Part 1 of 2
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap ... 6.67.1.pdf
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
J.G.G., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No: 1:25-cv-00766-JEB
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 1:25-cv-00766-JEB Document 67-1 Filed 03/28/25
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .... 1
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND .. 1
LEGAL STANDARD ............ 8
ARGUMENT ........... 8
I. Defendants’ Action is Subject to Judicial Review Under the APA and in Equity, and Need Not Be Brought in Habeas. .... 9
II. The Court Can Reach the Merits of Plaintiffs’ Claims. 14
A. The AEA Cases Confirm the Justiciability of Plaintiffs’ Claims. ...... 15
III. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits. ........ 21
A. The Proclamation Does Not Satisfy the AEA ........... 21
B. The Proclamation Violates the Specific Protections that Congress Established for Noncitizens Seeking Humanitarian Protection. ... 34
C. The Proclamation Violates the Procedural Requirements of the INA. ............ 36
IV. The Administration’s Abuse of the Alien Enemies Act Has Caused and Will Continue to Cause Plaintiffs Irreparable Harm. ......... 38
V. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Weigh Decidedly in Favor of a Preliminary Injunction Order. . 40
VI. The Court Should Not Require Plaintiffs to Provide Security Prior to the Preliminary Injunction Order. . 41
CONCLUSION ....... 41
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......... 43
[/b]TABLE OF AUTHORITIES[/b]
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967) ......... 11
Abourezk v. Reagan,
785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) ....... 16
Al Warafi v Obama,
No. CV 09-2368 (RCL), 2015 WL 4600420 (D.D.C. July 30, 2015), order vacated as moot (Mar. 4, 2016) ..... 17
Al-Alwi v. Trump,
901 F.3d 294 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ...... 17
Al-Joudi v. Bush,
406 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2005) 33
Alpine Secs. Corp. v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth.,
121 F.4th 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ..... 7
Al-Tamimi v. Adelson,
916 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .......... 15
Aracely, R. v. Nielsen,
319 F. Supp. 3d 110 (D.D.C. 2018) ....... 8, 11
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.,
575 U.S. 320 (2015) ......... 11
Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) . 15
Bauer v. Watkins,
171 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1948) .... 13, 27
Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154 (1997) ......... 11
Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008) ......... 26
Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky,
410 U.S. 484 (1973) ........... 9
Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh,
864 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ........ 9
Citizens Protective League v. Byrnes,
64 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1946) ....... 8
Citizens Protective League v. Clark,
155 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ......... 8, 13, 14
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,
470 U.S. 226 (1985) ......... 16
Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981) ......... 11
Damus v. Nielsen,
313 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D.D.C. 2018) 8
Davis v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n,
716 F.3d 660 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ........ 9
Demjanjuk v. Holder,
563 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2009) ......... 33
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California,
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) .... 11
El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States,
607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 15, 16
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
584 U.S. 497 (2018) ......... 29
Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) .......... 20
Ex parte Gilroy,
257 F. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) .......... 27
Ex Parte Milligan,
71 U.S. 2 (1866) .. 27
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,
589 U.S. 221 (2020) ......... 16
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557 (2006) ... 18, 26
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004) ... 17, 27
Holmes v. Jennison,
39 U.S. 540 (1840) ........... 23
Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas,
27 F.4th 718 (D.C. Cir. 2022) .... 8, 11, 29, 33
Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas,
560 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D.D.C. 2021) ........... 33
INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) ... 16, 26
J.D. v. Azar,
925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ...... 8
J.G.G. v. Trump,
No. 25-5067, 2025 WL 914682 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2025) ........ passim
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,
478 U.S. 221 (1986) ......... 15
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
367 U.S. 303 (1961) ......... 21
Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950) ......... 21
Jones v. Hendrix,
599 U.S. 465 (2023) ......... 30
Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
896 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ...... 17
League of Women Voters v. Newby,
838 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .......... 34
Leiva-Perez v. Holder,
640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011) ......... 33
LoBue v. Christopher
82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ........ 9
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369 (2024) ......... 15
Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. 160 (1948) .......... 12, 21, 27
Luokung Tech. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def.,
538 F. Supp. 3d 174, 195 (D.D.C. 2021) ... 34
Mathis v. U.S. Parole Commission,
749 F.Supp.3d 8 (D.D.C. 2024) .... 11
McQuiggin v. Perkins,
569 U.S. 383 (2013) ......... 12
Medellin v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491 (2008) ......... 23
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
498 U.S. 19 (1990) ........... 31
Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674 (2008) ........... 9
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon,
492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ...... 12
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U.S. 345 (1921) ......... 30
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) ... 32, 34
NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.,
580 U.S. 288 (2017) ......... 31
P.J.E.S. ex rel. Escobar Francisco v. Wolf,
502 F. Supp. 3d 492 (D.D.C. 2020) ..... 33, 35
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935) ......... 11
Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U.S. 395 (1946) ......... 12
Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973) ....... 8, 9
Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. FEC,
831 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ...... 34
R.I.L.-R v. Johnson,
