. At or around that time, TOVA
NOEL, the defendant, and Officer-2 were responsible for conducting
the 10 p.m. institutional count in the SHU. However, video from
the MCC's internal video surveillance system shows that NOEL and
Officer-2 did not perform the 10 p.m. count.
and Officer-2
Nonetheless, NOEL
completed and signed a count slip falsely stating
that the 10 p.m. institutional count had been performed. In
reliance on that falsified count slip, at approximately 10:36 p.m.,
the Control Center cleared the 10 p.m. count.
20. As reflected on video obtained from the MCC's
internal video surveillance system, at approximately 10:30 p.m. on
August 9, 2019 - after TOVA NOEL, the defendant, had signed and
submitted the 10 p.m. count slip and the institutional count had
been completed - NOEL briefly walked up to, and then walked back
from, the door to the tier in which Epstein was housed. As
confirmed by the video obtained from the MCC's internal video
surveillance system, this was the last time anyone, including any
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correctional officer, walked up to, let alone entered, the only
entrance to the tier in which Epstein was housed until
approximately 6:30 a.m. on August 10.
21. Officer-l's shift ended at approximately 10 p.m.,
and at approximately 12 a.m., MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendant,
replaced Officer-2, joining TOVA NOEL, the defendant, as the only
two correctional officers on duty in the SHU. NOEL and THOMAS
were responsible for conducting the 12 a.m. institutional count in
the SHU. As confirmed by video from the MCC's internal video
surveillance system, NOEL and THOMAS did not perform the 12 a.m.
GEM Nonetheless, NOEL and THOMAS completed and signed a count
fnfor the 12 a.m. count that falsely stated that the
institutional count had been performed. In reliance on that
falsified count slip, at approximately 12:49 a.m., the Control
Center cleared the 12 a.m. count.
22. TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants, were
additionally responsible for conducting the 3 a.m. and 5 a.m.
institutional counts in the SHU. As confirmed by video from the
MCC's internal video surveillance system, NOEL and THOMAS did not
perform either the 3 a.m. or the 5 a.m. counts. NOEL and THOMAS
nonetheless completed and signed count slips for both counts that
falsely stated that they had performed the 3 a.m. and 5 a.m.
institutional counts. In reliance on those falsified count slips,
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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 11 of 20
at approximately 3:24 a.m. and 5:30 a.m., the Control Center
cleared the 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. counts, respectively.
23. Moreover, despite the requirement that officers on
duty in the SHU conduct and document regular, 30-minute rounds,
TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants, did not perform any
of the required 30-minute rounds during their shift between
approximately 12 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. Nonetheless, NOEL completed
and signed more than 75 separate 30-minute round entries falsely
affirming that they had, in fact, conducted such rounds.
24. During the night, instead of completing the
required counts and rounds, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the
defendants, were seated at the correctional officers' desk in the
SHU common area (as noted above, approximately 15 feet from
Epstein's cell), used the computers, and moved around the SHU
common area. For a period of approximately two hours, NOEL and
THOMAS sat at their desk without moving, and appeared to have been
asleep. NOEL used the computer periodically throughout the night,
including to search the Internet for furniture sales and benefit
websites. THOMAS used the computer briefly around 1 a.m., 4 a.m.,
and 6 a.m. to search for motorcycle sales and sports news.
25. At approximately 4 a.m., the overnight supervisor
briefly visited NOEL and THOMAS in the SHU, and conferred with
NOEL and THOMAS, who were seated at and around the officers' desk,
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before leaving. At approximately 5:30 a.m., another correctional
officer briefly walked through the SHU common area. Aside from
those two officers, as confirmed by video surveillance, no one
else entered the SHU, no one conducted any counts or rounds
throughout the night, and no one entered the tier in which Epstein
was housed.
26. Shortly after 6 a.m. on August 10, 2019, MICHAEL
THOMAS and TOVA NOEL, the defendants, received a delivery of
breakfast carts into the SHU, after which time they were again the
only officers in the SHU. Shortly after 6:30 a.m., NOEL and THOMAS
walked up to and entered the tier in which Epstein was housed to
serve breakfast. At approximately 6:33 a.m., an alarm was
activated in the SHU. Epstein was alone in his cell and not
responsive, with a noose around his neck. A supervisor who had
just started his shift ("Supervisor-1") responded to the alarm
almost immediately thereafter, and as NOEL approached the door to
the SHU to open the door for Supervisor-1, NOEL told Supervisor-1
that "Epstein hung himself." After arriving in the SHU,
Supervisor-1 spoke with THOMAS and NOEL. NOEL told Supervisor-1
" we did not complete the 3 a.m. nor 5 a.m. rounds." THOMAS stated,
" we messed up," and "I messed up, she's not to blame, we didn't do
any rounds."
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27. Epstein was transferred to a local hospital where
he was declared dead shortly thereafter. The Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner of the City of New York conducted an autopsy and
determined that Epstein had committed suicide by hanging himself.
STATUTORY ALLEGATIONS
COUNT ONE
(Conspiracy)
The Grand Jury charges:
28. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
29. In or about August 2019, in the Southern District
of New York, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants,
knowingly conspired with each other to:
a. Knowingly defraud the United States by
impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of a
department or agency of the United States, to wit, the MCC's
function to ensure the care, custody, and control of its inmate
population.
b. Knowingly make and use a false writing or
document knowing the same to contain a materially false,
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and entry with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
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department or agency of the United States, in violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1001 (a)(3).
30. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the
illegal objects thereof, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the
defendants, committed the following overt acts, among others, in
the Southern District of New York:
a. On August 10, 2019, NOEL and THOMAS falsely
certified, on an MCC count slip, that they had performed the 12
a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they had not in fact
done so.
b. On August 10, 2019, NOEL and THOMAS falsely
certified, on an MCC count slip, that they had performed the 3
a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they had not in fact
done so.
C. On August 10, 2019, NOEL and THOMAS falsely
certified, on an MCC count slip, that they had performed the 5
a.m. institutional count of the SHU at MCC, when they had not in
fact done so.
d. On August 10, 2019, NOEL falsely certified that
she and THOMAS had performed a series of 30-minute rounds of the
SHU between 12 a.m. and 6:30 a.m., when they had not in fact done
so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371)
14
EFTA00009760
Case 1:19-cr700830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 15 of 20
COUNT TWO
(False Records - 4 p.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
31. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
32. On or about August 9, 2019, in the Southern District
of New York, TOVA NOEL, the defendant, willfully and knowingly did
make and use a false writing or document knowing the same to
contain a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement
and entry with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States, and
did attempt to do the same, to wit, NOEL created, signed, and
submitted to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that
she had performed the 4 p.m. institutional count of the SHU, when
she had not in fact done so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
COUNT THREE
(False Records - 10 p.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
33. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
15
EFTA00009761
Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 16 of 20
34. On or about August 9, 2019, in the Southern District
of New York, TOVA NOEL, the defendant, willfully and knowingly did
make and use a false writing or document knowing the same to
contain a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement
and entry with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States, and
did attempt to do the same, to wit, NOEL created, signed, and
(submitted to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that
'she had performed the 10 p.m. institutional count of the SHU, when
she had not in fact done so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
COUNT FOUR
(False Records - 12 a.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
35. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
36. On or about August 10, 2019, in the Southern
District of New York, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants,
willfully and knowingly did make and use a false writing or
document knowing the same to contain a materially false,
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and entry with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
16
EFTA00009762
Case 1:19-cr700830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 17 of 20
administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States, and did attempt to do
the same, to wit, NOEL and THOMAS created, signed, and submitted
to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that they had
performed the 12 a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they
had not in fact done so.
(Title 18, united States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
COUNT FIVE
(False Records - 3 a.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
37. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
38. On or about August 10, 2019, in the Southern
District of New York, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants,
willfully and knowingly did make and use a false writing or
document knowing the same to contain a materially false,
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and entry with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States, and did attempt to do
the same, to wit, NOEL and THOMAS created, signed, and submitted
to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that they had
17
EFTA00009763
Case 1:19-a: 00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 18 of 20
performed the 3 a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they had
not in fact done so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
COUNT SIX
(False Records - 5 a.m. Count)
The Grand Jury further charges:
39. The Grand Jury incorporates the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Indictment as though
fully set forth herein.
40. On or about August 10, 2019, in the Southern
District of New York, TOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, the defendants,
willfully and knowingly did make and use a false writing or
document knowing the same to contain a materially false,
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and entry with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper
administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States, and did attempt to do
the same, to wit, NOEL and THOMAS created, signed, and submitted
to the MCC a materially false count slip indicating that they had
18
EFTA00009764
Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 19 of 20
performed the S a.m. institutional count of the SHU, when they had
not in fact done so.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001(a)(3) and 2)
GEOFFR BERMAN
United States Attorney
19
EFTA00009765
Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 1 Filed 11/19/19 Page 20 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- v. -
TOVA NOEL and
MICHAEL THOMAS,
Defendants.
INDICTMENT
19 Cr.
Title 18, United States Code,
Sections 371, 1001(a) (3), and 2.
GEOFFREY S. BERMAN
United States Attorney
A TRUE BILL
7 1 2
Foreperson.
Z /Wed Rim/von-1
17,14
A Wpm", lu 742Uf
{ui. _Sas Ne ibetc,fr, USiCT
PIRO,
EFTA00009766
- admin
- Site Admin
- Posts: 39751
- Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am
Re: Data set 1 - 8
by admin » Fri Dec 26, 2025 7:16 pm
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/D ... 009794.pdf
§ 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
Code of Federal Regulations
Title 5. Administrative Personnel
Chapter XVI. Office of Government Ethics
Subchapter B. Government Ethics
Part 2635. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Refs & Annos)
Subpart A. General Provisions
5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
§ 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service.
Currentness
(a) Public service is a public trust. Each employee has a responsibility to the United States Government and its citizens to
place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles above private gain. To ensure that every citizen can have complete
confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each employee shall respect and adhere to the principles of ethical conduct
set forth in this section, as well as the implementing standards contained in this part and in supplemental agency regulations.
(b) General principles. The following general principles apply to every employee and may form the basis for the standards
contained in this part. Where a situation is not covered by the standards set forth in this part, employees shall apply the principles
set forth in this section in determining whether their conduct is proper.
(1) Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution. the laws and ethical principles
above private gain.
(2) Employees shall not hold financial interests that conflict with the conscientious performance of duty.
(3) Employees shall not engage in financial transactions using nonpublic Government information or allow the improper
use of such information to further any private interest.
(4) An employee shall not, except as permitted by subpart B of this part, solicit or accept any gift or other item of monetary
value from any person or entity seeking official action from, doing business with, or conducting activities regulated by
the employee's agency, or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the
employee's duties.
(5) Employees shall put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties.
(6) Employees shall not knowingly make unauthorized commitments or promises of any kind purporting to bind the
Government.
(7) Employees shall not use public office for private gain.
WESTLAW © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
EFTA00009794
§ 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
(8) Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual.
(9) Employees shall protect and conserve Federal property and shall not use it for other than authorized activities.
(10) Employees shall not engage in outside employment or activities, including seeking or negotiating for employment,
that conflict with official Government duties and responsibilities.
(II) Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.
(12) Employees shall satisfy in good faith their obligations as citizens, including all just financial obligations, especially
those—such as Federal, State, or local taxes—that are imposed by law.
(13) Employees shall adhere to all laws and regulations that provide equal opportunity for all Americans regardless of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap.
(14) Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical
standards set forth in this part. Whether particular circumstances create an appearance that the law or these standards have
been violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts.
(c) Related statutes. In addition to the standards of ethical conduct set forth in this part, there are conflict of interest statutes
that prohibit certain conduct. Criminal conflict of interest statutes of general applicability to all employees, 18 U.S.C. 201, 203,
205, 208, and 209, are summarized in the appropriate subparts of this part and must be taken into consideration in determining
whether conduct is proper. Citations to other generally applicable statutes relating to employee conduct are set forth in subpart
I and employees are further cautioned that there may be additional statutory and regulatory restrictions applicable to them
generally or as employees of their specific agencies. Because an employee is considered to be on notice of the requirements
of any statute, an employee should not rely upon any description or synopsis of a statutory restriction, but should refer to the
statute itself and obtain the advice of an agency ethics official as needed.
SOURCE: 57 FR 35041, Aug. 7, 1992; 62 FR 48747, Sept. 17, 1997, unless otherwise noted.
AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 7301, 7351, 7353; 5 U.S.C. App. (Ethics in Government Act of 1978); E.O. 12674, 54 FR 15159, 3
CFR, 1989 Comp., p. 215, as modified by E.O. 12731, 55 FR 42547, 3 CFR, 1990 Comp., p. 306.
Notes of Decisions (41)
Current through Nov. 14, 2022, 87 FR 68310. Some sections may be more current. See credits for details.
End of Document t 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
WESTLAW © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
EFTA00009795
§ 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
Code of Federal Regulations
Title 5. Administrative Personnel
Chapter XVI. Office of Government Ethics
Subchapter B. Government Ethics
Part 2635. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Refs & Annos)
Subpart A. General Provisions
5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
§ 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service.
Currentness
(a) Public service is a public trust. Each employee has a responsibility to the United States Government and its citizens to
place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles above private gain. To ensure that every citizen can have complete
confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each employee shall respect and adhere to the principles of ethical conduct
set forth in this section, as well as the implementing standards contained in this part and in supplemental agency regulations.
(b) General principles. The following general principles apply to every employee and may form the basis for the standards
contained in this part. Where a situation is not covered by the standards set forth in this part, employees shall apply the principles
set forth in this section in determining whether their conduct is proper.
(1) Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution. the laws and ethical principles
above private gain.
(2) Employees shall not hold financial interests that conflict with the conscientious performance of duty.
(3) Employees shall not engage in financial transactions using nonpublic Government information or allow the improper
use of such information to further any private interest.