80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.C.C. 2015) 11
Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S.,
758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ...... 28
Robbins v. Reagan,
780 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ........ 10
Sessions v. Dimaya,
584 U.S. 148 (2018) ......... 22
Simms v. District of Columbia,
872 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2012) 34
Skinner v. Switzer,
562 U.S. 521 (2011) ........... 8
Trump v. Hawaii,
585 U.S. 667 (2018) ......... 11
U.S. Dep’t of Com. v. Montana,
503 U.S. 442 (1992) ......... 15
U.S. ex rel. D’Esquiva v. Uhl,
137 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1943) .... 13, 17
U.S. ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins,
164 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1947) .......... 13
U.S. ex rel. Hoehn v. Shaughnessy,
175 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1949) .......... 14
U.S. ex rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi,
342 U.S. 347 (1952) ......... 13
U.S. ex rel. Kessler v. Watkins,
163 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1947) .... 13, 17
U.S. ex rel. Ludwig v. Watkins,
164 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1947) .... 14, 28
U.S. ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl,
137 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1943) .......... 13
U.S. ex rel. Von Heymann v. Watkins,
159 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1947) .... 14, 28
U.S. ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl,
137 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1943) .... 13, 17
United States ex rel. Dorfler v. Watkins,
171 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1948) .......... 28
United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl,
137 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1943) .......... 27
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159 (1977) ......... 11
United States v. Tinoso,
327 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003) ......... 31
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) ......... 18
Wiborg v. United States,
163 U.S. 632 (1896) ......... 21
Wilkinson v. Dotson,
544 U.S. 74 (2005) 9
Wilkinson v. Garland,
601 U.S. 209 (2024) ......... 16
Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974) ........... 9
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) .. passim
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton,
566 U.S. 189 (2012) .......... 15, 16, 18
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 2339A .. 25
22 U.S.C. § 6442a ... 25
42 U.S.C. § 265 ....... 29
5 U.S.C. § 704 ......... 10
50 U.S.C. § 21 .. passim
50 U.S.C. § 22 ... 23, 28
8 U.S.C. § 1158 ....... 30
8 U.S.C. § 1229a ............ 31, 32
8 U.S.C. § 1531 . 31, 32
8 U.S.C. § 1532 ....... 31
8 U.S.C. § 1533 ....... 31
8 U.S.C. § 1534 ....... 31
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 ..... 30
8 U.S.C. §1231 .. 29, 30
8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 ..... 8
Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578 .......... 20
Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578 .......... 20
Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 561 ....... 20
C.F.R. §§ 208.16 to 208.18 .. 29
Other Authorities
5 Annals of Cong. 1453 (Apr. 1798) 25
7 Annals of Cong. 58 (May 1797) .... 20
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 .. 15
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047, 2066 (2005) ........ 25
Jennifer K. Elsea & Matthew C. Weed, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL3113, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force 1 (2014) ......... 26
John Jay, Con’t Cong., Draft of an Address of the Convention of the Representatives of the State of New York to Their Constituents (Dec. 23, 1776) 19
John Lord O’Brian, Special Ass’t to the Att’y Gen. for War Work, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Annual Meeting: Civil Liberty in War Time, at 8 (Jan. 17, 1919) .... 25
Johnson’s Dictionary (1773) 19
Letter from George Washington to Nathanael Greene (Jan. 29, 1783) . 19
Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 6, 1781) ... 19
Letter from Timothy Pickering, Sec’y of State, to Alexander Hamilton (June 9, 1798) . 19
S. Rep. No. 82-1137 (Jan. 29, 1952) . 31
U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988) ........... 29
Webster’s Dictionary (1828) ....... 18, 19
INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented Proclamation at the heart of this case is unlawful because the Alien Enemies Act is a wartime measure that cannot be used where, as here, there is neither an “invasion or predatory incursion” nor such an act perpetrated by a “foreign nation or government.” And even if it could be used against a non-military criminal “gang” during peacetime, targeted individuals must be provided with a meaningful chance to contest that they fall within the Proclamation’s scope. That is particularly so given the increasing number of class members who dispute the government’s allegations of gang affiliation. For these and other reasons, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits. The remaining factors also decidedly tip in Plaintiffs’ favor. In the absence of an injunction, the government will be free to send hundreds more individuals, without notice, to the notorious Salvadoran prison where they may be held incommunicado for the rest of their lives. The government will suffer no comparable harm given that this Court has not prohibited it from prosecuting anyone who commits a criminal offense, detaining anyone under the Act or other authority, or removing anyone under the immigration laws, and the government has already conceded that some form of judicial review is appropriate. A preliminary injunction is warranted to preserve the status quo.
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As described in more detail in Plaintiffs’ prior filings, on March 14, the President signed a Proclamation announcing that Tren de Aragua (“TdA”), a Venezuelan gang, is “perpetrating, attempting, and threatening an invasion or predatory incursion” against the United States. See Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua (Mar. 15, 2025)1 (“Proclamation”); see also Mot. for TRO at 4-5, ECF No. 3-2.2 Prior to the Proclamation, ICE had moved Venezuelan detainees into position such that, when it was made public, the detainees had already being transported to the airport and were being loaded onto planes. See Mot. for TRO at 5. Those flights took off quickly and, despite this Court’s order to return individuals on the flights who were being removed pursuant to the AEA, the planes continued to El Salvador and the individuals were handed over to El Salvador. Pls.’ Response to Defs.’ Notice, ECF No. 21. Class members were promptly detained in that country’s Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT). Opp. to Mot. to Vacate at 10, ECF No. 44. As detailed previously, the conditions in El Salvador’s prisons are horrific. See generally Goebertus Decl., ECF No. 44- 3; Bishop Decl. ECF No. 44-4; Opp. to Mot. to Vacate at 9-10.