(4) An employee shall not, except as permitted by subpart B of this part, solicit or accept any gift or other item of monetary
value from any person or entity seeking official action from, doing business with, or conducting activities regulated by
the employee's agency, or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the
employee's duties.
(5) Employees shall put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties.
(6) Employees shall not knowingly make unauthorized commitments or promises of any kind purporting to bind the
Government.
(7) Employees shall not use public office for private gain.
WESTLAW © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
EFTA00009794
§ 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
(8) Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual.
(9) Employees shall protect and conserve Federal property and shall not use it for other than authorized activities.
(10) Employees shall not engage in outside employment or activities, including seeking or negotiating for employment,
that conflict with official Government duties and responsibilities.
(II) Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.
(12) Employees shall satisfy in good faith their obligations as citizens, including all just financial obligations, especially
those—such as Federal, State, or local taxes—that are imposed by law.
(13) Employees shall adhere to all laws and regulations that provide equal opportunity for all Americans regardless of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap.
(14) Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical
standards set forth in this part. Whether particular circumstances create an appearance that the law or these standards have
been violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts.
(c) Related statutes. In addition to the standards of ethical conduct set forth in this part, there are conflict of interest statutes
that prohibit certain conduct. Criminal conflict of interest statutes of general applicability to all employees, 18 U.S.C. 201, 203,
205, 208, and 209, are summarized in the appropriate subparts of this part and must be taken into consideration in determining
whether conduct is proper. Citations to other generally applicable statutes relating to employee conduct are set forth in subpart
I and employees are further cautioned that there may be additional statutory and regulatory restrictions applicable to them
generally or as employees of their specific agencies. Because an employee is considered to be on notice of the requirements
of any statute, an employee should not rely upon any description or synopsis of a statutory restriction, but should refer to the
statute itself and obtain the advice of an agency ethics official as needed.
SOURCE: 57 FR 35041, Aug. 7, 1992; 62 FR 48747, Sept. 17, 1997, unless otherwise noted.
AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 7301, 7351, 7353; 5 U.S.C. App. (Ethics in Government Act of 1978); E.O. 12674, 54 FR 15159, 3
CFR, 1989 Comp., p. 215, as modified by E.O. 12731, 55 FR 42547, 3 CFR, 1990 Comp., p. 306.
Notes of Decisions (41)
Current through Nov. 14, 2022, 87 FR 68310. Some sections may be more current. See credits for details.
End of Document t 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
WESTLAW © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
EFTA00009795
- admin
- Site Admin
- Posts: 39751
- Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am
Re: Data set 1 - 8
by admin » Fri Dec 26, 2025 7:19 pm
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/D ... 009800.pdf
From:
Subject: MCC: AP sources: Feds investigate contraband flow at Epstein jail
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2020 22:36:45 +0000
AP sources: Feds investigate contraband flow at Epstein jail
By MICHAEL BALSAMO and MICHAEL R. SISAK March 5, 2020 GMT
AP sources: Feds investigate contraband flow at Epstein jail
FILE- This March 12, 2009 photo shows the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City. The federal jail in New York
City where wealthy financier Jeffrey Epstein took his own life is on lockdown as authorities try to determine whether
someone smuggled a gun inside one of the most secure federal jails in the country. That's according to two people
familiar with the matter who spoke Friday to The Associated Press. (AP Photo/Mark Lennihan, File)
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Justice Department has opened a criminal investigation into potential misconduct by guards as
officials keep inmates locked down at the federal jail in New York where financier Jeffrey Epstein killed himself over the
summer, people familiar with the matter told The Associated Press.
The investigation at the Metropolitan Correctional Center is focusing on the flow of contraband into one of the most
secure jails in America and is being led by federal prosecutors from the U.S. attorney's office in Manhattan, the people
said. They were not authorized to discuss the investigation publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.
The criminal investigation comes as inmates have remained locked in their cells without access to their lawyers a week
after authorities began tossing cells in search of a possible gun that so far they've been unable to find. The investigation
started after jail officials received information that a gun may have been smuggled into the Manhattan lockup. Since then,
officials have canceled all visitation at the jail, which houses about 700 inmates. There are no signs of the lockdown
ending anytime soon.
The lockdown is just the latest crisis at the jail where Epstein died by suicide in August. Federal prosecutors allege that the
two correctional officers assigned to watch Epstein's unit were snoozing and shopping on the internet, and later forged
records to make it look like they checked in on him.
All visitors and inmates are searched before entering the facility and go through metal detectors. They are supposed to
leave personal belongings outside the jail. All mail is also screened by correctional staff. A gun smuggled inside would be a
major security breach.
In the past few days, officers have searched the facility and uncovered a sizable amount of contraband, including
cellphones, but no gun has not been found, the people said. Investigators are trying to determine how the contraband has
been entering into the facility.
The Bureau of Prisons said the jail is on "modified operations" because of the investigation. The bureau provided no
estimate for when normal operations could resume, raising legal concerns because the jail houses pretrial inmates while
EFTA00009800
their cases are ongoing.
In a statement to the AP, the agency said it must "take the time needed to complete a thorough investigation while
actively working to return the facility to normal operations as soon as possible."
David Patton, executive director and chief attorney of the Federal Defenders of New York, said it's a violation of inmates'
constitutional rights to deny them visits with their lawyers. He also said it has affected legal proceedings.
"Sentencings are being delayed. Hearings are being delayed," Patton said. "But the MCC acts as though it's perfectly fine
for them to just shut down the entire institution to look for contraband. It's just not acceptable. They've got to be able to
walk and chew gum at the same time."
Patton said federal prison officials have refused to provide information about what has prompted the current lockdown,
other than saying it is for "security concerns." They have not told the federal defenders that they are searching for a gun,
he said.
Patton said the chief judge in the Southern District of New York has been working with the U.S. Marshals Service to bring a
small number of people to the courthouse for individual meetings with lawyers, but they're capped at just five per day.
"It's just not nearly sufficient to deal with the need," he said.
The agency said Thursday that it arranged for additional staff from other parts of the U.S. to assist in the investigation and
ensure there is appropriate staffing at the jail. The agency said it "has maintained communication with stakeholders as
needed" and held a meeting with the chief federal judge and pubic defender in Manhattan, along with prosecutors, the
Marshals Service and probation officials.
The agency also said it has discussed a plan to resume legal visits at the jail on Friday and expects to allow full legal
visitation by next week. Visits with family members could resume as soon as this week, officials added.
"The Bureau has been working closely with the stakeholders throughout this period to ensure those defendants with
imminent court deadlines have the legal visits with their legal counsel as needed," the statement said.
Inmates are being locked down for 24 hours a day and lawyers have been told that on some units the prisoners are being
denied showers and being given cold meals in their cells. One inmate reported receiving peanut butter and jelly
sandwiches for every meal since last Thursday.
The bureau said inmates are on a periodic shower rotation, except for those in special housing units, who remain on a
regular schedule.