The government also sent eight Venezuelan women to CECOT, presumably pursuant to the Proclamation. Exh. I, Beckman Decl. ¶¶ 8-10; see also S.Z.F.R. Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 55-1; E.E.P.B. Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 55-2. However, upon landing, Salvadoran officials informed U.S. officials that CECOT does not imprison women. S.Z.F.R. Decl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 55-1; E.E.P.B. Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 55-2. The government returned the eight Venezuelan women to the United States, along with a Nicaraguan man whom they also attempted to send to CECOT. S.Z.F.R. Decl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 55-1; E.E.P.B. Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 55-2; Beckman Decl. ¶ 11.
In the past two weeks, more details have begun to emerge. Named Plaintiffs received no advance notice of the basis for their removal. Exh. C, J.G.G. Second Supp. Decl. ¶ 4; Exh. E, Shealy Second Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Exh. D, Carney Decl. Second Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5; Exh. F, Lauterback Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Exh. G, Smyth Second Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. They were never given any paperwork. Indeed, no government officers bothered to inform them that the plane they were boarding was headed to El Salvador. Id.; see also J.G.G. Suppl. Decl. ¶ 4; Exh. L, Thierry Decl. ¶ 10; Smyth Supp. Decl. ¶ 3. The government suggests they provided individuals with a notice form that asserts the men are alien enemies and pointedly states that they are “not entitled to a hearing, appeal, or judicial review of this notice and warrant of apprehension and removal.” Exh. S, Sarabia Roman Decl., Exh. 1 (AEA Validation Guide and Notice). But Plaintiffs and other class members received no such notice. Their immigration attorneys were never informed or notified of their impending deportation or the basis for the removal. Shealy Decl. ¶ 6; Thierry Decl. ¶ 9; Exh. M, Caro-Cruz Decl. ¶ 14; Exh. N, Kim Decl. ¶¶ 10-14; Smyth Supp. Decl. ¶ 6.
Whether most (or perhaps all) of the class members lack ties to TdA remains to be seen, because the government secretly rushed the men out of the country and has provided Plaintiffs with no information about the class. But evidence since the flights on March 15 increasingly shows that many class members removed to El Salvador are not “members” of TdA as is required to fall within the Proclamation; many have no ties to TdA at all.
For instance, one of the deported class members, Andry Jose Hernandez Romero, is a professional makeup artist who identifies as gay and never had an opportunity to contest the government’s TdA allegations. Exh. H, Reyes Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 25. While in detention he was tagged as a TdA associate based solely on his tattoos. Id. ¶¶ 4-7. Specifically, the government has apparently relied solely on two crown tattoos for a connection to TdA, having found no contact with gang members, no supporting evidence from intelligence agencies, or any other of its own indicators. Id. ¶¶ 22-24. Mr. Hernandez Romero has consistently denied affiliation with TdA, as the government’s own records show, id. (Exhibit A); his crown tattoos, which accompany the words “Mom” and “Dad,” have nothing to do with the TdA and reflect his work as a makeup artist for beauty pageants and his hometown’s association with the “Three Kings” festival, id. ¶¶ 21-23; see also id. (Exhibit B). Yet, he was subject to the Proclamation and deported without any notice to him or his attorney. Two days later, at his court hearing, his attorney learned for the first time of his removal. Id. ¶¶ 14-17. Even then the government’s attorney did not know the basis for removal.
Another deported class member, Jerce Reyes Barrios, was accused of being in TdA based on a tattoo of a soccer ball with a crown. Exh. K, Tobin Decl. ¶ 7. But Mr. Reyes Barrios is a professional soccer player, and the tattoo is similar to the logo for his favorite soccer team, Real Madrid. Id. Moreover, the government pointed to a social media post where Mr. Reyes Barrios made a common hand gesture that means “I love you” in sign language. Id. ¶ 8. But Mr. Reyes Barrios was never given the opportunity to explain this because he was removed prior to his immigration hearing, which was set for just over a month after the government deported him. Id. ¶ 4.
Yet another deported class member, Neri Alvarado Borges, was told by ICE officers that they picked him up because of his tattoos—one of which was an autism awareness ribbon with the name of his brother, who is autistic, on it. Sarabia Roman Decl., Exh. 17 (photo of tattoo). While the ICE agent who inspected his tattoos and his phone said he had nothing to do with Tren de Aragua, the Dallas ICE Field Office decided to keep Mr. Alvarado Borges in detention. Id. Mr. Alvarado Borges’s U.S.-citizen boss was stunned to hear that his employee—someone who he described as a “stand-up guy” and one of his few close friends—had been detained and ultimately deported. Id.
While these errors would be troublesome in any case, they are particularly devastating here, where Plaintiffs have strong claims for relief under our immigration laws and have ended up in one of the worst prisons in the world. For example, Mr. Silva experienced threats of death and physical violence by political opponents in Venezuela because of his parents’ political activities. Exh. O, A.V.S.O. Decl. ¶ 4. Mr. Hernandez Romero passed his asylum credible fear interview after suffering persecution on account of his sexual orientation and political opinion at the Venezuelan government sponsored news channel where he worked. Reyes Decl. ¶¶ 4-7. Mr. Reyes Barrios was tortured in Venezuela using electric shocks and suffocation after protesting Maduro’s authoritarian regime. Tobin Decl. ¶ 2. And E.V. already had refugee status, after undergoing 17 months of background checks by the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and demonstrating the persecution he had faced at the hands of Venezuelan paramilitary groups, colectivos, for exposing government shortcomings. Sarabia Roman Decl., Exh. 11.
The government’s errors are unsurprising, given the methods it is employing to identify members of TdA. The “Alien Enemy Validation Guide” that, upon information and belief, the government is using to ascertain alien enemy status, requires ICE officers to tally points for different categories of alleged TdA membership characteristics. Sarabia Roman Decl., Exh. 1. If an individual is given a score of 8 points, he is automatically deemed an “alien enemy;” six or seven points requires supervisor approval to label the individual a TdA member. Id. But experts have cast serious doubt on the checklist’s methodology. For example, the checklist gives four points for “tattoos denoting membership/loyalty to TDA,” but experts who study TdA explain that the gang “has never had . . . identity marks such as tattoos that identify its members.” Exh. B, Antillano Decl. ¶ 14; Exh. A, Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 22, 24 (“Tattoos are not a reliable way to identify members of the group.”); Exh. J, Dudley Decl. ¶ 25 (tattoos are not a “reliable means” of identifying TdA); see also Sarabia Roman Decl., Exh. 20 (“Venezuelan gangs are not identified by tattoos.”). Instead, tattoos are a common part of Venezuelan culture and many young people, whether in a gang or not, have them.3 Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 22, 24; Antillano Decl.¶ 14; see also Sarabia Roman Decl., Exh. 20 (“gang members also sport tattoos considered culturally popular at the moment and popular among the general public”).4 The scoring system also gives between two to four points for the use of hand gestures, symbols, logos, graffiti, or manner of dress but experts say these are also unreliable ways to identify TdA members. Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 23-24 (TdA does not have “iconography or unifying cultural motifs, such as symbols, insignias, logos, notations, graffiti tags, music, or drawings” nor “a typical manner of dress . . .” “associated with them”); Antillano Decl. ¶ 14 (no “symbol” or “identity mark” to identify TdA members). And there is no evidence that TdA has a constitution or membership certificate—which is worth six points on the checklist. Antillano Decl. ¶ 14.
The arbitrariness of Defendants’ process, particularly their reliance on tattoos as supposed evidence of TdA affiliation, is underscored by Plaintiffs’ experience. Indeed, four of the five named Plaintiffs possesses tattoos entirely unrelated to TdA—the fifth has no tattoos at all. See ECF No. 3-3 J.G.G. Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 3-3; Carney Second Supp. Decl. ¶ 6; Smyth Second Supp. Decl. ¶ 7; Lauterback Supp. Decl. ¶ 4 ; Shealy Second Supp. Decl. for J.G.O. ¶ 6 (no tattoos). All five vehemently deny membership in TdA, yet none was afforded an opportunity to contest this baseless designation. See ECF No. 3-3 (J.G.G. Decl.) ¶ 3, ECF No. 3-3; Carney Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 44-11; Smyth Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11, ECF No. 44-12; W.G.H. Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 3-6; Shealy Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 44-9; see also Exh. P, M.Y.O.R. ¶¶ 6-7. Likewise, numerous credible reports document additional noncitizens summarily removed under the Proclamation who had tattoos wholly unrelated to TdA—or no tattoos at all—and were similarly denied any chance to dispute their erroneous designations. See Sarabia Roman Decl., Exhs. 4-20; see also A.V.S.O. Decl. ¶ 9; Exh. Q, M.A.A. Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; M.Y.O.R. Decl. ¶ 6; Exh. R, Y.R.R. Decl. ¶ 10; Beckman Decl. ¶ 3.
Experts who have spent over a decade studying policing, violence, migration, prisons, and organized crime in Venezuela—and TdA in particular—submit declarations with this motion that provide a more accurate, comprehensive picture of TdA and its activities. TdA is a loose, decentralized group without a clear hierarchy or membership. Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 1, 27; Antillano Decl. ¶ 10. Following the Venezuelan government’s raid on the gang’s prison headquarters in 2023, the group has become even more diffuse and uncoordinated. Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 16, 27; Antillano Decl. ¶ 11; Dudley Decl. ¶ 22. TdA does not act as the de facto government in any region of Venezuela. Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 13-16. Experts further explain that there is no evidence of direct and stable links between the Maduro regime and TdA, nor evidence that the gang is intertwined with the Maduro regime or an arm of the Venezuelan state. Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 1, 14, 17; Antillano Decl. ¶ 13; Dudley Decl. ¶¶ 2, 21, 23.