"All inmates have access to medical care and appointments and medical staff continue normal rounds on every floor," BOP
said.
Public Affairs
United States Department of Justice
U.S. Attorney's Office I Southern District of New York
From:
Subject: MCC: AP sources: Feds investigate contraband flow at Epstein jail
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2020 22:36:45 +0000
AP sources: Feds investigate contraband flow at Epstein jail
By MICHAEL BALSAMO and MICHAEL R. SISAK March 5, 2020 GMT
AP sources: Feds investigate contraband flow at Epstein jail
FILE- This March 12, 2009 photo shows the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City. The federal jail in New York
City where wealthy financier Jeffrey Epstein took his own life is on lockdown as authorities try to determine whether
someone smuggled a gun inside one of the most secure federal jails in the country. That's according to two people
familiar with the matter who spoke Friday to The Associated Press. (AP Photo/Mark Lennihan, File)
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Justice Department has opened a criminal investigation into potential misconduct by guards as
officials keep inmates locked down at the federal jail in New York where financier Jeffrey Epstein killed himself over the
summer, people familiar with the matter told The Associated Press.
The investigation at the Metropolitan Correctional Center is focusing on the flow of contraband into one of the most
secure jails in America and is being led by federal prosecutors from the U.S. attorney's office in Manhattan, the people
said. They were not authorized to discuss the investigation publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.
The criminal investigation comes as inmates have remained locked in their cells without access to their lawyers a week
after authorities began tossing cells in search of a possible gun that so far they've been unable to find. The investigation
started after jail officials received information that a gun may have been smuggled into the Manhattan lockup. Since then,
officials have canceled all visitation at the jail, which houses about 700 inmates. There are no signs of the lockdown
ending anytime soon.
The lockdown is just the latest crisis at the jail where Epstein died by suicide in August. Federal prosecutors allege that the
two correctional officers assigned to watch Epstein's unit were snoozing and shopping on the internet, and later forged
records to make it look like they checked in on him.
All visitors and inmates are searched before entering the facility and go through metal detectors. They are supposed to
leave personal belongings outside the jail. All mail is also screened by correctional staff. A gun smuggled inside would be a
major security breach.
In the past few days, officers have searched the facility and uncovered a sizable amount of contraband, including
cellphones, but no gun has not been found, the people said. Investigators are trying to determine how the contraband has
been entering into the facility.
The Bureau of Prisons said the jail is on "modified operations" because of the investigation. The bureau provided no
estimate for when normal operations could resume, raising legal concerns because the jail houses pretrial inmates while
EFTA00009800
their cases are ongoing.
In a statement to the AP, the agency said it must "take the time needed to complete a thorough investigation while
actively working to return the facility to normal operations as soon as possible."
David Patton, executive director and chief attorney of the Federal Defenders of New York, said it's a violation of inmates'
constitutional rights to deny them visits with their lawyers. He also said it has affected legal proceedings.
"Sentencings are being delayed. Hearings are being delayed," Patton said. "But the MCC acts as though it's perfectly fine
for them to just shut down the entire institution to look for contraband. It's just not acceptable. They've got to be able to
walk and chew gum at the same time."
Patton said federal prison officials have refused to provide information about what has prompted the current lockdown,
other than saying it is for "security concerns." They have not told the federal defenders that they are searching for a gun,
he said.
Patton said the chief judge in the Southern District of New York has been working with the U.S. Marshals Service to bring a
small number of people to the courthouse for individual meetings with lawyers, but they're capped at just five per day.
"It's just not nearly sufficient to deal with the need," he said.
The agency said Thursday that it arranged for additional staff from other parts of the U.S. to assist in the investigation and
ensure there is appropriate staffing at the jail. The agency said it "has maintained communication with stakeholders as
needed" and held a meeting with the chief federal judge and pubic defender in Manhattan, along with prosecutors, the
Marshals Service and probation officials.
The agency also said it has discussed a plan to resume legal visits at the jail on Friday and expects to allow full legal
visitation by next week. Visits with family members could resume as soon as this week, officials added.
"The Bureau has been working closely with the stakeholders throughout this period to ensure those defendants with
imminent court deadlines have the legal visits with their legal counsel as needed," the statement said.
Inmates are being locked down for 24 hours a day and lawyers have been told that on some units the prisoners are being
denied showers and being given cold meals in their cells. One inmate reported receiving peanut butter and jelly
sandwiches for every meal since last Thursday.
The bureau said inmates are on a periodic shower rotation, except for those in special housing units, who remain on a
regular schedule.
"All inmates have access to medical care and appointments and medical staff continue normal rounds on every floor," BOP
said.
Public Affairs
United States Department of Justice
U.S. Attorney's Office I Southern District of New York
- admin
- Site Admin
- Posts: 39751
- Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am
Re: Data set 1 - 8
by admin » Fri Dec 26, 2025 7:32 pm
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/D ... 009809.pdf
Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 2 Filed 07/02/19 Page 1 of 14
ORIGINAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
Defendant.
SEALED INDICTMENT
19 CRIM 490
COUNT ONE
(Sex Trafficking Conspiracy
The Grand Jury charges:
OVERVIEW
1. As set forth herein, over the course of many
years, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, sexually exploited and
abused dozens of minor girls at his homes in Manhattan, New .
York, and Palm Beach, Florida, among other locations.
2. In particular, from at least in or about 2002, up
to and including at least in or about 2005, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, enticed and recruited, and caused to be enticed and
recruited, minor girls to visit his mansion in Manhattan, New
York (the "New York Residence") and his estate in Palm Beach,
Florida (the "Palm Beach Residence") to engage in sex acts with
him, after which he would give the victims hundreds of dollars
in cash. Moreover, and in order to maintain and increase his
supply of victims, EPSTEIN also paid certain of his victims to
recruit additional girls to be similarly abused by EPSTEIN. In
this way, EPSTEIN created a vast network of underage victims for
him to sexually exploit in locations including New York and
Palm Beach.
3. The victims described herein were as young as 14
years old at the time they were abused by JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, and were, for various reasons, often particularly
vulnerable to exploitation. EPSTEIN intentionally sought out
minors and knew that many of his victims were in fact under the
age of 18, including because, in some instances, minor victims
expressly told him their age.
4. in creating and maintaining this network of minor
victims in multiple states to sexually abuse and exploit,
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, worked and conspired with
others, including employees and associates who facilitated his
conduct by, among other things, contacting victims and
scheduling their sexual encounters with EPSTEIN at the New York
Residence and at the Palm Beach Residence.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. During all time periods charged in this
Indictment, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, was a financier with
multiple residences in the continental United States, including
the New York Residence and the Palm Beach Residence.
6. Beginning in at least 2002, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, enticed and recruited, and caused to be enticed and
recruited, dozens of minor girls to engage in sex acts with him,
after which EPSTEIN paid the victims hundreds of dollars in
cash, at the New York Residence and the Palm Beach Residence.