Experts have also explained that TdA does not have a significant presence in the United States and that its activities here are not widespread or coordinated. Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 19, 27; Antillano Decl. ¶ 12; Dudley Decl. ¶¶ 2, 24. They have likewise stated that there is no evidence to indicate that the Venezuelan government has directed TdA to enter the United States or that it controls TdA’s activities within the United States. Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 17, 20; Antillano Decl. ¶13; Dudley Decl. ¶¶ 2, 23-24. In fact, the government’s own intelligence agencies circulated findings in February 2025 that contradict the assertions in the Proclamation. Sarabia Roman Decl. Exh. 19 (intelligence community assessment concluded that TdA “was not directed by Venezuela’s government or committing crimes in the United States on its orders”).
LEGAL STANDARD
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the party must show that (1) it is “likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) it is “likely to suffer harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips in its favor”; and (4) the issuance of a preliminary injunction is “in the public interest.” Alpine Secs. Corp. v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., 121 F.4th 1314, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).
ARGUMENT
Since the Court granted the TRO, the justification for preliminary relief has only grown as evidence of Plaintiffs’ irreparable harm grows and sheds doubt on the government’s asserted justifications for summary removals. For the same reasons that the Court correctly granted a TRO, Plaintiffs easily satisfy the factors for a preliminary injunction. Defendants’ actions violate the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and due process. Plaintiffs have already suffered and will continue to suffer immense and irreparable harm without the Court’s intervention, and the balance of the equities and public interest fall decisively in Plaintiffs’ favor.
I. Defendants’ Action is Subject to Judicial Review Under the APA and in Equity, and Need Not Be Brought in Habeas.
The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because they need not be brought in habeas in the district of confinement, and Defendants’ conduct is plainly reviewable under the APA and in equity. Because Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive, declaratory, and other relief that does not require release, this case need not be brought in habeas. Plaintiffs therefore can pursue their claims outside of habeas, just as courts in this District have allowed detained noncitizens to do in multiple cases over the years. See, e.g., Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 718 (D.C. Cir. 2022); J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 323 (D.D.C. 2018); Aracely, R. v. Nielsen, 319 F. Supp. 3d 110, 126-27 (D.D.C. 2018). And this Court has already properly rejected the government’s contention that because Plaintiffs could bring their claims in habeas, they therefore must do so and cannot bring their claims under the APA or equity. Op. 13.5
First, a habeas action is not required. Although most past AEA cases were brought in habeas, “that fact is largely a relic of historical happenstance.” Op. 13. No court has held that AEA challenges must be brought in habeas. Indeed, in World War II cases, the D.C. Circuit considered non-habeas civil actions seeking “injunction, mandatory injunction and ancillary relief” against the application of the AEA. See Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F.2d 290, 291-92 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (addressing three consolidated actions on behalf of a nonprofit and 159 German nationals); see also Citizens Protective League v. Byrnes, 64 F. Supp. 233, 233 (D.D.C. 1946). And in Clark, although the government argued that one of the consolidated cases had to be brought in habeas, the district court “dismissed the complaints on the merits,” 155 F.2d at 292, and the court of appeals affirmed, id. at 293. And when Congress wants to specifically require that certain immigration claims are brought only in a habeas petition, it knows how to do so. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(e)(2) (providing for limited review of expedited removal orders “in habeas corpus proceedings”); id. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (stripping review “except as provided in subsection (e)”). Nothing in the AEA or elsewhere remotely requires Plaintiffs’ claims to be brought in habeas.
More generally, as this Court thoroughly explained, only “core” claims—those seeking release—must be brought in habeas; here, Plaintiffs are not seeking release. See Op. 16-18; see also, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 534 (2011) (Court has never “recognized habeas as the sole remedy, or even an available one, where the relief sought would ‘neither terminat[e] custody, accelerat[e] the future date of release from custody, nor reduc[e] the level of custody’”) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiffs can bring “noncore” habeas claims that do not seek release through other types of actions, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005), and the immediate custodian rule does not apply, see Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973). See also Davis v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 716 F.3d 660, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (considering action by individual incarcerated outside of the District because “victory would not secure his immediate release or even a reduction in his time served”).
Defendants ignore the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit’s long line of cases differentiating between “core” and “non-core” habeas claims and instead rely primarily on two cases to assert that venue must lie in the district of confinement. In LoBue v. Christopher, the D.C. Circuit held that plaintiffs challenging their extradition to Canada could not seek a declaratory judgment in this District but rather must pursue their challenge through their already-existing petition for habeas corpus. 82 F.3d 1081, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But extradition has its own specialized body of law. The LoBue plaintiffs had to seek habeas because there was no APA review available to them. Id. at 1083 (“extension of the APA to extradition orders is impossible” as the judges involved do not constitute an agency). The D.C. Circuit itself acknowledged that immigration cases were different from extradition cases since the Supreme Court’s decision in Pedreiro extended APA review over deportation orders. Id.; see also Op. 18. Additionally, LoBue rested on the unique circumstances in which the plaintiffs had a pending habeas petition in their district of confinement seeking release. The Court thus noted that because success in plaintiffs’ declaratory suit would have “preclusive effect” on their pending habeas petition, it would secure release from confinement, thereby precluding the availability of other remedies. 82 F.3d at 1083-844 (citing Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-90).