7. In both New York and Florida, JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
the defendant, perpetuated this abuse in similar ways. Victims
were initially recruited to provide "massages" to EPSTEIN, which
would be performed nude or partially nude, would become
increasingly sexual in nature, and would typically include one
or more sex acts. EPSTEIN paid his victims hundreds of dollars
in cash for each encounter. Moreover, EPSTEIN actively
encouraged certain of his victims to recruit additional girls to
be similarly sexually abused. EPSTEIN incentivized his victims
to become recruiters by paying these victim-recruiters hundreds
of dollars for each girl that they brought to EPSTEIN. In so
doing, EPSTEIN maintained a steady supply of new victims to
exploit.
The New York Residence
8. At all times relevant to this Indictment, JEFFREY
EPSTEIN, the defendant, possessed and controlled a multi-story
private residence on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, New York,
i.e., the New York Residence. Between at least in or about 2002
and in or about 2005, EPSTEIN abused numerous minor victims at
the New York Residence by causing these victims to be recruited
to engage in paid sex acts with him.
9. When a victim arrived at the New York Residence,
she typically would be escorted to a room with a massage table,
where she would perform a massage on JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant. The victims, who were as young as 14 years of age,
were told by EPSTEIN or other individuals to partially or fully
undress before beginning the "massage." During the encounter,
EPSTEIN would escalate the nature and scope of physical contact
with his victim to include, among other things, sex acts such as
groping and direct and indirect contact with the victim's
genitals. EPSTEIN typically would also masturbate during these
sexualized encounters, ask victims to touch him while he
masturbated, and touch victims' genitals with his hands or with
sex toys.
10. In connection with each sexual encounter, JEFFREY
EPSTEIN, the defendant, or one of his employees or associates,
paid the victim in cash. Victims typically were paid hundreds
of dollars in cash for each encounter.
11. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, knew that many of
his New York victims were underage, including because certain
victims told him their age. Further, once these minor victims
were recruited, many were abused by EPSTEIN on multiple
subsequent occasions at the New York Residence. EPSTEIN
sometimes personally contacted victims to schedule appointments
at the New York Residence. In other instances, EPSTEIN directed
("Employee-I"), to communicate with victims via phone to arrange
for these victims to return to the New York Residence for
additional sexual encounters with EPSTEIN.
12. Additionally, and to further facilitate his
ability to abuse minor girls in New York, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, asked and enticed certain of his victims to recruit
additional girls to perform "massages" and similarly engage in
sex acts with EPSTEIN. When a victim would recruit another girl
for EPSTEIN, he paid both the victim-recruiter and the new
victim hundreds of dollars in cash. Through these victim-recruiters,
EPSTEIN gained access to and was able to abuse
dozens of additional minor girls.
13. In particular, certain recruiters brought dozens
of additional minor girls to the New York Residence to give
massages to and engage in sex acts with JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant. EPSTEIN encouraged victims to recruit additional
girls by offering to pay these victim-recruiters for every
additional girl they brought to EPSTEIN. When a victim-recruiter
accompanied a new minor victim to the New York
Residence, both the victim-recruiter and the new minor victim
were paid hundreds of dollars by EPSTEIN for each encounter. In
addition, certain victim-recruiters routinely scheduled these
encounters through Employee-1, who sometimes asked the
recruiters to bring a specific minor girl for EPSTEIN.
The Palm Beach Residence
14. In addition to recruiting and abusing minor girls
in New York, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, created a similar
network of minor girls to victimize in Palm Beach, Florida,
where EPSTEIN owned, possessed and controlled another large
residence, i.e., the Palm Beach Residence. EPSTEIN frequently
traveled from New York to Palm Beach by private jet, before
which an employee or associate would ensure that minor victims
were available for encounters upon his arrival in Florida.
15. At the Palm Beach Residence, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, engaged in a similar course of abusive conduct.
When a victim initially arrived at the Palm Beach Residence, she
would be escorted to a room, sometimes by an employee of
EPSTEIN's, including, at times, two assistants ("Employee-2" and
"Employee-3") who, as described herein, were also responsible
for scheduling sexual encounters with minor victims. Once
inside, the victim would provide a nude or semi-nude massage for
EPSTEIN, who would himself typically be naked. During these
encounters, EPSTEIN would escalate the nature and scope of the
physical contact to include sex acts such as groping and direct
and indirect contact with the victim's genitals. EPSTEIN would
also typically masturbate during these encounters, ask victims
to touch him while he masturbated, and touch victims' genitals
with his hands or with sex toys.
16. In connection with each sexual encounter, JEFFREY
EPSTEIN, the defendant, or one of his employees or associates,
paid the victim in cash. Victims typically were paid hundreds
of dollars for each encounter.
17. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, knew that certain
of his victims were underage, including because certain victims
told him their age. In addition, as with New York-based
victims, many Florida victims, once recruited, were abused by
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, on multiple additional
occasions.
18. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, who during the
relevant time period was frequently in New York, would arrange
for Employee-2 or other employees to contact victims by phone in
advance of EPSTEIN's travel to Florida to ensure appointments
were scheduled for when he arrived. In particular, in certain
instances, Employee-2 placed phone calls to minor victims in
Florida to schedule encounters at the Palm Beach Residence. At
the time of certain of those phone calls, EPSTEIN and Employee-2
were in New York, New York. Additionally, certain of the
individuals victimized at the Palm Beach Residence were
contacted by phone by Employee-3 to schedule these encounters.
19. Moreover, as in New York, to ensure a steady
stream of minor victims, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, asked
and enticed certain victims in Florida to recruit other girls to
engage in sex acts. EPSTEIN paid hundreds of dollars to victim-recruiters
for each additional girl they brought to the Palm
Beach Residence.
STATUTORY ALLEGATIONS
20. From at least in or about 2002, up to and
including in or about 2005, in the Southern District of New York
and elsewhere, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, and others known
and unknown, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire,
confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an
offense against the United States, to wit, sex trafficking of
minors, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
1591(a) and (b).
21. It was a part and object of the conspiracy that
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, and others known and unknown,
would and did, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce,
recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, and obtain, by any
means a person, and to benefit, financially and by receiving
anything of value, from participation in a venture which has
engaged in any such act, knowing that the person had not
attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a
commercial sex act, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 1591(a) and (b)(2).
Overt Acts
22. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect
the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among
others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and
elsewhere:
a. In or about 2004, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, enticed and recruited multiple minor victims,
including minor victims identified herein as Minor Victim-1,
Minor Victim-2, and Minor Victim-3, to engage in sex acts with
EPSTEIN at his residences in Manhattan, New York, and Palm
Beach, Florida, after which he provided them with hundreds of
dollars in cash for each encounter.
b. In or about 2002, Minor Victim-1 was
recruited to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN and was repeatedly
sexually abused by EPSTEIN at the New York Residence over a
period of years and was paid hundreds of dollars for each
encounter. EPSTEIN also encouraged and enticed Minor Victim-1
to recruit other girls to engage in paid sex acts, which she
did. EPSTEIN asked Minor Victim-1 how old she was, and Minor
Victim-1 answered truthfully.
c. In or about 2004, Employee-1, located in the
Southern District of New York, and on behalf of EPSTEIN, placed
a telephone call to Minor Victim-1 in order to schedule an
appointment for Minor Victim-1 to engage in paid sex acts with
EPSTEIN.
d. In or about 2004, Minor Victim-2 was
recruited to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN and was repeatedly
sexually abused by EPSTEIN at the Palm Beach Residence over a
period of years and was paid hundreds of dollars after each
encounter. EPSTEIN also encouraged and enticed Minor Victim-2
to recruit other girls to engage in paid sex acts, which she
did.
e. In or about 2005, Employee-2, located in the
Southern District of New York, and on behalf of EPSTEIN, placed
a telephone call to Minor Victim-2 in order to schedule an
appointment for Minor Victim-2 to engage in paid sex acts with
EPSTEIN.
f. In or about 2005, Minor Victim-3 was
recruited to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN and was repeatedly
sexually abused by EPSTEIN at the Palm Beach Residence over a
period of years and was paid hundreds of dollars for each
encounter. EPSTEIN also encouraged and enticed Minor Victim-3
to recruit other girls to engage in paid sex acts, which she
did. EPSTEIN asked Minor Victim-3 how old she was, and Minor
Victim-3 answered truthfully.
g. In or about 2005, Employee-2, located in the
Southern District of New York, and on behalf of EPSTEIN, placed
a telephone call to Minor Victim-3 in Florida in order to
schedule an appointment for Minor Victim-3 to engage in paid sex
acts with EPSTEIN.
h. In or about 2004, Employee-3 placed a
telephone call to Minor Victim-3 in order to schedule an
appointment for Minor Victim-3 to engage in paid sex acts with
EPSTEIN.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)
COUNT TWO
(Sex Trafficking)
The Grand Jury further charges:
23. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 19 and 22 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged
as if fully set forth within.
24. From at least in or about 2002, up to and
including in or about 2005, in the Southern District of New
York, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, willfully and knowingly,
in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, did recruit,
entice, harbor, transport, provide, and obtain by any means a
person, knowing that the person had not attained the age of 18
years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, and
did aid and abet the same, to wit, EPSTEIN recruited, enticed,
harbored, transported, provided, and obtained numerous
individuals who were less than 18 years old, including but not
limited to Minor Victim-1, as described above, and who were then
caused to engage in at least one commercial sex act in
Manhattan, New York.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a).
(b) (2), and 2.)
FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS
25. As a result of committing the offense alleged in
Count Two of this Indictment, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant,
shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1594(c)(1), any property, real and
personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or to
facilitate the commission of the offense alleged in Count Two,
and any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from
any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of
the offense alleged in Count Two, or any property traceable to
such property, and the following specific property:
a. The lot or parcel of land, together with its
buildings, appurtenances, improvements, fixtures, attachments
and easements, located at 9 East 71st Street, New York, New
York, with block number 1386 and lot number 10, owned by
Maple, Inc.
Substitute Asset Provision
26. If any of the above-described forfeitable
property, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant:
(a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a
third person;
(c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court;
(d) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(e) has been commingled with other property which cannot
be subdivided without difficulty;
it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
853(p) and 28 U.S.C. S 2461(c), to seek forfeiture of any
other property of the defendant up to the value of the above
forfeitable property.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1594; Title 21,
United States Code, Section 853(p); and
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461.)
GEOFFREY BERMAN
United States Attorney
13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
Defendant.
INDICTMENT
(18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1591(a), (b)(2),
and 2)
14
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Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 2 Filed 07/02/19 Page 1 of 14
ORIGINAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
Defendant.
SEALED INDICTMENT
19 CRIM 490
COUNT ONE
(Sex Trafficking Conspiracy
The Grand Jury charges:
OVERVIEW
1. As set forth herein, over the course of many
years, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, sexually exploited and
abused dozens of minor girls at his homes in Manhattan, New .
York, and Palm Beach, Florida, among other locations.
2. In particular, from at least in or about 2002, up
to and including at least in or about 2005, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, enticed and recruited, and caused to be enticed and
recruited, minor girls to visit his mansion in Manhattan, New
York (the "New York Residence") and his estate in Palm Beach,
Florida (the "Palm Beach Residence") to engage in sex acts with
him, after which he would give the victims hundreds of dollars
in cash. Moreover, and in order to maintain and increase his
supply of victims, EPSTEIN also paid certain of his victims to
recruit additional girls to be similarly abused by EPSTEIN. In
this way, EPSTEIN created a vast network of underage victims for
him to sexually exploit in locations including New York and
Palm Beach.
3. The victims described herein were as young as 14
years old at the time they were abused by JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, and were, for various reasons, often particularly
vulnerable to exploitation. EPSTEIN intentionally sought out
minors and knew that many of his victims were in fact under the
age of 18, including because, in some instances, minor victims
expressly told him their age.
4. in creating and maintaining this network of minor
victims in multiple states to sexually abuse and exploit,
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, worked and conspired with
others, including employees and associates who facilitated his
conduct by, among other things, contacting victims and
scheduling their sexual encounters with EPSTEIN at the New York
Residence and at the Palm Beach Residence.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. During all time periods charged in this
Indictment, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, was a financier with
multiple residences in the continental United States, including
the New York Residence and the Palm Beach Residence.
6. Beginning in at least 2002, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, enticed and recruited, and caused to be enticed and
recruited, dozens of minor girls to engage in sex acts with him,
after which EPSTEIN paid the victims hundreds of dollars in
cash, at the New York Residence and the Palm Beach Residence.
7. In both New York and Florida, JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
the defendant, perpetuated this abuse in similar ways. Victims
were initially recruited to provide "massages" to EPSTEIN, which
would be performed nude or partially nude, would become
increasingly sexual in nature, and would typically include one
or more sex acts. EPSTEIN paid his victims hundreds of dollars
in cash for each encounter. Moreover, EPSTEIN actively
encouraged certain of his victims to recruit additional girls to
be similarly sexually abused. EPSTEIN incentivized his victims
to become recruiters by paying these victim-recruiters hundreds
of dollars for each girl that they brought to EPSTEIN. In so
doing, EPSTEIN maintained a steady supply of new victims to
exploit.
The New York Residence
8. At all times relevant to this Indictment, JEFFREY
EPSTEIN, the defendant, possessed and controlled a multi-story
private residence on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, New York,
i.e., the New York Residence. Between at least in or about 2002
and in or about 2005, EPSTEIN abused numerous minor victims at
the New York Residence by causing these victims to be recruited
to engage in paid sex acts with him.
9. When a victim arrived at the New York Residence,
she typically would be escorted to a room with a massage table,
where she would perform a massage on JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant. The victims, who were as young as 14 years of age,
were told by EPSTEIN or other individuals to partially or fully
undress before beginning the "massage." During the encounter,
EPSTEIN would escalate the nature and scope of physical contact
with his victim to include, among other things, sex acts such as
groping and direct and indirect contact with the victim's
genitals. EPSTEIN typically would also masturbate during these
sexualized encounters, ask victims to touch him while he
masturbated, and touch victims' genitals with his hands or with
sex toys.