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), also does not help Defendants. There, the Supreme Court held only that U.S. citizens who had voluntarily traveled to Iraq could bring a habeas challenge seeking to prevent their transfer from the custody of an overseas task force to that of Iraqi authorities for prosecution. 553 U.S. at 680. But the Court never suggested that petitioners were limited to habeas, much less sought to disturb the longstanding general distinction between core and non-core habeas actions. The issue was instead whether the overseas petitioners were in U.S. custody for purposes of habeas jurisdiction. Id. at 689.
Finally, and in any event, the government’s suggestion that every individual, even those who are unrepresented (the overwhelming majority), could file an individual habeas is, at best, illusory. As demonstrated above, the government is not providing any advance notice of an individual’s designation as an alien enemy, let alone providing time to file a habeas action and obtain a stay of removal. The notice form that it may be using—which no Plaintiff has reported receiving—says there is no form of review available. Moreover, the government has complete control over where it detains and transfers people, and transfers of class members have occurred swiftly (and without notice to counsel in the few cases where there is counsel). The reality is that, if forced to pursue their claims in habeas, Plaintiffs will face insurmountable hurdles to obtaining judicial review over the lawfulness of Defendants’ actions. The government has already admitted as much. See J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-5067, 2025 WL 914682, at *30 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2025) (Millett, J., concurring) (“The government’s position at oral argument was that, the moment the district court TROs are lifted, it can immediately resume removal flights without affording Plaintiffs notice of the grounds for their removal or any opportunity to call a lawyer, let alone to file a writ of habeas corpus or obtain any review of their legal challenges to removal.”) See id. at 29 (Millett, J., concurring) (“Only a swift class action could preserve the Plaintiffs’ legal rights before the rushed removals mooted their cases and thrust them into a Salvadorean prison.”); 5 U.S.C. § 704.6
Second, there is no question the Court can review and enjoin the agency actions implementing the Proclamation. APA review is generally available to plaintiffs absent specific preclusion by Congress. See Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020) (“The APA establishes a ‘basic presumption of judicial review [for] one suffering legal wrong because of agency action.’”) (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)). Indeed, even as to detention claims, Congress “has never manifested an intent to require those challenging an unlawful, nationwide detention policy to seek relief through habeas rather than the APA.” Op. 15 (quoting R.I.L.-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 186 (D.C.C. 2015) (citation omitted)); see also Huisha-Huisha, 27 F.4th at 726 (APA challenge to use of public health law to expel noncitizens from the United States); Aracely, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 126 (“courts in this jurisdiction facing challenges to similar nation-wide immigration policies have rejected the notion that detainees must proceed through a habeas petition”). Plaintiffs can therefore seek review over Defendants’ implementation of the Proclamation as it qualifies as final agency actions consummating the agency’s decisionmaking process in a manner from which legal consequences flow. Op. 15 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)).
Lastly, there is similarly no question that this Court can review the lawfulness of presidential actions like the Proclamation and its implementation. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 675–76 (2018) (reviewing President’s authority under the INA to issue proclamation); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (reviewing President Carter’s executive order ending the Iranian hostage crisis); Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (reviewing constitutionality of President Truman’s executive orders); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (reviewing validity of an executive order issued by President Franklin Roosevelt under the National Industrial Recovery Act in action against officials of the Department of the Interior); see also Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) (“The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England.”); United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 173 (1977) (court can avail itself of auxiliary writs “when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it”). As noted in Mathis v. U.S. Parole Commission, “by default, federal courts have ‘jurisdiction in equity.’” 749 F.Supp.3d 8, 23 (D.D.C. 2024) (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)). “[T]he ‘full scope of [this] jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied,’” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398), “absent only ‘the clearest command’ otherwise in a statute,” id. (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 397 (2013)). There is not the remotest suggestion in the AEA that equitable power is precluded.
Thus, the Court can review Plaintiffs’ claims under the APA and in equity.7
II. The Court Can Reach the Merits of Plaintiffs’ Claims.
Plaintiffs raise three statutory arguments: (1) the AEA’s use of “invasion” and “predatory incursion” refer only to military action in the context of an actual or imminent war; (2) a criminal gang is not a “foreign nation or government” within the AEA; and, (3) even if the AEA applies, it requires (a) an opportunity to contest whether an individual falls within the Proclamation, (b) compliance with the INA and other later-enacted, more specific statutory protections for noncitizens, and (c) an opportunity to voluntarily depart the United States prior to any removal.
In prior filings, the government has not directly disputed that Plaintiffs’ third set of statutory claims is justiciable and has instead limited its arguments to Plaintiffs’ first two statutory claims. The government’s justiciability arguments are wrong. The AEA cases confirm that this Court can reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. More generally, the political question doctrine poses no bar to judicial review of the proper interpretation of statutes that constrain the executive branch.