10. In connection with each sexual encounter, JEFFREY
EPSTEIN, the defendant, or one of his employees or associates,
paid the victim in cash. Victims typically were paid hundreds
of dollars in cash for each encounter.
11. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, knew that many of
his New York victims were underage, including because certain
victims told him their age. Further, once these minor victims
were recruited, many were abused by EPSTEIN on multiple
subsequent occasions at the New York Residence. EPSTEIN
sometimes personally contacted victims to schedule appointments
at the New York Residence. In other instances, EPSTEIN directed
("Employee-I"), to communicate with victims via phone to arrange
for these victims to return to the New York Residence for
additional sexual encounters with EPSTEIN.
12. Additionally, and to further facilitate his
ability to abuse minor girls in New York, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, asked and enticed certain of his victims to recruit
additional girls to perform "massages" and similarly engage in
sex acts with EPSTEIN. When a victim would recruit another girl
for EPSTEIN, he paid both the victim-recruiter and the new
victim hundreds of dollars in cash. Through these victim-recruiters,
EPSTEIN gained access to and was able to abuse
dozens of additional minor girls.
13. In particular, certain recruiters brought dozens
of additional minor girls to the New York Residence to give
massages to and engage in sex acts with JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant. EPSTEIN encouraged victims to recruit additional
girls by offering to pay these victim-recruiters for every
additional girl they brought to EPSTEIN. When a victim-recruiter
accompanied a new minor victim to the New York
Residence, both the victim-recruiter and the new minor victim
were paid hundreds of dollars by EPSTEIN for each encounter. In
addition, certain victim-recruiters routinely scheduled these
encounters through Employee-1, who sometimes asked the
recruiters to bring a specific minor girl for EPSTEIN.
The Palm Beach Residence
14. In addition to recruiting and abusing minor girls
in New York, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, created a similar
network of minor girls to victimize in Palm Beach, Florida,
where EPSTEIN owned, possessed and controlled another large
residence, i.e., the Palm Beach Residence. EPSTEIN frequently
traveled from New York to Palm Beach by private jet, before
which an employee or associate would ensure that minor victims
were available for encounters upon his arrival in Florida.
15. At the Palm Beach Residence, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, engaged in a similar course of abusive conduct.
When a victim initially arrived at the Palm Beach Residence, she
would be escorted to a room, sometimes by an employee of
EPSTEIN's, including, at times, two assistants ("Employee-2" and
"Employee-3") who, as described herein, were also responsible
for scheduling sexual encounters with minor victims. Once
inside, the victim would provide a nude or semi-nude massage for
EPSTEIN, who would himself typically be naked. During these
encounters, EPSTEIN would escalate the nature and scope of the
physical contact to include sex acts such as groping and direct
and indirect contact with the victim's genitals. EPSTEIN would
also typically masturbate during these encounters, ask victims
to touch him while he masturbated, and touch victims' genitals
with his hands or with sex toys.
16. In connection with each sexual encounter, JEFFREY
EPSTEIN, the defendant, or one of his employees or associates,
paid the victim in cash. Victims typically were paid hundreds
of dollars for each encounter.
17. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, knew that certain
of his victims were underage, including because certain victims
told him their age. In addition, as with New York-based
victims, many Florida victims, once recruited, were abused by
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, on multiple additional
occasions.
18. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, who during the
relevant time period was frequently in New York, would arrange
for Employee-2 or other employees to contact victims by phone in
advance of EPSTEIN's travel to Florida to ensure appointments
were scheduled for when he arrived. In particular, in certain
instances, Employee-2 placed phone calls to minor victims in
Florida to schedule encounters at the Palm Beach Residence. At
the time of certain of those phone calls, EPSTEIN and Employee-2
were in New York, New York. Additionally, certain of the
individuals victimized at the Palm Beach Residence were
contacted by phone by Employee-3 to schedule these encounters.
19. Moreover, as in New York, to ensure a steady
stream of minor victims, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, asked
and enticed certain victims in Florida to recruit other girls to
engage in sex acts. EPSTEIN paid hundreds of dollars to victim-recruiters
for each additional girl they brought to the Palm
Beach Residence.
STATUTORY ALLEGATIONS
20. From at least in or about 2002, up to and
including in or about 2005, in the Southern District of New York
and elsewhere, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, and others known
and unknown, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire,
confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an
offense against the United States, to wit, sex trafficking of
minors, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
1591(a) and (b).
21. It was a part and object of the conspiracy that
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, and others known and unknown,
would and did, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce,
recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, and obtain, by any
means a person, and to benefit, financially and by receiving
anything of value, from participation in a venture which has
engaged in any such act, knowing that the person had not
attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a
commercial sex act, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 1591(a) and (b)(2).
Overt Acts
22. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect
the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among
others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and
elsewhere:
a. In or about 2004, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the
defendant, enticed and recruited multiple minor victims,
including minor victims identified herein as Minor Victim-1,
Minor Victim-2, and Minor Victim-3, to engage in sex acts with
EPSTEIN at his residences in Manhattan, New York, and Palm
Beach, Florida, after which he provided them with hundreds of
dollars in cash for each encounter.
b. In or about 2002, Minor Victim-1 was
recruited to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN and was repeatedly
sexually abused by EPSTEIN at the New York Residence over a
period of years and was paid hundreds of dollars for each
encounter. EPSTEIN also encouraged and enticed Minor Victim-1
to recruit other girls to engage in paid sex acts, which she
did. EPSTEIN asked Minor Victim-1 how old she was, and Minor
Victim-1 answered truthfully.
c. In or about 2004, Employee-1, located in the
Southern District of New York, and on behalf of EPSTEIN, placed
a telephone call to Minor Victim-1 in order to schedule an
appointment for Minor Victim-1 to engage in paid sex acts with
EPSTEIN.
d. In or about 2004, Minor Victim-2 was
recruited to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN and was repeatedly
sexually abused by EPSTEIN at the Palm Beach Residence over a
period of years and was paid hundreds of dollars after each
encounter. EPSTEIN also encouraged and enticed Minor Victim-2
to recruit other girls to engage in paid sex acts, which she
did.
e. In or about 2005, Employee-2, located in the
Southern District of New York, and on behalf of EPSTEIN, placed
a telephone call to Minor Victim-2 in order to schedule an
appointment for Minor Victim-2 to engage in paid sex acts with
EPSTEIN.
f. In or about 2005, Minor Victim-3 was
recruited to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN and was repeatedly
sexually abused by EPSTEIN at the Palm Beach Residence over a
period of years and was paid hundreds of dollars for each
encounter. EPSTEIN also encouraged and enticed Minor Victim-3
to recruit other girls to engage in paid sex acts, which she
did. EPSTEIN asked Minor Victim-3 how old she was, and Minor
Victim-3 answered truthfully.
g. In or about 2005, Employee-2, located in the
Southern District of New York, and on behalf of EPSTEIN, placed
a telephone call to Minor Victim-3 in Florida in order to
schedule an appointment for Minor Victim-3 to engage in paid sex
acts with EPSTEIN.
h. In or about 2004, Employee-3 placed a
telephone call to Minor Victim-3 in order to schedule an
appointment for Minor Victim-3 to engage in paid sex acts with
EPSTEIN.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)
COUNT TWO
(Sex Trafficking)
The Grand Jury further charges:
23. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 19 and 22 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged
as if fully set forth within.