A. The AEA Cases Confirm the Justiciability of Plaintiffs’ Claims.
As this Court has already correctly held, it can “construe the terms ‘nation,’ ‘government,’ ‘invasion,’ and ‘predatory incursion.’” Op. 22. In Ludecke v. Watkins, the Supreme Court emphasized that “resort to the courts” was available “to challenge the construction and validity of the statute,” explicitly noting that the AEA does not preclude judicial review of “questions of interpretation and constitutionality.” 335 U.S. 160, 163, 171 (1948). Those questions—the “construction” and “interpretation” of the AEA—are precisely what are at issue here. And not only did the Ludecke Court make that point twice, but Ludecke itself reached the merits of the statutory question presented there: whether a “declared war” no longer existed within the meaning of the Act when “actual hostilities” had ceased (the “shooting war” had ended). Id. at 166-70. Only after concluding, on the merits, that the statutory term “declared war” did not mean “actual hostilities,” but instead referred to the point at which the President and Congress “declared” the war over, did the Court state that its review had come to an end. Id. at 170 & n.15. In short, the “political judgment[]” that Ludecke declined to revisit, see id. at 170, was simply the decision of Congress and the President not to choose to formally declare the war over, see id. at 169, and not a question of statutory interpretation. Indeed, four years later, the Court reversed a government World War II removal decision because “[t]he statutory power of the Attorney General to remove petitioner as an enemy alien ended when Congress terminated the war.” U.S. ex rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347, 348 (1952).
Consistent with Ludecke’s recognition that questions about the “construction and validity” of the AEA are justiciable, 335 U.S. at 171, courts have reviewed a range of issues concerning the AEA’s statutory prerequisites. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Kessler v. Watkins, 163 F.2d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 1947) (interpreting the meaning of “foreign nation or government”); U.S. ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 858, 860–61 (2d Cir. 1943) (“[t]he meaning of [native, citizen, denizen, or subject] as used in the statute . . . presents a question of law”; interpreting meaning of “denizen” and remanding for hearing on disputed facts); U.S. ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 137, 138 (2d Cir. 1947) (interpreting the meaning of “native”; discussing alternatives to attain a “logically consistent construction of the statute”); U.S. ex rel. D’Esquiva v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 903, 905–07 (2d Cir. 1943) (interpreting the meaning of “native” and reviewing executive branch’s position on legal status of Austria); U.S. ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898, 903 (2d Cir. 1943) (interpreting the meaning of “citizen” and legal effects of Germany’s annexation of Austria); Bauer v. Watkins, 171 F.2d 492, 493 (2d Cir. 1948) (holding that the government bears the burden of proof of establishing the citizenship of “alien enemy”); Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F.2d 290, 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (reviewing whether Proclamation was within “the precise terms” of the AEA, and whether AEA was impliedly repealed); U.S. ex rel. Von Heymann v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1947) (interpreting “within the United States”; requiring executive branch to show that the petitioner “refuse[d] or neglect[ed] to depart” under Section 21); U.S. ex rel. Ludwig v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 456, 457 (2d Cir. 1947) (interpreting “refuse or neglect to depart” in Section 21 as creating a “right of voluntary departure” that functions as a “statutory condition precedent” to the government’s right to deport enemy aliens); U.S. ex rel. Hoehn v. Shaughnessy, 175 F.2d 116, 117–18 (2d Cir. 1949) (interpreting “reasonable time” to depart under Section 22).
The government has leaned heavily on Ludecke’s recognition that the AEA vests the President with broad authority to take extraordinary measures. But that is precisely why the statutory perquisites have always been, and must be, interpreted by the courts. Otherwise, the President can employ this authority without regard to the careful limits Congress expressly established in the statute. Notably, Congress did not write that this extraordinary power can be used when the President unilaterally deems there to be an invasion or incursion by a foreign government or nation, but rather, when there “is” such an event. 50 U.S.C. § 21.
The government points to language in the D.C. Circuit’s (pre-Ludecke decision) Citizens Protective League, 155 F.2d at 294, stating that the Act vests “[u]nreviewable power in the President to restrain, and to provide for the removal of, alien enemies in time of war.” Mot. to Vacate 3, 7–8, ECF No. 26 (emphasis added). But, if anything, that statement only underscores that the AEA’s activation is limited to times of actual war and does not remotely suggest that courts may not review whether the statutory predicates have been satisfied. Indeed, the court stated that it could review whether the Presidential Proclamation and Attorney General’s regulations came “within the precise terms” of the AEA. And the court held, on the merits, that “[t]he constitutional question raised by appellants was not substantial.” 155 F.2d at 294–95.
B. The Political Question Doctrine Does Not Apply.
General political question doctrine and caselaw likewise supports this Court’s ability to interpret the meaning of the statutory terms in the AEA. Particularly in recent decisions, the Supreme Court has emphasized that courts may review—and are duty-bound to interpret— statutory terms, even where they touch on national security and foreign affairs. Indeed, Plaintiffs are not aware of any Supreme Court decision that has found a statutory claim non-justiciable. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[t]he Supreme Court has never applied the political question doctrine in cases involving statutory claims” that “the Executive Branch violated congressionally enacted statutes that purportedly constrain the Executive.”).
Rather, the political question doctrine is a “narrow exception” to courts’ presumptive exercise of jurisdiction. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012). The doctrine “is primarily a function of the separation of powers,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962), and so the judiciary must act when the questions at issue fall within its own competence, see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Com. v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992) (“As our previous rejection of the political question doctrine in this context should make clear, the interpretation of the apportionment provisions of the Constitution is well within the competence of the Judiciary.”); Al- Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Policy choices are to be made by the political branches and purely legal issues are to be decided by the courts.”); Baker, 369 U.S. at 216 (courts “will not stand impotent before an obvious instance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of power”); see generally Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024) (emphasizing that “the final ‘interpretation of the laws’ [is] ‘the proper and peculiar province of the courts’”) (quoting The Federalist No. 78 at 525 (A. Hamilton)).