24. From at least in or about 2002, up to and
including in or about 2005, in the Southern District of New
York, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, willfully and knowingly,
in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, did recruit,
entice, harbor, transport, provide, and obtain by any means a
person, knowing that the person had not attained the age of 18
years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, and
did aid and abet the same, to wit, EPSTEIN recruited, enticed,
harbored, transported, provided, and obtained numerous
individuals who were less than 18 years old, including but not
limited to Minor Victim-1, as described above, and who were then
caused to engage in at least one commercial sex act in
Manhattan, New York.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a).
(b) (2), and 2.)
FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS
25. As a result of committing the offense alleged in
Count Two of this Indictment, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant,
shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1594(c)(1), any property, real and
personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or to
facilitate the commission of the offense alleged in Count Two,
and any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from
any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of
the offense alleged in Count Two, or any property traceable to
such property, and the following specific property:
a. The lot or parcel of land, together with its
buildings, appurtenances, improvements, fixtures, attachments
and easements, located at 9 East 71st Street, New York, New
York, with block number 1386 and lot number 10, owned by
Maple, Inc.
Substitute Asset Provision
26. If any of the above-described forfeitable
property, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant:
(a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a
third person;
(c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court;
(d) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(e) has been commingled with other property which cannot
be subdivided without difficulty;
it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
853(p) and 28 U.S.C. S 2461(c), to seek forfeiture of any
other property of the defendant up to the value of the above
forfeitable property.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1594; Title 21,
United States Code, Section 853(p); and
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461.)
GEOFFREY BERMAN
United States Attorney
13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
Defendant.
INDICTMENT
(18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1591(a), (b)(2),
and 2)
14
EFTA00009822
- admin
- Site Admin
- Posts: 39751
- Joined: Thu Aug 01, 2013 5:21 am
Re: Data set 1 - 8
by admin » Sat Dec 27, 2025 8:26 pm
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/D ... 009865.pdf
From: Sigrid McCawley
Sent: Monday, December 14, 2020 8:39 PM
To:
Cc: Sigrid McCawley
Subject: Filing
Hello Maureen,
I hope you are doing great. This is the statement that would like to submit. What format would you like me to send
it in? Should it be as a signed declaration? She is comfortable having it attributed to her name.
"I appreciate the opportunity to again be heard by the Court in this matter and once more request that Ghislaine
Maxwell not be released prior to her trial. I write this not only on behalf of myself, but all of the other girls and
young women who were victimized by Maxwell. Ghislaine Maxwell sexually abused me as a child and the
government has the responsibility to make sure that she stands trial for her crimes. I do not believe that will
happen or that any of her victims will see justice if she is released on bail. She has lived a life of privilege,
abusing her position of power to live beyond the rules. Fleeing the country in order to escape once more would
fit with her long history of anti-social behavior.
Drawing on my personal experience with Maxwell and what I have learned of how she has lived since that time,
I believe that she is a psychopath. Her abuse of me and many other children and young women is evidence of her
disregard for and violation of the rights of others. She has demonstrated a complete failure to accept to
responsibility in any way for her actions and demonstrated a complete lack of remorse for her central role in
procuring victims for Epstein. She was both charming and manipulative with me during the grooming process,
consistent with what many of her victims have described. She has frequently lied to others, including repeatedly
lying about me and my family. Maxwell has for decades lived a parasitic lifestyle relying on Epstein and others
to fund her lavish existence.
Maxwell has repeatedly demonstrated that her primary concern is her own welfare, and that she is willing to
harm others if it benefits her. She is quite capable of doing so once more. She will not hesitate to leave the
country irrespective of whether others will be on the hook financially for her actions because she lacks empathy,
and therefore simply does not care about hurting others. She would in fact be highly motivated to flee in order to
reduce the possibility of continued imprisonment, the conditions of which she has continuously complained. Her
actions over the last several years and choice to live in isolation for long periods suggest that being comfortable
is more important to her than being connected. Even more concerning, is if she is let out she has the ability to
once again abuse children and the painful consequences of that type of trauma can last a lifetime. I implore the
Court to make sure that Ghislaine Maxwell does not escape justice by keeping her incarcerated until her trial."
Sigrid McCawley
Partner
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
http://www.bsfllp.com
From: Sigrid McCawley
Sent: Monday, December 14, 2020 8:39 PM
To:
Cc: Sigrid McCawley
Subject: Filing
Hello Maureen,
I hope you are doing great. This is the statement that would like to submit. What format would you like me to send
it in? Should it be as a signed declaration? She is comfortable having it attributed to her name.
"I appreciate the opportunity to again be heard by the Court in this matter and once more request that Ghislaine
Maxwell not be released prior to her trial. I write this not only on behalf of myself, but all of the other girls and
young women who were victimized by Maxwell. Ghislaine Maxwell sexually abused me as a child and the
government has the responsibility to make sure that she stands trial for her crimes. I do not believe that will
happen or that any of her victims will see justice if she is released on bail. She has lived a life of privilege,
abusing her position of power to live beyond the rules. Fleeing the country in order to escape once more would
fit with her long history of anti-social behavior.
Drawing on my personal experience with Maxwell and what I have learned of how she has lived since that time,
I believe that she is a psychopath. Her abuse of me and many other children and young women is evidence of her
disregard for and violation of the rights of others. She has demonstrated a complete failure to accept to
responsibility in any way for her actions and demonstrated a complete lack of remorse for her central role in
procuring victims for Epstein. She was both charming and manipulative with me during the grooming process,
consistent with what many of her victims have described. She has frequently lied to others, including repeatedly
lying about me and my family. Maxwell has for decades lived a parasitic lifestyle relying on Epstein and others
to fund her lavish existence.
Maxwell has repeatedly demonstrated that her primary concern is her own welfare, and that she is willing to
harm others if it benefits her. She is quite capable of doing so once more. She will not hesitate to leave the
country irrespective of whether others will be on the hook financially for her actions because she lacks empathy,
and therefore simply does not care about hurting others. She would in fact be highly motivated to flee in order to
reduce the possibility of continued imprisonment, the conditions of which she has continuously complained. Her
actions over the last several years and choice to live in isolation for long periods suggest that being comfortable
is more important to her than being connected. Even more concerning, is if she is let out she has the ability to
once again abuse children and the painful consequences of that type of trauma can last a lifetime. I implore the
Court to make sure that Ghislaine Maxwell does not escape justice by keeping her incarcerated until her trial."
Sigrid McCawley
Partner
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
http://www.bsfllp.com
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