As this Court explained in its TRO decision, the fact that a legal claim implicates (or arguably implicates) foreign affairs or national security does not make it a non-justiciable political question. See Op. 20; cf. J.G.G., 2025 WL 914682, at *12-16 (Henderson, J., concurring); id. at *25-32 (Millet, J., concurring). In Zivotofsky, for instance, the Court held that statutory right to passport designation did not raise a political question, even though it implicated the diplomatic status of Jerusalem. 566 U.S. at 196-201. Likewise, in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a “purely legal question of statutory interpretation” should be held nonjusticiable merely because it “involve[d] foreign relations,” explaining that “interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts” and the case “call[ed] for applying no more than the traditional rules of statutory construction, and then applying this analysis to the particular set of facts presented below.” 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983) (rejecting argument that Congress’s plenary power over immigration renders all immigration-related arguments political questions); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 249 (1985) (similar for Congress’s power over Indian affairs). Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (noting that although “[t]he Executive has broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of aliens, . . . [i]t extends only as far as the statutory authority conferred by Congress, and stressing it is “the duty of the courts, in cases properly before them, to say where those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie”).
In short, the political question doctrine serves to reinforce the separation of powers. And it is especially critical for the judiciary to enforce the separation of powers when inter-branch disputes arise, such as where the executive violates or exceeds its authority under a statute. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 855 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Here, judicial review of Plaintiffs’ challenge preserves the separation of powers by ensuring that the President does not exceed the specific authority Congress delegated in the AEA. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637– 38 (Jackson, J., concurring). This Court thus rightly acknowledged that it can construe the terms “nation,” “government,” “invasion,” and “predatory incursion.” Op. 22.
This Court also noted that whether courts are empowered to decide if TdA’s characteristics or conduct satisfy the statutory terms presents a “harder” issue. Id. As shown below, however, the Proclamation, on its face, does not satisfy the AEA’s statutory predicates as properly understood. See infra (discussing merits). Consequently, even if this Court were to accept the Proclamation’s conclusory, vague findings, it could still hold that the Proclamation fails to satisfy the AEA. That would merely involve a straightforward application of law to accepted facts and would thus be a “familiar judicial exercise.” Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 196; see also Guerrero- Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 217 (2024) (“In Guerrero-Lasprilla, this Court held that the statutory phrase ‘questions of law’ includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts, also referred to as mixed questions of law and fact.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moreover, even if the Court concluded that the Proclamation’s findings, on their face, did establish that TdA is a “foreign government or nation” and that TdA was engaged in an “invasion or predatory incursion,” it would still have an independent obligation to examine the factual record on whether those terms were satisfied. See Op. 21 (explaining that the Ludecke Court “interpreted ‘declared war,’ defined its termination based on that construction, and decided as a factual matter whether such termination had occurred”). If courts were to simply accept any presidential findings, no matter how conclusory or unfounded, judicial review would be rendered an empty exercise, undermining Congress’s decision to place express limits on the executive branch. Thus, even during World War II, the courts examined the facts to ensure that the AEA’s statutory limits on presidential power were observed. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Kessler, 163 F.2d at 143 (reviewing petitioner’s factual contention that the German government had ceased to exist after it surrendered and thus was no longer a “foreign nation or government” under the AEA); U.S. ex rel. Zdunic, 137 F.2d at 860–61 (interpreting meaning of “denizen” under the AEA and remanding for hearing on disputed facts); United States ex rel. D’Esquiva, 137 F.3d at 905–07 (interpreting meaning of “native” under the AEA and reviewing the U.S. government’s full course of conduct to ascertain whether and when it had officially recognized Austria’s annexation by Germany; remanding for additional factfinding on this question); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality op.) (detention of Taliban combatants authorized by the AUMF only “[i]f the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan”) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added)); Al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d 294, 298–300 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Henderson, J.) (evaluating whether “active hostilities” continued under the AUMF; concluding that “[t]he record so manifests here”); Al Warafi v Obama, No. CV 09-2368 (RCL), 2015 WL 4600420 (D.D.C. July 30, 2015), order vacated as moot (Mar. 4, 2016); Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[A] court must determine whether the circumstances involve an act of war within the meaning of the statutory exception. That interpretive exercise, unlike with a non-justiciable political question, is what courts do.’”).
Even if this Court grants some deference to the executive branch’s determinations, that deference does not require the Court to rubber-stamp unsupported, vague, and conclusory allegations in the face of contrary evidence, such as the facts provided by Plaintiffs’ experts on TdA. “The Judicial Branch appropriately exercises” review “where the question is whether Congress or the Executive is ‘aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch.’” Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 197; cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). That is precisely what this case is about. And where the executive branch exceeds those boundaries, its conduct must be subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591, 635 (2006) (interpreting statutes limiting executive’s authority to convene military commissions; “in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the rule of law that prevails in this jurisdiction”).